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Summary and main conclusions
Recent budgetary developments
Public finances in the euro area and the EU posted a sig-
nificant improvement in 2006. In the group of 13 countries
adopting the single currency the headline deficit declined
to 1.6 % of GDP, down from 2.5 % of GDP in 2005.
Progress was slightly lower but still significant in the EU
as a whole, including the two new Member States Bul-
garia and Romania. Taken at face value the improvement
of the headline deficit was matched by an identical change
in the budget net of cyclical factors and one-off and other
temporary measures suggesting that the improvement was
completely structural. However, the estimates of the struc-
tural deficit are likely to be affected by specific features of
the prevailing economic and fiscal conditions. In 2006, the
improvement of government budget balances took place
against the background of a broad-based economic recov-
ery over the course of which the inflow of tax revenues
went clearly beyond normal rates. Since the buoyancy of
tax revenues may reflect both temporary and permanent
elements, the verdict is still out on the actual determinants
of the estimated improvement of the structural budget bal-
ance and an additional degree of caution is warranted in
reading the available estimates.
The projections for 2007 and 2008 remain favourable. The
euro area deficit is expected to drop to 1 % of GDP this year
and, based on the customary no-policy-change assumption,
to post a further slight decline the year after. A similar
though slightly flatter profile is projected in the EU as a
whole. Taking into account that economic conditions in
2007 are forecast to remain favourable the estimated budg-
etary adjustment in structural terms of 0.3 % of GDP in the
euro area and of 0.2 % of GDP in the EU as a whole falls
short of the provisions of the reformed Stability and Growth
Pact which asks Member States to do more than the 0.5 %
of GDP benchmark during economic ‘good times’.
Since spring 2006, the Commission and the Council took
had corrected their excessive deficits. The excessive defi-
cit procedure for Cyprus was abrogated in July 2006, for
France in January 2007, and for Germany, Greece and
Malta in May 2007, respectively. Furthermore, the Com-
mission and the Council considered that Poland had not
respected the recommendations formulated in line with
the recommendation under Article 104(7) of the Treaty.
As Poland is a Member State with derogation, the Council
issued another recommendation based on Article 104(7)
in February 2007. Similarly, in May 2007 the Commis-
sion recommended the Council to decide that the Czech
Republic had not taken adequate actions in response to the
Council recommendation under Article 104(7) of the
Treaty and to address a new recommendation under the
same article. Having already decided that Hungary had
not respected its recommendations in 2005, the Council
addressed the third recommendation under Article 104(7)
to Hungary in October 2006. Currently, seven EU coun-
tries are still subject to an excessive deficit procedure: two
euro area Member States — Italy and Portugal — the
United Kingdom, and four new Member States — the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Based on
the Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast and the
April 2007 notification by the government, Romania
plans a deficit of slightly above 3 % in 2007 and 2008.
Developments are being monitored and the Commission
will take appropriate measures in the coming weeks. 
In the context of the EU budgetary surveillance, the Com-
mission assessed the 2006/07 updates of the stability and
convergence programmes submitted by the 27 Member
States and proposed Council opinions on these docu-
ments. The picture emerging from the Commission
assessment and Council opinion highlights two distinct
trends. The first and encouraging trend relates to the budg-
etary plans of countries currently in excessive deficit. If
they are fully implemented all but two countries currently
in excessive deficit will have a budgetary position breach-
ing the 3 % of GDP threshold of the Treaty by 2008. The13
action on eight Member States concerning the excessive
deficit procedure. The Commission and the Council con-
sidered that Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece and Malta
second and less encouraging trend refers to Member
States where the deficit is below the 3 % of GDP thresh-
old. They do not seem to fully seize the opportunity pro-
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adjustment effort targeted in 2006–09 is somewhat back-
loaded with larger adjustments planned for the outer
years. In 2007, countries already at the medium-term
budgetary objective are estimated to loosen their fiscal
stance by on average ã of a percentage point. In the same
year, while planning a fiscal adjustment, Member States
which are not yet at the medium-term objective are on
average estimated to target an improvement in the struc-
tural budget balance of less than the 0.5 % of GDP bench-
mark indicated by the reformed Stability and Growth Pact.
In the coming decades, ageing populations are projected to
have a significant budgetary impact on public finances in
the EU challenging the long-term sustainability of public
finances. The assessment of the 2006/07 updates of the sta-
bility and convergence programmes coupled with the com-
mon long-term budgetary projections show that the fiscal
efforts made by a number of Member States are bearing
fruit; the improved structural budgetary position in 2006 in
the EU as a whole contributes to a reduction in the sustain-
ability gap. Nevertheless, a significant sustainability gap
remains in the euro area and the EU structural budget bal-
ance would have to be permanently improved by 3 % of
GDP so as to ensure the sustainability of public finances in
the long term. For a large majority of countries, achieving
the budgetary targets set down in the 2006/07 updates of
the stability and convergence programmes would signifi-
cantly reduce yet not close the sustainability gap. Hence, to
ensure progress towards more sustainable public finances,
structural reform measures, notably in the field of pensions
and healthcare are required. As regards the degree of risks
to public finance sustainability by country, the assessment
of the 2006/07 updates of the stability and convergence
programmes confirms the findings of the previous year.
Six Member States (the Czech Republic, Greece, Cyprus,
Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia), face a high risk with
regard to the long-term sustainability of public finances in
view of the budgetary impact of ageing populations. Ten
Member States (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and the United
Kingdom) are at medium risk and another nine countries
(Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Austria, Poland, Finland and Sweden) are at low risk.
Evolving budgetary surveillance
Following years in which budgetary surveillance largely
focused attention on the correction of excessive deficits,
trend of the government debt ratio has been reversed and,
based on current plans, most excessive deficits are going
to be corrected in the coming years.
In spite of these encouraging developments, recent expe-
rience also highlights a number of issues that need to be
addressed in order to secure current accomplishments and
in particular to make sure that Member States make rapid
progress towards achieving sustainable budgetary posi-
tions in order to be prepared for the budgetary impact of
ageing populations. In a number of countries the decline
of the structural budget deficit recorded in 2006 signifi-
cantly benefited from better-than-expected tax revenues,
which were partly used to offset slippages on the expend-
iture side of the budget. Hence, revenue windfalls have
not been fully used for budgetary adjustment; a part has
been spent. A similar pattern is projected to prevail in
2007, when as mentioned before the projected improve-
ment in the structural budget balance for the euro area and
the EU as a whole falls short of the benchmark of 0.5 % of
GDP required by the reformed Stability and Growth Pact. 
With a view to avoiding mistakes of the past, the challenge
ahead is to ensure an effective functioning of the preven-
tive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact. As regards coor-
dination, one important element consists in discussing and
assessing at an early stage national fiscal policy intentions
at the EU level so as to possibly shape the national debate
before budget plans are fixed. One way to make progress
towards this objective is to strengthen the mid-term budg-
etary review along the lines indicated by the Eurogroup in
November 2006. The idea is to transform the mid-term
budgetary review, which takes place each year after the
presentation of the updated stability and convergence pro-
grammes ahead of the next round of budgetary planning,
into a more effective strategic policy debate. The main
innovations of the ongoing revamp refer to the timing of
the procedure and the level of commitment by the Member
States. The review is redesigned to better fit the national
budgetary calendars and Member States are invited to for-
ward any information on their main plans for fiscal policy
in the coming year. With a view to strengthening the results
and the impact of the review, the Eurogroup also plans to
endorse policy conclusions which should serve as guid-
ance for the national fiscal policymaking.
A second major avenue to be pursued in the future consists
in strengthening national budgetary procedures and to better
link them to the EU budgetary surveillance framework. The14
public finances in the EU are clearly improving. On the
back of both a broad-based economic recovery and adjust-
ments of the underlying budgetary positions, the upward
focus on budgetary procedures complements the work on
national fiscal rules and institutions which was at the centre
of last year’s Public Finance Report and which echoed the
S u m m a r y  a n d  m a i n  C o n c l u s i o nCouncil report of March 2005 underpinning the reformed
Stability and Growth Pact stating that ‘domestic governance
arrangements should complement the EU framework’.
Based on past experience, the failure to achieve medium-
term budgetary objectives can also be related to weak
arrangements ensuring the effective preparation, legislation
and the implementation of budgetary targets that go beyond
the annual budget cycle. The range of national practices is
very broad. In some countries, developed national medium-
term frameworks were introduced in the past and are work-
ing well; in others the ‘only’ instrument placing fiscal policy
into a multiannual context is the stability and convergence
programme, where the latter is not necessarily well inte-
grated with national procedures. In a bid to highlight the
importance of the quality of budgetary procedures for the
functioning of the preventive arm of the Pact this year’s
report attempts a first panoramic overview of the prevailing
landscape of budgetary procedures in the EU Member
States. It also touches upon some specific elements such as
medium-term budgetary frameworks showing that well-
defined arrangements embedding budgetary planning in a
multiannual context are a promising way forward to ensure
compliance with medium-term budgetary targets.
One of the distinctive features of the reformed Stability
and Growth Pact is its enhanced economic rationale. In the
preventive arm of the Pact this is reflected in requirements
for fiscal adjustment that explicitly take into account eco-
nomic conditions as well as other factors. In the past two
years, work was carried out to find operational definitions
of a number of concepts such as economic ‘good times’
and one-off measures that play a key role in the EU budg-
etary surveillance. On top of this, the current juncture
underlines the scope for improving the current toolset for
measuring the underlying fiscal position of Member
States. In many EU Member States the present economic
recovery goes along with higher-than-expected revenue
inflows and calls for improved indicators that allow for a
clearer view about which part of the budget balances can
be considered purely temporary and whether higher tax-
to-GDP ratios are purely temporary or more permanent.
The structural budget balance, i.e. the budget balance net
of cyclical factors and one-off and other temporary meas-
ures, which is the main indicator to assess the underlying
budgetary position in the EU budgetary framework, has
proved its usefulness over the years but needs to be
upgraded or complemented to safeguard its effectiveness
also in specific economic circumstances. Two interlinked
issues are of particular importance: the appraisal of cycli-
identified. The next step consists in translating current
findings and insights in practical improvements of the cur-
rent toolset used in the EU budgetary surveillance.
The benefits of sound fiscal policy could be better com-
municated if fiscal surveillance was placed into a broader
economic perspective, including the context of the
renewed Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs. The assess-
ment of fiscal policy developments could notably take
greater account of the overall macroeconomic situation in
the Member States. Particular attention could be given to
internal and external imbalances which may mask poten-
tial risks to sustainable economic development and in turn
to sustainable public finances.
Giving more attention in the surveillance of budgetary
positions to debt and long-term sustainability of public
finances was one of the main areas for improvement
identified in the 2005 Council report underpinning the
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. Since then a
number of important steps have been taken. The work on
common long-term budgetary projections carried out
jointly by the Member States and the Commission serv-
ices and, based on those projections, the first sustainabil-
ity report adopted by the Commission at the end of 2006
are cases in point. The next major update of the common
long-term projections and in turn of the sustainability
report is planned for 2009. In that context, a number of
potential improvements are envisaged so as to provide
further insight in the budgetary impact of ageing.
Analytical sections
How to stick to medium-term budgetary plans
One of the key goals of the Stability and Growth Pact is to
place fiscal policy into a multiannual framework by
requiring Member States to aim for a sound budgetary
position in the medium term. So far the track record of a
number of Member States in achieving medium-term tar-
gets has been mixed. In many cases, medium-term plans
rather than acting as a point of reference across years
turned into moving targets. Slippages from short-term
objectives were followed by a revision of the entire adjust-
ment path, in particular of the year in which the medium-
term objective was expected to be achieved. The issue of
why Member States conspicuously missed their medium-
term objectives in the past has been addressed from many
different angles, especially ahead of the reform of the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact in March 2005. The debate is gain-15
cal conditions in real time and the assessment of tax reve-
nues. Work is ongoing on both issues and possible ways
to overcome current limitations on both counts have been
ing renewed importance because, as mentioned before, the
focus is shifting from the corrective to the preventive arm
of the Pact. After the correction of most excessive deficits,
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in ensuring a rapid and consistent progress towards sound
budgetary positions in the medium term. 
Part III of this report focuses on the question of why some
EU Member States were more successful in achieving
medium-term budgetary targets than others. The main aim
is to identify the elements in the set up of national fiscal
policymaking that allow Member States to stick to a prede-
fined course of action over a number of years. Particular
attention is given to the role played by well-defined
medium-term budgetary frameworks. The basis of the
analysis is a comprehensive review of past experience,
which highlights the reasons for the difficulties to respect
medium-term budgetary targets. The comparison of plans
versus outcomes points to a number of revealing patterns.
The typical adjustment path laid out in the stability and
convergence programmes was expenditure based on top of
an improvement of the budget balance which aimed at
reducing the revenue-to-GDP ratio. In about two thirds of
the cases, the planned improvement in the budget balance
was missed mostly because of expenditure overruns, and to
a lesser extent due to negative growth surprises. As regards
the factors explaining the size of the expenditure overruns
the main results of the analysis refer to the institutions for
medium-term budgetary planning. In particular, the capac-
ity to achieve multiannual expenditure targets turns out to
be systematically linked to the quality of such institutions.
In the light of these findings the implementation or
strengthening of adequate medium-term budgetary frame-
works in the EU Member States seems to be a promising
avenue towards a better compliance with medium-term
budgetary targets. As a sort of guidance, the key conditions
for the effectiveness of medium-term budgetary frame-
work are discussed, notably cautious macroeconomic
assumptions and the credibility of budgetary objectives.
Lessons from successful fiscal 
consolidations
The correction of strained fiscal positions is a recurring fea-
ture of public finances, where, by experience, some types of
adjustment give rise to a more lasting correction than others.
The second analytical section of this report presents the
results of a comprehensive review of the episode of fiscal
consolidation carried out in the EU since 1970. The main aim
of the review is to re-examine the factors that lead to a more
lasting improvement of the underlying budgetary position.
found to be more likely to be successful than corrections
relying on higher revenues or cuts in investment expendi-
ture. Our analysis substantiates this ‘received wisdom’ for
the entire sample period 1970 and 2006, but points to some
qualifications as regards the 1990s and beyond. In the latter
period, cutting primary expenditure is still found to have
had a positive impact on the likelihood of success however
the link has grown weaker. Successful corrections were
increasingly characterised by across-the-board savings of
primary expenditure while unsuccessful episodes became
somewhat more expenditure based than in the 1970s and
1980s. As a result, the likelihood of success was somewhat
less determined by the composition of adjustment per se.
Other factors that helped safeguard expenditure cuts or
revenue increases are likely to have gained importance.
Two prominent examples of such other factors are fiscal
governance and structural reforms. Starting with fiscal
governance, our analysis indicates that the likelihood of
success significantly increases with the strength and cov-
erage of fiscal rules; the same holds for the effectiveness
of budgetary procedures. While the exact mechanisms
still need to be determined, the link between fiscal govern-
ance and lasting fiscal corrections is likely to work via at
least two different channels. Firstly, comprehensive and
strong fiscal rules favour discipline-oriented budgets.
They provide incentives to draw up adjustments that stand
a larger chance to be sustainable, not least in view of the
possible costs associated with the risk of running afoul of
the rules. Secondly, effective budgetary procedures
favour good planning, a balanced composition and an
effective implementation of consolidation measures as
opposed to a situation in which measures are planned over
a short period of time and in an uncoordinated way.
The EU experience also supports the conclusion that the
success of fiscal consolidation increases significantly if
they are coupled with structural reforms. We find a signif-
icant link for different types of reforms including those
focusing on product and labour markets. This result cor-
roborates potential complementarities between the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact and the Lisbon process for growth
and jobs. Our analysis does not detail the precise channels
through which structural reforms help fiscal consolida-
tion. Further work is needed to clarify the relationship.
However, the favourable impact of structural reforms on
the success rate of fiscal consolidation, especially of
labour market reforms, does not come as a complete sur-
prise. The empirical literature on fiscal consolidation16
The findings established in the literature have so far been
relatively clear: expenditure-based adjustments, in particu-
lar those involving cuts in the government wage bill, were
includes many references to potentially beneficial feed-
back mechanisms between reforms that contribute to
wage moderation and fiscal adjustment.
Part I
Current developments and prospects
Summary
In 2006, the budgetary position in the euro area and the
EU improved significantly compared to the previous
year. The headline deficit declined to 1.6 % of GDP in
the euro area, down from 2.5 % of GDP, and to 1.7 % of
GDP in the EU as a whole, down from 2.4 % of GDP.
The budgetary improvement took place against better-
than-expected economic growth performance and
higher-than-expected revenues.
Taken at face value, the improvement in the headline
deficit was matched by an equal improvement in the
budget balance net of cyclical factors and one-off and
other temporary measures suggesting that the improve-
ment was completely structural.
However, the estimates of the structural deficit are likely
to be affected by the exceptionally high tax content of eco-
nomic activity. In 2006, the current tax burden posted the
strongest annual increase in 10 years in both the euro area
and the EU. Since the buoyancy of tax revenues may
reflect both permanent and temporary factors, the verdict
is still out on the actual determinants of the estimated
improvement of the structural budget balance in 2006.
In the euro area, the largest improvements in both, nom-
inal and structural terms were recorded in Germany,
Greece and Portugal. The headline deficit increased in
Italy, mainly on the back of temporary effects. Net of
one-offs the deficit remains on a downward path. Out-
side the euro area three out of six excessive deficit coun-
tries, notably the Czech Republic, Malta and the UK
brought the budget deficits below the 3 % of GDP refer-
ence value of the Treaty. In the case of the Czech Repub-
lic the decline is forecast to be only temporary.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2007
forecast, the deficit of the euro area and EU is expected
to decline further in 2007 and, based on the no-policy-
the estimated improvement of the structural balance falls
short of the 0.5 % of GDP benchmark of the reformed
SGP. As regards the countries in excessive deficit, Italy
and Slovakia are forecast to bring the headline deficit
below the 3 % of GDP reference value in 2007. In the
same year, the nominal deficit is expected to return
above the 3 % of GDP reference value in the Czech
Republic, and to stay above the reference value in 2008,
unless further measures are taken. The deficit is forecast
to decline but to stay above 3 % of GDP in Hungary and
Poland. Additional measures will be needed to correct
the excessive deficit in Portugal by 2008.
Among the euro-area countries with relatively high struc-
tural deficits, improvements are expected in Greece,
France and Portugal over the forecast period. Outside the
euro area, most of the countries are expected to see a wors-
ening or no changes in the structural balance. The most
significant worsening is expected in the Czech Republic
and Romania. The countries where the structural balance
is expected to improve over the forecast period are
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
In 2006, the debt-to-GDP ratio in the euro area and the
EU returned to a declining path. Further reductions are
expected in 2007 and 2008 on the back of sustained eco-
nomic growth and projected improvement in the primary
budget balance. The debt ratio of the euro area is
expected to fall from 69.0 % of GDP in 2006 to 65.0 %
of GDP in 2008. In the EU as a whole, the debt-to-GDP
ratio is expected to fall from 61.7 % of GDP in 2006 to
58.3 % of GDP in 2008. As regards the high debt coun-
tries, the GDP debt ratio is expected to decline but to
remain well above 60 % of GDP in Belgium, Greece,
and in Italy. As of 2008, Italy is projected to be the only
Member State with a debt-to-GDP ratio above 100 % of
GDP. In Austria, the debt ratio is forecast to fall below
the 60 % of GDP reference in 2008.18
change assumption, also in 2008. Compared to 2006, the
composition of adjustment is projected to shift from the
revenue to the expenditure side of the budget. In 2007,
Since spring 2006, the Commission and the Council took
action on eight Member States concerning the excessive
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considered that Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece and
Malta had corrected their excessive deficits. The excessive
deficit procedure for Cyprus was abrogated in July 2006,
for France in January 2007, and for Germany, Greece and
Malta in June 2007, respectively. Furthermore, the Com-
mission and the Council considered that Poland had not
respected the recommendations formulated in line with the
recommendation under Article 104(7) and issued another
recommendation based on the same article of the Treaty in
February 2007. Similarly, in May 2007 the Commission
recommended the Council to decide that the Czech Repub-
lic had not taken adequate actions in response to the Coun-
cil recommendation under Article 104(7) of the Treaty and
to address a new recommendation under the same article.
Having already decided that Hungary had not respected its
recommendations in 2005, the Council addressed the third
recommendation based on Article 104(7) to Hungary in
October 2006. Currently, seven EU countries are subject to
an excessive deficit procedure: two euro area Member
States — Italy and Portugal — the United Kingdom, and
four recently acceded Member States — the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Following information
that Romania is planning a deficit of more than 3 % of
GDP in 2007 and beyond, the Commission will take the
appropriate steps in the coming weeks.
In the context of the EU budgetary surveillance, the Com-
mission assessed the 2006/07 updates of the stability and
convergence programmes submitted by the 27 Member
States and proposed Council opinions on these docu-
ments. The picture emerging from the Commission
assessment and Council opinion highlights two distinct
trends. The first and encouraging trend relates to the budg-
etary plans of countries the deficit of which still exceeds
the 3 % of GDP threshold of the Treaty. If budgetary tar-
gets are fully implemented, all but the Czech Republic and
Hungary will have corrected excessive deficit by 2008.
The second and less encouraging trend refers to countries
with deficits below the 3 % of GDP threshold, which do
not seem to seize the opportunity provided by the cur-
rently favourable economic outlook. The overall adjust-
ment effort targeted in 2006–09 is somewhat back-loaded
with larger adjustments planned in the outer years. In
2007, countries already at the medium-term budgetary
objective are projected to loosen their fiscal stance by on
average ã of a percentage point. In the same year, while
budget balance of less than the 0.5 % of GDP benchmark
indicated by the reformed Stability and Growth Pact.
Compared to the previous rounds of programme updates,
according to the 2006/07 vintage, most Member States
plan faster reduction in government debt-to-GDP ratio
over the programme period. A number of countries plan
their debt ratios to decline below the 60 % of GDP refer-
ence value over the programme period: in the euro area,
France and Austria and, outside the euro area, Cyprus
and Malta. In Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hun-
gary and Portugal the debt ratios are expected to stay
above the 60 % of GDP reference value. In Hungary, the
debt ratio is planned to be above its current level at the
end of the programme period.
In the coming decades, ageing populations will have a
significant budgetary impact on public finances in the
EU, challenging the long-term sustainability of public
finances. The assessment of the 2006/07 updates of the
stability and convergence programmes coupled with the
long-term budgetary projections produced jointly by the
Commission and the Economic Policy Committee of the
Council show that the fiscal efforts made by a number of
Member States are bearing fruit. The improved struc-
tural budgetary position in 2006 in the EU as a whole
contributes to a reduction in the sustainability gap. Nev-
ertheless, a significant sustainability gap remains. In the
euro area and the EU the structural budget balance would
have to be permanently improved by 3 % of GDP to
ensure the sustainability of public finances in the long
term. For a large majority of countries, achieving the
budgetary targets set in the 2006/07 updates of the stabil-
ity and convergence programmes would significantly
reduce but not close the sustainability gap. Hence, to
ensure progress towards more sustainable public
finances, structural reform measures, notably in the field
of pensions and healthcare are required. As regards the
degree of risks to public finance sustainability by coun-
try, the assessment of the 2006/07 updates of the stability
and convergence programmes confirms the findings of
the previous year. Six Member States (the Czech Repub-
lic, Greece, Cyprus, Hungary, Portugal and Slovenia),
face a high risk with regard to the long-term sustainabil-
ity of public finances in view of the budgetary impact of
ageing populations. Ten Member States (Belgium, Ger-
many, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Slovakia and the UK) are at medium risk and another19
planning a fiscal adjustment, Member States which are not
yet at the medium-term budgetary objective are on aver-
age estimated to target an improvement in the structural
nine countries (Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Finland and Sweden) are
at low risk.
1. Budgetary developments in the euro area 
and the EU Member States
1.1. Short-term developments 
and prospects for the budget balance 
and public debt
In 2006, the budgetary position of the euro area
improved for the third year running, recording a particu-
larly significant progress compared to 2005. The nomi-
nal deficit reached 1.6 % of GDP, down from 2.5 % of
GDP in 2005. A slightly more moderate, but still sizea-
ble improvement took place in the EU as a whole, where
the headline deficit declined by 0.7 percentage point
reaching 1.7 % of GDP in 2006.
In both the euro area and the EU the improvement in the
headline deficit was matched by an equal improvement of
the structural budget balance, i.e. the budget balance net of
cyclical factors and one-off and other temporary meas-
ures. Taken at face value this result would seem to suggest
that the improvement in the headline deficit was fully
structural or permanent. However, at the current juncture
the estimates of the structural budget balance are likely to
be affected by the exceptional buoyancy of tax revenues.
In 2006, the current tax burden measuring the incidence of
current taxes on GDP was 0.8 percentage point higher
than in the year before in both the euro area and the EU,
posting the strongest annual increase in 10 years. The
increase in the tax burden in 2006 surpassed the readings
observed at the end of the 1990s when tax revenues bene-
fited from a number of positive developments such as
strong consumption growth and an asset price boom. In
the light of this, and taking into account that few countries
implemented discretionary revenue increasing measures
in the 2006 budget, it is likely that at least part of the esti-
mated structural improvement is temporary.
The decline of the headline deficit in the euro area in 2006
budget balance is in the red, progress was particularly
sizeable in Greece, where the deficit fell by 2.9 percentage
points including 0.6 percentage point of one-off measures,
as well as in Portugal and Germany. Greece and Germany
succeeded in bringing the deficit below the 3 % of GDP
reference value of the Treaty in 2006 and joined France
which had achieved it the year before.
In Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the defi-
cit turned into a small surplus. In the case of Belgium this
was achieved thanks to sizeable temporary measures.
The only euro-area country with a government deficit
where the budgetary situation worsened is Italy. How-
ever, excluding the impact of deficit-increasing one-offs
worth around 1.2 percentage points of GDP the deficit
remained on a downward path.
The three euro-area members with a surplus in 2005,
notably Ireland, Spain and Finland, managed to further
improve the budget position in 2006.
Favourable growth conditions coupled with buoyant tax
revenues had a positive impact also outside the euro area.
Relative to 2005, the budgetary position weakened in just
four out of 14 Member States that did not adopt the single
currency. The most serious deterioration was recorded in
Hungary where the deficit widened from 7.8 % of GDP in
2005 to 9.2 % of GDP in 2006. In Slovakia, the deficit
returned above the 3 % of GDP threshold of the Treaty in
2006 after it had edged below the threshold the year
before. By contrast, there are three non-euro-area coun-
tries, the Czech Republic, Malta and the United Kingdom,
where the budget deficit dropped below the 3 % of GDP
reference value. In the case of the Czech Republic the
progress is expected to be temporary.
Looking ahead to 2007 and 2008, public finance devel-20
reflects a broad-based trend across countries. All Member
States recorded a more or less significant improvement in
the budget balance. Starting with countries where the
opments in the euro area and the EU are expected to fall
in a period of marginally slowing but still sustained eco-
nomic growth. The Commission services’ spring 2007
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compared to 2.7 % in 2006, and to stage a further
increase of 2.5 % in 2008.
Against this favourable backdrop, the public finance situa-
tion in the euro area is expected to further improve this year
and the next, yet at a slower pace compared to 2006. The
aggregate deficit of the 13 Member States adopting the sin-
gle currency is expected to reach 1.0 % of GDP in 2007, 0.6
percentage point lower than the year before. Based on the
customary no-policy-change assumption a further rather
marginal improvement to 0.8 % of GDP is projected in
2008. Broadly the same profile is projected for the EU as a
whole. The deficit is forecast to decline to 1.2 % of GDP in
2007, from 2.4 % in 2006, and to 1.0 % of GDP in 2008.
In structural terms, i.e. net of cyclical factors and one-off
and other temporary measures, the projected improve-
ment in both the euro area and the EU in 2007 is somewhat
lower than that of the headline figure in view of the
expected narrowing of the output gap. In particular, the
structural balance is estimated to improve by only 0.3 %
of GDP in the euro area and by 0.2 % of GDP in the EU
as a whole. This is less than the 0.5 % of GDP benchmark
required by the reformed Stability and Growth Pact.
As regards individual euro-area countries, Italy is fore-
cast to reduce the headline deficit below the 3 % of GDP
reference value in 2007, whereas further measures are
required to achieve the same results by 2008 in Portugal.
A relatively mixed pattern is forecast for the other euro-
area countries. Further significant progress is expected in
Germany where the deficit is likely to decline to 0.6 % of
GDP in 2007, and, at unchanged policies, to 0.3 % of GDP
in 2008. A significantly flatter downward trend is projected
in France. The budgetary position is expected to weaken
somewhat in Belgium, where the balance is forecast to
move back into the red, as well as in Ireland, Spain and Fin-
land which are forecast to reduce their budgetary surplus.
The group of euro-area countries that have already
achieved their medium-term budgetary objective (MTO),
notably Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
Finland, is expected to remain unchanged over the period
covered by the Commission services spring 2007 forecast.
Among the Member States outside the euro area, the
nominal deficit is projected to stay or return above the
3 % of GDP reference value in Hungary, the Czech
Republic and Poland. The budget deficit in Hungary is
projected to improve over the forecast horizon but to stay
well above the 3 % of GDP threshold by the end of 2008.
Similarly, in Poland, the deficit is forecast to ease from
3.9 % of GDP in 2006 to 3.3 % of GDP in 2008. Follow-
ing an improvement in 2006, the deficit in the Czech
Republic is expected to return above the 3 % of GDP ref-
erence value throughout the forecast period. Slovakia is
the only non-euro-area country with an excessive deficit
where the budget balance is expected to drop just below
the 3 % of GDP reference value in 2007 and to essen-
Table I.1.1
Euro area — The general government budget balance (% of GDP)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (1) 44.8 45.1 45.7 45.5 45.4
Total expenditure (2) 47.6 47.6 47.3 46.5 46.2
Actual balance (3) = (1) – (2) – 2.8 – 2.5 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 0.8
Interest (4) 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8
Primary balance (5) = (3) + (4) 0.3 0.5 1.3 1.9 2.0
One-offs (6) 0.3 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.0
Cyclically adjusted  balance (7) – 2.4 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.7
Cyclically adj. prim. balance = (7) + (4)   0.7 1.1 1.7 2.1 2.2
Structural budget balance = (7) – (6) – 2.8 – 2.0 – 1.1 – 0.8 – 0.7
Change in actual balance: 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.2
              —  Cycle – 0.1 – 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1
              —  Interest 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1
              —  Cycl. adj. prim. balance 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.1
              —  One-offs – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.3 0.1 0.0
              —  Structural budget balance 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.121
NB: Differences between totals and sum of individual items are due to rounding.
Source: Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
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the information available at the cut-off date of this
report, Romania is forecast to breach the 3 % of GDP
deficit threshold in 2007 and 2008.
Among the remaining Member States outside the euro
area, relatively comfortable surpluses are expected to be
maintained throughout the forecast period in Bulgaria,
Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Sweden. As regards the
position vis-à-vis the MTOs the Commission services’
spring 2007 forecast implies no change in the number of
non-euro-area countries in 2007.
Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania and Sweden are
all expected to keep their budgetary positions in line with
or above the MTO, in some cases despite a projected
deterioration in the structural balance. Unless further
measures are taken, the compliance with the MTOs is
likely to remain unchanged also in 2008.
Turning to government debt, in the euro area the ratio
with respect to GDP declined to 69.0 % in 2006. Accord-
ing to the Commission services’ spring 2007 forecasts,
the debt ratio is projected to decline to 65.0 % of GDP in
2008. Primary surpluses coupled with a positive contri-
bution from interest expenditure and economic growth
are expected to more than offset the effect of debt-
increasing stock-flow adjustment.
In the EU as a whole, the debt ratio stood at 61.7 % of
GDP in 2006 and is projected to decline to 58.3 % of
Table I.1.2
Budget balances in EU Member States (% of GDP)
Budget balance Structural balance Structural primary balance
2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE – 2.3 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.1 4.5 3.7 3.8 3.9
DE – 3.2 – 1.7 – 0.6 – 0.3 – 2.4 – 1.5 – 0.8 – 0.7 0.3 1.3 2.0 2.0
IE 1.0 2.9 1.5 1.0 0.8 3.0 1.8 1.6 1.9 4.0 2.9 2.6
EL – 5.5 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.7 – 6.1 – 3.9 – 3.6 – 3.4 – 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.8
ES 1.1 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.6 2.3 1.8 1.7 3.4 3.9 3.4 3.2
FR – 3.0 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.9 – 3.2 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 1.5 – 0.6 0.2 0.5 1.0
IT – 4.2 – 4.4 – 2.1 – 2.2 – 3.9 – 2.6 – 1.6 – 1.8 0.6 2.0 3.1 2.9
LU – 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.2 0.6 0.8 1.0
NL – 0.3 0.6 – 0.7 0.0 0.7 1.1 – 0.4 0.1 3.1 3.4 1.7 2.1
AT – 1.6 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.8 – 1.1 – 1.0 – 1.1 – 1.2 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4
PT – 6.1 – 3.9 – 3.5 – 3.2 – 5.0 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 0.1 0.2 0.3
SI – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.7 – 1.7 0.6 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.3
FI 2.7 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.6 5.1 5.1 4.9 5.0
EU-13 – 2.5 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 2.0 – 1.1 – 0.8 – 0.7 1.0 1.8 2.1 2.2
BG 1.9 3.3 2.0 2.0 1.3 2.8 1.6 1.8 2.9 4.1 2.8 2.9
CZ – 3.5 – 2.9 – 3.9 – 3.6 – 2.0 – 2.8 – 4.1 – 3.8 – 0.9 – 1.7 – 3.0 – 2.8
DK 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.6 4.8 3.7 3.3 3.8 6.6 5.3 4.7 5.0
EE 2.3 3.8 3.7 3.5 2.4 3.3 3.5 3.8 2.6 3.4 3.6 3.9
CY – 2.3 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.4 – 2.8 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.1 0.7 2.1 2.1 2.0
LV – 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 – 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.8
LT – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 1.0 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 1.0 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 – 0.2
HU – 7.8 – 9.2 – 6.8 – 4.9 – 8.4 – 9.4 – 6.1 – 4.6 – 4.3 – 5.5 – 1.9 – 0.7
MT – 3.1 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 1.6 – 3.8 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 1.6 0.0 1.0 0.8 1.7
PL – 4.3 – 3.9 – 3.4 – 3.3 – 4.2 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 3.3 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.0 – 0.7
RO – 1.4 – 1.9 – 3.2 – 3.2 – 1.2 – 2.2 – 3.5 – 3.3 – 0.1 – 1.4 – 2.8 – 2.5
SK – 2.8 – 3.4 – 2.9 – 2.8 – 1.2 – 3.3 – 3.4 – 3.3 0.4 – 1.9 – 2.0 – 2.0
SE 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6
UK – 3.1 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 3.2 – 2.6 – 2.5 – 2.1 – 1.1 – 0.6 – 0.4 0.0
EU-27 – 2.4 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 2.0 – 1.3 – 1.1 – 0.9 0.7 1.3 1.5 1.722
NB: The structural budget balance is calculated on the basis of the commonly agreed production function method (see European 
Commission, 2004).
Source: Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
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positive contribution from the primary balance and the
contribution from interest expenditure and economic
growth will more than offset the effect of debt-increas-
ing stock-flow adjustments.
Aggregate figures tend to mask diverging developments at
the country level. In 2006, Greece and Italy continued to
have debt ratios above 100 % of GDP, however by 2008
Greece is expected to reduce its debt ratio to below that
value. In Belgium the government debt remained on a
steady downward path. It fell below 90 % of GDP in 2006
and is expected to be at 82 % of GDP by 2008. Among the
other countries with debt ratios above the 60 % of GDP
threshold, notably Germany, France, Cyprus, Hungary,
Malta, Austria and Portugal, only Cyprus and Austria are
forecast to reduce their debt ratios below the reference
value of the Treaty by 2008 without additional measures.
In Hungary and Portugal the debt ratio is projected on an
upward path over the forecast period.
1.2. Government revenue and expenditure
In 2006, the observed improvement in budgetary positions
was chiefly the result of higher revenues. The overall
Table I.1.3
Composition of changes in the government debt ratio in EU Member States (% of GDP)
Gross debt Change in gross debt Change in 2006–08 due to
2005 2006 2007 2008 2006–08 Primary balance
Interest and 
growth 
contribution
Stock-flow 
adjustment
BE 93.2 89.1 85.6 82.6 – 6.5 – 7.3 0.4 0.5
DE 67.9 67.9 65.4 63.6 – 4.3 – 4.7 0.7 – 0.3
IE 27.4 24.9 23.0 21.7 – 3.2 – 4.5 – 1.3 2.6
EL 107.5 104.6 100.9 97.6 – 7.1 – 3.5 – 4.9 1.4
ES 43.2 39.9 37.0 34.6 – 5.2 – 5.7 – 1.7 2.2
FR 66.2 63.9 62.9 61.9 – 2.0 – 0.6 – 0.2 – 1.2
IT 106.2 106.8 105.0 103.1 – 3.7 – 5.2 1.3 0.1
LU 6.1 6.8 6.7 6.0 – 0.8 – 1.4 – 0.8 1.3
NL 52.7 48.7 47.7 45.9 – 2.8 – 3.6 – 0.1 0.8
AT 63.5 62.2 60.6 59.2 – 3.0 – 3.5 – 0.1 0.6
PT 63.6 64.7 65.4 65.8 1.0 0.8 0.2 0.0
SI 28.4 27.8 27.5 27.2 – 0.6 0.2 – 0.9 0.1
FI 41.4 39.1 37.0 35.2 – 4.0 – 10.0 – 0.6 6.7
EU-13 70.5 69.0 66.9 65.0 – 3.9 – 4.0 – 0.2 0.3
BG 29.2 22.8 20.9 19.0 – 3.8 – 6.2 – 1.9 4.3
CZ 30.4 30.4 30.6 30.9 0.6 5.5 – 2.1 – 2.8
DK 36.3 30.2 25.0 20.0 – 10.2 – 9.8 – 0.2 – 0.3
EE 4.4 4.1 2.7 2.3 – 1.8 – 7.5 – 0.8 6.4
CY 69.2 65.3 61.5 54.8 – 10.5 – 3.5 – 1.2 – 5.8
LV 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.7 – 3.3 – 1.0 – 2.3 0.0
LT 18.6 18.2 18.6 19.9 1.7 0.1 – 2.5 4.2
HU 61.7 66.0 67.1 68.1 2.1 3.7 – 1.1 – 0.5
MT 72.4 66.5 65.9 64.3 – 2.2 – 2.9 0.0 0.7
PL 47.1 47.8 48.4 49.1 1.3 1.6 – 2.2 1.9
RO 15.8 12.4 12.8 13.1 0.6 4.9 – 2.0 – 2.3
SK 34.5 30.7 29.7 29.4 – 1.3 3.1 – 3.1 – 1.3
SE 52.2 46.9 42.1 37.7 – 9.2 – 8.1 – 1.4 0.3
UK 42.2 43.5 44.0 44.5 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.3
EU-27 62.9 61.7 59.9 58.3 – 3.4 – 3.0 – 0.8 0.423
NB: Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding.
Source: Commission services’  spring 2007 forecast.
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area and of 0.7 % in the EU as a whole was two-thirds rev-
enue and only one-third expenditure based (see Table I.1.4).
At the level of individual revenue items, the single most
important contribution came from taxes on income and
wealth which compared to 2005 increased by 0.6 % of GDP
in both the euro area and the EU, thanks to a particularly
buoyant inflow of corporate income taxes. The decline in
the expenditure ratio was due to slightly lower social trans-
fers other than in kind and collective consumption.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2007
forecast, the composition of adjustment is expected to
shift towards the expenditure side of the budget in 2007–
08. In the euro area, a projected decline in the revenue
ratio of 0.3 percentage points of GDP is forecast to be
more than offset by a reduction in the expenditure ratio
of more than one percentage point of GDP. The brunt of
the adjustment is expected to be borne by collective con-
sumption and social transfers other than in kind, while
other expenditure items are foreseen to remain broadly
unchanged in per cent of GDP.
At the level of the Member States, the patterns are gen-
erally similar. Only in Belgium, Ireland, and, outside the
euro area, in the UK, expenditure ratios are projected to
increase in 2007–08.
Conversely, large declines are expected in Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden. The rev-
enue ratios are set to increase in 2007–08 in Italy, and,
outside the euro area, in Cyprus, Lithuania, Hungary,
Romania and the UK, whereas important reductions are
foreseen in Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Slovenia,
Finland and Sweden.
In the euro area, as well as in the EU, the projected
decrease in social contributions and other resources is
expected to be offset by a decline in expenditure on col-
lective consumption, social benefits in kind and transfers
other than in kind. These plans seems to reflect lessons
from the past according to which tax cuts should be
accompanied by expenditure restraints to avoid the
worsening of the general government balances.
The projected budgetary adjustment in the euro area and the
EU does not seem to weigh on growth enhancing spending
items such as public investment, education and R & D.
Gross fixed capital formation in the euro area is projected
broadly stable at around 2â % of GDP, while in the EU as
a whole a slight increase is expected. The reduction in inter-
est expenditure that has contributed to a better allocation of
available resources in past years will slowly continue.
1.2.1. The fiscal stance and policy mix in the euro 
area
An appropriate policy mix can be defined as a combina-
tion of monetary and fiscal policies that ensures price
Table I.1.4
Euro area — Government revenue and expenditures (% of GDP)
2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue 45.1 45.7 45.5 45.4
Taxes on imports and production (indirect) 13.4 13.6 13.7 13.7
Current taxes on income and wealth 11.6 12.2 12.2 12.3
Social contributions 15.5 15.6 15.3 15.3
of which actual social contributions 14.4 14.5 14.3 14.2
Other revenue 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.1
Total expenditure 47.6 47.3 46.5 46.2
Collective consumption 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.9
Social benefits in kind 12.3 12.4 12.2 12.2
Social transfers other than in kind 16.6 16.4 16.2 16.0
Interest 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8
Subsidies 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Gross fixed capital formation 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6
Other expenditures 3.8 3.9 3.6 3.524
NB: Differences between the sum and the total of individual items are due to rounding.
Source: Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
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tial level. In the euro area, given that monetary policy is
centralised and fiscal policies decentralised, it is of a par-
ticular importance to assess both the aggregate fiscal
stance at the euro area level and national fiscal stances.
Namely, the aggregate fiscal stance affects the policy
mix at the euro area level and is, therefore, one of the ele-
ments to be considered by the monetary policy authority.
Graph I.1.1 displays the fiscal stance approximated by
the change in the cyclically adjusted primary budget bal-
ance (Δ CAPB) in comparison with the change in the
cyclical conditions estimated by the output gap (1). In
this graph, fiscal behaviour in accordance with the SGP
would be represented by movements along the horizon-
tal axis. In other words, countries would achieve and
maintain broadly balanced budgets over the economic
cycle. However, as long as a Member State has not yet
reached the medium-term budgetary objective in line
with provisions of the SGP, a restrictive fiscal stance,
that is a positive change in the CAPB, would be needed.
On the face of it, in 2006 the fiscal stance in the euro
area would seem to have been clearly procyclical as the
budget balance net of cyclical factors markedly
improved against a background of an output gap that is
estimated to have been still negative. This conclusion
needs to be qualified in two respects. Firstly, and not
surprisingly the fiscal tightening largely reflects the fis-
cal adjustment undertaken in countries with an exces-
sive deficit. Secondly, although negative, the output
gap narrowed significantly in 2006 reflecting the ongo-
ing brisk economic recovery (see Graph I.1.2) (2). Tak-
ing into account the lessons from the past, it is crucial
not to relax adjustment efforts when growth prospects
are favourable.
Looking ahead, a further yet somewhat milder fiscal
tightening is expected in 2007 when cyclical conditions
are expected to continue improving. In 2008, the no-pol-
icy-change assumption underlying the Commission
services’ forecast implies a broadly neutral fiscal stance
when actual output is estimated to approach potential.
¥1∂ In line with the Council agreement, the output gap in this section is com-
puted with the production function method. It should be noted, however,
that changes in the output gap are equally relevant for the judgement of the
stance in relation to cyclical conditions.
¥2∂ Complementing the level with the change of the output gap when assess-
ing the fiscal stance is key in view of the relatively large uncertainty
attached to real time estimates of the output gap. This is also acknowl-
edged in the code of conduct on the specifications on the implementation
of the Stability and Growth Pact. For details see http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/codeofconduct_en.pdf 
Graph I.1.1:  Euro area fiscal stance and cyclical conditions
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2 0 0 7Graph I.1.3 illustrates the euro area policy mix, by plot-
ting the fiscal stance on the vertical axis and the mone-
tary stance (approximated by the change in the short-
in 2006. In 2007, the gradual increases in the ECB’s pol-
icy rate at the end of 2006 and at the beginning of this
year plus those assumed in the Commission services’
Graph I.1.2:  Euro area fiscal stance and cyclical conditions
Source: Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
Graph I.1.3:  Policy mix in the euro area
Source: Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
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term real interest rates) on the horizontal axis. Against
the background of brisk economic growth and fiscal
tightening the monetary stance remained broadly neutral
spring 2007 forecast are expected to give rise to a policy
mix where both monetary and fiscal instruments bridle
aggregate demand.
2. Implementing the Stability 
and Growth Pact
2.1. Introduction
The fiscal framework of EMU aims at ensuring budget-
ary discipline through two main requirements: the Treaty
requirement to avoid excessive deficit positions, meas-
ured against reference values for deficits and debt of 3 %
and 60 % of GDP respectively, and the requirement for
Member States to achieve and maintain their medium-
term budgetary objective (MTO). Compliance with the
MTO secures fiscal discipline and the sustainability of
public finances, and thus contributes to maintaining an
economic environment in which monetary policy can
effectively pursue price stability. It also provides the
necessary room for manoeuvre to allow the automatic
stabilisers to play freely without breaching the 3 % of
GDP reference value of the Treaty.
The rules-based framework of the Treaty and Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP) consists of both preventive and
dissuasive elements, both of which are backed up with
enforcement procedures. Box I.2.1 contains a brief
description of these procedures. In 2006 and the early
part of 2007, the Commission and Council applied the
various enforcement mechanisms of the SGP to several
Member States. This section reviews the implementation
of these mechanisms since spring 2006.
2.2. The excessive deficit procedure
Since spring 2006, the Commission and the Council took
action on eight Member States subject to an excessive
deficit procedure (EDP). The Commission and the
Council considered that Cyprus, France, Germany,
Greece and Malta had corrected their excessive deficits.
The Council decided to abrogate the excessive deficit
mission and the Council considered that Poland had not
respected the recommendations formulated under Arti-
cle 104(7) of the Treaty. As Poland is a Member State
with derogation the Council issued another recommen-
dation based on Article 104(7) in February 2007 (1).
Similarly, on 30 May 2007 the Commission recom-
mended the Council to decide that the Czech Republic
had not taken adequate actions in response to the Council
recommendation under Article 104(7) of the Treaty and
to address a new recommendation under the same article.
Having already decided that Hungary had not respected
its recommendations in 2005, the Council addressed the
third recommendation based on Article 104(7) to Hun-
gary in October 2006.
Currently, seven EU countries are still subject to an exces-
sive deficit procedure: two euro-area Member States,
namely Italy and Portugal, the UK and four recently
acceded Member States, namely the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia (2).
2.2.1. The surveillance mechanisms in the euro-area 
countries
Germany and France: summary of past events
Following evidence of government deficits above 3 %
of GDP in 2002, the Council decided in spring 2003
that excessive deficits existed in Germany and in
France and adopted recommendations under
Article 104(7) with a view to bringing this situation to
an end by 2004. In autumn 2003, the Commission
¥1∂ Recently acceded Member States went straight into Stage III of EMU, with
the status of ‘Member State with a derogation’ within the meaning of Arti-
cle 122 EC. Currently, the Member States with derogation are Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta,
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden.27
procedure for Cyprus in July 2006, for France in January
2007, and for Germany, Greece and Malta in June 2007,
respectively. Furthermore, in November 2006 the Com-
¥2∂ For documents concerning EDP procedures, see the section on fiscal sur-
veillance on the website of the Economic and Financial Affairs DG: http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/
fiscal_policy554_en.htm
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quate and recommended the Council to adopt deci-
sions giving notice to these two countries to correct the
excessive deficit by 2005.
On 25 November 2003, the Council voted on the recom-
mended decisions but did not achieve the required major-
ity. Instead the Council adopted conclusions addressing
recommendations to Germany and France for the correc-
tion of the excessive deficit by 2005 and stating that the
excessive deficit procedure was held in abeyance. The
Commission brought the case before the Court of Justice
of the European Communities. On 13 July 2004, the Court
annulled the Council conclusions in so far as they aimed
at formally suspending the procedure and modifying the
existing recommendations.
On 14 December 2004, the Commission adopted a com-
munication clarifying the situation of Germany and
France in relation to the excessive deficit procedure. The
Commission recognised that the actions of the two Mem-
ber States concerned taken in the aftermath of the Council
conclusions of 25 November 2003 and up to their annul-
ment by the Court on 13 July 2004 were based on the
notion that the deadline for the correction of the deficit
had been effectively moved to 2005. The Commission
considered that the assessment of the actions taken to cor-
rect the excessive deficit situation should refer to 2005 as
the relevant deadline. In the communication, the Commis-
sion stated that the actions taken by the German and
French authorities were broadly consistent with a correc-
tion of the excessive deficit by 2005 and that no further
steps were necessary under the excessive deficit proce-
dure. The Council agreed with this position.
Germany
The German statistics office announced on 22 Febru-
ary 2006 that the public deficit in 2005 was 3.3 % of
GDP, following 3.7 % of GDP in 2004. In addition, the
deficit was expected by the German authorities to
remain above the 3 % of GDP threshold in 2006. On 1
March 2006, the Commission recommended to the
Council to give notice to Germany, according to Arti-
cle 104(9) of the Treaty, to correct its excessive deficit
by 2007. Such a notice was adopted by the Council on
14 March 2006. In this notice, the Council acknowl-
edged that the German Government had adopted a
The Council recommended in the notice that Germany
corrects the excessive deficit by 2007 at the latest and
ensures that the budget balance in structural terms
improves by at least one percentage point cumulatively
in 2006 and 2007. The Council decided that Germany
had to submit, by 14 July 2006 at the latest, a report out-
lining the measures taken to comply with the notice.
Based on the German implementation report submitted on
5 July 2006, the action taken by Germany to correct its
excessive deficit was assessed in the Commission com-
munication of 19 July 2006. The Commission considered
that Germany was on track to correct its excessive deficit
by 2007 at the latest, as requested by the Council, pro-
vided it fully implemented the 2006 and 2007 budgets.
The Commission considered that no further steps were
needed at present under the excessive deficit procedure.
On 10 October 2006, the Council agreed with this position
welcoming the commitment of the German authorities to
address the budget deficit on a structural basis.
In 2006, the German deficit was reduced to 1.7 % of
GDP, well below the reference value of the Treaty, one
year earlier than recommended by the Council. The
Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast shows a
further reduction of the deficit to 0.6 % of GDP in 2007
and, on a no-policy change basis, to about 0.3 % in
2008. The cumulative structural improvement in 2006–
07 is estimated to be some 1â percentage points of
GDP. With the correction of the excessive deficit con-
firmed, the Council, following a recommendation of
the Commission, abrogated the EDP for Germany in
June 2007.
France
The French deficit was reduced to 2.9 % of GDP in 2005
from 3.7 % in 2004, partly thanks to substantial one-off
revenues. The structural adjustment (i.e. the improve-
ment in the cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and
other temporary measures) in 2005 amounted to 0.6 % of
GDP. In autumn 2006, both the French authorities and
the Commission expected the deficit to fall further, to
2.7 % of GDP in 2006, 2.6 % in 2007 and about 2 % by
2008, with the recourse to one-offs limited in 2006 (ä %
of GDP) and negligible or non-existent thereafter. As
this deficit reduction was expected to be driven by a bet-
ter expenditure control at the State and healthcare sector28
comprehensive budgetary consolidation strategy in a
context of still fragile economic recovery to bring the
deficit below the 3 % reference value by 2007.
levels, the improvement in the structural balance was
estimated at 0.5 %, 0.3 % and 0.6 % of GDP in 2006,
2007 and 2008, respectively. This suggested that the def-
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a credible and sustainable manner. According to the
Commission services’ 2006 autumn forecast, the debt
increase trend has also been inverted.
Based on these projections, the Commission concluded
that the excessive deficit situation in France has been
corrected and recommended on 29 November 2006 to
the Council to abrogate its decisions under paragraph 6
of Article 104 of the Treaty. On 30 January 2007, the
Council abrogated its decision on the existence of an
excessive deficit in France.
Portugal
The update of the stability programme submitted on
9 June 2005 by the Portuguese authorities revealed the
plans for a general government deficit in excess of the
3 % of GDP reference value of the Treaty for the years
from 2005 to 2007. More specifically, after a reported
deficit outturn of 2.9 % of GDP in 2004, Portugal
planned a government deficit of 6.2 % of GDP for 2005,
4.8 % in 2006, 3.9 % in 2007 and 2.8 % of GDP in 2008.
Over the same years, the debt-to-GDP ratio was pro-
jected to increase from 61.9 % in 2004 to a peak of
On the same date, the Council addressed a recommenda-
tion under Article 104(7) specifying that the excessive
deficit had to be corrected by 2008. Specifically, Portu-
gal was recommended to limit the deterioration of the
fiscal position in 2005 and to ensure a narrowing of the
structural deficit of 1.5 % of GDP in 2006 from 2005,
followed by a further decrease of, at least, ã % of GDP
in each of the two subsequent years. At the same time,
Portugal was invited to implement reforms rapidly to
contain and reduce expenditure and to stand ready to
adopt the additional measures which may be necessary
to achieve the correction of the excessive deficit by
2008. In addition, the Portuguese authorities were rec-
ommended to ensure that the government gross debt
ratio is brought onto a downward path also by avoiding
debt-increasing financial transactions, and by consider-
ing carefully the possible impact on debt of major public
investment projects.
The Council established the deadline of 19 March 2006
for the Portuguese Government to take effective action
in order to achieve the 2006 deficit target. The Commis-
sion communication of 21 June 2006 considered that the
action taken by Portugal in response to the Council rec-
ommendation represented adequate progress towards the
correction of the excessive deficit within the set time
Graph I.2.1:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Germany
Source: Commission services and stability programmes.
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67.8 % of GDP in 2007. On this basis, the Council
decided on 20 September 2005 that Portugal has an
excessive deficit.
limit. In particular, Portugal (i) achieved a 2005 deficit
in line with plans; (ii) adopted a comprehensive package
of corrective measures which, if fully implemented and
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ment in 2006; (iii) confirmed the deficit target for 2008
below 3 % of GDP and a structural adjustment path in
line with the Council recommendation; (iv) imple-
mented or initiated expenditure-containing measures and
kept fiscal targets in spite of a more cautious re-assess-
ment of GDP growth prospects; (v) planned to return
government debt to a declining path as from 2008; and
(vi) has taken action to improve statistics.
Greece
On 4 May 2004, the Greek authorities submitted a
revised EDP notification showing a 2003 deficit of
Graph I.2.2:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in France
Source: Commission services and stability programmes.
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Graph I.2.3:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Portugal
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developments in the debt ratio, decided that an excessive
deficit existed in Greece and addressed on 5 July 2004 a
recommendation under Article 104(7) to Greece with a
view to bringing the excessive deficit situation to an end
by 2005. The Council established the deadline of
5 November 2004 for Greece to take appropriate meas-
ures to this end.
Based on the Commission services’ 2004 autumn fore-
cast incorporating the data revisions of the September
2004 notification and projecting the 2005 deficit at
3.6 % of GDP, on 22 December 2004 the Commission
recommended to the Council to decide under Article
104(8) that no effective action had been taken in
response to its recommendation under Article 104(7).
The Council decided accordingly on 18 January 2005.
On 9 February 2005, the Commission recommended to
the Council to give notice to Greece, in accordance with
Article 104(9), to take the necessary measures to remedy
its excessive deficit situation. The Commission recom-
mended extending the deadline for correcting the exces-
sive deficit by one year to 2006. When taking this deci-
sion, the Commission took into account the fact that the
2004 deficit would likely be substantially higher than
expected, due to statistical revisions and to expenditure
overruns associated notably with the organisation of the
Olympic Games. In addition, the Commission consid-
ered that economic growth prospects for 2005 and 2006
had become less favourable, making the reduction of the
deficit more difficult.
On 17 February 2005, the Council adopted a decision
giving notice to Greece, in accordance with
Article 104(9), to take measures to remedy the situation
of excessive deficit as rapidly as possible and at the latest
by 2006 through (i) a rigorous implementation of the
2005 budget as approved by the parliament; (ii) imple-
menting in 2006 adjustment measures of a permanent
nature leading to a correction in the deficit of at least
0.6 percentage point of GDP (1). The Council decided
that Greece had to submit, by 21 March 2005 at the lat-
est, a report outlining the decisions to respect these rec-
ommendations.
Following the submission of the report, the Commis-
sion concluded in its communication of 6 April 2005
that the Greek Government had taken effective action
so that no further steps under the EDP were needed at
that stage.
In 2006, the deficit fell below the reference value, to
2.6 % of GDP, inter alia thanks to one-off measures
worth around 0.6 % of GDP. Including the impact of
recently announced new measures, the Commission
services’ spring 2007 forecast projects the deficit to nar-
row slightly to 2.4 % of GDP in 2007; excluding one-
offs, it would be 2.9 % of GDP. On a no-policy change
basis and without further one-offs, the deficit would
increase to 2.7 % of GDP in 2008. The fiscal effort,
measured by the improvement in the structural budget
balance, is estimated at more than 2 percentage points of
GDP in both 2005 and 2006. The projected evolution of
the debt ratio, which stood at 108â % of GDP in 2004
and should fall below 100 % of GDP in 2008, can be
considered to be in line with the Council’s recommenda-
tions. The spring forecast thus supports the conclusion
that the deficit has been brought below the reference
value in sustainable manner and, on this basis, the Coun-
cil, following a recommendation of the Commission,
abrogated the excessive deficit procedure for Greece in
June 2007.
Italy
On 23 May 2005, Eurostat released revised figures on
Italian Government data, showing a general government
deficit of 3.1 % of GDP in both 2003 and 2004. Over the
same two years, the debt-to-GDP ratio was reported to
have remained broadly stable at around 106–107 % of
GDP. On 24 May the Italian Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT) released new public finances data for the period
2000–04. The deficit was reported at 3.2 % of GDP in
2003 and 2004. Given that the deficit ratio had been
above but close to 3 % of GDP in 2003 and 2004 and that
the breach of the reference value could not be considered
temporary because the Commission projected the deficit
to exceed 3 % in 2005 and 2006, and taking into account
developments in the debt ratio, the Council decided that
Italy had an excessive deficit on 28 July 2005. At the
same time, the Council addressed a recommendation
under Article 104(7) specifying that the excessive deficit
had to be corrected by 2007.
¥1∂ The Council also recommended Greece to (iii) further pursue the efforts to
identify and control factors other than net borrowing, which contribute to
the change in debt levels, with a view to ensuring that the government31
In particular, Italy was recommended to implement with
rigour the 2005 budget; reduce the structural deficit by a
gross debt ratio diminishes sufficiently and approaches the reference value
at a satisfactory pace in line with the correction of the excessive deficit,
and (iv) to further pursue the efforts to improve the collection and process-
ing of general government data.
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2005, with at least half of this correction taking place in
2006 and ensure that the debt-to-GDP ratio diminishes
and approaches the reference value at a satisfactory pace.
On 22 February 2006, the Commission adopted a com-
munication concluding that the actions taken by Italy, if
fully implemented and effective, would be consistent
with the Council recommendation. The Commission
communication highlighted that implementation uncer-
tainties persisted, requiring continuous monitoring. On
14 March 2006, the Council agreed with this analysis,
stressing the utmost importance of the execution of the
2006 budget and the likely need to identify and implement
substantial additional corrective measures for 2007.
2.2.2. The surveillance mechanisms in the non-euro-
area Member States
United Kingdom
According to the data notified by the United Kingdom in
August 2005, the general government deficit amounted
to 3.2 % of GDP in the 2004/05 financial year (1). The
Commission services’ 2005 autumn forecasts projected
that on the basis of unchanged policies the general gov-
ernment deficit would rise further in the financial 2005/06
to 3.4 % of GDP, before declining to 3.2 % in 2006/07 and
3.0 % in 2007/08. Output in the Commission services’
2005 autumn forecasts was projected to be strengthening
from late 2005, with approximately trend-level growth
from 2006. Based on these projections, the excess over
the reference value could not be considered exceptional
or temporary within the meaning of the Treaty and the
Stability and Growth Pact although the deficit was close
to the reference value.
After the Commission services’ 2005 autumn forecasts
had been published, the United Kingdom announced
policy decisions in the pre-budget report presented to
parliament on 5 December. In net terms, these measures
represented an easing of policy by 0.1 % of GDP in the
2005/06 financial year and a tightening of policy by
0.1 % of GDP in 2006/07. Compared to an unchanged
policy scenario, the pre-budget report foresaw a tighten-
ing of 0.2 % of GDP in 2007/08. Taking into considera-
tion these measures, the Commission’s assessment
nevertheless remained that the deficit through to 2006/07
was expected to exceed 3 % of GDP. On this basis, the
Council decided on 24 January 2006 that the UK had an
excessive deficit.
Graph I.2.4:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Greece
Source: Commission services and stability programmes.
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At the same time, the Council addressed a recommenda-
tion under Article 104(7) specifying that the United
Kingdom authorities should put an end to the excessive
¥1∂ The EDP applies to the UK on a financial year basis. The UK financial
year runs from April to March. 
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year 2006/07 at the latest. To bring the general govern-
ment deficit below 3 % of GDP in a credible and sustain-
able manner the United Kingdom was required to ensure
an improvement of the structural balance by at least
0.5 percentage point of GDP between the 2005/06 and
2006/07 financial years.
On 20 September 2006, the Commission adopted a com-
munication concluding that the United Kingdom was
just on track to correct its excessive deficit by the end of
the 2006/07 financial year. According to the Commis-
sion, fiscal consolidation was supported by better GDP
growth than originally envisaged and the tax base was
strengthened by good performance of the financial sector
and oil prices. Nevertheless, the Commission communi-
cation noted that the deficit correction remained vulner-
able to negative surprises, given the lack of a safety mar-
gin against exceeding the 3 % reference value again and
the likely shortfall of the structural improvement recom-
mended under Article 104(7). On 10 October 2006, the
Council agreed with this view.
Graph I.2.5:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Italy
Source: Commission services and stability programmes.
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Box I.2.1: EU budgetary surveillance
This section provides a description of the enforcement mechanisms of the EU budgetary surveillance under the pro-
visions of the Stability and Growth Pact. It explains the different steps of the excessive deficit procedure, which is
codified in Article 104 of the Treaty and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, and when these steps need to be acti-
vated. A short description of the mechanism of early warning is also provided. This mechanism is codified in
Article 99(4) of the Treaty and Articles 6(2) and 10(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, as amended by Coun-
cil Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005.
The excessive deficit procedure
Article 104 of the Treaty states that Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits. In particular Member
States shall comply with budgetary discipline by respecting two criteria specified in the Protocol on the excessive
deficit procedures annexed to the Treaty: a deficit ratio and a debt ratio not exceeding reference values of respectively
3 % and 60 % of GDP. Article 104 also sets out the procedure to be followed to identify and correct situations of33
(Continued on the next page)
excessive deficit, and voting modalities in the course of the procedure. Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 as amended by
Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005, clarifies the procedure.
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The first four steps of the procedure, corresponding to provisions of paragraphs 3 to 6 of Article 104, concern the
identification of situations of excessive deficit. The excessive deficit procedure is triggered if the deficit of a Member
State exceeds 3 % of GDP (1). In such a situation, the Commission adopts a report, in accordance with Article 104(3),
reviewing in detail the economic and budgetary situation the Member State considered. As foreseen in Article 104(4)
and Regulation (EC) No 1467/97, the Economic and Financial Committee formulates an opinion on this report within
two weeks. The Commission takes this opinion into account and, if it considers that an excessive deficit exists,
addresses an opinion under Article 104(5) to the Council. On the basis of the Commission opinion, the Council
decides on the existence of an excessive deficit under Article 104(6).
The subsequent steps of the procedure are dedicated to the correction of excessive deficits. When it decides that an
excessive deficit exists, the Council addresses a recommendation to the Member State concerned in accordance with
Article 104(7). In this recommendation, the Council sets a deadline for the Member State to correct the excessive
deficit and a fiscal effort to be achieved by the Member States concerned to this end (at least 0.5 % of GDP as a
benchmark). Regulation (EC) No 1467(97) specifies that the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit shall
be set taking into account an overall assessment of the factors mentioned in the Article 104(3) of the Treaty.
Where action by the Member State concerned leads to the correction of the excessive deficit, the Council shall decide,
in accordance with Article 104(12), to abrogate its decisions under the excessive deficit procedure. In other words,
the procedure is closed. In the event that the Council considers that effective action has not been taken, it may decide,
as stated in Article 104(8) of the Treaty, to make public its recommendation according to Article 104(7). Where effec-
tive action has been taken but events outside the control of the government with large adverse consequences on the
budget prevent the correction of the excessive deficit within the time limits set by the Council, the possibility exists
to revise the deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit in a new Article104(7) recommendation.
The steps described above apply to all EU countries. The further steps of the procedure depend on whether the Mem-
ber State is a euro-area Member State.
The excessive deficit procedure applies in full to euro-area Member States. For these countries, Article 104(9) stip-
ulates that, provided the Council adopts a decision under Article 104(8), it may decide to give notice to the Member
State concerned to take the necessary measures to reduce the deficit. The recommendations under Article 104(9) of
the Treaty shall include a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and a fiscal effort to be achieved by the
Member States concerned to this end (at least 0.5 % of GDP as a benchmark).
This step constitutes a move towards even closer surveillance, and is the ultimate step before the possible imposition
of sanctions. If the Member State fails to comply with the recommendations, the Council may decide to impose sanc-
tions no later than two months after notice has been given. In case of compliance with the recommendations formu-
lated in the notice under Article 104(9), the decisions taken under Articles 104(6) to 104(9) are abrogated with a
Council decision in accordance with Article 104(12), and the procedure is closed. Where effective action has been
taken but events outside the control of the government with large adverse consequences on the budget prevent the
correction of the excessive deficit within the time limits set by the Council, the possibility exists to revise the deadline
for the correction of the excessive deficit in a new Article 104(9) notice.
As mentioned above, non-euro-area Member States are not exempt from the obligation to avoid excessive deficits,
but the later steps of the EDP do not apply for them. When a Member State outside the euro area in a situation of an
excessive deficit fails to respect the recommendations addressed under Article 104(7), it cannot be submitted to the
¥1∂ Article 104(2) of the Treaty states that a deficit in excess of the 3 % reference value that is only exceptional and temporary may not be considered
excessive where the deficit remains close to the reference value. A deficit above 3 % of GDP may also not be considered excessive if it has declined
substantially and reached a level that comes close to the reference value. The same article provides an exception for countries having a debt ratio above34
(Continued on the next page)
60 %, if this ratio diminishes sufficiently and approaches the value of 60 % of GDP at a satisfactory pace.
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According to the fiscal notification of March 2004, Hun-
gary had a general government deficit above the 3 % of
GDP reference value. On the basis of these notifications
and following a recommendation by the Commission the
Council decided that an excessive deficit existed in
ment the measures envisaged in the May 2004 conver-
gence programme aiming at a correction of the excessive
deficit by 2008. The Hungarian authorities were recom-
mended to stand ready to introduce additional measures,
if necessary, with a view to achieving the deficit targets
for 2004 and 2005.
Box I.2.1 (continued)
Graph I.2.6:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in the United Kingdom
Source: Commission services and convergence programmes.
last two steps of the excessive deficit procedure, namely notice foreseen in Article 104(9) and the imposition of sanc-
tions foreseen in Article 104(11) (1). Non-compliance with a recommendation under Article 104(7) may lead to a
renewed recommendation according to Article 104(7), following a decision according to Article 104(8).
The early warning mechanism
In complement to the excessive deficit procedure, the Treaty foresees in its Article 99(4) the possibility for the Coun-
cil to make recommendations to Member States in case their economic policies ‘are not consistent with the broad
guidelines or risk jeopardising the proper functioning of EMU’. Based on this article, Regulation (EC) No 1466/97
as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005, which codifies the preventive arm of the SGP, provides the
Council with the possibility to issue ‘early warnings’ to Member States in order to prevent the occurrence of an exces-
sive deficit.
¥1∂ These Member States have no voting right on decisions provided for under the two paragraphs.
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Hungary and addressed a recommendation under
Article 104(7) to Hungary on 5 July 2004. The recom-
mendation invited the Hungarian authorities to imple-
On 18 January 2005, in accordance with Article 104(8)
the Council considered that Hungary had not taken effec-
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gary is a Member State with derogation, the Council
issued on 8 March 2005 another recommendation based
on Article 104(7), taking into account the information of
Hungary’s convergence programme update submitted in
December 2004 (1). The Council recommended the Hun-
garian authorities to ‘take action in a medium-term frame-
work in order to bring the deficit below 3 % of GDP by
2008 in a credible and sustainable manner, in accordance
with the path for deficit reduction as specified in the
Council opinion of 8 March 2005 on the convergence pro-
gramme update submitted in December 2004.
In light of a substantial deterioration of the budgetary
outlook in Hungary, based on a Commission recommen-
dation the Council decided on 8 November 2005 acting
pursuant to Article 104(8) for the second time that Hun-
gary did not comply with the new recommendations
under 104(7).
The Council addressed a third recommendation under
Article 104(7) to Hungary on 10 October 2006, postpon-
ing the deadline for the correction of the excessive
deficit by one year, to 2009. The Hungarian authori-
ties were recommended to limit the deterioration of
the fiscal position in 2006, which was estimated as a
deficit of 10 % of GDP (including pension reform
costs) (2), ensure a frontloaded and sustained sub-
stantial correction of the structural deficit and adopt
and implement wide-ranging structural reforms
aimed at containing public expenditure. Further-
more, Hungary was requested to stand ready to
improve expenditure control and ensure the gross
debt ratio is brought onto a firm downward trajec-
tory, preferably before 2009.
The Council established the deadline of 10 April 2007
for Hungary to take effective action in order to achieve
the deficit targets for 2006 and 2007, and welcomed the
commitment of the Hungarian authorities to submit
reports on a six-monthly basis to the Commission and
the Council examining progress made in complying with
the Council recommendation.
¥1∂ Member States with a derogation are to avoid excessive deficits but in the
event of inadequate action established under Articles 104(8) further rec-
ommendations can be addressed only on the basis of Article 104(7) as
Article 104(9) and Article(11) do not apply to them.
¥2∂ Compare Box I.2.2. While Hungary availed itself of the transition period
in the October 2006 EDP notification, it included the pension reform costs
in its September 2006 adjusted update of the convergence programme,
which the Council took into account when formulating its recommenda-
tions under Article 104(7) in October 2006.
Graph I.2.7:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Hungary
Source: Commission services and stability programmes.
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On 5 July 2004 the Council decided that the Czech
Republic had an excessive deficit. At the same time, the
Council addressed a recommendation under Article
104(7) specifying that the excessive deficit had to be cor-
rected by 2008 in a credible and sustainable manner. In
particular, the Czech Republic was recommended to take
effective action regarding the measures envisaged to
achieve the 2005 deficit target by the deadline of
5 November 2004 and to implement with vigour the
measures envisaged in the May 2004 convergence pro-
gramme, in particular to cut the wage bill of central gov-
ernment and to reduce spending of individual ministries.
Furthermore, the Czech Republic was invited to allocate
higher-than-budgeted revenues to deficit reduction, to
introduce fiscal targeting based on medium-term
expenditure ceilings, to design effective rules to reduce
the risk of increasing indebtedness of regions and muni-
cipalities, to undertake the reform of the pension and
healthcare systems so as to improve the long-term sus-
tainability of the public finances and to minimise the
negative budgetary impact of the operations of the Czech
Consolidation Agency.
On 22 December 2004, the Commission concluded that
the Czech Government had taken effective action
regarding the measures envisaged to achieve the 2005
deficit target in response to the Council recommenda-
tion, and that no further steps were necessary under the
excessive deficit procedure.
In 2006, the deficit fell just below the reference value of
the Treaty, to 2.9 % of GDP, in spite of some deficit-
increasing one-off measures. The Commission services’
spring 2007 forecast projects the deficit to widen signif-
icantly in 2007 to close to 4 % of GDP, on the back of
higher social spending. Under the no-policy-change
assumption, it would decline to 3.6 % of GDP in 2008.
The structural position is estimated to have widened in
both 2005 and 2006 and to widen even more signifi-
cantly in 2007. Accordingly, on 30 May the Commission
recommended to the Council to decide that the Czech
Republic has not taken adequate action in response to the
Council recommendation under Article 104(7) and to
address a new recommendation under the same article.
Cyprus
On 5 July 2004, the Council decided that an excessive def-
icit existed in Cyprus. At the same time, the Council
addressed a recommendation to Cyprus under
Article 104(7), requesting Cyprus to take effective action
by 5 November 2004 in order to bring the deficit below
3 % of GDP by 2005 in a credible and sustainable manner
and to implement with vigour the measures envisaged in
the May 2004 programme. Cyprus was also requested to
ensure that the rise in the debt ratio was brought to a halt
Graph I.2.8:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in the Czech Republic
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2 0 0 7in 2004 and reversed thereafter as specified in the Council
opinion on the convergence programme.
A Commission communication of 22 December 2004
concluded that, on then available information and on the
basis of the measures detailed in the 2005 budget, it
appeared that the Cypriot Government had taken effec-
tive action to achieve the 2005 deficit target, in compli-
ance with the Council recommendation under Article
104(7). Accordingly, the Commission concluded that no
further steps were necessary at that point under the
excessive deficit procedure.
On 21 June 2006, the Commission recommended that
the Council abrogate the excessive deficit procedure
for Cyprus. The deficit had fallen to 2.4 % of GDP in
2005 and the government debt-to-GDP ratio had also
decreased. According to the Commission services’
spring 2006 forecast, the deficit was expected to fall
further in 2006 and 2007, thus staying well below the
3 % reference value, while the debt ratio would dimin-
ish sufficiently towards the 60 % of GDP reference
value. Although some one-off measures helped reduce
the deficit in 2005, the budgetary consolidation in
Cyprus was achieved mainly through structural meas-
ures. The structural deficit fell to 3 % of GDP, com-
pared to almost 5 % and 8 % of GDP in 2004 and 2003
Malta
On 5 July 2004 the Council decided that Malta had an
excessive deficit. At the same time, the Council
addressed a recommendation under Article 104(7) spec-
ifying that the excessive deficit had to be corrected by
2006. Malta was recommended to implement with vig-
our measures, particularly those of a structural nature,
aimed at rationalising and reducing expenditure. The
Council also recommended that the rise in the debt ratio
is brought to a halt in 2005 and reversed thereafter.
The Commission communication to the Council of
22 December 2004 concluded that, on the basis of the
measures contained in the 2005 budget, Malta appeared
to have taken effective action regarding the measures to
achieve the deficit targets for 2005, by the deadline of
5 November, in response to the Council recommenda-
tion under Article 104(7). The communication con-
cluded that no further steps were necessary at that point
under the excessive deficit procedure.
In 2006, the deficit declined to 2.6 % of GDP, owing to a
significant deficit-reducing one-off; excluding temporary
measures the deficit would be somewhat above the 3 % of
GDP reference value of the Treaty. The Commission serv-
ices’ spring 2007 forecast projects the deficit to narrow to
Graph I.2.9:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Cyprus
Source: Commission services and convergence programmes.
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respectively. On this basis, the Council abrogated its
decision on the existence of an excessive deficit in
Cyprus on 11 July 2006.
2.1 % of GDP (2.7 % of GDP net of one-off measures) in
2007. On a no-policy-change basis and without further
one-off measures, the deficit would decline to 1.6 % of
P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sGDP in 2008. This supports the conclusions that the defi-
cit has been brought below the reference value of the
Treaty in a sustainable manner. The fiscal effort, meas-
ured by the improvement in the structural balance, is esti-
mated at 1â percentage points of GDP between 2004 and
2006, followed by a further 1 percentage point of GDP
improvement in 2006–08. Against this backdrop, the
Council, following a recommendation by the Commis-
sion, abrogated the EDP for Malta in June 2007.
Poland
On 5 July 2004, the Council decided that Poland had an
excessive deficit. At the same time, the Council
addressed a recommendation under Article 104(7) spe-
cifying that the excessive deficit had to be corrected by
2007. In particular, Poland was recommended to imple-
ment with vigour the measures envisaged in the conver-
gence programme, in particular those contained in the
so-called Hausner plan. This plan was proposed in 2003
and aimed at reducing public expenditure on social pro-
tection, public administration and State aid. The Polish
authorities were recommended to take effective action
by 5 November 2004 regarding the measures envisaged
to achieve the 2005 deficit target. In addition, the Coun-
cil invited the Polish authorities to allocate possible extra
revenues to decrease the general government deficit.
Commission concluded, in its communication to the Coun-
cil of 22 December 2004, that no further steps were neces-
sary under the excessive deficit procedure for Poland as the
Polish Government had taken effective action regarding
the measures envisaged to achieve the 2005 deficit target.
On 14 November 2006, the Commission recommended
the Council to decide that Poland had not taken adequate
action in response to the July 2004 Council recommenda-
tion. Despite lower deficit outcomes in the period 2004 to
2006 than endorsed in the Council recommendation of
5 July 2004, the 2007 deficit target was revised to 1.7 %
of GDP (excluding pension reform costs) in the draft
budget for 2007, above the target of 1.5 % of GDP fore-
seen in the recommendation. These figures reflected the
classification of contributions to second-pillar funded
pension schemes as government revenues, possible by
way of transitional arrangement, until end-March
2007 (1). From April 2007, the inclusion of the pension
reform cost leads to a 2007 deficit target of around 3.7 %
of GDP. The Commission services’ autumn 2006 forecast
projected the 2007 deficit to somewhat exceed the target.
On 28 November 2006, the Council decided, on the basis
of the Commission recommendation, in accordance with
Article 104(8) stating that the action taken by Poland in
Graph I.2.10:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Malta
Source: Commission services and convergence programmes.
– 6
– 5
– 4
– 3
– 2
– 1
0
1
2
3
4
Reference valueBudget balance
GDP growth
Conv. prog. 2005 Conv. prog. 2006 Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast
2004 2009200820072006200539
After the expiry of the deadline of 5 November 2004 set in
the Council recommendation under Article 104(7), the ¥1∂ See Box I.2.2.
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is proving to be inadequate to correct the excessive def-
icit within the deadline fixed by the recommendation.
Since Poland is a Member State with derogation, the
Council issued on 27 February 2007 a new recommenda-
tion based on Article 104(7), taking into account the infor-
mation of Poland’s convergence programme update sub-
mitted in December 2006. The Council recommended the
Polish authorities to ‘take effective action by 27 August
2007 regarding additional measures, as far as possible of
a structural nature, in order to achieve the deficit target for
2007 as set in the updated convergence programme’.
Slovakia
On 5 July 2004 the Council decided that an excessive def-
icit existed in Slovakia. At the same time, the Council
addressed a recommendation under Article 104(7) specify-
ing that the excessive deficit had to be corrected by 2007.
Slovakia was recommended to take effective action by
5 November 2004 to achieve the 2005 deficit target, to
implement with vigour the measures envisaged in the May
2004 programme, in particular those related to the pro-
posed further healthcare reforms and further public sector
rationalisation. Furthermore Slovakia was invited to accel-
erate the fiscal adjustment if the implemented structural
reforms resulted in higher growth than expected in the pro-
gramme, in particular by dedicating any higher-than-budg-
eted revenues primarily to faster deficit reduction.
The Commission communication of 22 December 2004
concluded that, based on the then available information
and the measures detailed in the 2005 budget, it appeared
that the Slovak Government had taken effective action to
achieve the 2005 deficit target, by the deadline of
5 November, in response to the Council recommenda-
tion under Article 104(7). The communication con-
cluded that no further steps were necessary at that point
under the excessive deficit procedure.
Revised data show that the deficit was below the refer-
ence value in 2003–05 and exceeded it in 2006, when it
reached 3.4 % of GDP (1). The widening of the deficit in
2006 corresponds with a large deterioration in the struc-
tural balance by some 2 percentage points of GDP, part
of which can be explained by factors outside the control
of the authorities.     
¥1∂ The revisions were mainly due to a change in the methodology for record-
ing of taxes and social contributions in national accounts, partially com-
pensated in 2004 by a decrease in the surplus of other central government
bodies. See Eurostat news release No 55/2007 of 23 April 2007.
Graph I.2.11:  Budgetary plans, forecasts and outcomes in Poland
Source: Commission services and convergence programmes.
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Source: Commission services and convergence programmes.
Box I.2.2: Classification of pension schemes
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According to ESA95 rules and the Eurostat decision of 2 March 2004, funded defined-contribution (DC) pension schemes
should be classified in the financial sector and not in government. The decision followed the reasoning that pensions paid
by such schemes (i) depend primarily on financial markets performance (i.e. not under government control) and (ii) are
financed by reserves that are not economically owned by government. Even if they are mandatory or if they are managed
by government (for example, managed by the same government agency in charge of the pay-as-you-go pillar) or if there
is some  guarantee of a minimum pension, funded DC schemes should not be classified within government (1).
Therefore when a government creates a new funded DC pension scheme and shifts to this new scheme a share of the social
contributions that were previously collected by social security, government revenue falls. On the other hand, the pensions
that will be paid by the new pension scheme will not count as government expenditure. This usually leads to a medium-
term deterioration in the government deficit (often known as the pension reform cost) to be offset by an improvement in
the future.
This Eurostat decision on the sectoral classification of pension schemes was to be implemented by all Member States until
the end of a transitory period which ended in April 2007 (first EDP notification in 2007). Initially, Denmark, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia and Sweden benefited from this transitory period. By April 2007, the government deficits (surpluses) and
debts in these countries were revised upwards (downwards). Accordingly, pension reform costs have to be included when
assessing the compliance with the recommended deficit targets according to Article 104(7).
¥1∂ Eurostat news release No 30/2004 of 2 March 2004.41
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Overview EDP — Steps since spring 2006 — EU-15 Member States (planned dates in italics)
DE FR EL IT PT UK
Commission adopts EDP report (Art. 104.3) = start of the 
procedure
19.11.2002 2.4.2003 19.5.2004 7.6.2005 22.6.2005 21.9.2005
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion (Art. 104.4) 29.11.2002 13.4.2003 2.6.2004 20.6.2005 4.7.2005 30.9.2005
Commission adopts: 8.1.2003 7.5.2003 24.6.2004 29.6.2005 20.7.2005 11.1.2006
— opinion on existence of excessive deficit (Art. 104.5)
— recommendation for Council decision on existence 
of excessive deficit (Art.104.6)
— recommendation for Council recommendation to 
end this situation (Art. 104.7)
Council adopts: 21.1.2003 3.6.2003 5.7.2004 28.7.2005 (1) 20.9.2005 (2) 24.1.2006
— decision on existence of excessive deficit (Art. 104.6)
— recommendation to end this situation (Art. 104.7)
— deadline for taking effective action 21.5.2003 3.10.2003 5.11.2004 12.1.2006 19.3.2006 24.7.2006
— deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2004 2004 2005 2007 2008 fin.yr 
2006/07
Follow-up of the 104.7 Council recommendation
Commission adopts recommendations for:
— Council decision establishing no effective action (Art. 104.8) 8.10.2003 22.12.2004
— Council decision to give notice (Art. 104.9) 18.11.2003 21.10.2003 9.2.2005
Council adopts conclusions (instead of Commission 
recommendations for 104.8 and 104.9)
25.11.2003 25.11.2003
New deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2005 2005
(NB: conclusions annulled by European Court of Justice 
on 13.7.2004)
Commission adopts communication on budgetary situation 14.12.2004 14.12.2004
Council adopts conclusions thereon 18.1.2005 18.1.2005
Council adopts:
— decision establishing no effective action (Art. 104.8) 18.1.2005
— decision to give notice (Art. 104.9) 17.2.2005
Deadline for first report to be submitted 21.3.2005
New deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2006
Commission adopts communication on action taken 22.2.2006 21.6.2006 20.9.2006
Council adopts conclusions thereon 14.3.2006 11.7.2006 10.10.2006
Commission adopts NEW recommendation for:
— Council decision to give notice (Art. 104.9) 1.3.2006
Council adopts: 14.3.2006
— decision to give notice (Art. 104.9)
Deadline for first report to be submitted 14.7.2006
New deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2007
Follow-up of the 104.9 Council notice
Commission adopts communication on action taken 19.7.2006 6.4.2005
Council adopts conclusions thereon 10.10.2006 (3) 12.4.2005
Abrogation of the EDP
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision 
abrogating existence of excessive deficit (Art. 104.12)
16.5.2007 29.11.2006 16.5.2007
Council adopts decision abrogating existence of excessive deficit 
(Art. 104.12)
5.6.2007 30.1.2007 5.6.2007
(1) Date of political agreement: 12 July (Ecofin). Actual adoption on 28 July (written procedure). 42
(2) Date of political agreement: 9/10 September (informal Ecofin). Actual adoption on 20 September (Agriculture/Fisheries Council). 
(3) Date of political agreement (in the form of Presidency conclusions after the informal Ecofin Council): 8/9 September.
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Overview EDP — Steps since spring 2006 — Recently acceded Member States (planned dates in italics)
CZ CY HU MT PL SK
Commission adopts EDP report (Art. 104.3) = start of the 
procedure
12.5.2004 12.5.2004 12.5.2004 12.5.2004 12.5.2004 12.5.2004
Economic and Financial Committee adopts opinion (Art. 104.4) 24.5.2004 24.5.2004 24.5.2004 24.5.2004 24.5.2004 24.5.2004
Commission adopts: 24.6.2004 24.5.2004 24.5.2004 24.6.2004 24.6.2004 24.6.2004
— opinion on existence of excessive deficit (Art. 104.5)
— recommendation for Council decision on existence 
of excessive deficit (Art.104.6)
— recommendation for Council recommendation to 
end this situation (Art. 104.7)
Council adopts: 5.7.2004 5.7.2004 5.7.2004 5.7.2004 5.7.2004 5.7.2004
— decision on existence of excessive deficit (Art. 104.6)
— recommendation to end this situation (Art. 104.7)
— deadline for taking effective action 5.11.2004 5.11.2004 5.11.2004 5.11.2004 5.11.2004 5.11.2004
— deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2008 2005 2008 2006 2007 2007
Follow-up of the 104.7 Council recommendation
Commission adopts communication on action taken 22.12.2004 22.12.2004 22.12.2004 22.12.2004 22.12.2004
Council adopts conclusions thereon 18.1.2005 18.1.2005 18.1.2005 18.1.2005 18.1.2005
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision 
establishing no effective action (Art. 104.8)
30.5.2007 22.12.2004 14.11.2006
Council adopts decision establishing no effective action 
(Art. 104.8)
18.1.2005 28.11.2006
Commission adopts recommendation for new Council 
recommendation to end excessive deficit situation (Art. 104.7)
30.5.2007 16.2.2005 7.2.2007
Council adopts new recommendation to end excessive deficit 
situation (Art. 104.7):
8.3.2005 27.2.2007
— deadline for taking effective action
— new deadline for correction of excessive deficit 8.7.2005 27.8.2007
2008
Follow-up of the NEW 104.7 Council recommendation
Commission adopts communication on action taken 13.7.2005
Council adopts conclusions thereon —
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision 
establishing inadequate action (Art. 104.8)
20.10.2005
Council adopts decision establishing inadequate action 
(Art. 104.8)
8.11.2005
Commission adopts recommendation for new Council 
recommendation to end excessive deficit situation (Art. 104.7)
26.9.2006
Council adopts new recommendation to end excessive deficit 
situation (Art. 104.7)
10.10.2006
Deadline for taking effective action 10.4.2007
Progress report submitted 26.4.2007
New deadline for correction of excessive deficit 2009
Follow-up of the NEW 104.7 Council recommendation
Commission adopts communication on action taken 13.6.2007
Abrogation of the EDP
Commission adopts recommendation for Council decision 
abrogating existence of excessive deficit (Art. 104.12)
21.6.2006 16.5.200743
Council adopts decision abrogating existence of excessive deficit 
(Art. 104.12)
11.7.2006 5.6.2007
3. Overview of the 2006/07 updates of the 
stability and convergence programmes
3.1. Introduction
The 2006/07 assessment round of stability and conver-
gence programmes (SCPs) was the first to include all
27 Member States of the enlarged EU and the second
implementing the reformed Stability and Growth Pact
(SGP). A schematic overview by country of the main
points included in the Council opinions on the SCPs is
provided in Table I.3.7 and Table I.3.8 at the end of this
section.
There are at least three positive elements emerging from
the latest assessment round. Firstly, countries in the exces-
sive deficit procedure (EDP) plan significant fiscal correc-
tions. If plans are fully implemented all but two countries
will correct the excessive deficit by 2008. Secondly, apart
from a few exceptions, the macroeconomic assumptions
underlying the budgetary projections are generally plausi-
ble. Thirdly, the recourse to one-off and other temporary
measures plays a less important role than in the past.
Less encouraging are the budgetary plans of the non-
EDP countries and those relating to the period after the
correction of an excessive deficit. On the face of a
favourable economic outlook, the projected progress
towards the country-specific medium-term objectives
(MTO) is comparatively slow.
As in past years, the assessment process was delayed as
a considerable number of SCPs was submitted after the
deadline of 1 December set in the code of conduct (1). Of
the 27 Member States, 10 respected the official deadline,
while some submissions took place with delays of sev-
eral weeks. Only in a few cases delayed submissions
were due to objective political constraints (e.g. forma-
tion of new governments in Austria, the Czech Republic
and Latvia). Portugal and the United Kingdom availed
themselves of their respective derogations as defined in
the code of conduct. The deadline of 1 December was
not applicable to Bulgaria and Romania, as they joined
the EU on 1 January 2007.
3.2. Country-specific medium-term 
budgetary objectives
Following the 2005 reform of the SGP, which made
MTOs country-specific, Member States presented their
respective targets for the first time in the 2005/06
updates of the SCPs. In some cases, the MTOs were not
explicitly indicated but could be inferred from the pro-
grammes. Only the United Kingdom did not specify a
quantitative MTO.
In the 2006/07 updates, two countries, Finland and Hun-
gary, modified their MTO making it more ambitious. In
the case of Finland, the MTO inferred from the previous
programme, and confirmed by the Finnish authorities,
was a structural surplus of 1.5 % of GDP. The 2006/07
update explicitly indicates a structural surplus of 2 % of
GDP. As regards Hungary, the MTO was set as a range
of – 0.5 % to – 1 % of GDP in the previous programme,
while the 2006/07 update sets a deficit of 0.5 % of
GDP (2).
¥2∂ For Denmark, the MTO, expressed as a range between â and 1â % of
GDP is in substance unchanged compared to the previous update, when it
was expressed as a range between 1â % and 2â % of GDP as the differ-44
¥1∂ Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and
guidelines on the format and content of stability and convergence pro-
grammes. The full document is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/codeofconduct_en.pdf 
ence corresponds to the impact of the Eurostat decision on the accounting
of second pillar funded pension systems. Similarly, the Swedish MTO is in
substance unchanged taking into account the Eurostat decision and it is set
as 1 % of GDP (previously expressed as 2 % of GDP).
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MTO put forward by Romania in its convergence pro-
gramme is a structural deficit of 0.9 % of GDP, while
Bulgaria set a balanced budget in structural terms. Based
on the criteria set out in the code of conduct and in the
agreement of the Economic and Financial Committee,
the MTO of Romania is appropriate taking into account
the debt ratio and average potential growth in the long-
run (1). The MTO set by Bulgaria is above the range war-
ranted by the debt ratio and potential GDP growth.
3.3. The adjustment path over 
the programme period
The nominal deficit in the euro area and in the EU as a
whole is projected to decline from about 2 % of GDP in
2006 to 0.5 % of GDP in 2009. Compared to the 2005/06
updates, the planned adjustment of the headline deficit
benefits from a better-than-expected initial position in
2006 and a more favourable economic growth outlook.
In 2006, the improvement in the underlying situation of
government finances has not always been satisfactory in
spite of robust economic growth coupled with buoyant
tax receipts. The 2006/07 updates of SCPs show that the
average improvement in the structural balance did not
exceed 0.4 % of GDP in the euro area and the EU, and
hence fell short of the 0.5 % of GDP benchmark of the
reformed SGP. While countries in EDP have in general
taken sizeable adjustment measures, non-EDP countries
have on average experienced a deterioration of their
structural balance.
Based on the figures of the programmes and using the
commonly agreed method, the structural budget balance
in the euro area and in the EU is estimated to improve
from respectively – 1.6 % and – 1.7 % of GDP in 2006
to – 0.4 % and – 0.5 % of GDP in 2009. The overall
adjustment is however somewhat back-loaded. In 2007,
the estimated improvement of the structural balance does
not exceed 0.4 % of GDP. Larger improvements are
planned in the outer years of the programme period.
Taking into account the favourable economic outlook,
this time profile is not consistent with the provisions of
the reformed SGP. Euro-area countries or Member
States participating in ERM-II should pursue an annual
structural adjustment of 0.5 % of GDP as a benchmark
and are expected to step up the adjustment effort in eco-
nomic ‘good times’.
Countries at MTO
Countries already at the MTO are estimated to loosen
their structural balance in 2007 by on average ã percent-
age point of GDP. In the euro area, the average deterio-
ration of the structural budget balance in the same
¥1∂ In September 2005 the EFC reiterated the provisions of the code of con-
duct concerning the MTOs and concluded that Member States with a low
debt ratio would have an MTO in a range from -1.0 % of GDP to -0.5 % of
Table I.3.1
MTO, minimum benchmark, debt and potential 
growth
MTO Minimum benchmark
Debt ratio 
(2006)
Potential 
growth 
(average 
2005–50)
  (% of GDP) %
SE 2.0 – 0.6 46.9 2.2
FI 2.0 – 1.1 39.1 1.7
DK 1.0 – 0.5 30.2 1.6
BE 0.5 – 1.1 89.1 1.7
DE 0.0 – 1.8 67.9 1.4
IE 0.0 – 1.3 24.9 2.8
EL 0.0 – 1.3 104.6 1.4
ES 0.0 – 1.2 39.9 1.5
FR 0.0 – 1.4 63.9 1.8
IT 0.0 – 1.5 106.8 1.3
AT 0.0 – 1.5 62.2 1.5
EE 0.0 – 2.0 4.1 2.6
MT 0.0 – 1.8 66.5 2.4
BG 0.0 – 1.3 22.8 n.a.
PT – 0.5 – 1.1 64.7 1.5
CY – 0.5 – 1.9 65.3 2.9
HU – 0.5 – 2.0 66.0 2.0
NL – 0.8 – 1.0 48.7 1.7
LU – 0.8 – 0.8 6.8 3.1
SK – 0.9 – 2.2 30.7 2.3
RO – 0.9 – 1.8 12.4 n.a.
CZ – 1.0 – 1.6 30.4 1.9
LV – 1.0 – 2.1 10.0 2.8
LT – 1.0 – 1.8 18.2 2.7
PL – 1.0 – 1.6 47.8 2.445
GDP, and that Member States with a very high debt ratio would have an
MTO in balance or surplus. Within this range, the MTOs would be set tak-
ing into account average potential growth as projected by the Economic
Policy Committee.
SI – 1.0 – 1.9 27.8 2.0
UK n.a. – 1.4 43.5 1.9
Source: Commission services.
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and is particularly large in Ireland and the Netherlands,
respectively 1.1 % of GDP and 0.5 % of GDP. Outside the
euro area, a particularly large deterioration is estimated to
take place in Bulgaria (2.2 % of GDP), Estonia (1 % of
GDP), Sweden and Latvia (both 0.8 % of GDP).
by the 2006/07 convergence programme thanks to addi-
tional measures announced after the submission of the
programme (1).
Table I.3.2
Nominal budget balances in the 2006/07 stability and convergence programme updates and the Commission 
services’ autumn 2006 and spring 2007 forecasts (% of GDP)
2006/07 updates Commission services’
autumn 2006 forecast
Commission services’
spring 2007 forecast
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
BE (1) – 2.3 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.5 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.2
DE – 3.2 – 2.1 – 11/2 – 11/2 – 1.0 – 2.3 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 1.7 – 0.6 – 0.3
IE 1.1 2.3 1.2 0.9 0.6 1.2 0.9 0.4 2.9 1.5 1.0
EL – 5.2 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 2.6 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.7
ES 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.1 0.9 1.8 1.4 1.2
FR (2) – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.5 – 1.8 – 0.9 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.2 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.9
IT – 4.1 – 5.7 – 2.8 – 2.2 – 1.5 – 4.7 – 2.9 – 3.1 – 4.4 – 2.1 – 2.2
LU – 1.0 – 1.5 – 0.9 – 0.4 0.1 – 1.5 – 0.5 – 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6
NL – 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 – 0.7 0.0
AT – 1.5 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.7 – 0.2 – 1.3 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.8
PT – 6.0 – 4.6 – 3.7 – 2.6 – 1.5 – 4.6 – 4.0 – 3.9 – 3.9 – 3.5 – 3.2
SI – 1.4 – 1.6 – 1.5 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 1.6 – 1.6 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.5
FI 2.5 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.9 3.7 3.6
EU-13 – 2.4 – 2.1 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 0.5 – 2.0 – 1.5 – 1.3 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 0.8
BG 2.4 3.2 0.8 1.5 1.5 3.3 1.8 1.7 3.3 2.0 2.0
CZ – 3.6 – 3.5 – 4.0 – 3.5 – 3.2 – 3.5 – 3.6 – 3.2 – 2.9 – 3.9 – 3.6
DK (4) 4.0 3.1 2.8 2.5 1.8 3.2 3.3 3.2 4.2 3.7 3.6
EE 2.3 2.6 1.2 1.3 1.6 2.5 1.6 1.3 3.8 3.7 3.5
CY – 2.3 – 1.9 – 1.6 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 1.9 – 1.7 – 1.7 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.4
LV 0.1 – 0.4 – 1.3 – 0.9 – 0.4 – 1.0 – 1.2 – 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.1
LT – 0.5 – 1.2 – 0.9 – 0.5 0.0 – 1.0 – 1.2 – 1.3 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 1.0
HU – 7.8 – 10.1 – 6.8 – 4.3 – 3.2 – 10.1 – 7.4 – 5.6 – 9.2 – 6.8 – 4.9
MT – 3.2 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 0.9 0.1 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 1.6
PL (4) – 2.5 – 1.9 – 1.4 – 1.0 – 0.6 – 2.2 – 2.0 – 1.8 – 3.9 – 3.4 – 3.3
RO – 1.5 – 2.3 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.0 – 1.4 – 2.6 – 2.6 – 1.9 – 3.2 – 3.2
SK – 3.1 – 3.7 – 2.9 – 2.4 – 1.9 – 3.4 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.5
SE (4) 3.0 3.0 2.4 2.7 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.2 2.4
UK (5) – 2.9 – 2.8 – 2.3 – 1.9 – 1.7 – 2.9 – 2.8 – 2.5 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 2.4
EU-27 (3) – 2.3 – 2.0 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 0.6 – 2.0 – 1.6 – 1.4 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 1.0
(1) The 2005 outcome follows the Eurostat decision to amend the deficit and debt data notified by Belgium for 2005 in relation to the assumption by government (FIF
— Fonds de l’infrastructure ferroviaire) of EUR 7 400 million (2.5% of GDP) of the debt of the railway company SNCB in 2005. 
(2) For France, the low-growth scenario has been taken into account.
(3) Data from the autumn forecast have been used for the missing countries for the calculation of the aggregates.
(4) The budgetary projections include the impact of the Eurostat decision of 2 March 2004 on the classification of funded pension schemes.
(5) Financial years ending in following March. Adjusted by Commission services to bring treatment of UMTS receipts in line with EDP definition.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ According to the anti-inflation plan released on 6 March 2007, Latvia46
In Bulgaria and Latvia, the deterioration of the structural
budget balance in 2007 is likely to be lower than implied
plans to achieve a balanced budget in 2007; the target in the convergence
programme was – 1.3 % of GDP. Bulgaria announced that it would aim for
a surplus of 2.0 % of GDP in 2007 as compared to 0.8 % of GDP indicated
in the convergence programme. 
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stance is not warranted against the backdrop of the
favourable economic growth prospects and impending
budgetary effects of ageing population. In some coun-
tries the fiscal loosening entails the risk of running pro-
cyclical policies. This risk was explicitly mentioned in
the Council opinions on the SCPs of Bulgaria, Ireland,
Estonia, the Netherlands and Sweden.
Countries not yet at the MTO
The adjustment planned by Member States with a deficit
below 3 % of GDP but not yet at MTO continues to fall
short of the 0.5 % benchmark in 2007. This is also the
case when considering only the euro-area countries of
the same category. While none of the currently con-
cerned euro-area countries is estimated to loosen the fis-
cal stance, the planned improvement, where there is one,
is modest. Based on the figures of the updated pro-
grammes and using the commonly agreed method, in
2007 the estimated improvement of the structural budget
balance in France, for which the low-growth scenario
was considered, is 0.3 % of GDP, while the structural
balance is estimated to remain almost unchanged in
Slovenia and Austria. Belgium and Luxembourg are the
only euro-area economies where the estimated structural
adjustment does not fall short of the 0.5 % of GDP
benchmark of the reformed Pact. However, in the case of
Belgium the Council in its opinion on the 2006/07
updated stability programme observed that the adjust-
ment towards the MTO may fall short of the 0.5 % of
GDP benchmark in 2007 and slow down thereafter. It
invited Belgium to ensure that the budget target for 2007
is met. As regards the time profile of the structural
adjustment over the entire programme period, the
planned improvement in France, Austria and Slovenia is
clearly back-loaded. In France and Austria, the bulk of
the adjustment is estimated to take place from 2008
onwards, while in Slovenia only from 2009 onwards.
Given the currently favourable economic conditions, the
three countries were invited by the Council to bring for-
ward their fiscal adjustment.
With the exception of Romania, the structural adjust-
ment in non-euro area countries that have not yet reached
the MTO is estimated to be somewhat larger on average
over the programme period. In Romania, a deterioration
of the structural budget balance is expected in 2007 and
the bulk of the overall adjustment effort for the entire
programme period is back-loaded to 2009.
Excessive deficit countries
Countries in EDP are estimated to make headway to cor-
rect the excessive deficits. According to the budgetary
Graph I.3.1:  Structural budget balances in the EU Member States and planned changes 2006–08 
(% of GDP)
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Structural balance in 2006
Structural balance in 2007
Structural balance in 2008
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Source: Commission services.
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Czech Republic would be the only EU Member States
with a deficit of more than 3 % of GDP after 2008.
In Greece, after an improvement of 0.6 % of GDP in 2007,
the planned adjustment effort over the rest of the pro-
gramme period, meets the 0.5 % of GDP benchmark. In
Italy and Portugal, the planned improvement in the struc-
tural balance throughout the programme period signifi-
cantly exceeds the 0.5 % of GDP benchmark each year
(e.g. in 2007, respectively 1.4 % and 0.8 % of GDP) and
reflects the aim of the two countries to comply with the
respective Council recommendations under Article 104(7).
Outside the euro area, compared to last year’s plans when
the projected annual fiscal adjustment in the recently
acceded Member States in EDP was estimated to fall short
of the 0.5 % benchmark, projections have been upgraded
in the new convergence programmes. In Hungary, for
instance, the improvement of the structural balance is esti-
mated to be particularly large (6.8 % of GDP over 2006–
09) aiming to correct the excessive deficit by 2009. In
Malta, an adjustment of 2.5 % of GDP is planned over the
same period. Despite a relatively high structural deficit,
the planned adjustment in 2006–09 is rather small in the
Czech Republic with only 0.4 % of GDP.
grow weaker once the deficit is projected to fall below
3 % of the GDP threshold. On the basis of the commonly
agreed method using the data of the SCPs, the projected
reduction of the structural budget balance falls signifi-
cantly short of the 0.5 % benchmark, in at least one of the
years following the correction of their excessive deficit.
For instance, Germany plans no improvement in 2008
and little improvement is planned in the United King-
dom in 2008 and 2009. Similarly, Slovakia, an ERM II
country, which is expected to correct its excessive deficit
by the 2007 deadline set by the Council plans an
improvement in the structural balance of only 1 % of
GDP over the entire programme period 2006–09.
3.3.1. Composition of the planned adjustments
The 2006/07 updates of the SCPs project a decline in both
the revenue and expenditure ratios over the programme
period. In the euro area, total revenues are expected to fall
by 0.4 percentage points, to 45 % of GDP in 2009. The
decline in revenues as a share of GDP is planned to be
more than offset by a sizeable reduction of the expenditure
ratio of around 1â % of GDP. A similar composition of
the adjustment is planned for the EU as a whole.
A decomposition of the planned reduction of the govern-
Graph I.3.2:  Structural balances and planned changes in Member States in EDP end 2006 
with deadlines for their correction
Source: Commission services.
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In some of the countries that are expected to correct the
excessive deficit shortly, the adjustment effort seems to
ment balance-to-GDP ratio reported in Table I.3.3 and
Table I.3.4 highlights a number of interesting elements.
Firstly, the projected decline in the expenditure-to-GDP
P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sratio is the combined effect of an increase in expenditure
levels that stays behind the projected increase in the
overall level of economic activity. In the euro area total
expenditures are planned to increase on average by
slightly less than 3 % per year in 2006–09. This com-
pares with an average annual increase of nominal GDP
of around 4 % per year, which is slightly above the aver-
age growth rate of the past 10 years and roughly corre-
sponds to the current estimate of real potential GDP
growth for the euro area plus the ECB’s 2 % reference
value for inflation. Secondly, the average annual
increase in total revenues is expected to be slightly lower
than nominal GDP growth and in line with the perform-
ance over the past 10 years.
A similar picture emerges for the EU as a whole. The
planned fiscal adjustment is expected to be obtained by
keeping average expenditure growth below the projected
growth rate of total revenues, which in turn are expected
to grow less than nominal GDP growth.
Most of the Member States that have been under the
excessive deficit procedure plan to improve their budg-
etary position chiefly via cuts in primary current expen-
ditures in % of GDP, or combine it with an increase in
revenues (Greece, Hungary, Italy). In some cases
(e.g. Italy and Poland), the planned budgetary adjust-
In some recently acceded Member States, a significant
increase in public investment is planned, especially in
Romania and the Baltic countries, reflecting the need to
build up and expand infrastructures. Declining investment
expenditures are planned in Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Finally, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal
expect an increase in interest expenditure in % of GDP
over the programme period in view of rising market
rates. By contrast, significant savings on interest expen-
ditures are expected in Member States with currently rel-
atively high, but rapidly declining debt ratios (Belgium,
Greece, Cyprus, Malta) although in some other countries
with debt levels below 30 % of GDP (Denmark, Roma-
nia, Slovenia) non-negligible savings are planned too.
3.3.2. One-off and other temporary measures
Over the programme period, one-off and other temporary
measures are planned to be negligible in both the euro area
and EU. They are expected to amount to less than 0.05 %
of GDP in 2007, following an already low amount in
2006. The impact of one-off and other temporary meas-
ures is expected to decline further in 2008 and 2009 (1).
By country, relatively large one-offs are expected in 2007
in Hungary and to a lesser extent in Belgium, Denmark,
Estonia, Italy and Malta. In the light of its past track
Graph I.3.3:  Headline deficit of the euro area; projections in the successive updates of the stability 
programmes (% of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
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ment involves a decline in public investments.
¥1∂ Countries for which the programme either does not provide any informa-
tion on one-offs or plans zero one-offs are not shown.
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recourse to one-off measures when strengthening the pace
of adjustment towards the MTO.
3.4. Debt projections
In 2006, the gross debt-to-GDP ratio in the euro area
declined to 69 % of GDP in 2006 and in the EU as a whole
to 61.7 % of GDP. The reduction of the debt ratio is planned
to accelerate significantly over the period covered by the
programmes, mainly due to higher primary surpluses and
favourable economic growth prospects. In 2009, the debt-
to-GDP ratio would be 64.6 % of GDP in the euro area,
while the EU aggregate is planned to be below the reference
value of 60 % of GDP, at 57.6 % of GDP.
reduce their debt levels over the programme period, only
France and Austria expect to bring it below the reference
value of the Treaty in 2010.
In the Member States outside the euro area, where the
debt ratio is on average lower, all countries, except Hun-
gary and the United Kingdom, are expected to reduce the
debt levels in per cent of GDP between now and 2009.
By the end of the programme period the only country
with a debt ratio above the 60 % of GDP reference value
of the Treaty would be Hungary. A rapid decline to just
below 60 % of GDP is projected in Malta.
3.5. Macroeconomic assumptions and 
risks to the budgetary projections
Table I.3.3
Euro area — Decomposition of the planned change in government balance-to-GDP ratio
2006 2009 Difference (2006–09) p.m. past performance
% of
GDP
EUR 
billion 
% of
GDP
EUR 
billion 
p.p. 
of GDP
EUR 
billion 
%
change
Annual 
average % 
change
Annual average % 
change
Total revenue 45.4 3 838.3 45.0 4 278.7 – 0.4 440.4 11.5 3.8 3.7  (1996–2005)
Total 
expenditure
47.3 3 997.5 45.7 4 343.6 – 1.6 346.1 8.7 2.9 3.2  (1996–2005)
Budget balance – 1.9 – 159.3 – 0.7 – 64.9 1.2 94.3
GDP 8 458.7 9 507.7 1 049.1 12.4 4.1 3.9  (1995–2005)
Source: Commission services on the basis of the 2006/07 updates of the stability and convergence programmes.
Table I.3.4
EU — Decomposition of the planned change in government balance-to-GDP ratio
2006 2009 Difference (2006–09) p.m. past performance
% of
GDP
EUR 
billion 
% of
GDP
EUR 
billion 
p.p. 
of GDP
EUR 
billion 
%
change
Annual
average % 
change
Annual average % 
change
Total revenue 44.5 5 146.4 44.2 5 832.3 – 0.3 685.9 13.3 4.4 4.6  (2001–05)
Total 
expenditure
46.4 5 362.2 45.0 5 933.9 – 1.4 571.8 10.7 3.6 3.2 (2001–05)
Budget balance – 1.9 – 215.8 – 0.8 – 101.7 1.1 114.1
GDP 11 559.0 13 195.1 1 636.0 14.2 4.7 4.5 (1995–2005)
Source: Commission services on the basis of the 2006/07 updates of the stability and convergence programmes.50
Although all six euro area Member States with debt lev-
els currently above the 60 % of GDP ceiling (Belgium,
Germany, Greece, France, Italy and Portugal) plan to
3.5.1. Risks to the budgetary projections
In the past, significant deviations from the budgetary
plans set out by Member States in their SCPs were
P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sobserved (see Graph I.3.3). The main reasons for the
deviations were (i) optimistic macroeconomic projec-
tions, (ii) slippages of government expenditures, despite
favourable developments in interest payments reflecting
the decline in market rates (1).
In line with established practice, the Commission and
the Council assessed the risks to the budgetary projec-
tions presented in the 2006/07 updates of the SCPs. The
conclusion was drawn that budgetary developments
could be ‘worse than projected’ in 2007 in four Mem-
ber States, while for 2008 and 2009, the number is sig-
Graph I.3.4:  Composition in the variation of the budget position 2006–09 (% of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
Graph I.3.5:  Debt-to-GDP ratio of the euro area: projections in successive updates of stability 
programmes (% of GDP)
Source: Commission services.
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nificantly higher, 11 and 13, respectively. In several
cases the assessment of the risks to the adjustment path
is complicated by the fact that the budgetary measures
¥1∂ Part III of this report provides a detailed analysis of the differences
between plans and outcomes over the period 1998-2006.
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ciently specified, especially in the outer years of the
programme period.
3.5.2. More cautious macroeconomic assumptions
According to the 2006/07 updates of the SCPs, rela-
tively sound economic growth prospects are expected
in the euro area and EU as a whole throughout the pro-
gramme period. Average real GDP growth is expected
to be close to or at the current estimate of potential
growth of 2ä % in the euro area and of 2â % in the EU.
As a result, the output gap calculated with the com-
monly agreed method is projected to remain roughly
stable at around – â percentage point of GDP in both
the euro area and the EU.
The growth projections in the 2006/07 updates were in
line with the Commission services’ autumn 2006 fore-
cast, which serves as benchmark for the assessment, and
have been considered as plausible in most of the assess-
ments. This constitutes a clear improvement compared
to the recent past when medium-term budgetary projec-
tions were typically based on optimistic macroeconomic
assumptions.
Nevertheless, in some cases macroeconomic projections
were considered favourable (or mildly favourable)
throughout the programme period (Malta) or in the outer
years of the programme (Poland, Portugal, Greece, Hun-
gary and Germany).       
Table I.3.5
Projections of real growth  (% change on the previous year)
2006/07 updates of stability and convergence 
programmes
Commission services’ autumn 
2006 forecast
Commission services’ spring 
2007 forecast
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
BE 1.2 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.7 2.3 2.2 3.1 2.3 2.2
DE 0.9 2.3 1.4 1.8 1.8 2.4 1.2 2.0 2.7 2.5 2.4
IE 5.5 5.4 5.3 4.6 4.1 5.3 5.3 4.3 6.0 5.0 4.0
EL 3.7 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.7 4.3 3.7 3.7
ES 3.5 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.9 3.7 3.4
FR 1.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.3
IT 0.0 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.7
LU 4.0 5.5 4.0 5.0 4.0 5.5 4.5 4.2 6.2 5.0 4.7
NL 1.5 3.8 3.0 1.8 1.8 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.9 2.8 2.6
AT 2.0 3.1 2.7 2.3 2.5 3.1 2.6 2.1 3.1 2.9 2.5
PT 0.4 1.4 1.8 2.4 3.0 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.8 2.0
SI 4.0 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.8 4.2 4.5 5.2 4.3 4.0
FI 2.9 4.5 3.0 2.9 2.6 4.9 3.0 2.6 5.5 3.1 2.7
EU-13 1.4 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.1 2.2 2.7 2.6 2.5
BG 5.5 5.9 5.9 6.2 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.2
CZ 6.1 6.0 4.9 4.8 4.8 6.0 5.1 4.7 6.1 4.9 4.9
DK 3.6 2.7 2.0 0.7 0.7 3.0 2.3 2.2 3.2 2.3 2.0
EE 10.5 11.0 8.3 7.7 7.6 10.9 9.5 8.4 11.4 8.7 8.2
CY 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.9
LV 10.2 11.5 9.0 7.5 7.5 11.0 8.9 8.0 11.9 9.6 7.9
LT 7.6 7.8 6.3 5.3 4.5 7.8 7.0 6.5 7.5 7.3 6.3
HU 4.2 4.0 2.2 2.6 4.2 4.0 2.4 2.7 3.9 2.4 2.6
MT 2.2 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.9 3.0 2.8
PL 3.5 5.4 5.1 5.1 5.6 5.2 4.7 4.8 6.1 6.1 5.5
RO 8.0 6.5 6.3 5.9 7.2 5.8 5.6 7.7 6.7 6.3
SK 6.1 6.6 7.1 5.5 5.1 6.7 7.2 5.7 8.3 8.5 6.5
SE 2.7 4.0 3.3 3.1 2.7 4.0 3.3 3.1 4.4 3.8 3.352
UK 1.8 2.8 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.5
EU-27 1.7 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.4 2.4 3.0 2.9 2.7
Source: Commission services.
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Table I.3.6
General government gross debt (% of GDP)
2006/07 updates of stability and
convergence programmes
Commission services’
autumn 2006 forecast
Commission services’
spring 2007 forecast
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008
BE 93.2 89.4 85.6 82.1 78.3 89.4 86.3 83.2 89.1 85.6 82.6
DE 67.9 67.9 67.0 66.5 65.5 67.8 67.7 67.3 67.9 65.4 63.6
IE 27.4 25.1 23.0 22.4 21.9 25.8 24.4 23.6 24.9 23.0 21.7
EL 107.5 104.1 100.1 95.9 91.3 104.8 101.0 96.4 104.6 100.9 97.6
ES 43.1 39.7 36.6 34.3 32.2 39.7 37.0 34.7 39.9 37.0 34.6
FR 66.6 64.6 63.6 62.6 60.7 64.7 63.9 63.3 63.9 62.9 61.9
IT 106.6 107.6 106.9 105.4 103.5 107.2 105.9 105.7 106.8 105.0 103.1
LU 6.1 7.5 8.2 8.5 8.5 7.4 7.3 7.1 6.8 6.7 6.0
NL 52.7 50.2 47.9 46.3 44.2 50.5 47.8 45.4 48.7 47.7 45.9
AT 63.4 62.2 61.2 59.9 58.5 62.1 60.9 59.8 62.2 60.6 59.2
PT 64.0 67.4 68.0 67.3 65.2 67.4 69.4 70.7 64.7 65.4 65.8
SI 28.0 28.5 28.2 28.3 27.7 28.4 28.0 27.6 27.8 27.5 27.2
FI 41.3 39.1 37.7 36.2 35.0 38.8 37.3 35.8 39.1 37.0 35.2
EU-13 70.6 69.4 67.8 66.4 64.6 69.4 68.0 66.9 69.0 66.9 65.0
BG 29.8 25.3 22.7 22.3 21.1 25.8 21.8 17.9 22.8 20.9 19.0
CZ 30.4 30.6 30.5 31.3 32.0 30.9 30.8 31.0 30.4 30.6 30.9
DK (1) 36.2 29.8 25.8 22.7 20.5 29.7 25.7 23.2 30.2 25.0 20.0
EE 4.5 3.7 2.6 2.3 2.1 4.0 2.7 2.1 4.1 2.7 2.3
CY 69.2 64.7 60.5 52.5 49.0 64.8 62.2 59.6 65.3 61.5 54.8
LV 12.1 10.7 10.5 10.6 9.4 11.1 10.6 10.3 10.0 8.0 6.7
LT 18.7 18.4 19.2 19.0 17.7 18.9 19.6 19.8 18.2 18.6 19.9
HU 61.7 67.5 70.1 71.3 69.3 67.6 70.9 72.7 66.0 67.1 68.1
MT 74.2 68.3 66.7 63.2 59.4 69.6 69.0 68.6 66.5 65.9 64.3
PL (2) 41.9 42.0 42.1 41.4 40.6 42.4 43.1 42.7 47.8 48.4 49.1
RO 15.9 12.8 13.5 12.6 11.7 13.7 13.9 14.4 12.4 12.8 13.1
SK 34.5 33.1 31.8 31.0 29.7 33.0 31.6 31.0 30.7 29.7 29.4
SE (2) 50.3 46.5 41.5 37.4 33.0 46.7 42.6 38.7 46.9 42.1 37.7
UK (3) 42.7 43.7 44.1 44.2 44.2 43.2 44.1 44.7 43.5 44.0 44.5
EU-27 63.0 61.8 60.4 59.1 57.6 61.7 60.6 59.6 61.7 59.9 58.3
(1) The projections include the impact of the Eurostat decision of 2 March 2004 on the classification of funded pension schemes. 
(2) The budgetary projections exclude the impact of the Eurostat decision of 2 March 2004 on the classification of funded pension schemes, which needs to be imple-
mented by the time of the spring 2007 notification (see Box I.2.2). 
(3) Financial years ending in following March.
Source: Commission services.53
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Council examinations of the 2006/07 updates of stability and convergence programmes
Macro 
outlook
MTO (% of 
GDP) (target 
year)
Risks 
to budget 
targets
Consistent 
with EDP 
correction 
(deadline)?
Safety margin 
provided?
MTO 
achieved?
Fiscal 
stance (4)
Debt ratio 
sufficiently 
diminishing?
Long-term 
sustainability 
risk
BE 2006–10 Plausible 0.5 % (2008 —
assuming that 
one-offs are 
lower than 
0.4 % of GDP)
Worse than 
targeted esp. 
in 2007 
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period
Not in 2008 Should be 
strengthened 
especially in 
2007
Yes Medium
BG 2006–09 Plausible 0 % (whole 
period)
Better than 
projected in 
2007, broadly 
balanced 
thereafter
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period
Throughout 
programme 
period
Not fully in line:  
expansionary 
fiscal stance in 
2007 and risk of 
procyclicality in 
good times
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Cannot be 
assessed but 
significant 
impact of 
ageing on 
expenditures 
can be expected
CZ 2006–09 (2) Plausible – 1 % (2013) Broadly 
balanced 
No (2008) [Not within 
programme 
period] (1)
[Not within 
programme 
period] (1)
Should be 
strengthened; 
risk of 
procyclicality in 
2007
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
High
DK 2006–10 Markedly 
cautious, esp. 
for 2008–10
(+0.5) –(+1.5) % 
(on average  
through 
the whole 
period to 2010)
Better than 
targeted 
(esp. 2008–10)
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period
Throughout 
programme 
period
Fully in line Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Low
DE 2006–10 Plausible until 
2008; mildly 
favourable 
thereafter
0 % (not within 
programme 
period)
Broadly 
balanced 
in 2007, worse 
than targeted 
thereafter
Yes, already 
in 2006 (2007)
From 2007 
(but risks)
Not within 
programme 
period
Should be 
strengthened 
(especially 
in 2008)
No Medium
EE 2006–10 Cautious 0 % (whole 
period)
Broadly 
balanced 
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period
Throughout 
programme 
period
Not fully in line: 
procyclicality in 
good times in 
2007
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Low
IE 2006–09 Plausible 0 % (whole 
period)
Broadly 
balanced 
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period
Throughout 
programme 
period
In line for 2008 
and 2009. Risk 
of procyclicality 
in 2007
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Medium
EL 2006–09 Plausible for 
2007; 
favourable 
thereafter
0 % (not within 
the programme 
period)
Broadly 
balanced in 
2007; worse 
than targeted 
thereafter
Yes (2006) Not within 
programme 
period
[Not within 
programme 
period] (1)
Should be 
strengthened 
(esp. after 2007)
Yes High
ES 2006–09 Plausible 0 % (whole 
period)
Broadly 
balanced
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period 
Throughout 
programme 
period
In line Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Medium
FR 2006–10 Plausible from 
2007 (NB: low 
growth 
scenario)
0 % (2010) Broadly 
balanced until 
2008; worse 
than targeted 
thereafter
Not in EDP 
(from January 
2007)
Probably from 
2009
Possibly not 
within 
programme 
period
Broadly in line 
except for 2007
Yes Medium
IT 2006–11 Plausible 0 % (2011) Better than 
targeted in 
2006; broadly 
balanced 
in 2007;  worse 
than targeted 
thereafter
Conditionally  
yes 2007
Possibly only 
from 2010
Possibly not 
within 
programme 
period
Broadly in line No Medium
CY 2006–10 Plausible – 0.5 % (2008) Broadly 
balanced
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period
From 2008 In line, both 
before and 
after achieving 
the MTO
Yes (below 
60 % from 
2008)
High
(Continued on the next page)54
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LV 2006–09 (3) Plausible but 
risk of less 
favourable 
outlook in view 
of the external 
imbalances
– 1.0 % (2008) Broadly 
balanced 
in 2007; worse 
than targeted 
from 2008
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period
Not in 2008 Broadly in line 
except for 2007
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Low
LT 2006–09 Cautious from 
2007
– 1.0 % (2008) Broadly 
balanced 
in 2007; worse 
than targeted 
thereafter
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period 
Possibly 
not in 2008
Should be 
strengthened by 
backing up with 
measures
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Low
(1) Points are not explicitly made in the Council opinion.
(2) Commission recommendation.
(3) Admissible temporary deviation for LV due to the implementation of a pension reform. However, the fiscal adjustment is still not in line with the Pact.
(4) Namely: for countries that are in MTO, whether procyclical fiscal policies are avoided in good times, and for countries that are not yet in MTO, whether the adjust-
ment (towards the MTO) is appropriate (of 0.5 % of GDP benchmark for euro area and ERM II countries) and higher in good times; for countries in EDP, the assess-
ment on the fiscal stance is carried out only for the period following the correction of the excessive deficit.
Table I.3.8
Council examinations of the 2006/07 updates of stability and convergence programmes 
Macro 
outlook
MTO 
(% of GDP) 
(+ target 
year)
Risks 
to budget 
targets
Consistent 
with EDP 
correction 
(+ deadline)?
Safety margin 
provided?
MTO 
achieved?
Fiscal 
Stance (3)
Debt ratio 
sufficiently 
diminishing?
Long-term 
sustainability 
risk
LU 2006–09 Plausible – 0.8 % (2007) Better than 
targeted
Not in EDP Possibly from 
2007
Possibly From 
2007
Fully in line 
(before and 
after achieving 
the MTO) 
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Medium
HU 2006–10 Plausible to 
slightly cautious 
until 2008; 
rather 
favourable 
thereafter 
– 0.5 %
(not within 
programme 
period)
Worse than 
targeted, esp. 
from 2008
Conditional yes 
(2009)
[Not within 
programme 
period] (1)
[Not within 
programme 
period] (1)
Should be 
strengthened
Not sufficiently 
diminishing
High
MT 2006–09 Favourable for 
2007; markedly 
favourable 
thereafter
0 % (not within 
programme 
period)
Broadly 
balanced in 
2007; worse 
than targeted 
thereafter
Yes (2006) From 2008 [Not within 
programme 
period]( 1)
Broadly in line Yes Medium
NL 2006–09 Plausible until 
2007; cautious 
thereafter
(– 1.0) – (– 0.5) % 
(whole period)
Broadly 
balanced from 
2007
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period
Throughout 
programme 
period
Risk of 
procyclicality 
in good times 
in 2007
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Low
AT 2006–10 (2) Cautious until 
2008; plausible 
thereafter
0 % 
(nearly reached 
in 2009)
Broadly 
balanced until 
2008; worse 
than targeted 
thereafter
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period
Not in 2010 Insufficient and 
should be 
strengthened in 
2007 and 2008 
Yes Low
PL 2006–09  Cautious until 
2007; rather 
favourable 
thereafter
– 1.0 % (not 
within 
programme 
period)
Worse than 
targeted in 
particular in the 
outer years of 
the programme
No (2007) Not within 
programme 
period
Not in 2010 Should be 
strengthened
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Low
PT 2006–10 Favourable for 
2008; and for  
the outer years
– 0.5 % (2010) Worse than 
targeted 
Conditional yes 
(2008)
Not within 
programme 
period
Not within 
programme 
period
Possible 
reinforced 
measures could 
be required to 
be in line
Yes at end of 
programme 
period
High
(Continued on the next page)55
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RO 2006–09 Plausible – 0.9 %  (2011) Broadly 
balanced in 
2007; worse 
than targeted 
thereafter
Not in EDP Not within 
programme 
period
Not within 
programme 
period
Insufficient and 
should be 
strengthened 
significantly
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Cannot be 
assessed; but 
significant 
impact of 
ageing on 
expenditures 
can be expected 
SI 2006–09 Plausible – 1.0 % (2009) Broadly 
balanced until 
2008; worse 
than targeted in 
2009
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period
Not within 
programme 
period
Insufficient and 
should be 
strengthened 
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
High
SK 2006–09 Plausible from 
2007
– 0.9 % 
(‘deficit of just 
below 1 %’) 
(2010)
Broadly 
balanced
Yes but 
adjustment 
should be 
strengthened
Not within 
programme 
period
Not within 
programme 
period
Should be 
strengthened
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Medium
FI 2006–10 Plausible in 
2007–09; 
cautious 
thereafter
+ 2.0 % 
(whole period)
Broadly 
balanced
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period 
Throughout 
programme 
period 
Fully in line Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Low
SE 2006–09 Plausible + 2.0 %
(whole period)
Broadly 
balanced
Not in EDP Throughout 
programme 
period
Throughout 
programme 
period
Risk of 
procyclicality 
in 2007
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Low
UK 2006/07–
2011–12
Plausible
(NB: low growth 
scenario)
Not specified Broadly 
balanced until 
2007/08; worse 
than targeted 
thereafter 
Yes (2006/07) From 2009/10 Cannot be 
assessed
Should be 
strengthened
Debt ratio 
< 60 %
Medium
(1) Points are not explicitly made in the Council opinion.
(2) Commission recommendation.
(3) Namely: for countries that are in MTO, procyclical fiscal policies are avoided in good times, and for countries that are not yet in MTO, whether the adjustment
(towards the MTO) is appropriate (of 0.5 % of GDP benchmark for euro area and ERM II countries) and higher in good times; for countries in EDP, the assessment on
the fiscal stance is carried out only for the period following the correction of the excessive deficit.56
4. The long-term sustainability of public 
finances based on the 2006/07 updates of 
the stability and convergence programmes
4.1. Introduction
In response to the increased emphasis put on long-term
sustainability by the Council in the context of the 2005
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the Com-
mission released a comprehensive assessment on the
long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU, the
first Sustainability Report, in October 2006.
The assessment round of the 2006/07 vintage of stability
and convergence programmes (SCPs) provides the basis
for the first update of this comprehensive assessment. In
particular, it gives the possibility to take account of (i)
the most recent economic and fiscal developments and
projections as outlined in the programmes, and (ii) recent
structural reforms measures undertaken by the Member
States with an impact on the long-term budgetary trends.
To arrive at an overall assessment of the budgetary chal-
lenges posed by ageing populations, the assessment of the
long-term sustainability of public finances carried out by
the Commission and the Council on the basis of the infor-
mation provided in the SCPs uses both quantitative indi-
cators and qualitative information. A detailed description
of the methodology used to assess long-term sustainability
of public finances in the EU is given in the Commission
services Sustainability Report (SR), in agreement with the
Member States (1). The estimated impact included in the
SCPs of recent pension reforms in some Member States
was not incorporated in the baseline calculation of the sus-
tainability indicators and debt projections, but was consid-
ered in the overall assessment.
4.2. The update of the long-term 
sustainability analysis
In agreement with the opinion by the Council and the
EPC (2), the assessment of the long-term sustainability
of public finances on the basis of the information pro-
vided in the latest SCP updates relies on the common
long-term budgetary projections prepared jointly by the
Commission services and the EPC (3).
The most salient figures of the common projections of
age-related expenditure are summarised in Table I.4.1.
With a few exceptions (see Section 4.2.2 below), the
latest SCP updates presented by Member States use
these common projections when discussing long-term
sustainability of public finances.
4.2.1. The quantitative indicators
Compared with the Sustainability Report of October
2006, the main change in the present assessment is that
the initial budgetary position shifts by one year. In the
Sustainability Report, the starting point was the struc-
tural (primary) balances and the debt-to-GDP ratio of
2005. In the assessment round of the 2006/07 vintage of
SCPs, the starting point is the structural (primary) bal-
ances and the debt-to-GDP ratio of 2006, referred to as
‘2006 scenario’.¥1∂ The Ecofin Council and the Economic Policy Committee considered thatthe sustainability report should be the basis for the annual examination of
the stability and convergence programmes. See draft Council conclusions
on the long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU, UEM 150,57
14615/06, Brussels, 30 October 2006 and opinion by the Economic Policy
Committee (EPC) on the Commission’s report on the long-term sustaina-
bility of public finances in the EU (2006), ECFIN/EPC(2006)REP/56232
final, Brussels, 25 October 2006.
¥2∂ See previous footnote.
¥3∂ The common projections were released in February 2006; see Economic
Policy Committee and the European Commission (2006).
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in terms of both the structural balance and the primary
structural balance. In general, and reflecting consolida-
tion efforts, a majority of countries improved the under-
lying budgetary position in 2006. An improvement of
more than one percentage point of GDP was recorded in
Germany, Greece, Cyprus and Portugal. However, in
some countries the structural balance deteriorated by
â percentage point of GDP or more; this was the case in
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Hungary, the Netherlands and Slovakia.
Table I.4.3 presents the results of the quantitative sus-
tainability indicators S1 and S2, calculated on the basis
of the information provided in the 2006/07 updates of the
SCPs using the commonly agreed methodology and the
common projections of age-related expenditure up until
2050. S1 measures the size of the permanent budgetary
adjustment necessary for the debt to reach 60 % of GDP
in 2050. By contrast, S2 gives the size of the permanent
budgetary adjustment necessary to fulfil the inter-tempo-
ral budget constraint (1).
The sustainability indicators are broken down into dif-
ferent components to determine the extent to which the
sustainability gaps can be attributed to (i) the relative
position of the current primary budget balance (IBP)
compared to the primary balance that stabilises the debt
as a share of GDP and/or to (ii) the increase in age-
related expenditure in the future (LTC). The component
denoted as GRD is specific to S1 and relates to the initial
level of debt vis-à-vis the 60 % of GDP threshold of the
Treaty (2).
In the EU as a whole and in the euro area, the sustaina-
bility gap is about 2 % of GDP according to the S1 indi-
cator and about 3 % of GDP according to the S2 indica-
tor. This implies a slight improvement compared with
the results of the 2006 Sustainability Report. The posi-
tion has improved by almost â percentage point of GDP,
reflecting the better structural fiscal position in 2006.
Abstracting from the impact of age-related expenditure,
the initial level of the primary balance is in fact close to
the one stabilising the debt ratio. The long-term budget-
ary impact of ageing continues to explain the lion’s share
of the overall sustainability gap. The EU aggregates
mask significant differences across countries. The
majority of Member States have sustainability gaps:
16 according to the S1 indicator and 19 according to the
S2 indicator. In those countries, based on the current
budgetary position and with no changes in policies, an
adjustment is necessary to place public finances on a sus-
tainable footing.
The impact of the initial budgetary position
According to the S2 sustainability indicator, in about
half of the Member States public finances are on an
unsustainable path even before considering the long-
term budgetary impact of ageing populations (3).
In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and
Slovakia an adjustment of the structural primary balance
of more than 2 % of GDP would be required to avoid an
unsustainable path in the medium term (4). In another
five — Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal and the
United Kingdom — an adjustment of between 1 % and
2 % of GDP would be required. For these countries the
initial budgetary position poses a significant risk to the
sustainability of the public finances.
Finally, in 11 countries — Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark,
Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Aus-
tria, Finland and Sweden — the current fiscal position
would be consistent with sustainable public finances if
there was no impact of ageing on public finances. It can
thus contribute to cover part of the budgetary impact of
ageing over the long-term by reducing public debt and/
or accumulating assets in the next decades.
The long-term budgetary impact of ageing
As regards the pure budgetary impact of ageing, as meas-
ured by the component denoted as LTC, the update of the
assessment on the basis of the information provided in
the 2006/07 vintage of SCPs give rise to small differ-
ences compared to the 2006 Sustainability Report. This
is because the last year of the programme period for all
Member States, when the long-term budgetary impact of
ageing is assumed to begin, is close to 2010, which was
used in the SR. 
¥3∂ The contributions of the IBP to the sustainability gap are of similar size for
both indicators S1 and S2. In the following paragraphs the results of the S2
indicator are referred to.58
¥1∂ For a more a detailed description see Box I.4.1
¥2∂ A more detailed description is provided in Box I.4.1.
¥4∂ Poland is however in a very specific position. The projected decrease in
age-related expenditure as a share of GDP results in a negative long-term
budgetary impact of ageing. This almost exactly offsets the weak initial
budgetary position.
P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sThe cross-country differences remain large reflecting in
particular the diversity in public pension arrangements, in
their degree of maturity and the effects of pension reforms
projected to bring relief to the budgetary position in the
long-run. In all other countries age-related expenditures
are projected to require more ore less large additional
Table I.4.1
Projected changes according to the common projections in age-related public expenditure 
between 2004 and 2030–50 (% of GDP)
Pensions
 
Healthcare
 
Long-term care
 
Unemployment 
benefits
 
Education
 
Total 
age-related 
expenditure
 
Level Change  from 2004 to: Level 
Change  from 
2004 to: Level 
Change  from 
2004 to: Level 
Change  from 
2004 to: Level 
Change  from 
2004 to: 
Change  from 
2004 to: 
2004 2030 2050 2004 2030 2050 2004 2030 2050 2004 2030 2050 2004 2030 2050 2030 2050 
BE 10.4 4.3 5.1 6.2 0.9 1.4 0.9 0.4 1.0 2.3 – 0.5 – 0.5 5.6 – 0.6 – 0.7 4.5 6.3 BE
CZ 8.5 1.1 5.6 6.4 1.4 2.0 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.2 – 0.0 – 0.0 3.8 – 0.9 – 0.7 1.8 7.2 CZ
DK 9.5 3.3 3.3 6.9 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.6 1.1 1.5 – 0.3 – 0.3 7.8 – 0.4 – 0.3 4.0 4.8 DK
DE 11.4 0.9 1.7 6.0 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.4 1.0 1.3 – 0.4 – 0.4 4.0 – 0.8 – 0.9 1.0 2.7 DE
EE 6.7 – 1.9 – 2.5 5.4 0.8 1.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 – 0.0 – 0.0 5.0 – 1.1 – 1.3 – 2.2 – 2.5 EE
IE 4.7 3.1 6.4 5.3 1.2 2.0 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.7 – 0.2 – 0.2 4.1 – 0.9 – 1.0 3.3 7.8 IE
EL (*) 5.1 0.8 1.7 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.1 3.5 – 0.5 – 0.4 EL (*)
ES 8.6 3.3 7.1 6.1 1.2 2.2 0.5 0.0 0.2 1.1 – 0.4 – 0.4 3.7 – 0.7 – 0.6 3.3 8.5 ES
FR 12.8 1.5 2.0 7.7 1.2 1.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 1.2 – 0.3 – 0.3 5.0 – 0.5 – 0.5 2.0 3.2 FR
IT 14.2 0.8 0.4 5.8 0.9 1.3 1.5 0.2 0.7 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.1 4.3 – 0.8 – 0.6 1.0 1.7 IT
CY 6.9 5.3 12.9 2.9 0.7 1.1 0.4 – 0.0 – 0.0 6.3 – 1.9 – 2.2 4.1 11.8 CY
LV 6.8 – 1.2 – 1.2 5.1 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.1 4.9 – 1.2 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.3 LV
LT 6.7 1.2 1.8 3.7 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 5.0 – 1.6 – 1.6 0.3 1.4 LT
LU 10.0 5.0 7.4 5.1 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.2 0.6 0.3 – 0.0 – 0.1 3.3 – 0.5 – 0.9 5.4 8.2 LU
HU 10.4 3.1 6.7 5.5 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.2 – 0.0 – 0.0 4.5 – 1.0 – 0.7 3.1 7.6 HU
MT 7.4 1.7 – 0.4 4.2 1.3 1.8 0.9 0.2 0.2 1.2 – 0.2 – 0.2 4.4 – 1.2 – 1.2 1.8 0.3 MT
NL 7.7 2.9 3.5 6.1 1.0 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.6 1.8 – 0.2 – 0.2 4.8 – 0.2 – 0.2 3.8 5.0 NL
AT 13.4 0.6 – 1.2 5.3 1.0 1.6 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.8 – 0.1 – 0.1 5.1 – 0.9 – 1.0 0.9 0.2 AT
PL 13.9 – 4.7 – 5.9 4.1 1.0 1.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.4 5.0 – 2.0 – 1.9 – 6.1 – 6.7 PL
PT 11.1 4.9 9.7 6.7 – 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.4 1.0 – 0.1 – 0.1 5.1 – 0.6 – 0.4 4.3 10.1 PT
SI 11.0 3.4 7.3 6.4 1.2 1.6 0.9 0.5 1.2 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.1 5.3 – 0.7 – 0.4 4.4 9.7 SI
SK 7.2 0.5 1.8 4.4 1.3 1.9 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.2 3.7 – 1.5 – 1.3 0.3 2.9 SK
FI 10.7 3.3 3.1 5.6 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.2 1.8 1.5 – 0.4 – 0.4 6.0 – 0.6 – 0.7 4.7 5.2 FI
SE 10.6 0.4 0.6 6.7 0.7 1.0 3.8 1.1 1.7 1.1 – 0.2 – 0.2 7.3 – 0.7 – 0.9 1.3 2.2 SE
UK 6.6 1.3 2.0 7.0 1.1 1.9 1.0 0.3 0.8 0.4 – 0.0 – 0.0 4.6 – 0.5 – 0.6 2.2 4.0 UK
EU-25 10.6 1.3 2.2 6.4 1.0 1.6 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.9 – 0.3 – 0.3 4.6 – 0.7 – 0.6 1.6 3.4 EU-25
EU-15 10.6 1.5 2.3 6.4 1.0 1.6 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.9 – 0.2 – 0.2 4.6 – 0.6 – 0.6 1.9 3.7 EU-15
EU-12 11.5 1.6 2.6 6.3 1.0 1.5 0.8 0.2 0.6 1.0 – 0.3 – 0.3 4.4 – 0.7 – 0.6 1.9 3.8 EU-12
EU-10 10.9 – 1.0 0.3 4.9 0.9 1.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.2 4.7 – 1.5 – 1.3 – 1.7 0.3 EU-10
(*) Total expenditure for pensions does not include Greece. For long-term care, there are no projections available for Greece and Cyprus. Since the release of the Age-
ing Report, FR, PT, EE and HU have provided the data required to conduct the projections for long-term care for these countries. Table 1 includes these projections.
The projection results for public spending on long-term care for Germany does not reflect current legislation where benefit levels are fixed. A scenario which comes
closer to the current setting of legislation projects that public spending would remain constant as a share of GDP over the projection period. These figures refer to
the baseline projections for social security spending on pensions, education and unemployment transfers. For healthcare and long-term care, the projections refer to
‘AWG reference scenarios’.
Sources: EPC and European Commission (2006a) and European Commission (2006b).59
enacted so far. Differences in other age-related expendi-
ture items projections are smaller. Only in two countries
— Estonia and Poland — age-related expenditures are
budgetary adjustments to secure the long-term sustaina-
bility of public finances. The largest additional adjustment
of more than 8 % of GDP is projected for Cyprus.
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 7A number of countries — Belgium, Denmark, Hungary,
Malta, Portugal and the United Kingdom — have under-
taken structural reforms with an estimated impact on the
age-related expenditure ratio over the long-term. The
impacts of such reforms are however not taken account
of in the calculations reported in Table I.4.3. They are
discussed in Section 4.2.2 below.
For Bulgaria and Romania, which recently joined the EU,
long-term projections for the five expenditure items cov-
ered by the common projections exercise (shown in Table
I.4.1) were not available on a comparable basis and the
European aggregates are therefore calculated without
The required balance
One way to cope with the budgetary implications of age-
ing is to consolidate public finances over the medium
term, i.e. to frontload the necessary budgetary adjust-
ment. This can be illustrated by the required primary bal-
ance (RPB), the structural primary budgetary position
over the medium term that is consistent with sustainable
public finances as measured by the S2 indicator. The
RPB as well as the structural primary balances in 2006
are shown in Table I.4.4 (1)
Table I.4.2
Government balances in 2005 and 2006 compared (% of GDP)
Structural balance Structural primary balance Structural primary balance
Sustainability 
Report 2005
SCP
2006
Sustainability 
Report 2005
SCP
2006
in last year
of programme
last year 
of programme
BE 0.1 – 0.4 4.5 3.7 4.0 2010
CZ – 1.4 – 3.9 – 0.2 – 2.8 – 1.9 2009
DK (*) 5.2 (4.3) 3.1 (2.2) 7.1 (6.2) 4.7 (3.8) 4.3 (3.3) 2010
DE – 3.1 – 2.0 – 0.3 0.8 2.2 2010
EE 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.8 2010
IE 1.9 2.7 3.1 3.7 2.6 2009
EL – 5.3 – 3.4 – 0.3 1.2 2.3 2009
ES 1.3 1.8 3.1 3.4 2.9 2009
FR – 3.1 – 2.5 – 0.5 0.1 2.7 2010
IT – 3.9 – 3.9 0.6 0.9 5.2 2011
CY – 2.9 – 1.5 0.5 1.8 2.6 2010
LV – 0.1 – 0.9 0.5 – 0.3 0.7 2009
LT – 1.1 – 1.8 – 0.3 – 1.0 1.3 2009
LU – 1.3 – 1.3 – 1.2 – 1.1 1.1 2009
HU – 7.7 – 9.8 – 3.6 – 5.9 0.9 2010
MT – 3.1 – 2.9 0.9 0.8 2.7 2009
NL 1.0 0.4 3.6 2.7 2.4 2009
AT – 1.0 – 0.9 1.7 2.1 3.1 2010
PL (*) – 2.6 (– 4.5) – 2.1 (– 3.9) – 0.2 (– 1.7) 0.3 (– 1.3) 1.6 (– 0.1) 2009
PT – 5.2 – 3.4 – 2.5 – 0.5 2.4 2010
SI – 1.5 – 1.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 2009
SK – 2.2 – 3.5 – 0.4 – 1.7 – 0.8 2009
FI 3.2 2.9 4.7 4.5 4.1 2010
SE (*) 2.6 (1.6) 3.0 (2.0) 4.2 (3.2) 4.5 (3.5) 4.5 (3.4) 2009
UK – 3.3 – 2.5 – 1.1 – 0.3 0.8 2011
(*) For countries that had not yet applied the Eurostat decision on the classification of pension schemes (DK, PL, SE), the balances are given including revenue to the
funded part of the mandatory pension scheme; data without such revenue are given in brackets.
Sources: 2006/07 updates stability and convergence programmes, Commission services’ calculations.60
these countries. However, a significant impact of ageing
on government expenditure cannot be excluded given the
current and projected demographic structure.
¥1∂ The structural primary balances of 2006 include the revenue-reducing
impact of Eurostat’s decision regarding the classification of funded
defined contribution pension schemes, which is fully in place from April
2007. See Eurostat (2004) and Part II.2.3 of this report.
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surplus significantly more than 2 % of GDP, and hence
well above the current medium-term budgetary objec-
tives (MTOs) chosen by the Member States; the country
with the highest MTO is Finland, which targets a struc-
tural surplus of 2 % of GDP. Unless MTOs are revised
considerably, Table I.4.4 makes clear that long-term sus-
other two pillars of the three-pronged strategy to ensure
sustainable public finances, agreed by the European
Council in March 2001, namely by: (i) reforming pen-
sion and healthcare systems; and, (ii) increasing employ-
ment rates and enhancing productivity. In particular,
countries with very high RPBs would need to supple-
ment ambitious fiscal policies with structural reforms
Table I.4.3
Sustainability gaps in the ‘2006 scenario’ (% GDP)
S1
S1 in 
Sustainability 
Report
S2
S2 in 
Sustainability 
Report
Total IBP (*) DR (*) LTC (*) Total Total IBP (*) LTC (*) Total
BE 1.3 – 2.7 0.3 3.7 0.4 2.7 – 2.6 5.3 1.8
CZ 5.2 3.2 – 0.5 2.5 2.5 8.0 3.3 4.7 5.5
DK – 1.4 – 3.6 – 0.8 3.0 – 4.2 0.3 – 3.6 3.9 – 2.2
DE 2.2 0.4 0.1 1.7 3.5 3.3 0.4 2.8 4.4
EE – 4.2 – 1.6 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 4.4 – 3.2 – 1.6 – 1.7 – 3.4
IE – 1.2 – 3.7 – 1.0 3.5 – 0.8 2.4 – 3.6 6.0 2.9
EL (**) 1.2 0.3 0.5 0.3 3.2 1.3 0.4 0.8 3.0
ES – 0.2 – 3.0 – 0.5 3.3 0.2 2.8 – 2.9 5.7 3.2
FR 2.3 0.6 – 0.1 1.8 3.2 3.2 0.6 2.6 4.0
IT 3.4 1.0 0.9 1.5 3.4 3.0 1.0 2.0 3.1
CY 2.3 – 1.7 – 0.3 4.3 4.0 7.0 – 1.3 8.3 8.5
LV – 0.1 0.4 – 0.9 0.4 – 0.6 1.2 0.4 0.8 0.8
LT 1.0 1.1 – 0.7 0.5 0.3 2.4 1.3 1.1 1.8
LU 4.3 1.1 – 1.7 4.9 4.6 9.3 1.1 8.2 9.5
HU 10.5 6.9 0.6 3.1 7.9 12.3 7.2 5.1 9.8
MT 0.4 – 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.3
NL 0.8 – 2.1 – 0.3 3.3 – 0.2 2.4 – 2.2 4.5 1.3
AT – 0.2 – 1.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 – 0.1 – 1.1 1.1 0.3
PL – 1.6 1.7 – 0.1 – 3.1 – 0.4 – 1.4 2.1 – 3.4 – 0.2
PT 5.6 1.4 0.1 4.1 7.9 8.3 1.6 6.7 10.5
SI 3.6 0.0 – 0.6 4.2 3.9 7.0 0.1 7.0 7.3
SK 2.4 1.9 – 0.5 1.0 1.3 4.1 2.2 2.0 3.0
FI – 3.1 – 4.8 – 1.6 3.3 – 3.3 – 0.7 – 4.9 4.2 – 0.9
SE – 3.1 – 3.4 – 1.0 1.3 – 2.7 – 1.5 – 3.4 1.9 – 1.1
UK 2.6 0.8 – 0.2 2.0 3.4 4.2 1.0 3.2 4.9
EU-13 (**) 1.9 – 0.4 0.0 2.2 2.3 3.0 – 0.3 3.3 3.5
EU-27 (**) 1.8 – 0.2 – 0.1 2.0 2.1 3.0 – 0.1 3.1 3.4
(*) IBP = the initial budgetary position, DR = the debt requirement in 2050, LTC = the long-term changes in the primary balance. A positive value of S1 and S2 indi-
cates that a budgetary improvement would close the gap, while a negative value indicates that a budgetary weakening would close the gap. In the ‘2006 scenario’,
it is assumed that the structural primary balance will remain unchanged from 2006 throughout the programme period, usually until 2010. Debt projections in this
scenario start in 2007. 
(**) No pension projections were available for Greece and the rise in age-related expenditure is therefore underestimated. Pension expenditure was projected to rise
between 2005 and 2050 by 10.2 % in the 2002 update of the Greek stability programme. The aggregate results for the euro area (EU-13) exclude Greece and for the
European Union (EU-27) additionally exclude Romania and Bulgaria.
Source: Commission services.61
tainability is unlikely to be achieved by complying with
the budgetary requirements of the reformed SGP. It also
underscores the importance of making progress with the
that contribute to curb the long-term budgetary impact of
ageing in order to progress towards more sustainable
public finances.
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 7Achieving the plans in the SCPs
The sustainability challenge would be significantly
reduced if Member States reached the budgetary targets
outlined in the 2006/07 updates of the SCPs. The impact
on the sustainability indicators of implementing the
plans in the programmes is given in Table I.4.5. For the
EU as a whole, the sustainability gap would be reduced
The planned consolidation in France, Italy, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Hungary, and Portugal would result in a
reduction of the S2 sustainability gap by 2 percentage
points of GDP or more.
Debt developments
Given the improved structural budgetary position in
2006, the debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to fall below the
60 % of GDP reference value in the ‘2006 scenario’ over
the coming decade for the EU as a whole. However, in
the early 2020s it is projected to start rising again and
reach around 160 % of GDP in 2050, revealing that on
current policies the public finances are on an unsustain-
able path.
Compared with the results in the 2006 Sustainability
Report, this is an improvement for the EU as a whole, as
debt was projected to reach around 180 % of GDP in
2050. For the countries that significantly improved their
structural balance in 2006 compared with 2005, for
example Germany, Cyprus and Portugal, a considerable
improvement in the projected debt position over the pro-
jection period up to 2050 is to be noted.
If the medium-term budgetary targets in the stability and
convergence programmes are implemented in full, the
debt-to-GDP ratio will decline more markedly up to the
early 2030s. This trend will, however, start to reverse
once the budgetary impact of ageing starts to take hold
more firmly and the debt-to-GDP ratio will again start
rising thereafter and it would be higher than 60 % of
GDP in 2050 (see Graph I.4.1 and Table I.4.6). Consoli-
dating the public finances over the medium term enables
the debt-to-GDP ratio to be reduced in the coming dec-
ades, a reduction which absorbs part of the long-term
budgetary impact of an ageing population.
4.2.2. The qualitative considerations
In order to interpret the quantitative sustainability indi-
cators, it is necessary to take into account other factors
so as to identify the main reasons behind the sustainabil-
ity risks in the formulation of an overall assessment of
the long-term sustainability of public finances.
The current level of the debt-to-GDP ratio is an impor-
tant item in terms of risks to public finance sustainabil-
ity. High-debt countries may have to sustain high pri-
Table I.4.4
Required primary balance (% of GDP)
Structural
primary
balance
Required
primary
balance
Increase in
age-related
expenditure
2006 Between 2010 
and 2050
BE 3.7 6.2 6.6
CZ – 2.8 5.3 7.7
DK 3.8 3.6 4.5
DE 0.8 4.3 4.0
EE 1.6 – 1.0 – 1.8
IE 3.7 5.7 7.8
EL (*) 1.2 2.5 1.4
ES 3.4 6.4 8.9
FR 0.1 3.2 3.2
IT 0.9 3.9 2.4
CY 1.8 8.8 11.7
LV – 0.3 1.6 1.6
LT – 1.0 1.8 2.1
LU – 1.1 8.0 8.4
HU – 5.9 6.3 7.1
MT 0.8 0.2 – 0.6
NL 2.7 4.6 5.2
AT 2.1 2.3 1.1
PL – 1.3 – 0.9 – 3.2
PT – 0.5 7.5 9.7
SI 0.3 7.3 9.9
SK – 1.7 2.8 3.7
FI 4.5 3.4 5.0
SE 3.5 2.1 2.4
UK – 0.3 3.8 4.2
NB: The required primary balance is given as an average over the period cover-
ing the first five years after the last year covered by the programme.
(*) No pension projections were available for Greece and the rise in age-
related expenditure is therefore underestimated. Pension expenditure was
projected to rise between 2005 and 2050 by 10.2 % in the 2002 update of
the Greek stability programme.
Source: Commission services. 62
by some 1â percentage points of GDP, that is about half
of the distance between current and sustainable budget-
ary positions.
mary surpluses, which might be difficult to maintain
over time. Moreover, high-debt countries are more vul-
nerable to negative growth rate or interest rate shocks.
P a r t  I
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impact on the sustainability indicators, it requires special
attention in the assessment (1). These considerations
notably apply to countries like Belgium, Greece and
Italy. They also apply symmetrically to Luxembourg,
being a low-debt country.
When relevant, structural reforms are also taken into
Box I.4.1: Sustainability indicators
The sustainability gap indicator S1 shows the permanent budgetary adjustment required to reach a debt ratio in 2050 of
60 % of GDP.
The sustainability gap indicator S2 shows the permanent budgetary adjustment that guarantees the respect of the inter-
temporal budget constraint of the government (1). S2 is estimated by assuming that the revenue and expenditure ratios (age-
related and non-age-related) do not change after 2050.
While the sustainability gap indicators (S1, S2) are usually defined in terms of revenue ratios, there are several ways to
ensure sustainability. Governments typically choose a combination of (i) budgetary measures (either expenditure reduction
and/or tax hikes) and (ii) structural reforms aiming at curbing long-term public spending (e.g. pension reforms).
The sustainability indicators can be decomposed into the: (i) initial budgetary position (IBP); (ii) long-term change in
the primary balance (LTC); and, (iii) debt requirement in 2050 (GRD).
In addition, the required primary balance (RPB) can be derived from the S2 indicator. It measures the average primary
balance over the first five years following the last year period covered by the SCPs (in the case of the 2006/07 updates of
the SCPs the five-year period is 2011–15) that results from a permanent budgetary adjustment carried out to comply fully
with the S2 indicator.
Summarising the sustainability indicators
¥1∂ Formally, the intertemporal budget constraint of the government entails that the discounted value of all future structural primary balances should equal
the current level of debt. It can be expressed as , where: D is the debt ratio, PB is the structural primary balance,  1 + r
is the interest-growth rate differential, i.e.  where R and G are the nominal interest rate and the nominal GDP growth rate, respec-
tively.
NB: For a complete description of the sustainability indicators, see European Commission (2006), Annex I.
Impact of
Initial budgetary position Debt requirement in 2050 Long-term changes in the primary balance
S1 = Gap to the debt-stabilising 
primary balance
+ Additional adjustment required 
to reach a debt target of 60 % 
of GDP in 2050
+ Additional adjustment required 
to finance the increase in public 
expenditure up to 2050
S2 = Gap to the debt-stabilising 
primary balance
+ 0 + Additional adjustment required 
to finance the increase in public 
expenditure over an infinite 
horizon
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account in the assessment. Some of them have a positive
impact on the long-term budgetary trends and/or the eco-
nomic variables underlying such trends but their impact
¥1∂ The contribution of the debt to the S2 sustainability indicator for a country
with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 100 % and an interest/growth rate differential
of 1.5 % is in fact 1.5 % of GDP (debt times the interest/growth rate differ-
ential).
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grammes and is therefore not incorporated in the quanti-
tative indicators. This is particularly the case for recent
have implemented structural reforms that according to
the information provided in the SCPs are estimated to
reduce the projected increase in the pension expenditure
ratio, notably so in the case of Portugal.
Malta and the United Kingdom have also introduced
reforms to their public pension systems aiming at ensur-
Table I.4.5
Sustainability gaps of the ‘programme scenario’ 
(% GDP)
S1 S2
Total IBP (*) DR (*) LTC (*) Total IBP (*) LTC (*)
BE 1.0 – 3.0 0.3 3.7 2.4 – 3.0 5.3
CZ 4.3 2.3 – 0.5 2.5 7.1 2.4 4.7
DK – 0.9 – 3.1 – 0.8 3.0 0.8 – 3.1 3.9
DE 0.7 – 1.1 0.1 1.7 1.8 – 1.1 2.8
EE – 4.4 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 3.4 – 1.8 – 1.7
IE 0.0 – 2.6 – 0.9 3.5 3.6 – 2.5 6.0
EL (**) 0.1 – 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.1 – 0.7 0.8
ES 0.4 – 2.4 – 0.5 3.3 3.3 – 2.4 5.7
FR – 0.5 – 2.1 – 0.2 1.8 0.6 – 2.0 2.6
IT – 1.4 – 3.5 0.7 1.5 – 1.5 – 3.5 2.0
CY 1.5 – 2.5 – 0.3 4.3 6.2 – 2.1 8.3
LV – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.9 0.4 0.2 – 0.6 0.8
LT – 1.4 – 1.2 – 0.8 0.5 0.1 – 1.1 1.1
LU 2.0 – 1.1 – 1.8 4.9 7.1 – 1.1 8.2
HU 3.0 – 0.2 0.1 3.1 5.2 0.1 5.1
MT – 1.6 – 2.4 0.0 0.8 – 2.0 – 2.1 0.1
NL 1.2 – 1.8 – 0.3 3.3 2.7 – 1.8 4.5
AT – 1.3 – 2.2 – 0.1 1.0 – 1.1 – 2.2 1.1
PL – 2.8 0.5 – 0.2 – 3.1 – 2.6 0.8 – 3.4
PT 2.5 – 1.6 0.0 4.1 5.3 – 1.4 6.7
SI 3.7 0.1 – 0.6 4.2 7.2 0.2 7.0
SK 1.5 1.0 – 0.5 1.0 3.2 1.2 2.0
FI – 2.6 – 4.4 – 1.6 3.3 – 0.2 – 4.5 4.2
SE – 3.0 – 3.3 – 1.0 1.3 – 1.4 – 3.3 1.9
UK 1.4 – 0.3 – 0.3 2.0 3.0 – 0.2 3.2
EU-13 (**) 0.0 – 2.2 0.0 2.2 1.2 – 2.1 3.3
EU-27 (**) 0.1 – 1.8 – 0.1 2.0 1.4 – 1.7 3.1
(*) IBP = the initial budgetary position, DR = the debt requirement in 2050,
LTC = the long-term changes in the primary balance. A positive value of S1
and S2 indicates that a budgetary improvement would close the gap, while a
negative value indicates that a budgetary weakening would close the gap. 
(**) No pension projections were available for Greece and the rise in age-related
expenditure is therefore underestimated. Pension expenditure was projected
to rise between 2005 and 2050 by 10.2 % in the 2002 update of the Greek
stability programme. The aggregate results for the euro area (EU-13)
exclude Greece and for the European Union (EU-27) additionally exclude
Romania and Bulgaria. In the ‘programme scenario’, it is assumed that the
macroeconomic and budgetary plans throughout the programme period will
be fully respected.
Source: Commission services.
Table I.4.6
Projected debt developments in the EU Member 
States (% of GDP)
Gross 
debt ‘2006 scenario’ ‘Programme scenario’
2006 2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050
BE 89.4 75.0 54.0 131.0 74.0 45.0 113.0
CZ 30.6 36.0 112.0 370.0 34.0 91.0 315.0
DK 28.6 18.0 – 25.0 – 13.0 19.0 – 12.0 15.0
DE 67.9 68.0 89.0 188.0 64.0 51.0 99.0
EE 3.7 1.0 – 58.0 – 166.0 2.0 – 61.0 – 176.0
IE 25.1 15.0 – 23.0 12.0 19.0 3.0 72.0
EL (*) 104.1 93.0 94.0 137.0 90.0 64.0 64.0
ES 39.7 28.0 – 22.0 53.0 29.0 – 8.0 87.0
FR 64.6 60.0 95.0 191.0 55.0 29.0 45.0
IT 107.6 111.0 140.0 256.0 101.0 27.0 – 19.0
CY 64.7 48.0 38.0 171.0 46.0 20.0 131.0
LV 10.7 9.0 12.0 53.0 8.0 – 10.0 – 4.0
LT 18.4 22.0 39.0 114.0 16.0 – 15.0 – 20.0
LU 7.5 13.0 86.0 261.0 7.0 35.0 167.0
HU 67.5 91.0 251.0 638.0 68.0 81.0 226.0
MT 68.3 63.0 74.0 79.0 57.0 29.0 – 18.0
NL 50.2 41.0 36.0 106.0 42.0 45.0 125.0
AT 62.2 59.0 37.0 46.0 57.0 11.0 – 15.0
PL 42 52.0 18.0 – 30.0 49.0 – 9.0 – 102.0
PT 67.4 70.0 136.0 394.0 62.0 63.0 210.0
SI 28.5 26.0 63.0 265.0 27.0 66.0 273.0
SK 33.1 32.0 65.0 205.0 30.0 44.0 149.0
FI 39.1 32.0 – 14.0 – 7.0 34.0 – 3.0 17.0
SE 46.5 29.0 – 34.0 – 66.0 30.0 – 30.0 – 59.0
UK 43.7 47.0 80.0 194.0 44.0 53.0 131.0
EU-13 (**) 66.5 63.0 72.0 165.0 59.0 30.0 66.0
EU-27 (**) 61.6 59.0 69.0 160.0 55.0 31.0 71.0
(*) No pension projections were available for Greece and the rise in age-
related expenditure is therefore underestimated. Pension expenditure was
projected to rise between 2005 and 2050 by 10.2 % in the 2002 update of
the Greek stability programme.
(**) The aggregate results for the euro area (EU-13) exclude Greece and for the
European Union (EU-27) additionally exclude Romania and Bulgaria.
Source: Commission services.64
pension reforms, which have been or are in the process
of being implemented in a number of Member States.
For example, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary and Portugal
ing adequate pensions in the future while at the same
time safeguarding fiscal sustainability to the greatest
extent possible. In these latter cases, pension expenditure
P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t sis estimated in the programme updates to involve a
higher increase in the pension expenditure ratio, being
more limited in the case of the UK.
In accordance with the opinion of the EPC, the estimated
impact included in the SCPs of these recent reforms was
not included in the baseline calculation of the sustaina-
bility indicators and the debt projections above (1). The
estimated reform impact was however considered in
qualitative terms and hence is included in the overall
assessment of long-term sustainability.
The reliability of projections may play a role, particularly
when long-term assumptions/projections are considerably
different from the common budgetary projections in the
Ageing Report (2), suggesting that the indicators may be
over/underestimated. This applies to the new Member
States Bulgaria and Romania, for which long-term projec-
tions were not included in the Ageing Report. In fact, the
lack of comparable and comprehensive long-term projec-
tions for these countries prevents the Commission serv-
ices form reaching an overall assessment. Nonetheless, a
significant impact of ageing on government expenditure
cannot be excluded given the current and projected demo-
graphic structure. Moreover, missing projections for
Greece (pension and long-term care) and Cyprus (long-
term care) result in an underestimation of the long-term
budgetary impact of ageing. Greece was in fact invited by
the Council to produce pension projections as soon as pos-
sible (see Table I.4.9 below).
The tax ratio could also play a role. Indeed, it may be
more difficult for high tax-ratio countries to increase
taxes further limiting the possibilities to deal with the
budgetary impact of ageing population. This could be the
case for high-tax countries such as Sweden and Den-
mark, should the need arise.
Other long-term budgetary changes in revenue may be
taken into account in the qualitative assessment. To
ensure full comparability across countries, the quantita-
tive sustainability indicators are calculated for a prede-
fined set of budgetary items decided at EPC level. But
when changes of other items are clearly explained and if
the size of their impact seems reasonable, they would be
taken into account in the overall assessment. This is the
case for Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden.
For example, an increase in taxes related to pensions is
projected in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden,
which would limit the budgetary impact of ageing. By
¥1∂ See Economic Policy Committee (2007). According to the EPC opinion,
new long-term projections resulting from major pension reforms should be
subject to a peer review in the working group on ageing of the EPC before
being used in the calculations of the baseline sustainability indicators in
order to ensure comparability and transparency of the long-term projec-
tions used in the assessments of the Commission and the Council.
¥2∂ See European Economy (2006).
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2 0 0 7contrast, government property income (‘returns on
assets’) could be reduced as a share of GDP over the
long-term under the assumption of no stock-flow adjust-
ment and assuming that the rate of return on assets held
by government is the same as the interest rate on govern-
ment debt (3 % real) (1).
The evolution of the benefit ratio (i.e. the average pen-
sion in relation to GDP per worker) is strongly driven by
the pensions reforms enacted (or lack thereof) in recent
years (see Chapter IV.2 in European Commission,
2006). A decrease in the public benefit ratio can lead to
further risks to public finances, notably if it leads to (i) a
substantial increase in the poverty rate of older people;
(ii) a large increase in contributions of private occupa-
tional/supplementary schemes over the long-term, which
may affect public revenue; and (iii) if there are obstacles
limiting the job activity of older workers that prevent
them from accumulating additional pension rights or if
prolonging substantially their working lives does not
result in a substantial increase in pensions. Data availa-
bility is not currently sufficient to fully assess each of
these risks. However, the evolution of the benefit ratio
can better qualify the assessment, notably when the
decrease in the benefit ratio is coupled with a strong
increase in the employment rates of older workers. In
that case, increasing the participation rates of older
workers would improve workers pension rights in the
future and therefore reduce the sustainability risks.
4.3. Overall assessment 
of the sustainability challenge 
in the Member States
The budgetary impact of ageing populations is a concern
for all EU Member States. There is however a large varia-
tion in the degree of risks that they are facing and in the
contributory factors. As indicated in Table I.4.7, on the
basis of the information provided in the 2006/07 updates of
the SCPs six countries were assessed to be at high risk, 10
at medium risk and nine at low risk. This overall assess-
ment is the same as in the 2006 Sustainability Report.
Graph I.4.2 shows that the size of the S2 sustainability gap
in general corresponds closely to the overall risk categori-
sation. The assessment by the Commission was confirmed
in the Council opinion on the updated SCPs.
The underlying reasons for the challenges to long-term
sustainability of public finance differ across Member
States. As shown above, it is possible to decompose the
sustainability indicators (S1, S2) so that the impact of the
current budgetary position and the future change (deteri-
oration) is separated.
High-risk countries
The high risk group of countries is characterised by a
very significant rise in age-related expenditure over the
long term, underlining that measures aimed at curbing
them will prove necessary. Moreover, the Czech Repub-
lic, Greece, Cyprus, Hungary and Portugal have large
deficits and in some cases also a high level of debt, in
particular in Greece.
Budgetary consolidation is therefore necessary and
urgent in order to reduce risks to public finance sustain-
ability. It should be noted that the Portuguese pro-
gramme update estimates a significant expenditure-
reducing impact of the recent pension reform, which
would reduce the long-term impact of ageing.
Medium-risk countries
The intermediate group includes Member States with very
different characteristics but a relatively clear-cut distinction
can be made between two subsets of countries. The first
relates to countries with a significant cost of ageing and
where measures might be needed to curb these costs, but
which currently have relatively strong budgetary positions
(Ireland, Spain and Luxembourg). The second subset refers
to countries that need to consolidate, though to different
¥1∂ The assumption of no stock-flow adjustments implies that property income
(returns form financial assets) is constant in nominal terms rather than as a
share of GDP. In particular, property income is fully used to reduce debt
and not to buy new assets and when a bond matures, it is replaced by a
Table I.4.7
Overall classification of risks to the sustainability 
of public finances
Risk category Country
Low DK, EE, LV, LT, NL, AT, PL, FI, SE
Medium BE, DE, ES, IE, FR, IT, LU, MT, SK, UK
High CZ, EL, CY, HU, PT, SI
Source: Commission services.66
degrees, their public finances over the medium term but for
which the costs of ageing are less of a concern, usually as a
result of enacted reforms to their pension systems (Ger-
bond with the same nominal value. Hence, since the value of assets is con-
stant in nominal terms, the nominal returns are also constant since the rate
of return is assumed to be constant. See European Commission (2006a),
Chapter IV.3.3.
P a r t  I
C u r r e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  a n d  p r o s p e c t smany, France, Italy, Malta, Slovakia and the United King-
dom). In Italy rapid budgetary consolidation is required to
ensure a steady reduction of the currently very high level of
debt. The situation in Belgium is also distinctive in that it
needs to maintain a strong budget balance to reduce its very
high level of government debt. However, the current high
primary surplus, even if it is maintained for a long period of
time, is not sufficient to fully cover the high cost of ageing
populations over the long term and measures aiming at
curbing the projected increases in pension expenditure
would undoubtedly contribute to reduce the risks to sustain-
ability. It should be noted that the pension reforms in Malta
and the United Kingdom are estimated to result in an
increase in the pension expenditure ratio, which means that
the long-term impact of ageing would be higher.
Low-risk countries
The low risk countries have in general come furthest in
coping with ageing, which implies either a strong budget-
ary position (running large surpluses, reducing debt and/
or accumulating assets) and/or comprehensive pension
reforms, sometimes including a shift towards private pen-
sion schemes. This does not mean that in these countries
there are no risks regarding the long-term sustainability of
public finances. In fact, their situation (assessment) relies
on the successful implementation of the far-reaching
ary position, and in some cases strengthening it. Other
countries with a relatively high projected cost of ageing,
notably on pensions, may also need to consider structural
reforms aimed at modifying the projected long-term budg-
etary trends at some point (the Netherlands and Finland).
It should be noted that when considering the estimated
expenditure-reducing impact of the reform package in
Denmark, including reforms of the pension system, the
long-term impact of ageing would be even smaller.
Policy invitations and conclusions
On the basis of the analysis and assessments of the
updated SCPs made by the Commission, policy invita-
tions were given to a number of countries in view of
ensuring progress towards sustainable public finances.
These invitations are summarised in Table I.4.8 below.
In particular, an invitation for policy action was given in
cases where achieving (or even having already achieved)
the MTO as planned in the programme would not be suf-
ficient to avoid significant risks to fiscal sustainability,
in the light of the long-term expenditure pressures
beyond the programme horizon. This reflects the
increased importance assigned to longer-term concerns
by the Commission and by the Council.
Table I.4.9 presents the conclusions regarding long-term
Graph I.4.2:  Overall risk classification and the sustainability gap (S2 in the ‘2006 scenario’)
Source: Commission services.
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reforms, which have reduced significantly the long-term
budgetary impact of ageing (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Austria, Poland and Sweden) and maintaining the budget-
sustainability of public finances reached by the Ecofin
Council in its opinions on the 2006/07 updates of the
SCPs on the basis of the Commission’s assessments.    
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Policy invitations by the Council on the sustainability of public finances on the 2006/07 SCPs
Policy invitation by the Council
BE In view of the high level of debt and the projected increase in age-related expenditure, the Council invites Belgium to better 
address the long-term sustainability of public finances by at least achieving the MTO as well as by implementing reforms.
CZ (1) In view of the projected increase in age-related expenditures, improve the long-term sustainability of public finances by 
implementing the necessary pension and healthcare reforms.
DE In view of the level of debt and the projected increase in age-related spending, improve long-term sustainability of public 
finances by achieving the MTO and by implementing reforms, particularly in the healthcare system.
IE In view of, in particular, the projected increase in age-related expenditure, continue to implement measures to improve the long-
term sustainability of its public finances and to avoid procyclical policies in the years ahead.
EL In view of the very high level of debt and the projected increase in age-related expenditure, improve the long-term sustainability 
of public finances by achieving the MTO, controlling public pension and healthcare expenditures and resolutely implementing 
ambitious reforms; and produce as soon as possible long-term projections for age-related expenditure.
ES In view of the above assessment and in particular the projected increase in age-related expenditure, further improve the long-
term sustainability of public finances with additional measures to contain the future impact of ageing on spending programmes.
FR Exploit the robust growth prospects and the positive base effect from a stronger than previously expected 2006 outturn to 
frontload the adjustment towards the MTO and pursue an ambitious structural adjustment in the coming years with a view to 
achieving the MTO by 2010 as planned, thereby reducing the level of the debt and improving the long-term sustainability of 
public finances.
IT In view of the very high level of debt, fully implement the adopted pension reforms including the planned periodical actuarial 
adjustment in line with life expectancy so as to avoid significant increases in age-related spending.
CY In view of, in particular, the level of debt and the projected increase in age-related spending: (i) control public pension 
expenditure and implement further reforms in the areas of pensions and healthcare in order to improve the long-term 
sustainability of public finances; (ii) implement the fiscal consolidation path as foreseen in the programme.
LU In view of the projected increase in age-related expenditure, improve the long-term sustainability of public finances by 
implementing structural reform measures (especially in the area of pensions).
HU In view of the level of debt and the increase in age-related expenditure, improve the long-term sustainability of public finances 
by making adequate progress towards the MTO and taking additional pension reform measures as announced.
MT In view of the level of debt and the projected increase in age-related expenditure, improve the long-term sustainability of public 
finances by achieving the MTO and making further progress in the design and implementation of the healthcare reform.
PL Safeguard the results of the pension reform.
PT In view of the level of debt and the projected increase in age-related expenditure, improve the long-term sustainability of public 
finances by achieving the MTO and by securing and possibly enhancing the benefits of the adopted pension reforms.
RO In view of the above assessment, exploit the good times to significantly strengthen the pace of adjustment towards the MTO by 
aiming for more demanding budgetary targets in 2007 and subsequent years. Improving the structural budgetary position over 
the medium term would contribute to containing risks to the sustainability of public finances.
SI In view of the projected increase in age-related expenditure, improve the long-term sustainability of public finances, in particular 
by strengthening the ongoing pension reform with additional measures, geared especially to increasing labour participation of 
older workers and encouraging the move towards a greater reliance on private pension saving schemes.
UK Pursue budgetary consolidation over the programme period, especially by implementing the projected reduction in expenditure 
growth after 2007/08, and strengthen further its fiscal position in order to address the risks to long-term sustainability of public 
finances.
(1) For CZ, the Commission services’ text is given.
Sources: Council opinions on the 2006/07 updated stability and convergence programmes on the basis of the Commission’s assessment.68
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Policy conclusions by the Council on the sustainability of public finances on the 2006/07 SCPs
Risk 
category What are the main issues?
Has risk 
category 
changed?
BE Medium The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Belgium is above the EU average, influenced notably by a large 
increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP over the coming decades. The initial budgetary position 
with a high primary surplus, albeit weaker compared with 2005, contributes to easing the projected long-term 
budgetary impact of an ageing population, but it is not sufficient to fully cover the substantial increase in 
expenditure. Moreover, the current level of gross debt, while declining, remains well above the Treaty 
reference value. The steady reduction of the debt ratio requires sustaining high primary surpluses for a long 
period of time, which would contribute to reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances. 
No
BG  In the absence of the long-term projections of age-related expenditures, based on the common 
macroeconomic assumptions as carried out by the EPC/Commission, it is not possible to assess the impact of 
population ageing in Bulgaria on a comparable and robust basis as it is currently done for the other Member 
States, for which the projections on this basis are available. However, a significant impact of ageing on 
expenditures cannot be excluded given the current demographic structure. The initial budgetary position, 
with a large structural surplus, contributes significantly to stabilise debt before considering the long-term 
budgetary impact of ageing. Maintaining high primary surpluses over the medium term would contribute to 
containing risks to the sustainability of public finances.
CZ (1) High The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in the Czech Republic is well above the EU average, influenced 
notably by a substantial increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP as well as a significant increase in 
healthcare expenditure. Implementation of structural reform measures notably in the field of pensions and 
healthcare aimed at containing the significant increase in age-related expenditures would contribute to 
reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances. The budgetary position expected at the end of the 
programme period, which has worsened compared with previous exercises, constitutes a risk to sustainable 
public finances even before the long-term budgetary impact of an ageing population is considered. 
Consolidating public finances further than currently planned would contribute to reducing risks to the 
sustainability of public finances.
No
DK Low The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Denmark is projected to be higher than on average in the EU, 
influenced notably by a relatively high increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP over the coming 
decades. However, the comprehensive reform package adopted in June 2006, the ‘Agreement on future 
prosperity, welfare and investments in the future’ or simply Welfare Agreement, aims at delaying retirement. 
Both the general pension age and the early retirement age will be gradually increased by two years followed 
later by an indexation of the age thresholds to changes in life expectancy. Therefore, the Welfare Agreement 
contributes to curb the long-term expenditure trends and thus improves public finance sustainability. 
Moreover, the initial budgetary position with a large structural surplus contributes significantly to ease the 
long-term budgetary impact of ageing. Maintaining high primary surpluses over the medium term will 
contribute to reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances.
No
DE Medium The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Germany is close to the EU average, though with pension 
expenditure showing a somewhat smaller increase than in many other countries, as a result of the pension 
reforms already enacted. A draft law has been adopted to raise the statutory retirement age in steps to 
67 years, from 2012 onwards. Although exemptions to the higher age limit are being granted, the move will 
enhance the long-term sustainability of public finances. In addition, developing further private pension 
arrangements would contribute positively to retirement incomes. The initial budgetary position constitutes a 
risk to sustainable public finances even before the long-term budgetary impact of ageing populations is 
considered. Moreover, the current level of gross debt is above the Treaty reference value.
No
EE Low The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Estonia is among the lowest in the EU, with age-related 
expenditure projected to fall as a share of GDP over the coming decades, influenced by the considerable 
expenditure-reducing impact of the reform of the pension system. The current level of gross debt is very low in 
Estonia and maintaining sound government finances, in line with the budgetary plans over the programme 
period, would contribute to containing the risks to the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
No
(Continued on the next page)69
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IE Medium The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Ireland is well above the EU average, mainly as a result of a 
relatively younger population and consequently a higher increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP 
over the coming decades, influenced in part by the maturing of the pension system. The initial budgetary 
position, improved compared with 2005, contributes significantly to easing the projected long-term budgetary 
impact of ageing populations, but is not sufficient to fully cover the substantial increase in expenditure due to 
the ageing of the population. Maintaining high primary surpluses over the medium term and implementing 
measures aimed at curbing the significant increase in age-related expenditures would, as recognised in the 
programme, contribute to reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances.
No
EL High The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Greece is uncertain as long-term projections of pension 
expenditure are not available; however, it is very likely to be well above the EU average; according to the 
latest available information from the 2002 updated Greek stability programme, a significant increase in 
pension expenditure as a share of GDP is projected over the long term. The initial budgetary position, albeit 
improved compared with 2005, constitutes a significant risk to sustainable public finances even before 
considering the long-term budgetary impact of an ageing population. Moreover, the current level of gross 
debt is well above the Treaty reference value and reducing it requires achieving high primary surpluses for a 
long period of time. Consolidating the public finances as planned, together with urgent reform measures 
aimed at containing the likely significant increase in age-related expenditures, would contribute to reducing 
risks to the long-term sustainability of public finances. The availability of long-term projections of pension 
expenditure would improve the assessment of long term budgetary sustainability.
No
ES Medium The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Spain is well above the EU average, mainly as a result of a 
relatively high increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP over the coming decades. The initial 
budgetary position, improved compared with 2005, contributes to easing the projected long-term budgetary 
impact of ageing populations, but is not sufficient to fully cover the substantial increase in expenditure due to 
the ageing of the population. Maintaining high primary surpluses over the medium term and implementing 
further measures aimed at curbing the significant increase in age-related expenditures would contribute to 
reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances.
No
FR Medium The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in France is slightly lower than the EU average, with pension 
expenditure showing a somewhat more limited increase than in many other countries, as a result of the 
pension reforms already enacted. The initial budgetary position, albeit improved compared with 2005, still 
constitutes a risk to sustainable public finances even before the long-term budgetary impact of an ageing 
population is considered. Moreover, the current level of gross debt is above the Treaty reference value. Further 
budgetary consolidation would contribute to reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances, which 
would also benefit from preserving and possibly enhancing the benefits of the pension reform.
No
IT Medium The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Italy is lower than the EU average, with pension expenditure 
showing a more limited increase than on average in the EU, thanks to the pension reforms adopted, assuming 
they are fully implemented, notably including the planned periodical actuarial adjustment in line with life 
expectancy. Increasing the employment rate, notably of older workers, would improve workers’ pensions in 
the future and contribute to the success of the pension reforms. The initial budgetary position, albeit slightly 
improved compared with 2005, constitutes a risk to sustainable public finances even before the long-term 
budgetary impact of an ageing population is considered. Moreover, the current level of gross debt is well 
above the Treaty reference value and reducing it will require high primary surpluses to be achieved and 
maintained over a long period.
No
CY High The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Cyprus is among the highest in the EU, influenced notably by a 
very large increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP. The initial budgetary position contributes to 
easing part of the projected considerable long-term budgetary impact of an ageing population, but it is not 
sufficient to cover it. Moreover, the current level of gross debt is above the Treaty reference value. Continuing 
the consolidation of the public finances simultaneously with adopting pension reform measures aimed at 
containing the significant increase in age-related expenditures would contribute, as recognised by the 
authorities, to reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances.
No
LV Low The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Latvia is lower than the EU average, with age-related 
expenditure projected to fall as a share of GDP over the coming decades, influenced by the expenditure-
reducing impact of the reform of the pension system. The current level of gross debt is very low in Latvia and 
improving the structural budgetary position as planned in the convergence programme update would 
contribute to containing the risks to the long-term sustainability of public finances.
No
LT Low The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Lithuania is lower than the EU average, with a limited increase 
in pension expenditure over the coming decades, influenced by the pension reforms enacted. The current level 
of gross debt is very low in Lithuania and improving the budgetary position as planned in the convergence 
programme update would contribute to containing the risks to the long-term sustainability of public finances. 
No70
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LU Medium The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Luxembourg is among the highest in the EU, influenced notably 
by a very considerable increase in pension expenditure, by 7â percentage points of GDP, and in total age-
related public spending, by 8ä points, from 2004 to 2050 (compared with EU average increases of 2ä and 
3â percentage points of GDP, respectively). The current level of gross debt is very low and considerable assets 
have been accumulated by the social security system. However, while the current size of these assets 
(estimated at around 25 % of GDP) contributes significantly to public finance sustainability, it will not be 
sufficient to offset the impact on the debt ratio in the long term resulting from the sizeable increase in age-
related expenditure. Therefore, while keeping a strong budgetary position will help to alleviate part of the 
cost of ageing, as recognised by the authorities, some changes to the pension scheme are necessary so as to 
contain the future increase in public expenditure and reduce the risks to the long-term sustainability of public 
finances.
No
HU High The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Hungary is well above the EU average, notably as a result of the 
high increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP over the long term. While first important steps have 
been taken, full implementation of further reform measures aimed at containing the significant increase in 
age-related expenditures as planned in the programme would contribute to reducing risks to the 
sustainability of public finances. Moreover, and importantly, the weak initial budgetary position, having 
deteriorated substantially compared with 2005, constitutes a risk to sustainable public finances even before 
the long-term budgetary impact of an ageing population is considered. In addition, the current level of gross 
debt is above the Treaty reference value. Further budgetary consolidation as planned would contribute to 
reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances. 
No
MT Medium Malta has recently enacted a pension reform aimed at increasing the effective retirement age, while raising 
the level of pensions. As a result estimates in the programme suggest that pension expenditures will be higher, 
leading to a higher increase in age-related expenditure, close to the EU average. Although at a somewhat 
slower pace than historical trends, projections for healthcare spending show an increase of around 1ã 
percentage points of GDP in the long term, if current trends persist. The current budgetary position would not 
ensure a steady reduction of debt to below the Treaty reference value. Therefore, improving the budgetary 
position, as projected in the programme, would contribute to reducing the risks to the sustainability of public 
finances. 
No
NL (2) Low The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in the Netherlands is higher than the EU average, influenced 
notably by a relatively high increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP over the coming decades. The 
initial budgetary position, albeit not as strong as in 2005, contributes to easing the projected long-term 
budgetary impact of an ageing population, but it is not sufficient to fully cover it. The projected future rise of 
revenues as a share of GDP, mainly due to deferred taxation of pensions, would partly compensate for the 
increase in public expenditure over the long term. Ensuring high primary surpluses over the medium term and/
or implementing reform measures that curb the projected increase in age-related expenditure would 
contribute to containing risks to the sustainability of public finances. 
Yes
AT (1) Low The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Austria is well below the EU average, with pension expenditure 
projected to decrease as a share of GDP over the long term, as a consequence of the significant expenditure 
containment expected from the 2004 pension reform. The initial budgetary position, with a structural primary 
surplus, contributes to easing the long-term budgetary impact of ageing. Increasing primary surpluses over the 
medium term, as announced in the programme, as well as an increase in the employment rate of older 
workers, would contribute towards containing risks to the sustainability of public finances.
No
PL Low The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Poland is the lowest in the EU, with age-related expenditure 
projected to fall, partly as a result of the considerable expenditure-reducing impact of the reform of the 
pension system — assuming that the pension reforms are fully implemented. The initial budgetary position, 
although improved compared with 2005, still constitutes a risk to sustainable public finances before the long-
term budgetary impact of an ageing population is considered and further budgetary consolidation envisaged 
in the programme would contribute to containing risks to the sustainability of public finances.
No
PT High Portugal has recently enacted pension reforms aimed at strengthening the sustainability of public finances. 
Estimates in the programme suggest that the overall increase in age-related expenditure over the coming 
decades would be significantly lower as a result of the reform, though remaining sizeable. The initial 
budgetary position, albeit markedly improved compared with 2005, still constitutes a risk to sustainable public 
finances even before the long-term budgetary impact of an ageing population is considered. Moreover, the 
current level of gross debt is above the Treaty reference value. The planned budgetary consolidation coupled 
with the expected containment of the age-related expenditure, arising from ongoing reforms, would 
significantly contribute to reducing such risks.
No but 
recent 
reform 
measures 
indicate 
clear 
progress.
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RO  In the absence of the long-term projections of age-related expenditures, based on the common 
macroeconomic assumptions as carried out by the EPC/Commission, it is not possible to assess the impact of 
population ageing in Romania on a comparable and robust basis as it is currently done for the other Member 
States, for which the projections on this basis are available. However, a significant impact of ageing on 
expenditure cannot be excluded given the current demographic structure. The initial budgetary position, with 
a large structural deficit, is not sufficient to stabilise debt even before considering the long-term budgetary 
impact of ageing. Improving the structural budgetary position over the medium term would contribute to 
containing risks to the sustainability of public finances.
SI High The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Slovenia is among the largest in the EU, influenced notably by a 
considerable increase in pension expenditure as a share of GDP. While some action is being taken, stronger 
fiscal consolidation and implementation of further reform measures aimed at containing the substantial 
increase in age-related expenditures would contribute to reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances. 
Although the initial budgetary position contributes to stabilising the debt ratio over the medium term, the 
low structural improvement over the programme period will not be sufficient to contain the expected 
budgetary impact of ageing in the long term. 
No
SK (3) Medium The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Slovakia is lower than the EU average, with pension expenditure 
influenced by the recent pension reform showing a more limited increase than in many other countries. The 
initial budgetary position constitutes a risk to sustainable public finances even before considering the long-
term budgetary impact of an ageing population. Consolidating the public finances would therefore contribute 
to reducing risks to the sustainability of public finances. 
Yes
FI Low The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Finland is higher than on average in the EU, although enacted 
pension reform measures have helped to contain the increase in pension expenditure to close to the EU 
average as a share of GDP over the coming decades. The initial budgetary position, with a large structural 
surplus, contributes significantly to easing the long-term budgetary impact of ageing. Moreover, the large 
assets accumulated in the public pension fund will finance part of the increase in pension expenditure. 
However, maintaining high primary surpluses over the medium term would contribute towards containing 
risks to the sustainability of public finances. 
No
SE Low The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in Sweden is lower than the EU average, with pension expenditure 
projected to remain relatively stable as a share of GDP over the long term, influenced by the considerable 
expenditure-reducing impact of the reform of the pension system. The initial budgetary position with a high 
primary surplus contributes to the reduction of gross debt and the accumulation of assets. Maintaining sound 
government finances with continued surpluses as planned would contribute to limiting risks to the 
sustainability of public finances. 
No
UK Medium The long-term budgetary impact of ageing in the UK is close to the EU average, with pension expenditure 
showing a somewhat more limited increase than on average in the EU, in part as a result of the UK’s 
historically relying relatively more on private pension arrangements than have other EU countries. The 
proposed reforms to pension provision address the concern of potentially inadequate provision in the future, 
by strengthening the incentives for private savings for retirement and by increasing provision of public 
pensions, thus involving a slightly higher increase in public pension expenditure than previously projected; the 
reform also incorporates a planned gradual increase in the statutory State pension age. The initial budgetary 
position, though improved compared with 2005, would still constitute a risk to sustainable public finances if 
no significant reduction in the deficit occurs in the medium term, even before the long-term budgetary impact 
of an ageing population is considered.
Consolidating the public finances by strengthening the budgetary position further than planned in the 
convergence programme would thus contribute to reducing risks to the long-term sustainability of public 
finances.
No
(1) For AT and CZ, the Commission services’ text is given.
(2) For the Netherlands, the Commission’s assessment was ‘low’ risk in the previous assessment, while the Council changed it to ‘medium’ risk.
(3) For Slovakia,  the Commission’s assessment was ‘medium’ risk in the previous assessment, while the Council changed it to ’low’ risk.
Sources: Council opinions on the 2006/07 updated stability and convergence programmes on the basis of the Commission’s assessment.72
Part II
Evolving budgetary surveillance

Summary
In the second year since its inception, the current track
record of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
is positive. Most of the provisions of the revised Pact
have been deployed, implemented and tried out in prac-
tice giving rise to encouraging results. Compared to a
couple of years ago, the overall conditions of public
finances are significantly improving in the euro area and
the EU as a whole on the back of both a broad-based eco-
nomic recovery and significant improvements in the
underlying budgetary positions, especially thanks to the
efforts put in place by Member States currently in exces-
sive deficit procedure. Based on current plans outlined in
the 2006/07 stability and convergence programmes
(SCPs) all but two countries currently in excessive defi-
cit will have brought the deficit below the 3 % of GDP
threshold of the Treaty by 2008.
In the face of an overall positive performance, the recent
experience also highlights a number of issues that need
to be tackled in order to safeguard current accomplish-
ments and in particular to make sure that Member States
make rapid progress towards achieving sustainable
budgetary positions in order to be prepared for the budg-
etary impact of ageing population.
Ensuring the effectiveness of the preventive arm 
of the Pact
Firstly, and most importantly, the improvement in the
underlying budgetary position posted in 2006 masks an
inconvenient pattern. In a number of countries the reduc-
tion of the structural deficit was mainly achieved thanks
to significantly better-than-expected tax revenues which
actually offset slippages on the expenditure side. Reve-
nue windfalls have not been fully used for budgetary
adjustment; a part has been spent. A similar pattern is
projected to prevail in 2007, when, based on the Com-
mission services’ spring 2007 forecast, the projected
reformed SGP in spite of favourable economic condi-
tions.
With a view to avoiding mistakes of the past, the chal-
lenge ahead is to ensure a more effective functioning of
the preventive arm of the SGP. The aim is twofold: using
the opportunity offered by the current favourable cycli-
cal conditions to move towards sustainable fiscal posi-
tions; and ensuring a better coordination of national fis-
cal policies in the euro area.
Past experience has shown that slippages from budgetary
targets are to some extent the result of negative growth
surprises. With a view to better assess the macroeco-
nomic assumptions underpinning budgetary projections
and to highlight risks the Commission services are mov-
ing towards a broader economic appraisal of stability
and convergence programmes. The assessment of the
macroeconomic outlook underpinning the medium-term
budgetary projections of the Member States is more
detailed and particular attention is paid to the assessment
of cyclical conditions so as to better identify economic
good times.
Another way of reducing the gaps between budgetary
plans and outcomes is to strengthen the link between
national budgets and SCPs. In many cases, SCPs still
have a weak impact on the national budgetary process.
Possible ways to enhance the role of SCPs in the national
context range from relatively simple and straightforward
changes in the national budgetary process aimed at
increasing the coordination among the entities that draw
up the budgetary planning documents to a greater
involvement of national parliaments in the discussion
and formulation of the medium-term fiscal targets sub-
mitted for examination at the EU level.
A third avenue relates to the question of whether and75
improvement in the structural budget balance for the
euro area and the EU as a whole are likely to fall short of
the benchmark of 0.5 % of GDP required by the
how the annual budget is embedded in a medium-term
policy plan. The range of national practices is very
broad. In some countries, developed national medium-
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working well; in others the only instrument placing fis-
cal policy into a multiannual context is the stability and
convergence programme.
To discuss most recent budgetary developments and to
ensure a proper coordination of national fiscal policies in
the euro area, a mid-term budgetary review (MTBR) is
carried out before the summer. It takes place after the
assessment of the updated SCPs and ahead of the next
round of budgetary planning. With a view to strengthen
the MTBR, in November 2006 the Eurogroup decided to
adapt its content and format. The main innovations com-
pared to past practice are that the review is re-designed
to better fit the national budgetary calendars and that
Member States are invited to forward any information on
their policy intentions for the coming year. In combina-
tion with the assessment of ongoing budgetary develop-
ments, a discussion and assessment of such intentions at
the EU level can be conducive to shape the national
debate and ensure a better coordination of policies in the
euro area.
The currently used reference values for the country-spe-
cific medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs) are
provisional. In accordance with the 2005 Council report
underpinning the reform of the Pact, work on how to
account for implicit liabilities, i.e. impending expendi-
ture increases due to ageing populations, is ongoing and
a number of options have been produced. Two of them
build upon synthetic sustainability indicators. The third
approach is less mechanistic. On top of purely quantita-
tive indicators, it incorporates other qualitative elements
considered to be important in view of public finance sus-
tainability.
The benefits of sound fiscal policy could be better com-
municated if fiscal surveillance was placed into a
broader economic perspective, including the context of
the renewed strategy of Lisbon for growth and jobs. The
assessment of fiscal policy developments could notably
take greater account of the overall macroeconomic situ-
ation of the Member States. Particular attention could be
given to internal and external imbalances which may
mask potential risks to sustainable economic develop-
ment and in turn to sustainable public finances. 
Progress and issues in the measurement of budgetary 
formance. Economic conditions play an increasingly
important role in defining and assessing the appropriate-
ness of a country’s fiscal performance vis-à-vis the pro-
visions of the Pact.
A wider and more complex assessment goes along with
stricter requirements in terms of timely and reliable data
as well as reliable economic and fiscal indicators. The
current economic juncture is a particularly evident case
in point where the assessment of the underlying budget-
ary position is complicated by exceptionally high
inflows of tax revenues. Currently available methods for
measuring both potential output and tax elasticities need
to be improved in order to better distinguish between
purely temporary and more permanent fluctuations in tax
revenues with respect to GDP.
One of the main aims of the country-specific MTOs
introduced with the revised Pact is to safeguard against
the risk of breaching the 3 % of GDP deficit threshold of
the Treaty under normal cyclical conditions. In practice,
this requirement is made operational via the so-called
minimum benchmark, country specific indicators which
are recurrently updated. The latest update of the mini-
mum benchmarks, including a revision of the methodol-
ogy, was carried out at the end of 2006 and the new esti-
mates have been used for the assessment of the latest
round of stability and convergence programmes.
In view of ageing population, increasing attention is
focused on pensions systems also in the field of national
accounting. In the ongoing discussion on the revision of
national accounts one important aspect relates to the
issue of how to record government commitments in rela-
tion to future pensions. Under current practice pensions
accruing in the future in unfunded schemes are not
recorded as liabilities while contributions are recorded as
deficit decreasing. The final verdict is still out on how to
adapt national accounts so as to include pension liabili-
ties, but the search for solutions has narrowed; potential
implications are clearer.
The data that are relevant for deciding whether a country
is fulfilling the requirements of the SGP are the annual
deficit and debt ratios, compiled according to the ESA95
accounting rules. On top of the annual data, national and
statistical offices in collaboration with Eurostat have put
considerable effort in collecting and compiling quarterly76
positions
The increased economic rationale of the revised SGP has
broadened the assessment of economic and fiscal per-
public finance data. Quarterly government accounts may
give a relevant contribution to the quality of fiscal sur-
veillance. In particular, these infra-annual data can give
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policymakers to take measures in case fiscal policy was
found to be off track. Although a large majority of Mem-
ber States releases quarterly government accounts com-
piled according to ESA95 rules, some additional chal-
lenges are to be faced.
Improving the assessment of long-term budgetary 
sustainability
Giving more attention in the surveillance of budgetary
positions to debt and sustainability was one of the main
areas for improvement identified in the 2005 Council
report underpinning the reform of the SGP. Since then a
number of important steps towards a more comprehen-
sive and enhanced assessment of the long-term sustaina-
bility have been taken. The work on common long-term
budgetary projections carried out jointly by the Member
States and the Commission services and the first Sustain-
ability Report adopted by the Commission at the end of
2006 are cases in point. The next major update of the
common long-term projections and of the sustainability
report is planned for 2009. In that context a number of
potential improvements, such as the modelling of tax
revenues, are envisaged so as to provide further insight
in the budgetary impact of ageing.
Systemic pension reforms in the reformed SGP
In order to enhance the growth-oriented nature of the
Pact, the 2005 Council report states that structural
reforms should be taken into account when assessing the
fiscal performance of a country with respect to the fiscal
requirements of the Pact. The Council regulations that
codify the revised SGP contain specific provisions for
pension reforms, not least because unlike most other
structural reforms they produce a significant impact on
the budget in the short term. Those legal provisions aim
to avoid the SGP discouraging structural reforms
addressing longer-term sustainability issues while not
affecting the overall provision of the SGP.
Procedures for the preparation, legislation and 
execution of the budget
The Council report of March 2005, which forms the
basis of the reformed SGP, highlights the importance of
domestic fiscal governance arrangements as comple-
ments to the EU framework. Against this background a
great deal of attention has been focused over the past
years on the way fiscal rules and fiscal councils impact
on the fiscal performance of EU Member States. Less
attention has been given so far to another important
dimension of fiscal governance, namely budgetary pro-
cedures. In a bid to get a first and systematic overview of
existing procedures in the EU Member States, Commis-
sion services ploughed through the stock of available
information. Unsurprisingly, the results of the analysis
reveal a wide spectrum of different arrangements. Nev-
ertheless, a cursory analysis of the data shows that coun-
tries that rank high in terms of the quality of budgetary
procedures tend to be among the group of fiscally virtu-
ous countries and vice versa.77
1. Ensuring the effectiveness 
of the preventive arm of the Stability 
and Growth Pact
1.1. Introduction
Two years ago, the reform of the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) confirmed the consensus among the EU
Member States for sound fiscal policies. Its main objec-
tive was to address effectively the challenges to make
progress towards sustainable fiscal positions. The reform
confirmed the fundamental rules and principles of the
Treaty and, at the same time, increased the flexibility and
economic rationale of the SGP. Notably the revised SGP
requests Member States to target the attainment of coun-
try-specific medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs)
and includes sound fiscal policy principles guiding the
adjustment towards these objectives. In June 2006, the
Commission made an early assessment on the function-
ing of the revised SGP, one year after its inception. The
Commission concluded that the experience with the
revised SGP was rather positive. It welcomed the smooth
and consistent implementation of the excessive deficit
procedure, which applies to Member States with deficits
in excess of 3 % of GDP, and the improvement in the
overall budgetary situation. Concerns were however
expressed regarding the implementation of the preven-
tive arm of the Pact.
The discussion on recent budgetary developments and
current plans for the coming years in Part I of this
report largely confirms last year’s assessment: the cor-
rective arm of the SGP works better but, in spite of the
ongoing improvement in the budgetary situation, devi-
ations from the sound principles of the revised SGP
have been identified in countries that have not reached
the MTO yet. In a context where most of the EU Mem-
more effective functioning of the preventive arm. The
aim is twofold: using the opportunity offered by the
current favourable cyclical conditions to move towards
sustainable fiscal positions; and improving the coordi-
nation of fiscal policies.
This section of the report reviews various ways to ensure
a better operation of the preventive arm of the SGP.
Firstly, it assesses the link between the preparation of the
stability and convergence programmes (SCPs) and
national budgetary procedures. Some proposals are for-
mulated so as to strengthen the interplay between
domestic budgetary procedures and the EU fiscal sur-
veillance framework. Secondly, it describes the recent
agreement on the strengthening of the mid-term review
of fiscal policies. The Eurogroup decided to transform
this exercise, which takes place every year before the
summer and aims at ensuring a proper coordination of
national fiscal policies in the euro area, into a real strate-
gic policy debate, organised just before the crucial deci-
sions on the budgetary plans for the following year are
taken in the Member States. Thirdly, this section of the
report presents the recent steps towards complementing
and strengthening the technical analysis of SCPs by the
Commission services, with a view to placing the analysis
of the budgetary targets into a broader economic assess-
ment. Fourthly, it reviews the revised SGP provisions
related to the Commission policy advice, and examines
the possible role of this instrument in the context of other
instruments of the EU budgetary surveillance frame-
work. Finally, this section presents the progress made in
the last 12 months by Commission services in identify-
ing broad possible options for taking into account78
ber States have just corrected their excessive deficits,
or are about to do so, the challenge ahead is to ensure a
implicit liabilities in the formulation of country-specific
MTOs.
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the stability and convergence 
programmes and national budgetary 
plans
1.2.1. Introduction
While the EU budgetary surveillance framework has
contributed positively to reinforce the link between fis-
cal governance at the national and the EU level, past
experience suggests that further efforts in this direction
are still required.
The need for a strong link between the domestic conduct
of fiscal policy and the EU fiscal framework can be moti-
vated on different grounds in the context of the economic
and monetary union (EMU). For instance, Member
States should pay due attention not only to the knock-on
effects of their fiscal plans in the partner countries form-
ing the single currency area, but also in the EMU as a
whole, specifically by internalising potential spillovers
of domestic budgetary policies on the policy mix of the
euro area. Additionally, national budgetary plans need to
be consistent with the provisions of the SGP, which also
calls for a tighter relationship between the domestic and
EU dimension.
In order to strengthen the link between national and EU
budgetary policymaking, it is necessary to first analyse
to what extent the main fiscal policy instruments of the
domestic and EU fiscal framework, namely national
budgets on the one hand and the stability and conver-
gence programmes (SCPs) on the other, are connected.
This subsection aims at providing some food for thought
on this issue and at preparing the ground for further anal-
yses. On the basis of a survey launched recently by the
Commission services on budgetary procedures in EU
countries, it takes a closer look at the current ties
between national budgets and the SCPs. The analysis
focuses on three different dimensions. Firstly, it com-
pares calendars for the release and adoption of national
budgets and SCPs. Secondly, the role of national parlia-
ments in the preparation and approval of the SCPs is also
considered. Next, a number of elements regarding the
preparation of the national budgets and the SCPs is
described so as to analyse the connection between these
two budgetary policy documents and their consistency in
1.2.2. Calendars for budget and SCPs preparation
Table II.1.1 contains the calendars for the national budg-
ets and SCPs in the EU Member States, showing the key
stages related to their preparation and adoption. 
The overall picture emerging from these calendars is that
SCPs are in a large majority of cases approved by the
national executive in November, once the draft budget has
previously been endorsed by the government and submit-
ted to parliament between September and October.
Arguably, the release of the programmes after the gov-
ernmental approval of the draft budget and its submis-
sion to parliament should ensure that the outcome of the
domestic budgetary process is better reflected in the
SCPs. This appears plausible according to the dates pro-
vided by Member States in the survey, especially taking
into account that draft budgets are usually very close to
the final budgets approved by the parliaments, at least in
terms of the targeted balance (1) .
However, this calendar implies a unidirectional relation-
ship from domestic budgets to SCPs and avoids a paral-
lel discussion at national and EU level on fiscal policy
issues. In practical terms, programmes are examined by
the Commission and the Council only after national
budgets have definitively been passed by national
authorities. As a result, Council opinions, which are
often released long after the relevant domestic debate in
parliament has taken place, cannot be taken into account
in the preparation of the budget law. This also entails the
risk that the assessments as well as the Council opinions
become quickly outdated, reducing their value as policy
guidelines. This situation undermines the effectiveness
of the whole peer review process and weakens the pre-
ventive arm of the SGP (2).
In principle, there are several options to address this sit-
uation. For instance, some changes in the previously
described calendar could be envisaged in order to submit
the programmes before the start of the annual budgetary
¥1∂ Additionally, a significant number of Member States generally submit the
SCP to the Commission only after 1 December, which is the deadline
established by the code of conduct (except for Austria, Portugal and the
United Kingdom, for which the deadline is extended to mid-December). 
¥2∂ Arguably, since both the SCPs and the Council opinions are multiannual,
their lack of influence on the budget preparation for year t+1 should not
prevent them from influencing the budget of t+2. However, past experi-79
terms of fiscal policymaking. Finally, some ways for-
ward to strengthen the links between national budgets
and SCPs are presented.
ence shows that the medium-term fiscal objectives included in the SCPs
are often significantly revised in the subsequent programmes according to
current budgetary developments and the objectives considered in the next
annual budget. 
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the year, they could influence the budget preparation of
year t+1. Such a change could reinforce the commitment
of national authorities to the main budgetary objectives
included in the SCPs, while providing room for the
budgetary concerns expressed at EU level to be consid-
ered in the preparation of national budgets.
However, less drastic changes based on the reinforce-
ment of existing coordination mechanisms in the EU fis-
cal surveillance framework may also prove instrumental
in exploiting the potential benefits of peer support and
pressure. For example, SCPs could continue to be sub-
mitted (in year t) between mid-October and end-Novem-
ber as specified in the code of conduct. As usual, the
assessments of the programmes and their Council opin-
ions would be released during the next three or four
months. In the following year t+1, an appropriate coor-
dination mechanism among Member States could moni-
tor whether budgetary developments in t+1 and budget-
ary plans for t+2 are consistent with the envisaged fiscal
outcomes included in the latest SCP. This coordination
exercise should take place at the beginning of the annual
budget preparation (i.e. around April in most EU Mem-
ber States) in order to incorporate policy recommenda-
tions and invitations raised at EU level in the domestic
fiscal plans. In this scenario, the so-called mid-term
budgetary review (MTBR) may play a crucial role while
reinforcing the preventive arm of the SGP (see
Section II.3 of this report).
1.2.3. The role of national parliaments
One indicator to assess to what extent the domestic con-
duct of budgetary policy heeds the EU fiscal dimension
is the degree of involvement of national institutions in
the preparation of the SCPs, and in particular the role
played by national parliaments. One would expect that
the greater the importance attached domestically to the
budgetary implications of the EU fiscal framework, the
larger the interest of national parliaments in the SCPs as
a key element for the conduct of fiscal policy at national
level. 
Whilst governments interact directly with parliament
during the annual budget process, they generally operate
with a large degree of discretion in relation to the
medium-term fiscal targets and commitments contained
in the SCPs. At present, most national parliaments in EU
either presented but not voted or not even submitted to
national parliaments (see Part III of this report). This
may result in a lack of domestic checks and balances to
ensure consistency between annual budgetary plans and
fiscal commitments at EU level. 
However, in a reduced number of countries a form of
indirect parliamentary endorsement of the programmes
exists as the SCPs mirror documents that have already
been discussed and/or approved by parliament. These
documents generally relate to the existing medium-term
budgetary frameworks in some Member States such as
the Netherlands and Sweden (see Part III for further
details about medium-term budgetary frameworks).
Like for the SCPs, the role of national parliaments in
relation to the Council opinions on the programmes is
rather limited. In a large majority of EU countries Coun-
cil opinions are neither presented nor discussed in parlia-
ment.
Finally, according to the survey conducted among EU
Member States, national parliaments hardly examine the
implementation of the latest SCPs and the achievement
of their fiscal objectives (1).
On the whole, the degree of national commitment asso-
ciated with the fiscal objectives included in the SCPs
appears rather weak in terms of parliamentary involve-
ment. As a result, this generally leads to an insufficient
domestic debate about the consistency of domestic budg-
etary plans vis-à-vis the existing constraints in the con-
text of the EMU.
1.2.4. Some comparative features of the SCPs and 
national budgets
Information provided by the survey also gives some
interesting comparative features related to the prepara-
tion and content of the SCPs and national budgets. These
elements allow to some extent an assessment of the cur-
rent link and coherence of both documents (2).
¥1∂ In most Member States, the implementation assessment is only carried out
in the successive SCPs. 
¥2∂ Ideally, this link and coherence between SCPs and national budgets ought
to establish a clear influence from the former to the latter. Specifically,
SCPs should establish the main budgetary objectives and policy guidelines80
countries are not formally involved in the preparation
and endorsement of the SCPs. In approximately three
quarters of the Member States, the programmes are
for the annual budgets, and ensure that fiscal commitments at EU level are
translated into the national yearly budgetary discussion. Certainly, this
would also require that medium-term fiscal plans included in the SCPs are
not annually revised according to yearly budgetary decisions.
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preparation
The fact that the national budget and the SCPs are prepared
by the same or by different departments may be an impor-
tant element in ensuring an appropriate consistency
between both documents. According to the survey only in
one third of the Member States both documents are pre-
pared by the same department, mainly the budget depart-
ment or directorate of the Ministry of Finance (see
Graph II.1.1). In the remaining EU countries, the budget
department continues to be the relevant body in charge of
the budget preparation, while several other departments
may be involved in the draft of the SCPs (e.g. the Treasury,
fiscal policy directorate, tax policy department, economic
analysis and forecasting units etc.). In these cases, the
extent to which an appropriate coordination among differ-
ent departments exists to ensure consistency between the
budget and the SCP would require a more detailed analysis
on a country-by-country basis. Interestingly, among the
large EU economies only in the UK are the budget and the
SCP produced by one single department.
Accounting rules used for the preparation of the budget 
and the SCP
An additional element that can also influence the con-
sistency between fiscal targets included in the budget
and in the SPCs refers to the accounting rules applied in
both documents (see Graph II.1.2). More than half of the
Member States declare they apply different accounting
rules, namely budgetary accounting for budget law and
ESA 95 figures for the SCP. While the use of different
accounting rules may be justified by the different nature
of both documents (i.e. annual expenditures and reve-
nues versus medium-term fiscal plans), ensuring a full
and transparent consistency between both set of figures
is of utmost importance. Interestingly, some of those
countries using different accounting systems also report
systematic adjustment procedures to convert budgetary
figures into national accounts values (e.g. Spain and
France). This should in principle ensure an adequate
comparability between the objectives included in the
budget and the SCP, and may represent an example of
best practices to be followed by other Member States.
Information on the SCP included in the draft budget law
One of the questions included in the survey was about
whether the SCP or a preliminary version of it
(e.g. medium-term macroeconomic projections and budg-
etary projections on which the SCP will be based) is
annexed to the draft budget law submitted to parliament.
In principle, a positive answer might imply a stronger link
between both documents, and would allow considering
Graph II.1.1:  Department in charge of budget and stability and convergence programmes’ 
preparation and accounting rules
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domestic budgetary policy. According to the answers pro-
vided (see Graph II.1.2), nearly 20 EU Member States
declare including neither the SCP nor a preliminary ver-
sion in the draft budget law. Nonetheless, some of these
negative answers should be somewhat qualified. In some
of the countries that declare not to annex information
about multiannual targets and projections in the draft
budget, national parliaments have already discussed and/
or approved fiscal objectives included in their medium-
term budgetary frameworks (e.g. the Netherlands, Finland
and Sweden), which in turn form the basis of the SCP tar-
gets. Despite these notable exceptions, the results of the
survey point to an overall rather weak link between budget
laws and medium-term objectives presented in the SCPs.
Fiscal targets for year t and t+1 in the draft budget 
and the SCP
Finally, the comparison between fiscal targets for years t
and t+1 included in the draft budget and the programme
may show to some extent the degree of compatibility
between both policy instruments. A large majority of
Member States declared to consider the same budgetary
objectives for the current and the next year in both doc-
uments (see Graph II.1.2). However, this apparent over-
lap between budgets and SCPs is, as mentioned in Sec-
tion II.2.2 rather unidirectional, in the sense that the SCP
simply adopts the figures indicated in the budget. Thus,
identical targets do not presuppose that fiscal policy con-
siderations at EU level have been taken into account in
the conduct of domestic budgetary policy. 
1.2.5. Proposals to improve the current interaction 
between national and European fiscal 
procedures
The results of our survey give rise to some tentative pro-
posals for strengthening the link between the domestic
budget process and the EU fiscal surveillance frame-
work. The potential improvements can be summarised as
follows.
In a number of Member States the link between the
annual budget and the EU fiscal framework is weak.
Past policy experience shows that this may result in
sizeable gaps between plans set out in the SCPs and
actual budgetary outcomes. The interaction between
national budgets and the EU dimension could be signif-
icantly reinforced in the annual mid-term budgetary
review (MTBR), which assesses the envisaged budget-
ary strategies of EU countries for the following year
(see Section II.1.3) (1). In the context of this peer
¥1∂ In 2007, the mid-term budgetary review was to take place in April, when
according to Table II.1.1 most national budgets started to be prepared.
Graph II.1.2:  Stability and convergence programmes annexed to the budgets and targets for t+1
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between the most recent SCP updates and the prepara-
tion of next year’s budget could be better evaluated.
Significant deviations of current budgetary develop-
ments from the adjustment path included in the latest
ante the appropriate fiscal policy stance for the euro
area in the subsequent year, and to ensure that their
national budgetary plans are consistent with the euro
area-wide policy objectives.
Table II.1.1
Calendar for the preparation of national budgets and stability and convergence programmes (SCP)
in Member States
Main steps for the budget preparation Main steps for the SCP preparation
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
BE BE
BG BG
CZ CZ
DK DK
DE DE
EE EE
IE (1) IE
EL EL
ES ES
FR FR
IT IT
CY CY
LV LV
LT LT
LU LU
HU HU
MT MT
NL NL
AT AT
PL PL
PT PT
RO RO
SI SI
SK SK
FI FI
SE SE
UK (2) UK
Legend and notes: 
 Start Start
 Approval by government and submission to parliament Approval by government
Approval by parliament
(1) In Ireland, the budget is debated but not voted following its presentation in the parliament. Instead, changes are introduced through the Social Welfare Bill and the
Finance Bill in December and February respectively.
(2) The UK has a different fiscal year that does not fit properly in this table. An important event is the release of the autumn pre-budget report after which the SCP has
to be approved. 
Source: Commission services.83
SCP should be justified and corrective measures pro-
vided in the up-coming budget. Overall, this would
give Member States the chance to jointly determine ex
• As suggested by some country experiences, the
link between the SCPs and the annual budget laws
could be strengthened through the implementation
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(see Section III.2). Such frameworks should form the
basis upon which both the national budgets and the
SCPs are prepared. In a number of Member States
(e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, and Finland), a strong
connection between medium-term objectives and
yearly budgetary plans is assured by means of fixed
medium-term expenditure paths that are not systemat-
ically revised on a yearly basis. Obviously, the SCPs
could also play the role of medium-term budgetary
frameworks. However, country policy experiences
suggest that medium-term expenditure frameworks
may be more effective, which can be partly explained
by the fact that spending is the part of the budget most
directly controlled by fiscal authorities.
• In line with the 2005 reform of the SGP that recom-
mended a higher involvement of national institu-
tions in the preparation of the updated programmes,
the role of parliaments in discussing the SCPs and
the Council opinions could be enhanced. This would
allow for a richer domestic debate about budgetary
issues and their EU dimension. 
• Ensuring a strong coordination among departments
in charge of the preparation of the budget and the
SCP may be relevant for some Member States. As
previously mentioned, only in one third of the EU
countries one single department is responsible for
both the budget and the SCP.
• Given that generally national budgets and SCPs are
not based on the same accounting rules, clear and
comprehensive adjustment procedures to convert
budgetary values into national accounts figures should
be available to secure consistency and comparability.
Finally, strengthened fiscal coordination among general
government tiers when setting the multiannual fiscal tar-
gets in the SCPs would help facilitate a more effective
commitment of all actors involved in the conduct of fis-
cal policy at national level. Belgium and Spain may pro-
vide positive examples in this respect.
1.3. A stronger role for the mid-term 
budgetary review in the euro area
The Council report of March 2005 underpinning the
and their implications for the euro area as a whole’. This
mid-term budgetary review (MTBR) was conceived as a
strategic policy debate, to be held just before crucial
decisions on the budgetary plans for the following year
are taken in the Member States. At its meeting of
24 November 2006, the Eurogroup considered that the
MTBR discussion had not fully lived up to expectations
and that it should be improved so as to become a genuine
ex ante political debate on the fiscal stance both in the
euro area as a whole and the individual Member States.
Ministers considered notably that the MTBR should bet-
ter focus on the implications for the euro area of policy
intentions of Member States and that the forward-look-
ing dimension of the discussion should be developed.
The Eurogroup invited the Commission to work on ways
to improve the MTBR and to strengthen it, so as to trans-
form it into a real political discussion of Member States’
intentions for the following year’s budget. On the basis
of Commission proposals, the Eurogroup took a number
of decisions to strengthen the MTBR, which are summa-
rised below.
1.3.1. Specification of the purpose of the MTBR
The Eurogroup agreed that the purpose of the MTBR is
twofold: (i) to ensure a proper coordination of national
fiscal policies in the euro area; and (ii) to provide suffi-
cient peer support and pressure for sound fiscal policies
at national level, through an informed and frank discus-
sion of the national fiscal strategies. This means that the
discussion should focus not only on problematic coun-
tries. Rather, the discussion should examine develop-
ments in the Member States which may have an impact
on economic developments in other Member States and
in the euro area as a whole.
1.3.2. Provision of information by the Member 
States
In the past, the MTBR was typically based on the macr-
oeconomic and budgetary projections included in the
spring Commission forecast, which for the year t+1 is pre-
pared on the basis of the customary ‘no-policy-change
assumption clause’. This assumption implies that, for the
year t+1, the Commission services’ spring forecast only
reflects measures that are publicly announced and known
in sufficient detail. Hence, mere policy intentions
expressed by the governments are not taken into account.
To enrich the MTBR discussions, the Eurogroup decided84
2005 reform of the SGP states that the Eurogroup should
discuss, at least once a year before the summer, ‘a hori-
zontal assessment of national budgetary developments
that Member States could, if they consider it expedient,
provide updated information on their fiscal policy inten-
tions for the year t+1. Member States were invited to for-
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information will be taken into account by the Commission
services in the preparation of the document preparing the
MTBR discussion. This improvement will potentially
allow a stronger peer support from the Eurogroup for ade-
quate national policy intentions, which may be helpful in
the national fiscal policy debate. Moreover, by agreeing to
forward new information, Member States show their
intention to really transform the MTBR into a strategic
policy debate.
1.3.3. Change in the calendar of the MTBR
As detailed in Section II.1.2, one of the difficulties faced
in the coordination of fiscal policies in the euro area is
that there are important differences in the national budg-
etary calendars. The most frequent situation is that the
budget for the year t+1 is prepared in the course of the
summer of year t by the government, adopted by the gov-
ernment in September or October and then submitted to
the vote of the national parliament, which generally
intervenes in the latest weeks of year t or in the first
weeks of year t+1. Two euro area Member States have a
significantly different budgetary calendar, as major deci-
sions are taken relatively early in the year in which the
budget for year t+1 is prepared.
• In Germany, the preparation of the budget for year
t+1 starts in December of year t-1 with the letters to
the line ministries. Until March of year t, negotia-
tions take place between the Ministry of Finance and
the line ministries, at the working level. Budget
negotiations at ministerial level generally start in
June of year t, and Cabinet decision on the budget
plan and financial plan takes place already by end-
June or early July, which is much earlier than in
most other euro-area countries. In August of year t,
the government draft budget is presented to the Bun-
destag and the Bundesrat. In September, the first
reading of the draft budget takes place in the Bun-
destag. The budget law is generally adopted in the
course of December of year t.
• In the Netherlands, the Cabinet decision on the
(draft) budget of year t+1 (as well as on the update
of the budget of year t) takes place in the spring of
year t. The preparation of the budget for year t+1
takes as a basis the real medium-term expenditure
ceilings agreed in the context of the medium term
in the preparation of the new budget and is used to
transform the real ceilings into nominal ceilings.
The budget is generally presented to parliament in
September of year t.
As one of the main aims of the MTBR discussion is to
influence national fiscal policy decisions to ensure an
appropriate fiscal stance at the euro area level, Ministers
decided to split the MTBR discussion in two main steps.
A first discussion will take place in April, e.g. immedi-
ately after the assessment of the medium-term budgetary
plans formulated by Member States in their stability and
convergence programmes. The main horizontal discus-
sion on the appropriate fiscal stance in the euro area will
take place in that meeting. The cases of Member States
with an advanced budgetary calendar (Germany, the
Netherlands) will also be examined in this meeting. A
second Eurogroup meeting, in June, will assess the situ-
ation of the other Member States, in the light of previous
horizontal and country-specific discussions. Such a cal-
endar will allow at the same time to base discussions on
up-to-date information and to have them at a moment
when fiscal policy decisions can still be influenced.
1.3.4. Adoption of horizontal and country-specific 
conclusions
The final element going in the direction of a strengthen-
ing of the MTBR exercise is that a concrete output will
come out of the Eurogroup discussions. Ministers con-
curred that the Eurogroup would agree on conclusions
that would cover both horizontal and country-specific
issues. All countries will be covered by the conclusions.
The Eurogroup will formally agree on both horizontal
and country-specific conclusions. The horizontal part
will be made public; the country-specific sections will
remain confidential. The fact that the Eurogroup will
agree on a written text of reference summarising the
main conclusions of the MTBR discussion, and to which
ministers could refer in the subsequent steps of budget-
ary surveillance and coordination, will contribute to
enhancing peer support and peer pressure for sound fis-
cal policies. The written text can also be used in the
national debate.
1.4. Putting the assessment of stability 
and convergence programmes into 
a broader economic perspective85
budgetary framework. The spring economic forecast
of the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis (CPB) determines the room for manoeuvre
Under the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) each year Member States are required to
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convergence programmes (SCPs). These programmes
indicate for the current and at least the three following
years budgetary targets for the general government bal-
ances and the projected path for the debt ratio together
with information on how the targets are expected to be
achieved. These programmes are at the core of the Coun-
cil’s surveillance of budgetary positions and its surveil-
lance, as well as the coordination of economic policies.
The examination of the SCPs by the Council is based on a
recommendation by the Commission which in turn
reflects a comprehensive and detailed technical analysis
carried out by the Commission services. Over the years
this technical analysis has evolved and broadened reflect-
ing both the evolution of the SGP and its implementation
as well as the evolutions in fiscal measurement.
The most recent extension of the technical analysis was
put in place for the assessment of the 2006/07 vintage of
SCPs. It puts the analysis of the budgetary targets and of
the strategy presented in the programmes into a broader
economic assessment with a view to providing a more
comprehensive and coherent framework for fiscal and
economic surveillance.
This section briefly presents the background to this
recent step towards complementing and strengthening
the technical analysis carried out by the Commission
services and outlines the main structure and purpose of
the enhanced exercise.
1.4.1. Background
In line with the provisions of the preventive arm of the
Pact as laid out in Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97,
the assessment process of the SCPs passes through dif-
ferent stages involving the Commission and the Council.
The starting point and basis of the assessment process is
a technical analysis carried out by the staff of, and under
the responsibility of, the Directorate-General for Eco-
nomic and Financial Affairs of the Commission. The
results of that analysis are presented in a working docu-
ment which since 2003 is also made available to the gen-
eral public (1). The main conclusions of the working doc-
ument are distilled and reflected in the Commission
recommendation for a Council opinion on the SCPs.
The technical analysis of the Commission services typi-
cally focuses attention on points that are directly linked
to the requirements of the SGP. The complete list of
these points, based on the provisions of the reformed
Pact, is presented in Box II.1.1.
On several occasions in the past, when assessing the
Commission recommendations for a Council opinion on
the SCPs, the Economic and Financial Committee
(EFC) (2) expressed the view that a strict focus on the
requirements of the Pact would be an incomplete basis
for an effective multilateral surveillance aimed at ensur-
ing closer coordination of economic policies in the EU.
Moreover, the links with the renewed Lisbon strategy for
growth and jobs were also felt to deserve additional
attention.
The scope for broadening the assessment of the SCPs
beyond the strict requirements of the Pact also emerges
from the Council report of March 2005 underpinning the
reform of the Pact. One of the main aims of the reform
was to put greater emphasis on country-specific eco-
nomic developments. This holds true for both the pre-
ventive and the corrective arm of the Pact (3).
A fair and effective application of these provisions calls
for a more comprehensive appraisal of the economic and
budgetary situation of a country in the various stages of
EU budgetary surveillance. It is against this backdrop
that the Commission services reviewed and extended the
scope of its technical assessment.
1.4.2. The structure and content of the broadened 
economic assessment
Up until 2005, the assessment of a country’s economic
outlook was an integral, but not prominent element in the
technical analysis of SCPs carried out by the Commis-
sion services. Consideration was mainly given to the
macroeconomic outlook underpinning the budgetary tar-
gets presented by the Member States and to the question
¥2∂ The EFC is a Council committee set up by Article 114 of the Treaty based
of the preventive arm of the SGP, and within the framework of multilateral
surveillance under Article 99 of the Treaty, which together with the Com-
mission examines the budgetary targets presented by the Member States in
the stability and convergence programmes.
¥3∂ Under the preventive arm of the Pact, the adjustment effort towards the
country-specific medium-term budgetary objectives can be modulated in
function of the prevailing cyclical conditions. Under the corrective arm of86
¥1∂ The working documents, organised by Member States, can be found at the
following Internet address: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/fiscal_policy528_en.htm
the Pact, the assessment of so called other relevant factors which include
the medium-term economic position play a role when launching the exces-
sive deficit procedure as well as in all successive procedural steps once a
country is found to have an excessive deficit.
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less realistic. The assessed degree of realism would then
play a role in the risk assessment of the budgetary pro-
jections.
The technical analysis carried out in the assessment
round of the 2006/07 updates of the SCPs has signifi-
cantly broadened the review of economic developments.
Firstly, the assessment of the macroeconomic outlook
presented in the programmes is more detailed and partic-
ular attention is paid to the assessment of cyclical condi-
tions so as to better identify economic ‘good times’ and
hence the appropriateness of the planned fiscal adjust-
ment.
Secondly and more importantly, the analysis starts with
a comprehensive review of economic and fiscal trends
over the past 10 years. It thus sets the scene for the
assessment proper of both the economic and budgetary
projections presented in the programme.
1.4.3. The backward-looking analysis 
and the medium and long-term economic 
policy challenges
Apart from putting the economic and budgetary projec-
tions presented in the SCPs into perspective, the chief
objective of the retrospective part is to diagnose the main
medium and long-term economic policy challenges of
the Member States that have implications for public
finances. As a rule, these challenges can serve as refer-
ence when assessing the budgetary strategy presented in
the SCPs, beyond the strict requirements of the SGP.
Where relevant, attention is given to the economic and
fiscal challenges of a country on the one hand and the
reform efforts under the renewed Lisbon strategy for
growth and jobs on the other.
The medium and long-term challenges are grouped
around three headings that capture the different dimen-
sions of fiscal policy or more generally of public
finances: (i) stabilisation versus adjustment, (ii) effi-
ciency and (iii) sustainability. Not all countries will nec-
essarily have challenges under all three headings. The
presentation is expected to reflect the relative impor-
tance of the issues within and across countries.
The first heading stabilisation versus adjustment com-
prises challenges linked to the traditional fiscal policy
procyclical fiscal policy and, more specifically, the risk
of overheating. The risk of overheating is of particular
interest because it is not necessarily covered by the
requirements of the Pact. In particular, a country could
be in line with the requirements of the EU surveillance
framework, i.e. have already achieved its medium-term
objective or be on track towards it, but still show signs of
economic tension, such as large and increasing current
account imbalances or high inflation, that risk jeopardis-
ing stability in the short or medium term. As regards pro-
cyclical fiscal policy a review of the past can help under-
stand differences between plans and outcomes and hence
clarify the fiscal performance of a country and possibly
provide lessons for the future.
Challenges under the heading of efficiency refer to a
potentially broad range of issues typically linked to
structural problems emerging from the economic analy-
sis and generally or potentially addressed in the national
reform programmes under the renewed Lisbon strategy
for growth and jobs. Two possible subheadings are of
interest: (i) the composition of government expenditure
and (ii) the level and composition of direct/indirect tax-
ation as well as incentives or disincentives of the pen-
sions system. For instance, in an economy with below
average economic growth with origins mainly in weak
total factor productivity a comparatively low share of
public expenditures on education, R & D and infrastruc-
ture would signal a challenge of composition. Similarly,
if the economic analysis revealed low labour market par-
ticipation and a high rate of unemployment a high tax
wedge on labour could possibly indicate a challenge on
the tax side of the budget.
The presentation of sustainability challenges in the con-
text of the broadened economic appraisal is mainly done
for the sake of completeness. The basis for the assess-
ment of the long-term sustainability of public finances is
provided by the commonly agreed methodology under-
lying the Sustainability Report of the Commission,
which, on the basis of long-term projections, groups
countries into three different risk categories: low,
medium and high (1). On top of the standardised assess-
ment, the value added of the discussion of sustainability
¥1∂ The sustainability report was a response to an invitation of the Council in
February 2006 to undertake a comprehensive assessment on the long-term
public finance situation in the EU and in the individual Member States.87
aim of smoothing cyclical variations in output. They typ-
ically refer to a prevailing mismatch between fiscal
stance and cyclical conditions. Concrete examples are
The sustainability report is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/publications/publication_summary7907_en.htm
Advances in the assessment of the long-term sustainability of public
finances are discussed in Section II.4 of this report.
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SCPs consists in highlighting country-specific issues.
1.4.4. The assessment of the macroeconomic 
projections underpinning the budgetary 
targets
Against the backdrop of the retrospective part, the eco-
nomic appraisal proceeds with a structured assessment
of the macroeconomic projections presented in the
SCPs. The overall aim is to identify significant breaks
vis-à-vis past trends, to judge the internal consistency of
the macroeconomic scenario and to make out upside or
downside risks with significant budgetary implications.
The benchmark for the assessment is the latest Commis-
sion services’ autumn forecast complemented by more
recent information, in particular, if available, the spring
interim forecast (1).
The assessment covers the various dimensions of the
macroeconomic scenario, such as the external assump-
tions, economic activity, the labour market, costs and
prices and balances of institutional sectors. In contrast to
past practice, the focus has been widened. It looks
beyond the question of whether projected real GDP
growth is (markedly) cautious or favourable so as to
judge the possible repercussions on the budgetary tar-
gets. Recent experience has clearly shown that there are
many other factors besides movements in aggregate
activity that have an impact on the budget. Specifically,
for a given rate of real GDP growth the composition of
aggregate demand or the composition of primary income
distribution can make a sizeable difference in terms of
tax revenues (2). In the light of this, attention is also given
to the projected link between major tax bases and the
level of overall economic activity.
¥1∂ In between the biannual fully-fledged forecast rounds the Commission
services produce interim forecasts (for DE, ES, FR, IT, NL, PL, UK)
which update projections for real GDP growth and inflation of the current
year.
¥2∂ A more detailed discussion of related issues is presented in Section II.2.1.
Box II.1.1: Main points covered by the Commission services technical analysis of stability 
and convergence programmes
As required by Article 5(1) (for stability programmes) and Article 9(1) (for convergence programmes) of Council Regu-
lation (EC) No 1466/97, the assessment covers the following points:
• whether the economic assumptions on which the programme is based are plausible. The plausibility of the programme’s
macroeconomic assumptions is assessed by reference to the latest Commission services autumn forecast;
• the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) presented by the Member State and whether the adjustment path towards
it is appropriate;
• whether measures being taken and/or proposed to respect that adjustment path are sufficient to achieve the MTO over
the cycle;
• when assessing the adjustment path towards the MTO, whether a higher adjustment effort is made in economic good
times, whereas the effort may be more limited in economic bad times, and, for euro area and ERM II Member States,
whether the Member State pursues an annual improvement of the cyclically adjusted balance, net of one-off and other
temporary measures, of 0.5 % of GDP as a benchmark to meet its MTO;
• when defining the adjustment path to the MTO (for Member States that have not yet reached it) or allowing a temporary
deviation from the MTO (for Member States that have), the implementation of major structural reforms which have
direct long-term cost-saving effects (including by raising potential growth) and therefore a verifiable impact on the long-
term sustainability of public finances (subject to the condition that an appropriate safety margin with respect to the 3 %
of GDP reference value is preserved and that the budgetary position is expected to return to the MTO within the pro-
gramme period), with special attention for pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory,
fully-funded pillar;
• whether the economic policies of the Member State are consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines in the area88
(Continued on the next page)
of public finances.
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of the macroeconomic scenario is followed by consider-
ations about whether economic conditions over the pro-
gramme period can be characterised as economic ‘good’
or ‘bad times’. This is crucial to assess the appropriate-
ness of the planned annual fiscal adjustment. In line with
the specifications on the implementation of the SGP, the
so-called code of conduct, the main criteria for assessing
cyclical conditions is the output gap, where a period in
which actual output exceeds its potential level should be
defined as ‘good times’ (1). However, in view of the
notorious uncertainty surrounding real-time estimates of
the output gap a novel and more comprehensive
approach is being examined. The real-time output gap
estimates are complemented by a battery of indicators
that are available in real time and are generally expected
to reflect cyclical conditions. Potential candidates are the
rate of inflation, the change in the rate of unemployment,
the real effective exchange rate, the economy’s external
balance and the rate of capacity utilisation in the manu-
facturing industry. If, by way of illustration, the output
gap estimate of a given country was close to zero, while
all other indicators pointed to favourable economic con-
ditions the broader assessment could be that the econ-
omy in question is enjoying economic good times.
Clearly, the wider battery of indicators needs to be inter-
preted with the necessary degree of judgement inter alia
because some of the indicators may rather reflect struc-
tural as opposed to cyclical factors. Nevertheless,
broader assessment may prove to be useful to get a better
view as compared to traditional indicators of the cyclical
stance.
1.5. The Commission policy advice
The Council report of 20 March 2005, which summa-
rises the political agreement on the SGP reform, intro-
duced the possibility for the Commission to issue direct
— i.e. without involvement of the Council — policy
advice to a Member State. The reference to the policy
advice comes in the section of the report related to the
adjustment path to the medium-term budgetary objective
(MTO). In the SGP reform debate, the introduction of
the Commission policy advice was also motivated by the
consideration that a more symmetrical approach to fiscal
policy over the cycle should be achieved, through
enhanced budgetary discipline in periods of economic
recovery. This section examines the possible role of this
instrument in relation to instruments of the EU budget-
Box II.1.1 (continued)
The assessment also examines:
— the evolution of the debt ratio and the outlook for the long-term sustainability of the public finances, which should be
given ‘sufficient attention in the surveillance of budgetary positions’ according to the Council report of 20 March 2005
on improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. A Commission communication of 12 October 2006
sets out the approach to the assessment of long-term sustainability (1);
— the degree of integration with the national reform programme, submitted by Member States in the context of the Lisbon
strategy for growth and jobs. In its cover note of 7 June 2005 to the European Council on the broad economic policy
guidelines for the period 2005–08, the Ecofin Council stated that the national reform programmes should be consistent
with the stability and convergence programmes;
— compliance with the code of conduct (2), which inter alia prescribes a common structure and set of data tables for the
stability and convergence programmes.
¥1∂ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘The long-term sustainability of public finances in the EU’,
12.10.2006, COM(2006) 574 final and European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (2006), ‘The long-term sus-
tainability of public finances in the European Union’, European Economy No 4/2006.
¥2∂ ‘Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact and guidelines on the format and content of stability and convergence pro-
grammes’, endorsed by the Ecofin Council of 11 October 2005.89
ary framework (opinions on SCPs, Council early warn-
ing) and discusses the circumstances in which it could be
activated.
¥1∂ The full document is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
about/activities/sgp/codeofconduct_en.pdf 
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The use of the Commission policy advice should be seen
in the context of the other instruments available in the
preventive arm of the SGP, in particular the Council rec-
ommendations under Article 99 of the Treaty (e.g. the
early warning mechanism) and the Council opinion on
the stability and convergence programme.
Policy advice versus recommendation under Article 99 
of the Treaty
The Council may issue a recommendation under Article
99(4) of the Treaty when policies of a Member State are
not consistent with the broad economic policy guidelines
(BEPGs) or risk jeopardising the proper functioning of
the economic and monetary union (EMU). This covers a
broad range of situations. In practice, however, recom-
mendations under Article 99 were generally used to send
early warnings to Member States. These early warnings
are a special case of recommendation under Article 99
for which the conditions have been codified in Regula-
tion (EC) No 1466/97. Articles 6(2) and 10(2) of Regu-
lation (EC) No 1466/97 specify that ‘in the event that the
Council identifies significant divergence of the budget-
ary position from the medium-term budgetary objective,
or the adjustment path towards it, it shall, with a view to
giving early warning in order to prevent the occurrence
of an excessive deficit, address, in accordance with Arti-
cle 99(4), a recommendation to the Member State con-
cerned to take the necessary adjustment measures’.
The Commission policy advice differs from the early
warning in three respects. Firstly, the policy advice
reflects only the views of the Commission, as it is issued
without involvement of the Council. Secondly, for a pol-
icy advice there is not necessarily a need to have identi-
fied a divergence from the MTO or the adjustment path
towards it and there is no relation to the possible occur-
rence of an excessive deficit. Thirdly, even more than the
Council early warnings (which were in the past activated
at a relatively late stage, in part because of the need to
see a divergence from plans), the policy advice is a for-
ward-looking instrument which could be activated at a
time when it can still influence policy decisions.
Policy advice versus policy invitations formulated in
Council opinions on stability and convergence pro-
grammes
ions on the stability and convergence programmes. The
policy advices and policy invitations formulated in
Council opinions both address non-binding recommen-
dations to the country concerned. The policy advice has
three specific features compared to the Council opinion.
Firstly, it reflects the views of the Commission and is
issued without involvement of the Council. Secondly, it
could generally have a more short-term orientation
focusing on the discussion of envisaged measures while
the opinions on stability and convergence programmes
relate more to medium-term planning. Thirdly, the pol-
icy advice can be sent at any time in the year.
Policy advice versus non-formal instruments
The main purpose of the Commission policy advice is to
send a public signal to a country which should take some
policy measures to keep its fiscal situation and plans in
line with the principles of the preventive arm of the SGP.
Such signal could also be conveyed through less formal
channels, e.g. in the context of Commission communica-
tions on public finances or of regular fiscal surveillance
exercises at EU level (discussion on the mid-term budg-
etary review for euro area countries, fiscal policy discus-
sions in the Council based on Commission economic
forecasts, etc.). Compared to these instruments, the pol-
icy advice would however be more flexible in terms of
timing and the message would be politically stronger, in
the sense that policy advice has to be adopted by the
Commission.
1.5.2. When to send policy advice?
To be effective, policy advice should be issued timely
wherever possible, at a moment when it is still realistic
to influence policy decisions in the Member State con-
cerned. Policy advice after adoption of undesired meas-
ures would likely be considered as punitive rather than
preventive. The credibility and effectiveness of the new
instrument in influencing the national debate would ben-
efit from basing it primarily on economic rationale and
argumentation rather than on legalistic and normative
considerations. Even considering the challenges that
flexibility could pose as regards equal treatment, pre-
serving the flexibility and room for judgement in the use
of the policy advice seems preferable to defining the pre-
cise conditions of when to use and when not to use it.
One of the main advantages of the new instrument is that90
In some cases, the Council formulates policy invitations
to the Member State concerned in the context of its opin-
it would allow the Commission to take the initiative in
influencing national policy decisions ex ante while they
are being discussed. Basing the issuance of policy advice
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interpretation should be considered. To avoid controver-
sies, policy advice could, for instance, be addressed
when plans or envisaged measures are in very clear con-
tradiction with agreed principles under the Pact (0.5 %
of GDP annual adjustment for countries of the euro area
or participating to ERM-II, strengthened consolidation
in good times, avoid procyclical policies) or where
envisaged measures could lead to clearly inappropriate
policies e.g. procyclical fiscal stance in ‘good times’.
Overall, the flexibility of the instrument allows consid-
ering it on a case-by-case basis as circumstances call for
it. Still, a non-exhaustive number of possible cases that
could justify the activation of the policy advice are listed
below.
• To influence the debate in Member States on poli-
cies which are not in line with the provisions of the
SGP on the adjustment path towards the MTO or on
the conduct of fiscal policy in good times. A policy
advice could, for instance, be issued where there is a
political debate in a Member State that would likely
lead to the implementation of policies that are in
clear contradiction with the principles of the SGP.
• To advise on policy in case of a risk of overheating
in a Member State. The activation of the instrument
could be considered where a Member State faces
clear risks of overheating, which may put at risk the
macroeconomic stability in the country concerned
or in the euro area. The Commission could envisage,
at an early stage and in a preventive spirit, the for-
mulation of policy advice.
• To prevent and signal clear non-respect of policy
invitations previously formulated by the Council.
The Commission could consider issuing a policy
advice when a Member State envisages policy meas-
ures that are in clear contradiction with the policy
invitations formulated earlier by the Council in its
Council opinion on the stability or convergence pro-
gramme.
The early policy advice should however not be used as a
systematic follow-up to, for example, non-respect of pol-
icy invitations in Council opinions; nor should ex ante
criteria be identified which would trigger it. Rather, to
1.6. Implicit government liabilities and 
medium-term budgetary objectives
1.6.1. Introduction
According to the Council report of March 2005 which
forms the basis of the reformed Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) EU Member States are required to achieve
medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs) that pursue
a triple aim: (i) provide a safety margin with respect to
the 3 % of GDP deficit limit of the Treaty; (ii) ensure
rapid progress towards sustainability; and (iii) taking this
into account, allow room for budgetary manoeuvre. The
MTOs are defined in structural terms, i.e. net of cyclical
and one-off and other temporary factors.
The Council report also indicates that the MTOs should
be differentiated for individual Member States so as to
account for the diversity of economic and budgetary
positions and developments as well as the diversity of
risks to the sustainability of public finances (1).
The safety margin safeguarding against the risk of
breaching the 3 % of GDP reference value is measured
by the so-called minimum benchmark. The most recent
update of the minimum benchmark was carried out in
autumn 2006. The corresponding results and a detailed
description of the method is provided in Section II.2.2
of this report.
As regards the second aim of the MTOs, the reference
values of the country-specific structural budget balance
that ensure rapid progress towards the long-run sustain-
ability of public finances should be based on a compre-
hensive assessment of implicit liabilities, i.e. impending
expenditure increases in the light of ageing populations.
Since such an assessment requires the clarification of a
number of conceptual and possibly methodological
issues, the Council concluded that until criteria and
modalities for taking into account implicit liabilities are
appropriately established and agreed by the Council the
country-specific MTOs are set on the basis of the current
government debt ratio and potential growth, while pre-
serving a sufficient safety margin against the risk of
breaching the 3 % of GDP reference value.
In the transition period Council Regulation (EC)
No 1466/97 as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005,91
ensure effectiveness of the instrument, its possible use
should be carefully contemplated on a case-by-case basis
assessing the severity of economic issues.
¥1∂ See Council of the European Union, Presidency conclusions, 7615/1/05
REV 1, ANNEX II, 23 March 2005.
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stipulates that the country-specific MTOs of euro area and
ERM II Member States shall be within a defined range
between – 1 % of GDP and balance or surplus, in cycli-
cally adjusted terms, net of one-off and temporary meas-
ures.
This section reflects the progress report submitted to the
Council in December 2006 and the envisaged way
forward (1). In particular, it takes a closer look at how
implicit liabilities are measured in the EU budgetary sur-
veillance framework. It then examines alternative strate-
gies to address the increase in age-related expenditures
and their implications for the MTOs. It finally presents
broad possible options for taking implicit liabilities into
account in the formulation of MTOs.
1.6.2. Implicit liabilities in the analysis of the 
long-term sustainability of public finances
Implicit liabilities already play an important role in the
EU’s multilateral budgetary surveillance framework. An
assessment by the Commission of the long-term sustain-
ability of public finances in the EU based on the 2006
common long-term budgetary projections conducted by
the EPC and the Commission was released on 12 Octo-
ber 2006 (2). It provides an assessment of risks to public
finance sustainability on a comparable basis in the EU
Member States and where the risks mainly stem from. In
its conclusions of 7 November 2006 (3), the Council con-
sidered that the sustainability report by the Commission
should be the basis for the annual examination of the sta-
bility and convergence programmes.
The analysis of public finance sustainability made by the
Commission and the Council in the context of budgetary
surveillance considers a relatively broad definition of net
implicit liabilities. Age-related expenditures stemming
from government commitments relating to pensions,
health and long-term care, unemployment benefits and
education are projected on the basis of the criteria agreed
within the EPC/AWG. As agreed in the revised code of
conduct, the common projections ‘provide the basis for
the assessment by the Commission and the Council of
sustainability of the Member States’ public finances
within the context of the SGP’ (4).
In the Commission’s practice for assessing long-term
sustainability, different synthetic indicators providing a
flow measure of the impact of implicit liabilities are con-
structed. The main indicator used in the sustainability
assessment is a synthetic sustainability gap indicator
(called the S2 indicator). This indicator provides a meas-
ure of the permanent improvement in the unchanged-
policy structural primary balance necessary to guarantee
that the intertemporal budget constraint of the govern-
ment is satisfied. In order to give a clear indication of the
medium-term budgetary policy implications of achiev-
ing sustainable public finance over an infinite horizon,
the sustainability gap indicator can be expressed as a
required primary balance (the RPB). This is the
unchanged-policy structural primary balance which
would allow the respect of the government intertemporal
budget constraint. In practice, it is constructed as the sum
of the sustainability gap indicator and the average of the
structural primary balance over the first five years of the
projection period after the end of the stability or conver-
gence programme.
It needs to be stressed that quantitative measures of net
implicit liabilities share some common limitations:
(i) their value is sensitive to the assumptions used to
project government revenues and expenditures. The reli-
ability of debt projections and synthetic sustainability
indicators depends crucially on the quality and availabil-
ity of age-related expenditure projections and assump-
tions on growth and interest rates. Moreover, debt pro-
jections and the S2 indicator depend crucially on the
starting budgetary conditions; (ii) there are aspects that
are relevant in an overall assessment of public finance
sustainability that are not captured by the quantitative
indicators.
In order to take into account these limitations, the quan-
titative sustainability analysis made by the Commission
services is complemented by a qualitative assessment
which covers elements such as the current debt-to-GDP
ratio, estimates of changes in the revenue/GDP ratio over
time.
The information used in the regular sustainability analy-
sis for the purpose of estimating implicit liabilities could
¥1∂ See Implicit government liabilities and medium-term budgetary objec-
tives: Progress report, note to the attention of the Economic and Financial
Committee, ECFIN-C2-REP-57606, Brussels, 15.12.2006. The three92
broad options presented in this section were outlined in Part II.2.2.2 of the
2006 public finance report, see European Commission (2006b).
¥2∂ See European Commission (2006b).
¥3∂ See Council of the European Union (2006). ¥4∂ See European Commission (2005a).
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account implicit liabilities for several reasons: (i) the
data on implicit liabilities come from a comprehensive
projection exercise, with common budgetary projections
conducted jointly by the Commission and the Economic
Policy Committee, based on commonly agreed criteria
and using a large amount of information from national
sources (especially concerning pension expenditure pro-
jections); (ii) the methodology for computing synthetic
sustainability indicators is discussed and agreed with the
Member States; (iii) it would ensure consistency
between the approach to sustainability analysis implicit
in the determination of the MTO with that used in the
assessment of stability and convergence programmes,
both aimed at ensuring sound fiscal positions over the
long-term within the context of budgetary surveillance
under the Stability and Growth Pact.
1.6.3. MTOs and strategies to deal with the impact 
of ageing
By targeting appropriate MTOs over the medium run,
and by sticking to them, Member States would create
room in their budgets to face the looming budgetary
impact of ageing.
The specific size of the appropriate MTO accounting for
implicit liabilities depends on at least two key policy
choices. The first choice faced by countries in setting a
strategy to deal with public finances sustainability is
whether to create room in government budgets to accom-
modate rising age-related expenditure or carry out struc-
tural reforms in such a way to contain the age-related
expenditure. In the first case, the strategy consists in ris-
ing taxes or cutting expenditure with a view to offsetting
the deterioration of the budget associated with rising
age-related expenditure. In the second case, the idea is to
directly contain the impact of ageing. Consequently,
major structural reforms will generally reduce the MTO
that safeguards long-term sustainability of public
finances. This aspect is captured by the 2005 Council
report according to which MTOs could be revised when
a major reform is implemented. However, the report
indicates relatively strict conditions for invoking struc-
tural reforms. Only ‘major’ reforms with a direct long-
term cost-saving effect are considered. Their impact on
the long-term sustainability has to be verifiable specifi-
cally in term of a detailed cost-benefit analysis.
time. In the first case, the adjustment necessary to make
public finances sustainable would be frontloaded, and no
further substantial adjustment would be required in the
future. In the second case, the initial budgetary effort is
less ambitious but an effort to accommodate rising age-
related expenditures needs to be made over a prolonged
period. The first strategy may be politically more costly.
However, a given budgetary adjustment is more costly to
the budget if implemented gradually because of a higher
present value of the government debt and in turn higher
interest expenditures. Moreover, a strong commitment is
required towards a protracted budgetary adjustment not
only by the incumbent government but also by future
governments.
In order for the MTOs to be useful targets for budgetary
policies, it is necessary that they are attainable and
achieved over the medium term. A majority of the Mem-
ber States had in 2005 a structural deficit above their cur-
rent MTOs as defined in the stability and convergence
programmes. These countries plan to consolidate the
public finances over the medium term and achieving
their current MTOs without further delay should be
given priority. Indeed, achieving the current MTOs over
the medium term would imply a significant contribution
towards sustainable public finances for the EU.
Keeping the current MTOs for a period of time would
allow focusing the discussion and efforts to the attain-
ment of the MTOs. It would also have some advantages:
(i) the current MTOs have been specified by the Member
States and have been integrated in their medium-term
budgetary planning and, in most cases, appear to be
appropriate for the next four years; (ii) the assessment of
three rounds of SCPs would be made by reference to the
same MTOs, which would allow a better analysis of the
consistency between budgetary plans and outcomes;
(iii) the current approach to calculate MTOs on the basis
of current debt and potential growth would be consoli-
dated; allowing to better build the additional step (taking
into account implicit liabilities) on the current principles.
The current principles attach more importance to the cur-
rent debt rather than to future debt developments. This is
an important feature, as reducing current debt is crucial
to improve fiscal sustainability.
However, while the current MTOs would stabilise the
debt ratio for most Member States, they would not be suf-93
A second choice that countries have to make is between
carrying out ambitious budgetary adjustments at once or
undertaking a gradual consolidation protracted over
ficiently ambitious to cope with the projected costs of age-
ing in all countries. Therefore, more ambitious MTOs
would contribute to more sustainable public finances.
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determination of MTOs: possible alternatives
On the basis of the available measures of implicit
liabilities and taking into account the considerations
above concerning the alternative strategies three broad
operational approaches for linking MTOs with implicit
liabilities can be distinguished. Two approaches build
fully upon synthetic sustainability indicators. The third
approach also allows for qualitative elements affecting
long-term sustainability.
(i) Frontloading of the adjustment
This approach consists of setting the country-specific
MTO equal to the (structural) balance required to achieve
sustainability, i.e., the structural balance improved by the
sustainability gap.
Since the MTO needs to define a safety margin against
the risk of breaching the 3 % of GDP reference value of
the Treaty for the overall budget balance, the MTO needs
to be gross of interest expenditures, i.e., the required pri-
mary balance needs to be translated into a required bal-
ance which includes interest expenditures.
This method permits to construct MTOs representing the
budgetary position that, if respected over the years,
would at unchanged policies keep public finances under
control also when the impact of ageing will show up. If
countries attain MTOs defined in this way neither struc-
tural reforms nor further budgetary efforts (i.e., tax
increases or cuts in non-age-related expenditures) would
be strictly necessary to ensure sustainability.
MTOs defined in this way have the advantage of being
based on a quantitative indicator based on the govern-
ment’s intertemporal budget constraint. As mentioned
above they could be revised as a result of major struc-
tural reforms. Reforms would give rise to new projec-
tions for age-related expenditures which in turn imply a
new required balance. There are also disadvantages.
Firstly, the method may in some cases be judged as
yielding excessively ambitious budgetary targets for
those countries that intend to rely intensively on struc-
tural reforms to face the impact of ageing or that have a
preference for gradual budgetary adjustment strategies.
In other cases, it may lead to less ambitious budgetary
that may be relevant in the assessment of sustainability
are not considered.
(ii) Gradual adjustment
With this method the value of the MTO does not assume
an immediate adjustment to the required balance. Sus-
tainability in this case requires a gradual but continuous
budgetary adjustment and structural reforms.
In practice, the method would consist of defining MTOs
as the sum of an appropriately chosen reference point for
the structural balance plus a fraction of the difference
between the required balance and this reference point.
This fraction captures the extent of the desired frontload-
ing.
Regarding the choice of the reference point one possibil-
ity would be to use the lower limit of – 1 % of GDP for
MTOs of ERM-II and euro area members indicated in
the Council regulation that codifies the preventive arm
of the reformed SGP (1). A common reference point for
all Member States of – 1 % of GDP would generally be
consistent with the respect of a safety margin against the
3 % of GDP deficit threshold (the minimum bench-
marks, as recently computed by the Commission and
agreed by the EFC, are generally less stringent than – 1 %
of GDP; see Section II.2.2). The drawback with such a
reference point is an obvious element of arbitrariness. A
different possibility would be to use the current princi-
ples for determining the MTOs. With this approach, the
current stock of government debt and possibly potential
GDP growth could be taken into account in the determi-
nation of the MTO, thus recognising the different char-
acteristics of the EU Member States. Another possibility
would be to set the reference point equal to the debt-sta-
bilising structural primary balance.
This gradual adjustment has the advantage of avoiding
possibly overly ambitious MTOs in some cases. However,
to ensure long-term sustainability countries would need to
adjust their budgets to create room for rising age-related
expenditures and carry out structural reforms. Moreover,
the gradual approach implies a cost compared to frontload-
ing option, as a sharper rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio would
lead to a higher present value of interest expenditure.94
targets for countries with a low increase in age-related
expenditures, due to reforms, even if the current level of
government debt is high. Secondly, qualitative factors
¥1∂ See Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending
Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic
policies, OJ L 174, 7.7.2005.
P a r t  I I
E v o l v i n g  b u d g e t a r y  s u r v e i l l a n c e(iii) Sustainability margins
Both approaches described above are fully based on syn-
thetic quantitative sustainability indicators. A different
less mechanistic approach for the determination of
MTOs could be envisaged. The simplest method to pur-
sue this objective would be that of adding a sustainability
margin to a reference point mentioned before (e.g. a def-
icit of 1 % of GDP). Such margins would take into
account not only the results of quantitative sustainability
indicators but would also incorporate other qualitative
elements considered to be important in view of public
finance sustainability.
Groups of countries would be identified on the basis of a
comprehensive risk assessment taking into account the
factors that are considered in the sustainability assess-
ment, notably the long-term cost of ageing derived from
the synthetic sustainability gap indicators and also qual-
itative elements (e.g. the current debt-to-GDP ratio and
possibly changes in the government revenue-to-GDP
ratio). Sustainability margins would be higher the higher
the projected cost of ageing. The MTOs could also in this
option be revised to reflect the projected impact on fiscal
sustainability of major reforms.
In this approach, the MTO ranges that were defined when
setting the current MTOs could be extended. For example,
it could be envisaged to extend the number of groups used
for the current MTOs (– 1 % of GDP to – 0.5 % of GDP,
– 0.5 % of GDP to 0 % of GDP, and ‘balance or sur-
plus’) to also include some ‘surplus groups’.
The main drawback with this approach is a degree of
arbitrariness in defining the size of sustainability mar-
gins and the corresponding MTOs, as is the case with the
second option described above. However, there are clear
advantages. It would permit to take into account other
information than just the sustainability indicators, which
would be more in line with the current sustainability
assessment.95
2. Measurement and statistical issues
2.1. The assessment of tax revenues 
in the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework
In recent years, the volatility and/or unusual strength of
tax revenues in some EU Member States has attracted
increasing attention, as it affects the assessment of the
underlying budgetary position and the fiscal stance. This
section takes a closer look at the assessment of tax reve-
nues in the EU fiscal surveillance framework. It outlines
the current methodological approach and highlights a
number of issues linked to the experience of the recent
past, when the assessment of budgetary developments in
the EU has been complicated by relatively large swings
in tax revenues. Such swings went clearly beyond avail-
able estimates of the cyclical sensitivity of tax revenues
with respect to economic activity and sometimes gave
rise to misleading interpretations or unwarranted policy
decisions.
In some EU countries strong revenue inflows in the late
1990s were used to reduce taxes or to increase expendi-
tures on the assumption they would be permanent. Hind-
sight proved this assessment wrong giving way to
weaker than expected underlying budgetary positions
and the need for significant and taxing fiscal consolida-
tion during the protracted economic slowdown follow-
ing the abrupt end of the IT-boom in 2000–01. The
strong rebound of tax revenues in most recent years car-
ries the risk of repeating the mistakes of the past and
calls for a better understanding of the underlying mech-
anisms.
2.1.1. Tax revenues in the cyclical adjustment 
of the budget balance
The government’s actual budget balance reflects the
influence of both transitory and non-transitory factors.
ponents, which are likely to be observed if the economy
was operating at its potential level of economic activity.
Disentangling transitory elements of the budget from
permanent ones is crucial to gauge the medium-term
orientation of fiscal policy and constitutes relevant
information for policymaking.
In level terms, the sensitivity of the budget with respect
to the economic cycle mainly originates on the revenue
side as taxes are linked to the level of economic activity.
In the EU-25, current taxes account on average for
around 90 % of total revenues. There are also cyclically
sensitive expenditure items notably unemployment-
related expenditure, but they tend to be relatively small
in size; they generally account for less than 5 % of total
expenditure. For most expenditure components no auto-
matic link with short-term variations in the level of eco-
nomic activity can be assumed.
In the EU budgetary surveillance framework the cyclical
adjustment of the budget balance involves (i) a measure
of the cyclical position of the economy and (ii) a measure
of the link between the cycle and the components of the
budget. As for (i), the cyclical position is generally
measured by the output gap, the distance between actual
and potential output (1). Concerning (ii), the link
between the economic cycle and the budget balance is
summarised by elasticity parameters representing the
percentage change in the budget with respect to the per-
centage changes in the level of economic activity. A
brief description of the cyclical adjustment method is
included in Box II.2.1.
On the revenue side the adjustment is done for four major
tax categories: private income taxes, corporate income
taxes, indirect taxes and social contributions. Table II.2.1
displays the estimates of the respective elasticities cur-96
The transitory component largely refers to variations
ensuing from cyclical movements of GDP. Conversely,
the non-transitory elements refer to the budgetary com-
¥1∂ The reference method for calculating potential output and the output gap is
based on a production function approach which is described in detail in
Part VI of this report.
P a r t  I I
E v o l v i n g  b u d g e t a r y  s u r v e i l l a n c erently used in the EU fiscal surveillance framework and
calculated according to a methodology agreed at the EU
level (1). A comprehensive discussion of the estimates was
provided in European Commission (2005).
The clear advantage of the cyclical adjustment of the
budget balance used in the EU fiscal surveillance
framework is its simplicity as compared to alternative
approaches as well as the possibility to apply it uni-
formly across countries. Moreover, the underlying
formula is very popular among fiscal experts. It is
commonly used to do back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tions in order to have a quick assessment of the impact
of economic growth on the budget. However, the
method has two important limitations. Firstly, tax
elasticities are taken to be constant over time. They
measure the average relationship between tax reve-
nues and economic activity; year-to-year fluctuations,
which by experience can be relatively big, are not cap-
tured. The use of constant estimates is linked to the
forward-looking nature of the surveillance exercise:
the best predictor for tax elasticities in future years is
the average of the past. In practice, this approach can
have unwelcome implications for fiscal policy analy-
sis.
¥1∂ The methodology was developed by the OECD and the Commission serv-
ices within the framework of the working group on output gaps of the Eco-
nomic Policy Committee. The committee endorsed the method in 2005. A
detailed description of the approach is in Girouard and André (2005).
Table II.2.1
Tax elasticities of EU Member States
Personal tax Corporate tax Social contributions Indirect taxes Elasticity of total 
revenues
BE 1.09 1.57 0.80 1.00 1.00
BG 4.90 1.40 0.70 1.00 1.40
CZ 1.19 1.39 0.80 1.00 0.99
DK 0.96 1.65 0.72 1.00 1.00
DE 1.61 1.53 0.57 1.00 0.97
EE 0.80 1.40 0.70 1.00 0.88
IE 1.44 1.30 0.88 1.00 1.14
EL 1.80 1.08 0.85 1.00 1.07
ES 1.92 1.15 0.68 1.00 1.09
FR 1.18 1.59 0.79 1.00 0.98
IT 1.75 1.12 0.86 1.00 1.17
CY 2.10 1.50 0.70 1.00 1.14
LV 0.90 1.30 0.70 1.00 0.89
LT 0.90 1.40 0.70 1.00 0.90
LU 1.50 1.75 0.76 1.00 1.14
HU 1.70 1.44 0.63 1.00 1.02
MT 2.20 1.40 0.40 1.00 1.04
NL 1.69 1.52 0.56 1.00 1.01
AT 1.31 1.69 0.58 1.00 0.96
PL 1.00 1.39 0.69 1.00 0.91
PT 1.53 1.17 0.92 1.00 1.08
RO 1.90 1.60 0.70 1.00 1.10
SI 1.40 1.50 0.70 1.00 0.96
SK 0.70 1.32 0.70 1.00 0.88
FI 0.91 1.64 0.62 1.00 0.92
SE 0.92 1.78 0.72 1.00 0.94
UK 1.18 1.66 0.91 1.00 1.10
Euro area 1.48 1.43 0.74 1.00 1.04
EU-15 1.39 1.48 0.75 1.00 1.04
EU-10 1.29 1.40 0.67 1.00 0.9697
EU-25 1.35 1.45 0.72 1.00 1.01
EU-27 1.50 1.45 0.72 1.00 1.02
Sources: OECD and Commission services.
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real time are surrounded by a considerable degree of
uncertainty. In particular, the perceived position in the
cycle crucially depends on the prevailing outlook for
medium-term growth which is subsequently revised as
data for later years arrive (1). The fundamental problem
in assessing the cycle in real time and, hence, the under-
lying budgetary position, consists in estimating the level
of potential output. Potential output is the anchor that
determines the structural level of revenues and in turn
the sustainable level of expenditure. Where medium-
term growth prospects and linked to them potential out-
put estimates are too optimistic, revenues that are
thought to be structural will turn out to be temporary.
Discretionary policy measures that are based on such a
misperception of potential output and the cycle will ex
post lead to a deterioration of the budget.
2.1.2. Assessment and fiscal policy issues of 
the recent past
Graph II.2.1 shows the evolution of the apparent tax
elasticity of the euro area as a whole, defined as the
observed relative change of current taxes with respect to
the observed relative change of nominal GDP, with the
estimate currently used in the EU fiscal surveillance. As
apparent elasticities also include the effect of discretion-
ary policy measures, such as an increase or a cut of tax
rates, the comparison of the two series is not straightfor-
ward. Nevertheless, the graph provides a useful indica-
tion of the degree of volatility involved. While overall
taxes appear to be proportional to GDP on average (the
estimate of the tax elasticity is marginally above 1) the
link between taxes and economic activity is subject to
significant changes.
In the late 1990s, against the backdrop of a strong ITC-
boom, apparent tax elasticities had climbed well above
the average estimate reaching a peak of 1.3, i.e. the yield
of national tax systems had on average increased by
30 % compared with ‘normal’ times. In some countries
the significant windfall of taxes was either used to
reduce the tax burden or to increase expenditure or both.
At the time, such measures did not seem to be particu-
larly unwarranted. The underlying budgetary position as
measured by the approach outlined above signalled a
very sound and in some cases maybe even too strict fis-
cal stance. Such an assessment turned out to be skewed
for two reasons. Firstly, the real-time estimates of the
cycle did not point to particularly favourable economic
conditions. As medium-term growth prospects were gen-
erally assessed to be very bright the prevailing economic
¥1∂ The issue was first highlighted and empirically explored in connection
with US monetary policy-making by Orphanides (2003) and Orphanides
and van Norden (2002). Similar work in the field of fiscal policy in the
OECD countries was carried out by Forni and Momigliano (2004).
Graph II.2.1:  Euro-area tax elasticity with respect to GDP
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ondly, the windfall of government revenues, with tax
elasticities well above normal levels, was considered to
be permanent and hence at the disposal for fiscal policy-
making without affecting the sustainability of public
finances. This misapprehension was also due to a short-
coming in the current method of cyclical adjustment
(see Box II.2.1).
The misinterpretation of the nature of tax revenues
became apparent during the protracted economic slow-
down in the first half of the 2000s. As evidenced by the
strong revision of the output gap estimates for the year
2000 displayed in Graphs II.2.2, medium-term growth
prospects did not materialise. The high rates of economic
growth observed over those years turned out to be
mainly temporary, and with them tax revenues.
In autumn 2000, the underlying deficit in Germany,
France and Italy for that year was estimated at around
1–1.5 % of GDP. In the following years the successive
revisions of the output gap implied a consistent deterio-
ration of the cyclically adjusted budget balance
(see Graph II.2.3). Based on today’s assessment of the
cycle, the cyclically adjusted budget balance for the year
2000 would have been around 2–2.5 % of GDP or
higher. A very similar pattern holds for the year 2001.
On top of lower-than-expected potential growth at the
beginning of the decade, the yield of national tax sys-
tems fell significantly short of normal levels. The appar-
ent tax elasticity in the euro area average dropped to
0.5 in 2001 and recovered only gradually in subsequent
years. In 2005 and 2006 it staged a novel rebound to val-
ues well above the estimated average, against the back-
drop of a moderate economic recovery. The expected
return to normal levels in 2007 and 2008 depicted in
Graph II.2.1 essentially reflects the abovementioned fact
that revenue forecasts are typically based on normal or
average elasticities.
2.1.3. Ways of improving the assessment of tax 
revenues
The two key elements in the assessment of structural rev-
enues are (i) potential output and the output gap and
(ii) tax elasticities.
As mentioned above, the significant degree of uncer-
tainty of real-time output gap estimates can be inter-
preted as a forecasting problem.   
Graph II.2.2:  Revisions of the output gap estimate for 2000 in successive Commission services 
forecasts
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economic growth, which typically and inevitably deviate
from the actual outturn (1). To the extent that if such fore-
cast errors were purely random they would have to be
accepted as the price of genuine uncertainty surrounding
the future course of the economy. The main issue is to
avoid systematic mistakes, especially systematic mis-
takes towards optimism. In a rules-based fiscal frame-
work that sets limits on the budget balance, it is generally
easier to cope with positive growth surprises as they
increase the distance vis-à-vis the threshold, whereas
negative growth surprises will require a downward
adjustment of expenditure plans.
As regards the official forecasts of Member States there
is evidence in the literature of a statistically significant
degree of optimism in a number of euro area
countries (2). The experience of the early years of the
2000s, when budgetary plans of a number of Member
States were successively built on the relatively sanguine
assumption that medium-term growth would return to
the high rates observed towards the end of the 1990s, is
a particularly interesting case in point. As actual growth
consistently stayed behind expectations, the assessment
of structural revenues had to be adjusted downwards and
with them structural expenditures.
In the light of this experience, two main conclusions are
warranted; both are reflected in the agreement of March
2005 on the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact.
First, budgetary plans should be built on economic
growth projections which possibly err on the side of cau-
tion. Second, budgetary projections and the assessment
thereof should highlight and possibly quantify the budg-
etary implications of alternative growth scenarios so as
to have a complete view of the range of possible fiscal
outcomes.
Graph II.2.3:  Revisions of the cyclically adjusted budget balance (CAB) for 2000 following revisions 
of the output gap estimates of successive Commission services’ forecasts
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ The estimate of potential output in year t estimated in the current year T,
generally involves a centred and symmetric function of actual GDP y or
parts of actual GDP: . For estimates of
potential output in year T or beyond this involves the use of forecasts i.e.
. Taking the difference
between the ‘final’ estimate of potential output, the one obtained after the
arrival of new data, and the forecast yields
yt T
P
b0 bjyt j–
j 0=
∞
∑ bjyt j+
j i=
∞
∑+ +=
yT t T+ b0 bjyT i j–+
j 0=
∞
∑ bjEyT i j T+ +
j i=
∞
∑+ +=
∞100
which means that
the revision of potential output and the output gap estimate reflects the
forecast errors for real GDP.
yT i T i++ yT i T+– b0 bj yT i j+ + EyT i j T+ +–( )
j i=
∑+=
¥2∂ See Jonung and Larch (2006) and Strauch et al. (2004).
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E v o l v i n g  b u d g e t a r y  s u r v e i l l a n c eBox II.2.1: The cyclical adjustment of the budget balances in the EU budgetary surveillances: caveats 
linked to the assessment of tax revenues
In the EU budgetary surveillance framework, the cyclical adjustment of the budget balance is performed with the following
expression
(1)
where  is the nominal budget balance,  nominal GDP, Rt total current taxes and Gt current primary expenditures, OGt
the output gap defined as the distance between actual and potential GDP, expressed as a share of potential output. The
parameter  denotes the average budgetary sensitivity which in turn is a function of the revenue and expenditure elastici-
ties  and . A more detailed description of the cyclical adjustment method applied in the framework of the EU
fiscal surveillance can be found in European Commission (2004).
Assuming, for simplicity, that the relation between taxes and GDP is linear we have
(2)
where denotes the structural budget balance,  potential GDP,  actual GDP,  total expenditure, is the sen-
sitivity of the budget balance with respect to GDP in year t,  is the normal or average sensitivity of the budget and 
is the temporary deviation of the sensitivity from its normal or average value. Total expenditure is assumed to be cyclically
insensitive.
The overall budget balance-to-GDP ratio is the sum of a structural component and a cyclical component. Both components
can be represented as the product of the budgetary sensitivity  and GDP: for the structural component the
base is potential output , for the cyclical component it is the output gap . Hence, a temporary increase of the
sensitivity will lead to an overall improvement of the budget balance, which in that case will include two transitory com-
ponents: the purely cyclical component  and the component linked to the temporary increase in the budgetary
sensitivity . To obtain the structural balance one would have to subtract both transitory components from the
actual budget balance. Re-arranging terms in the equation (2) above yields
(3)
This equation essentially shows that the current method for cyclical adjustment overestimates (underestimates) the under-
lying budgetary position when the tax elasticity with respect to GDP increases (decreases) as compared with normal values.
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2 0 0 7Based on the data of successive vintages of stability and
convergence programmes, Graph II.2.4 displays the
growth projection of real GDP growth of the euro area of
the last year of the programme period. The focus is on
the last year because it is particularly indicative for the
assumed medium-term growth prospects. It is four years
ahead of the current period, when growth can generally
be expected to have returned to its ‘cruising speed’; i.e.
the prevailing view about potential output growth. The
two most recent vintages of stability and convergence
programmes (2005/06 and 2006/07) seem to point to a
shift towards more cautious growth assumptions, espe-
cially as regards the medium term. While the sample
period is clearly too short to extract solid trends, such a
change will certainly be conducive to help improve the
transparency of budgetary policy and possibly in turn
fiscal performance.
As regards the surveillance of budgetary positions under
the preventive arm of the Pact via the assessment of sta-
bility and convergence programmes, a number of steps
have been taken to better evaluate the official macroeco-
nomic projections presented by Member States. Firstly,
the assessment of the official macroeconomic scenario
presented in the stability and convergence programmes
is preceded by a broader discussion of past economic
developments so as to identify trends and challenges so
as to better evaluate the degree of realism of the medium-
term growth projections (see Section II.1.4. for a detailed
presentation of the broadened economic appraisal). Sec-
ondly, the assessment of the macroeconomic scenario
proper has been extended to include a specific section
focusing on cyclical conditions with a view to better
evaluating the position in the cycle and in turn the under-
lying growth momentum. Thirdly, the Commission serv-
ices’ forecasts, which serve as benchmark for the assess-
ment of fiscal developments in the Member States, are
recurrently examined with respect to their statistical
accuracy.
Turning to tax elasticities, the main challenge consists in
finding ways to better track and assess short-term fluctu-
ations of tax elasticities in real time (1).
From a conceptual point of view, there is a relatively
good understanding of why the link between tax reve-
nues and aggregate level of economic activity is not sta-
ble over time. What is lacking are workable methods to
gauge the short-term fluctuations of the tax elasticity
with respect to GDP.
¥1∂ In the formal framework presented in Box II.2.1, the short-term variations
of the tax elasticity are indicated as . εtΔ
Graph II.2.4:  Euro area projections of real GDP growth of the last year of stability 
programme period
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ticities can be subsumed under the general heading of
composition effects. The aggregate level of economic
activity as measured by GDP, both in terms of expendi-
ture and primary distribution of income, consists of indi-
vidual components that are subject to different tax
regimes and hence give rise to different tax yields. Con-
sequently, any change in the composition of GDP will go
along with a change in its tax content. The standard
example used to illustrate the point is a decline in the
overall tax elasticity on the back of an export-led recov-
ery. Exports of goods and services are exempt of value
added taxes and hence do not generate the same amount
of government revenues as final private consumption.
Similarly, compensations of employees are generally
more tax intensive than their complement in GDP,
namely the gross operating surplus. Depending on the
relative increase (or decline) of the two components a
given growth rate of GDP will give rise to higher or
lower change of income taxes.
Less apparent or less frequently considered composition
effects are related to asset price cycles which will have a
direct impact on capital gain taxes. These taxes are gener-
ally recorded as part of personal or corporate income
taxes. The literature that examines the interaction between
asset prices and fiscal policy provides evidence that asset
cycles are generally not synchronised with the economic
cycle and hence, will trigger short-term changes in the
overall tax elasticity with respect to GDP (1).
An additional, potentially significant composition effect
that has reached some prominence over the last couple of
years, are oil price developments. Large shifts in the
price of oil are particularly, though not exclusively rele-
vant for EU countries where oil and/or gas production is
important such as Denmark, the Netherlands and the
UK. They generally boost corporate income of the
respective industry and can also lead to an increase in
revenues from VAT on energy products. Indirect effects
via the terms-of-trade and linked to that an increase in
real income may also play a role (2).
Finally, short-term variations of the tax elasticity with
respect to GDP can arise as a result of time lags espe-
cially on the revenue side of the budget. For instance, a
non-negligible part of government revenues accruing
from income taxes is not collected in a withholding fash-
ion. It is generally assessed and collected only after the
end of the year the income is generated. Consequently,
revenues in any given year t may also depend on the eco-
nomic conditions of previous periods.
The current setup of cyclical adjustment described above
provides only limited scope for capturing composition
effects. To start with, the composition of real GDP with
respect to its expenditure and primary income compo-
nents is held constant. This limitation could in principle
be overcome by choosing a disaggregated approach in
which taxes are not linked to cyclical fluctuations of
GDP but to fluctuations of their respective tax base. The
ECB uses such an approach (3). However, the benefit of
allowing for changes in the composition of major
demand or income components comes at a price. In par-
ticular, the issue of separating the trend from the cycle
proliferates: what are the reference models, equivalent to
a production function approach used for GDP, that
would make it possible to estimate the trend of private
consumption, the gross operating surplus or compensa-
tions of employees? Moreover, there would no longer be
a clear link between the fiscal stance and the economic
cycle because individual tax bases are not necessarily
synchronised with the fluctuations of overall GDP; e.g. a
specific tax base could for instance perform particularly
well in economically difficult times. A further issue
related to the disaggregated approach refers to the degree
of detail. Even a breakdown into four major tax catego-
ries may not be sufficiently comprehensive. There can be
significant shifts within individual categories such as
personal income taxes due to a higher or lower increase
of capital income as compared with labour income. To
the extent that capital gains are taxed at different rates
such a shift could give rise to a change in the tax elastic-
ity with respect to GDP even if asset prices are synchro-
nised with GDP developments.
A second limitation of the current framework is that it
does not provide for a full coverage of taxable income or
expenditure. For instance, the tax base of indirect taxa-
tion is approximated by private consumption only,
which means that VAT paid on new residential housing
(classified as private investment expenditure) is not cap-
tured. In general, this approximation works quite well
but can give rise to relatively large leakages in the event
of a housing boom. This has for instance been the case in103
¥1∂ See for instance Eschenbach and Schuhknecht (2002), Girouard and Price
(2004) and Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004).
¥2∂ See Turner (2006). ¥3∂ See Bouthevillan et al. (2001).
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did not capture the revenues linked to the booming resi-
dential housing market observed over the past several
years. In such a case, the ‘extra revenue’ would seem to
be non-cyclical.
From a practical point of view, the assessment of tax rev-
enues in real time is complicated by the fact that short-
term fluctuations of the tax elasticity with respect to
GDP cannot be observed directly. As mentioned at the
beginning of this section the apparent elasticity may
include both temporary deviations of the tax elasticity
and the effect of discretionary measures. In principle,
there are two ways to separate the two. The first would
require estimates of the budgetary impact of discretion-
ary fiscal policy measures. On the basis of such estimates
the actual tax elasticity with respect to GDP could be
obtained by difference (1). The second method takes the
alternative route and tries to track fluctuations of the tax
elasticity directly as a function of a number of variables
that trigger the various composition effects discussed
before. Both methods have their pros and cons and are
worth exploring.
2.1.4. Conclusions
The measurement of the general government budget bal-
ance, net of cyclical and other temporary factors is a piv-
otal element of fiscal policy analysis. It is crucial to
gauge the medium-term orientation of fiscal policy and
constitutes relevant information for the assessment and
conduct of fiscal policy in general and in the EU fiscal
surveillance framework in particular. In recent years,
particularly volatile and/or buoyant tax revenues have
blurred the view of the structural level of general govern-
ment revenues.
The distortion has two different sources: (i) the estima-
tion of potential output in real time and (ii) the measure-
ment of year-to-year changes in the tax elasticity with
respect to GDP. The uncertainty surrounding real-time
potential output and output gap estimates is a well-
known issue. Its implications for budgetary surveillance
and fiscal policy as recognised in the Council report can
be best addressed by building budgetary plans on cau-
tious growth forecasts. Taking into account the degree of
uncertainty already into the planning phase of the budget
may also help to highlight risks. As regards the uncer-
tainty linked to tax elasticities, the conceptual issues are
relatively well understood but workable methods for
tackling them in practice need to be developed or
improved.
2.2. New methodology for computing 
minimum benchmarks
2.2.1. Background information
Under the provisions of the reformed Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) Member States are required to
achieve and safeguard a medium-term budgetary objec-
tive (MTO), which should ensure, inter alia, a sufficient
safety margin against the risk of breaching the 3 % of
GDP threshold of the Treaty.
This implies that the country-specific MTO should be set
above a threshold value, the minimum benchmark,
which ensures the respect of the 3 % reference value
under normal cyclical conditions. In the EU budgetary
surveillance framework, the minimum benchmark pro-
vides a lower bound for the determination of the country-
specific MTO.
The country-specific minimum benchmark is calculated
on the basis of two indicators (2):
• the budgetary sensitivity, which measures the
impact of cyclical fluctuations on the general gov-
ernment balance;
• an estimate of a representative output gap (ROG)
capturing very negative, but still likely cyclical con-
ditions.
Minimum benchmarks were updated in October 2005, to
take into account the new and updated values for budg-
etary sensitivities (3). Member States agreed on the new
¥1∂ The observed change in tax revenues expressed as ratio of GDP results
from the relative change in the overall level of economic activity and dis-
cretionary changes: . If estimates for the effect of
discretionary measures were available the actual sensitivity is obtained
as . The link between sensitivity and elasticity
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¥3∂ In June 2005, the budgetary sensitivities were updated for the EU-15 and
broadened to include estimates for the recently acceded Member States
(see European Commission, 2006a).
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sion services but invited the Economic Policy Commit-
tee (EPC) to carry out further work to explore possible
methodological improvements compared with the cur-
rent method and in September 2006, a new method to
calculate the representative output gap was agreed.
2.2.2. The concept of minimum benchmark
Budget balances are affected by cyclical fluctuations of
aggregate economic activity through the effect of the so-
called automatic stabilisers. The strength of the auto-
matic stabilisers depends mainly on the size of govern-
ment, the degree of progression of the tax system and the
generosity of unemployment benefits. Under the provi-
sions of the SGP automatic stabilisers are allowed to
operate freely as long as the headline deficit respects the
3 % of GDP reference value of the Treaty; with the pos-
sible exception of ‘severe downturns’ in which case
‘exceptional circumstances’ foreseen by the excessive
deficit procedure can be invoked (1).
With a view to providing Member States with an indica-
tion of the minimum structural budgetary position con-
sistent with a sufficient safety margin against breaching
the 3 % of GDP reference value of the Treaty, the Com-
mission introduced in 2000 the concept of the ‘minimum
benchmark’ (2).
Graph II.2.5 illustrates in a stylised way the role and
functioning of the minimum benchmark. The blue line
represents the output gap, while the purple line indicates
the general government balance expressed in nominal
terms. The structural deficit is assumed to be at the min-
imum benchmark (dotted bold horizontal line). In this
case, the headline deficit oscillates in line with the output
gap around the minimum benchmark. Taking into
account the sensitivity of the budget with respect to
cyclical fluctuations and the variability of the cycle, the
minimum benchmark is chosen in such a way as to guar-
antee that the headline deficit stays below the 3 % of
GDP reference value even when the output gap reaches
very negative but still reasonably likely values.
The minimum benchmark is used for two different pur-
poses in the assessment of the budgetary plans that
Member States present in the updates of their stability
and convergence programmes. First, they are used to
assess whether the MTO set by the country is consistent
¥1∂ See Article 2(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 as amended by
Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005. For further details see Section I.B. of
‘Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact’.
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/
codeofconduct_en.pdf 
¥2∂ See European Commission (2000) and (2002) for a detailed description of
the original method.
Graph II.2.5:  Minimum benchmarks: an illustration
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breaching the 3 % of GDP reference value of the Treaty.
Secondly, for countries that have not yet reached the
MTO, the minimum benchmark is also used to check
whether in any given year the budgetary projections pre-
sented in the stability and convergence programmes
ensure a sufficient safety margin with respect to the 3 %
of GDP threshold.
2.2.3. Updating the methodology to estimate 
the minimum benchmarks
Minimum benchmarks were updated in 2005 but Mem-
ber States invited the EPC to carry out further methodo-
logical work (see European Commission, 2006a). On
29 September 2006, Member States agreed on a new
methodology for computing the representative output
gap, one of the two components of the minimum bench-
marks.
The new methodology computes the representative out-
put gap as a weighted average of the 5 % percentile of
the country specific output gap series and of the 5 % per-
centile of output gap data for all countries (1). The
weights are set proportional to the amount of country-
specific data available: the longer the available time
series, the higher the weight given to the country-spe-
cific component.
(II.2.1) 
 (2)
The logic of this approach is that of using the simplest
and most direct statistical indicator which captures the
idea of the representative output gap, i.e. a particularly
low value of the output gap likely to be observed with a
probability of 5 %.
The representative output gap is computed on the basis
both of country-specific series and of information on the
whole set of observations. While capturing country-spe-
cific features, it limits the risks that the output gap obser-
vations over the past decades are for some countries not
fully representative of future fluctuations. For example,
limited output gap fluctuations do not guarantee that the
volatility will not be higher in the future, particularly if
time series are relatively short. Complementing country-
specific information with information embedded in
series of other EU Member States may overcome part of
the problem, on the ground that there are common ele-
ments in the cycle across countries.
The method takes into account all available country-
specific information and uses the same algorithm for
every country. The relative weights of the common and
country-specific component are different today among
countries, especially for the recently acceded Member
States due to the limited availability of data before 1995.
However, the weights will automatically converge to the
same value when the length of the time series increases
over time reaching and exceeding 25 years. The choice
of using moving samples has the advantage of not taking
into account very distant years in which the volatility of
the cycle may have followed different patterns inter alia
due to a different economic policy framework.
2.2.4. New minimum benchmarks
Table II.2.2 reports the updated minimum benchmarks
based on the new methodology for computing the repre-
sentative output gap. They were applied for the first time
in the assessment round of the 2006/07 updates of the
stability and convergence programmes. The new esti-
mates have a negative sign for all countries, meaning that
a moderate structural deficit would be compatible with-
out incurring the risk of breaching the 3 % deficit ceiling
under normal cyclical fluctuations. The simple average
of the minimum benchmarks across the EU-15 Member
States is – 1.3 % of GDP, close to the previous minimum
benchmark of – 1.2 % of GDP. Minimum benchmarks
for the recently acceded Member States are in general
less strict than those of EU-15 Member States. This is
essentially due to smaller budgetary sensitivities
(0.36 for new Member States compared to 0.49 for EU-
15) and somewhat less volatile output gaps over the sam-
ple period. Following sharp adjustments in the early
¥1∂ The variation across countries of minimum values for output gaps high-
lights the need of eliminating possible ‘outliers’ from the sample, i.e. out-
put gap estimates exhibiting exceptionally high or low values that
correspond to particular events unlikely to repeat themselves in the future.
The sample of output gaps used to calculate the representative output gap
was therefore redefined to exclude all observations below, and above,
respectively, the 2.5 % and the 97.5 % percentiles of the distribution for
ROG
Ni
25 Nt+
-----------------P5% country( )  2525 Nt+
-----------------P5% EU25( )+=106
1990s, for which generally no data are available, the
recently acceded Member States have since enjoyed a
comparatively smooth economic development.
the sample including all Member States.
¥2∂ Ni is the number of output gaps observed for country i over the last25 years (i.e. between 1981 and 2005). Outliers which have been deleted
from the sample are not considered as observations.
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liabilities
2.3.1. The review of the system of national accounts
The worldwide statistical community has been discuss-
tical Commission by March 2008. The European system
of national and regional accounts (ESA) is expected to
Table II.2.2
New minimum benchmarks
Number of 
country specific 
observations
Weight given 
to the country 
specific 
component (%)
Overall 5 % 
percentile
5 % percentile 
of country specific  
data
ROG Budgetary 
sensitivity
Minimum 
benchmark
(i) (ii)=(i)/((i) + 25) (iii) (iv) (v)=(ii)*(iv) + (1 – (ii))*(iii) (vi)
(vii)= – 3 
– (vi)*(v)
BE 25 50 – 3.7 – 2.4 – 3.1 0.54 – 1.3
BG 9 26 – 3.7 – 3.1 – 3.6 0.48 – 1.3
CZ 9 26 – 3.7 – 3.8 – 3.7 0.37 – 1.6
DK 25 50 – 3.7 – 3.8 – 3.8 0.65 – 0.5
DE 15 38 – 3.7 – 1.3 – 2.8 0.51 – 1.6
EE 9 26 – 3.7 – 3.0 – 3.5 0.30 – 1.9
IE 22 47 – 3.7 – 4.0 – 3.8 0.40 – 1.5
EL 25 50 – 3.7 – 3.5 – 3.6 0.43 – 1.4
ES 25 50 – 3.7 – 4.8 – 4.3 0.43 – 1.2
FR 25 50 – 3.7 – 2.1 – 2.9 0.49 – 1.6
IT 25 50 – 3.7 – 2.6 – 3.1 0.50 – 1.4
CY 11 31 – 3.7 – 1.6 – 3.1 0.39 – 1.8
LV 11 31 – 3.7 – 2.8 – 3.4 0.28 – 2.0
LT 9 26 – 3.7 – 4.5 – 3.9 0.27 – 1.9
LU 18 42 – 3.7 – 4.5 – 4.1 0.49 – 1.0
HU 11 31 – 3.7 – 1.2 – 2.9 0.46 – 1.6
MT 10 29 – 3.7 – 3.3 – 3.6 0.37 – 1.7
NL 25 50 – 3.7 – 3.1 – 3.4 0.55 – 1.1
AT 25 50 – 3.7 – 2.1 – 2.9 0.47 – 1.6
PL 11 31 – 3.7 – 3.9 – 3.8 0.40 – 1.5
PT 20 44 – 3.7 – 3.0 – 3.4 0.45 – 1.5
RO 7 22 – 3.7 – 4.3 – 3.8 0.32 – 1.8
SI 9 26 – 3.7 – 1.4 – 3.1 0.44 – 1.6
SK 10 29 – 3.7 – 2.4 – 3.3 0.29 – 2.0
FI 21 46 – 3.7 – 3.4 – 3.6 0.50 – 1.2
SE 24 49 – 3.7 – 3.2 – 3.5 0.58 – 1.0
UK 24 49 – 3.7 – 4.1 – 3.9 0.42 – 1.4
EU-15 23 48 – 3.7 – 3.2 – 3.5 0.49 – 1.3
EU-12 10 28 – 3.7 – 2.9 – 3.5 0.36 – 1.7
EU-27 17 39 – 3.7 – 3.1 – 3.5 0.44 – 1.5
NB: The budgetary sensitivities were adopted in 2005; the representative output gaps were adopted in autumn 2006. Estimates for RO and BG, which joined the EU in
2007, were calculated on the basis of the commonly agreed methodology.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ The update of SNA was initiated by the UN Statistical Commission in
2003, ‘to bring the accounts into line with the new economic environment,107
ing the revision of national accounting rules for some
years (1). The aim is to have an updated system of
national accounts (SNA rev.1) adopted by the UN Statis-
advance in methodological research, and needs of users’. The UN Statis-
tical Commission website http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/
snarevl.asp contains information on the whole process and on each of the
44 topics under review.
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SNA. As far as government accounts are concerned, a
broad range of issues are being discussed (1). The most
important topic under review concerns the recording of
pension-related transactions and the recognition of gov-
ernment commitments with pensions as liabilities (2).
Extending the notion of liabilities
In the present versions of SNA and ESA, government
liabilities consist of securities and loans, as well as cur-
rency, deposits and accounts payable, which finance the
government deficits and accumulation of assets (3).
Government liabilities in the SNA and ESA do not cover
all commitments of future payments undertaken by the
government. In particular, government liabilities in SNA
and ESA do not include social benefits to be paid
although the events vesting rights in specific individuals
have already occurred. This is typically the case of
accrued-to-date pension liabilities, i.e. the pension enti-
tlements that members of pension schemes (workers and
pensioners) have accumulated so far.
The revised version of the SNA will widen the scope of
liabilities to include accrued-to-date liabilities of pen-
sion schemes (or narrow implicit liabilities, see
Box II.2.2) although the specific recording and measure-
ment are still under discussion. The attention given to
pension liabilities in the SNA review is explained by the
size and the economic relevance of the pension commit-
ments in a context of ageing populations and related
expenditure pressure. It was also felt that the current
treatment in SNA hampered the comparability of figures
across countries, as pension liabilities of funded schemes
were already recorded in national accounts (4).
Yet, the revised version of the SNA will not provide a
complete view of government liabilities. State guarantees,
which may lead to future disbursements, depending on a
number of contingencies (5), government liabilities
related to social benefits other than old-age pensions, such
as healthcare, disability or unemployment benefits (6) will
not be recognised in the SNA balance sheets.
Two competing views
The recording of pension-related transactions has been
one of the most controversial issues discussed in the con-
text of the SNA review and revealed major differences of
opinion among the statistical community worldwide.
During the deliberations, two main positions emerged.
The first viewpoint was that the government commit-
ments in relation to pensions to be paid to civil servants
should be recognised in the government accounts as liabil-
ities (7). In this way, government accounts would align
themselves with corporate accounting whereby pension
commitments are recognised in balance sheets as liabili-
ties (8). However, the pensions to be paid by social secu-
rity to the population at large would not be recognised as
liabilities. According to this viewpoint, the rationale for a
different treatment between employer schemes and social
security was that pensions provided by employers, and
therefore by the general government to the civil servants,
have a contractual nature and correspond to deferred com-
pensation of employees, while social security pensions do
not have that nature. Moreover, it was felt that in some
countries, notably outside the EU, the strength of the com-
mitment to pay old-age pensions to civil servants and to
the population at large was not the same.
The second view, mainly supported within the EU, was
that a distinction in the accounting treatment of pensions
to be paid to civil servants and of pensions to be paid to
the population at large was not warranted (9). In most EU
countries, the pension schemes for civil servants and for
the rest of the population are very similar, or even iden-
tical. As a consequence, either the revised SNA/ESA
recognised all government obligations to pay pensions as
¥1∂ It includes notably public-private partnerships, military expenditure, con-
tracts, leases and licences, government transactions with public enterprises
(earning from equity investment and capital injections), tax revenue,
uncollectable taxes and tax credits, and public-private-government deline-
ation.
¥2∂ The recording of pension-related transactions is also relevant for the cor-
porate sector. However, this section focuses on public pension systems
only. 
¥3∂ On the factors other than the deficit that explain the evolution of the gov-
ernment debt, see, Section II.2.2 (‘The dynamics of government debt:
¥5∂ See Box II.3 (‘Accounting for financial guarantees and for debt assump-
tions in the ESA 95’) in European Commission (2004).
¥6∂ Old-age and healthcare benefits have natures which may justify different
accounting treatments. With old-age benefits, pension scheme members
pay contributions with the aim of acquiring the right to receive pensions in
the future. With healthcare benefits, there is less of an accumulation of
entitlements over the years. 
¥7∂ See for example, Rougemont (2003).
¥8∂ According to international accounting standards (IAS 19 and 26, see Com-108
decomposing the stock-flow adjustment’) in European Commission
(2005a). For the most recent data, see Eurostat (2007). 
¥4∂ On the reasons for the review of the current SNA/ESA rules, see for
instance Lequiller and Rougemont (2004). 
mission Regulation (EC) No 1725/2003 OJ L 261, 13.10.2003), employee
benefits should be recognised in the period in which the benefit is earned
by the employee, rather than when they are paid or payable.
¥9∂ On this second view, see e.g. Mink and Walton (2005).
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A different recording for pension obligations vis-à-vis
civil servants relative to those vis-à-vis the general pop-
ulation would be neither economically nor institutionally
suitable. Moreover, it was felt that the recognition of
Crucial variables (government saving, balance and debt,
etc.) would dramatically change (1).
Box II.2.2: Narrow and broad definitions of implicit liabilities
There is not a unanimous definition of implicit liabilities; the term does not appear in statistical manuals and is often sur-
rounded by confusion in the policy debate. A clear distinction must be established between narrow and broader definitions
of implicit liabilities (1).
A narrow definition of implicit liabilities of the government would refer to the commitments of future payments that the
government entered into, but that are not recognised as debt alongside the loans, bonds and bills issued in the financial
markets. The best example of these narrowly defined implicit liabilities refers to the accrued-to-date pension obligations.
Accrued-to-date means that the actions that are necessary to vest rights on specific individuals (for example to be affiliated
to a pension scheme, to have paid contributions, to have worked for the government, or in some cases simply to have been
a resident in a given country) are already behind us. The accrued-to-date pension obligations of the government differ in
several ways from the financial debt e.g. in terms of uncertainty of amounts, redemption timing or tradability. Moreover,
the liable entity (the government) can change the pension-related rights and obligations (see e.g. Balassone and Franco,
2000; Franco et al., 2006 and Blanchet and Ouvrard, 2006). However, the distinction between debt and this narrow defi-
nition of implicit liabilities is often a matter of convention rather than of substance. Some government obligations in rela-
tion to partnerships with the private sector, e.g. regular payments to private enterprises managing infrastructure, such as
motorways, could also be considered in this narrow definition of implicit liabilities. This narrow definition is backward
looking. This fits well in the generic definition of liabilities in use by the accounting profession as present obligations aris-
ing from past events (IFAC, 2005).
A broader definition of implicit liabilities refers to future government expenditures which have not yet been funded, even
when these future expenditures are not backed by law or contract, but are simply grounded in strong expectations of the
public. This broader definition is thus more consistent with the concept of sustainability as discussed in the economic
literature (2). In the area of pensions, this broad definition takes into consideration the present value of all future pensions
to be paid by government, including in relation to individuals that are not yet in the labour market or not even born, assum-
ing that the criteria to the attribution of social benefits will be kept unchanged. Therefore, in this broader sense, implicit
liabilities correspond to the present value of future government expenditure in all areas of government activity, wages, pro-
curement, transfers, investment, etc., assuming that the government will keep distributing transfers and providing services
according to the same criteria currently in use. To be meaningful for analysis, these broader implicit liabilities should be
assessed net of future revenue assuming that the government will keep collecting taxes and non-tax revenue at rates com-
parable to current levels. Therefore, the broader concept of implicit liabilities corresponds to the net present value of future
deficits and surpluses (ex ante implicit liabilities). Its measurement depends on long-term demographic and macroeco-
nomic projections, is subject to very large margins of error and is extremely sensitive to a number of assumptions, notably
on the discount rate, the long-term growth rate and the initial budgetary position. Moreover, as it corresponds to the dis-
counted sum of balances projected to the infinity, data are of difficult interpretation. As a result, data on the broader defi-
nition of implicit liabilities are rarely published as such. In practice, information on implicit liabilities are often, and
preferably, shown as the projected developments of debt (or ex post explicit liabilities) or as sustainability gaps.
¥1∂ This box draws extensively on Buti and Nogueira Martins (2006b).
¥2∂ For example Blanchard et al. (1990) and European Commission (2006). This is also the concept of implicit liabilities that appears in the Council
(2005) report on the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact.109
unfunded pension liabilities in the government accounts
would fundamentally change the nature of the accounts.
For example, it would reduce the reliability of figures.
¥1∂ Moreover it could have potentially important implications for the implemen-
tation of the budgetary framework of the European Union, especially as
regards the Treaty thresholds related to the deficit- and debt-to-GDP ratios.
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A compromise has been reached between those two
camps. It involves flexibility in the recognition of pension
entitlements in the accounts. The updated SNA will allow
recording only some pension entitlements in the core
accounts (i.e. in the traditional sequence of accounts)
depending on the specificity and institutional arrange-
ments of each country or geographic area. However, there
will be a new supplementary table which will measure the
pension liabilities of all pension systems, public and pri-
vate, funded and unfunded, for specific categories and for
the whole population. Data in this supplementary table
will enable users to compute themselves harmonised and
comparable figures across the world.
In the European context, all indications are that a
revised ESA will keep unchanged the accounting rules
on pension-related transactions in the traditional
sequence of government accounts, and will not result in
changes to general government deficit and debt data
used for the purposes of the excessive deficit
procedure (1). This means that the unfunded govern-
ment commitments on pensions will not be recognised
as debt; social contributions will remain recorded as
deficit-decreasing revenue, while pensions paid
increase the deficit. The only, yet crucial, innovation
would be the supplementary table.
A supplementary table on pensions in the new SNA/ESA
would thus contain information on the estimated value of
government’s accrued-to-date liabilities on pensions and
the respective households’ entitlements. This would
allow analysis on how such a value evolves with time,
the relative level of the pension benefits, the impact of
reforms and of changes in the underlying assumptions.
EU statisticians continue to discuss the practical
application of the agreed compromise, with a view to
developing rules that ensure comparability (2).
2.3.2. Link between sustainability analysis and 
accrued-to-date liabilities
Measures of accrued-to-date pension liabilities will be
useful for economic analyses. They will essentially pro-
vide an estimate of the cost of a hypothetical dismantling
of the pension system without reneging on accrued entitle-
ments. As measures of the households’ implicit wealth,
they are also useful to understand changes and differences
in the saving and consumption behaviour of the private
sector. Those estimates may help assessing pension
reforms involving the setting up of a new system for new
contributions or new contributors, while maintaining the
current system for already accrued entitlements (3).
However, the accrued-to-date pension liabilities are not
indicators of long-term sustainability of pension systems
or of public finance. Large pension liabilities do not
imply unsustainable systems, and small pension liabili-
ties do not mean that pension systems are sustainable.
The following examples show that what is relevant in the
sustainability analyses is not the level of payments or of
pension entitlements, but their dynamics, linked notably
to demographic and socioeconomic changes (4).
In a mature pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme where the
average pension evolves in line with the average wage in
the economy and the age and entitlement structure is
constant, total pension expenditure increases in line with
total wages, in turn assumed to be a constant share of
GDP. Maintaining the contribution rate at its current
level is sufficient to ensure that contributions exactly
match the pensions of retirees, today and in the foresee-
able future. The system is therefore sustainable. Yet, the
ratio-to-GDP of accrued-to-date liabilities can be very
large, above 200 % or 300 % of the yearly GDP (5).
Assume that a country establishes a new unfunded pen-
sion scheme, financed by transfers from the government
budget. Citizens accumulate pension entitlements accord-
ing to the length of their working life since the scheme is
¥1∂ The status of ESA is different from SNA and many other statistical manu-
als, since it is a legal act (Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96). The
amendment of ESA will have to be adopted by the European Parliament
and the Council on the basis of a Commission proposal.
¥2∂ Eurostat and the ECB have set up a task force on the measurement of
implicit liabilities of pension schemes. It involves representatives of a
number of European statistical offices and central banks, of the OECD, the
¥3∂ On the usefulness of estimates of pension liabilities, see Holzmann et al.
(2004).
¥4∂ See Franco (1995) for a discussion on how pension liabilities are inappro-
priate to assess sustainability and may often be misleading. Blanchet and
Ouvrard (2006) also show with the help of numerical simulations in realis-
tic circumstances that accrued-to-date pension liabilities may even decline
at the same time sustainability problems loom on the horizon.
¥5∂ In a country with a mature PAYG system and a stable demographic struc-
ture, where retirees receive a pension for 20 years after they retired and110
ECB, the European Commission (Eurostat, Economic and Financial
Affairs DG), the IMF and the SNA editor. It aims notably at designing the
new supplementary table to be included in the revised version of the ESA,
and discussing methodological issues and compilation methods.
where pensions paid amount to 10.5 % of GDP, the stock of accrued-to-
date liabilities is 250 % of GDP if the discount rate is 1.5 % above growth
rate and 320 % of GDP if the discount rate is equal to the growth rate of
the economy.
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workers have accumulated very small entitlements. Statis-
ticians would, therefore, record hardly any pension liabil-
ities. However, as citizens accumulate more and more
pension rights with time, the accrued-to-date pension enti-
tlements and the effective pension payments will increase
substantially. To finance those payments, the general gov-
ernment may have to increase taxes, to reduce other
expenditure or issue debt. The scheme may quickly
become unsustainable, though the accrued-to-date pen-
sion liabilities are initially very small.
Graph II.2.6 illustrates how the accrued-to-date pension
liabilities are a component of a broader definition of
implicit liabilities (see Box II.2.2) and represent a fraction
of pensions to be paid in the future. The upper solid line
shows a projection for pension expenditure. In a pure sce-
nario of ageing (with only demographic and economic
factors taken into account), pension expenditure is pro-
jected to increase from an illustrative 10 % of GDP in
2000 to above 16 % of GDP by 2070. Those payments can
be divided in four groups. For each year, the line A corre-
sponds to the pensions to be paid to people already retired
today. Given the mortality of pensioners, this group of
payments is expected to progressively decline in impor-
tance and will become zero when the last people already
retired today die. The distance between lines A and B cor-
responds to pensions to be paid in the future to people
working today, in relation to the entitlement they have
already acquired until now. This share of payments will
increase for several years, as people currently working
will progressively retire; it will then decrease according to
mortality. The distance from B to C corresponds to pen-
sions to be paid to people already in the labour market, in
relation to the entitlements they will accumulate from now
on until their retirement. Finally, the distance from C to
the solid D line in the top right of the graph corresponds to
pensions to be paid in the far future to people that are not
yet in the labour market, some of them not even born (1).
The pension liabilities/entitlements that will be meas-
ured by the statisticians correspond to the integral below
line B, taking into account an appropriate discount rate.
In contrast, the concept that is relevant for assessing sus-
tainability corresponds to the integral of the area below
the solid line D, together with the related revenues, also
taking into account a discount rate.
2.3.3. Measuring accrued-to-date liabilities
Accrued-to-date liabilities are a backward-looking con-
cept. The accumulation of pension entitlements results
¥1∂ The area below the solid line C is often characterised as ‘closed-group’. It
corresponds to pensions to be paid to current members of pension schemes
(retirees and workers) under the assumption that the rules of the pension
schemes are unchanged, but that there will be no new entrants in the scheme.
Graph II.2.6:  Alternative definitions of implicit liabilities
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scheme, having paid contributions, having worked for
the government, or simply having resided in some coun-
tries. Accrued-to-date pension liabilities thus appear, at
first glance, unrelated to what can happen in the future.
However, the measurement of these liabilities is not a
trivial exercise; it raises a number of challenges and, par-
adoxically, the measurement of accrued-to-date liabili-
ties does require a number of assumptions and projec-
tions over many years in the future.
Assumptions and projections for accrued-to-date 
liabilities
Accrued-to-date pension liabilities are the present value
of the future flow of pension payments in relation to
rights accumulated until now. Their measurement
depends notably on the discount rate used (1), on the pro-
jected effective retirement age (which, given the
employment rates of older workers, may significantly
differ from the statutory retirement age) and on future
mortality, both pre-retirement mortality and post-retire-
ment longevity, including projected developments in
mortality rates. The need to project the future in order to
measure a backward-looking indicator results from the
fact that the amount of pensions to be paid is contingent
on a number of future events which cannot be anticipated
with certainty (2). Even when the first monthly pension
to be paid is known (e.g. somebody retiring today),
indexation rules require the projection of future infla-
tion, wages or some other indexes (3).
The fact that statisticians will have to estimate accrued-
to-date pension liabilities on the basis of a number of
long-term projections raises the question of what to do
when those projections turn out to be wrong. Should the
resulting change in pension liabilities be recorded in the
period during which the projections appear to be wrong
or assumptions are revised, as a revaluation? Or should
the change in liabilities imply revisions in time series?
There is an ongoing discussion on what to do in those
cases. A backward revision of series might best serve the
interest of data users, notably to assess the dynamic of
implicit liabilities over a long period, but raises technical
difficulties.
Distributing pension entitlements over the working life
Measuring the pension entitlements of somebody on the
eve of his/her retirement or during retirement becomes a
relatively simple exercise, if assumptions on the discount
rate, mortality and indexation are available. Calculating
pension entitlements in the case of defined-contribution
(DC) scheme is also a straightforward exercise at any
moment during the working life of the scheme members (4).
In contrast, in a defined-benefit (DB) scheme, the calcula-
tion of accrued-to-date pension liabilities during the work-
ing life raises a number of technical hurdles and several
diverse options are possible. In particular, the accumulation
of social contributions paid may provide little guidance in
estimating the level of accrued-to-date liabilities (5).
Assume an unfunded pension scheme that pays pensions
proportional to wages during the working life, but where
there is a five-year vesting period. The five-year vesting
period means that workers would receive no pension if
they left the pension scheme, for example if they emi-
grated, during the first five years of affiliation to the
scheme. At the end of the fifth year, workers acquire the
rights in relation to the first five years. How should stat-
isticians measure and record situations like this? A first
option is that, during the first years, the scheme members
accumulate no pension rights. For the sake of the argu-
ment, assume that all scheme members left the scheme
before the end of the fifth year. In this unlikely case, the
¥1∂ The choice of an appropriate discount rate is not straightforward. Though
this section will not elaborate on this issue, market yields are not necessar-
ily the only option. For a discussion on the discount rate in very long-term
analyses, see Ewijk et al. (2006).
¥2∂ Pension liabilities have neither a nominal nor a market price, which can be
observed and used by statisticians, as for other liabilities. Pension schemes
exchange, transfer, sell and buy pension commitments among themselves,
and rarely with the scheme members. This occurs, for example when peo-
ple emigrate or change from one industry to another, or when employees
have the possibility of receiving a lump sum in exchange for renouncing
future pensions. These transfers may convey useful information for statis-
ticians. However, payments in exchange for the transfer of pension entitle-
ment do not always have the nature of a market price. For example, the no-
arbitrage condition (or law of one price) would normally not hold.
¥3∂ In some cases, the indexation rules may be particularly complex. For
example, Germany runs a points system. Workers accumulate pension
points during their working life and pensions to be paid are calculated as
the number of points of each individual times the value of the point. The
value of each point is calculated and indexed on gross earnings, but also
takes into consideration sustainability and contribution factors, which
depend on the dependency ratio and the evolution of the contribution rate
necessary to balance the pension scheme. In Portugal, after the 2006
¥4∂ Public pension systems are usually defined-benefit rather than defined-
contribution.
¥5∂ For example, contributions paid so far may seriously underestimate the lia-112
reform, the pension indexation will depend on a number of elements,
including the real GDP growth rate. Therefore, the valuation of accrued-
to-date pension liabilities may require economic, demographic and labour
market projections.
bilities if the pension scheme is partly financed through taxation or if the
PAYG scheme is maturing. In the last case, the level of contribution today
is set in relation with the current pensions (which are low) and not in rela-
tion with future pensions which will be much higher.
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fore, would not have accumulated any pension liabilities.
Another option is to distribute the present value of pen-
sions to be paid in future proportionally to the number of
years of affiliation to the scheme during the vesting
period. The vesting period is only relevant in the sense that
statisticians need to estimate the probability that members
leave the scheme before completing the vesting period.
Similar options are also relevant when the pension award
formulas contain other nonlinearities with respect to the
length of the career or to the earnings taken into consid-
eration in the pension award formula, typically when the
pension award formula depends on the wages of a lim-
ited number of years (1). Regarding the latter issues,
these nonlinearities are magnified by the fact that for
most people, wages, not only in nominal and real terms,
but also relative to the average wage of the economy (2),
increase with seniority.
The two main options to deal with these situations are usu-
ally denoted as ABO and PBO methods, standing respec-
tively for accumulated benefit obligation and projected
benefit obligation. According to ABO, what matters is the
present value of pensions to be paid in the future if the
employee continued in employment until retirement age at
current wage rates, in proportion to the working life
already behind him/her, i.e. if he/she had no further
increases in wage. PBO corresponds to the present value
of benefit accrued to the valuation date taking into account
the projected career progression until the retirement date.
There is no consensus as regards which option is prefera-
ble in corporate accounting (3). This may depend on the
use of data. From the pension scheme viewpoint, an ABO
measure represents the cost if all workers were to leave the
pension scheme today and is a useful measure for sol-
vency assessment purposes. However, a PBO measure-
ment is more appropriate for most economic analysis. In
the case of social security — where pension award formu-
las are usually more complex and less linear than in
employer pension schemes — the PBO valuation is pref-
erable in view of ensuring comparability of estimates
across countries (4) .However, the most appropriate option
for national accounts is still subject to discussion.
2.3.4. Conclusions
The compilation of data on pension liabilities — or more
precisely on accrued-to-date pension obligations — by the
EU statisticians will provide useful information to assess
and compare fiscal policies, better comparing pension
systems among countries, understanding the evolution of
these liabilities over time, better measuring the costs and
benefits of reforms, etc. In particular data on those nar-
rowly-defined implicit liabilities will provide a comple-
ment to the existing statistics on government debt.
The measurement of accrued-to-date pension liabilities
of social security is a complex task. In spite of the back-
ward-looking nature of the indicator, its measurement
requires a number of complex assumptions and long-
term projections. The uncertainty around such a measure
will be very large, and in particular much larger than in
most macroeconomic aggregates. For the sake of trans-
parency, those assumptions and projections should be
spelled out and open to scrutiny (5).
Data on the implicit pension liabilities are not by them-
selves a measure of sustainability, either for each spe-
cific pension scheme, or for the government as a whole.
The assessment of sustainability of public finances needs
to be done by estimating how all government spending
and receipts will evolve in the future. It implies project-
ing pension expenditure under unchanged policies,
i.e. including rights that workers will accrue in the future
if the pension scheme remains unchanged. It also implies
projecting all other budgetary lines on the expenditure
(e.g. healthcare, long-term care, education) and revenue
side. In the European budgetary surveillance framework,
such projections are made on commonly agreed princi-
ples and methodology to ensure the comparability and
the reliability of the assessment (6).
¥1∂ For example, pension award formulas may depend on the wages of the last
5, 10 or 25 years, or the best 5 of the last 10, or simply on the last wage.
¥4∂ For example, in sectors where the wage profile is broadly similar for many
workers (typically, for civil servants), it is common to define the pension
as a share of the last wage. However, the same pensions can be defined as
a (higher) share of the average wage over the entire career. Yet applied
partially in the course of the career, the formulas may lead to substantially
different measures of accrued-to-date liabilities if the projected wages are
not duly taken in consideration.
¥5∂ Whenever possible, those assumptions and projections should be consist-113
¥2∂ An example of such wage profile on French data can be found in Koubi
(2003). 
¥3∂ However, international accounting standard (IAS19) specifies a ‘projected
unit credit method’ which is basically PBO.
ent with other long-term projections, such as those by the working group
on ageing (AWG) of the EPC.
¥6∂ See ‘The long-term sustainability of public finances in the European
Union’, European Commission (2006b).
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and fiscal surveillance
2.4.1. Introduction
The data that are relevant for deciding whether a
country is complying with the Treaty and Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP) requirements are the annual deficit
and debt ratios, compiled according to the ESA95
accounting rules. Given that the government budgets are
adopted and executed by the political institutions of
each country with a yearly frequency, it would not make
sense to implement the SGP on a basis other than
annual. However, the economic literature has stressed
the need to base budgetary surveillance on a wide range
of indicators, going beyond those that are defined by
ESA 95 and specifically mentioned in the SGP-related
acts. Notably, this means paying attention to data
compiled on different accounting bases (e.g. accrual and
cash), nominal and cyclically adjusted, with annual and
infra-annual frequencies.
An effective fiscal surveillance requires, in particular,
tracking budgetary developments during the implementa-
tion of each annual budget. In this respect, all Member
States have a long tradition of publishing monthly data,
according to specific national definitions (1). However,
since such data are not harmonised they are of limited use
for fiscal surveillance in an international context. The lack
of harmonised infra-annual budgetary statistics was identi-
fied in the Ecofin Council report on statistical requirements
in economic and monetary union, approved on 18 January
1999 (2). The Council concluded that ‘a high priority
should be given to statistics on the public finances. The
objective is the production of quarterly national and finan-
cial account data for general government’.
After a number of intermediate steps (3), quarterly gov-
ernment accounts, compiled according to the ESA 95
rules, are now being released timely by a very large
majority of Member States (see Table II.2.3).
Quarterly government accounts may give a relevant con-
tribution to the quality of fiscal surveillance. These infra-
annual data can give early signals on the course of fiscal
policy; thus allowing policymakers to better attune their
measures within each year, whenever any deviation from
plans becomes evident. Moreover, infra-annual data allow
fiscal policy analysts to better understand the interaction
between the fiscal positions of countries and economic
activity. The availability of timely quarterly data also
allows the Council and the Commission to better measure
and consider the budgetary efforts by the EU Member
States, for example when assessing compliance with
Council recommendations during an excessive deficit
procedure (4). Moreover, experience from other statistics
shows that the compilation of data with a higher frequency
(quarterly figures) has a favourable impact on the quality
of statistics with a lower frequency (annual data).
2.4.2. Challenges for economic analysis
While quarterly government accounts provide useful
information, they also raise a number of challenges for
analysis. The interpretation of quarterly fiscal data needs
to be done very carefully. Economists and policymakers
need to learn how to properly interpret quarterly data.
A first challenge comes from the fact that the available
series are yet not seasonally adjusted (5). As a result, the
revenue, expenditure and deficit series are extremely
volatile from one quarter to another. Quarter-on-quarter
growth rates of government expenditure and revenue,
such as those frequently quoted with reference to GDP,
and changes in the deficit/surplus from one quarter to
another are meaningless.
However, the volatility of the revenue, expenditure and
deficit figures is not an insurmountable difficulty. Given
a relatively stable seasonality, useful information can be
extracted by reference to moving averages (see
Graph II.2.7) or by looking into the year-on-year growth
rates of expenditure and revenue (see Graph II.2.8).
Actually a four-period moving average of quarterly def-
icit ratios corresponds to an annual deficit, similar to
those that are relevant for the SGP, with the difference
that each ‘year’ may start and end in months other than
January and December.¥1∂ The monthly data that Member States publish follow national definitions
which may differ quite considerably from the ESA 95 concept, notably in
terms of sectoral delimitation (central government rather general govern-
ment) and time of recording (cash rather than accrual accounting). On the
use of those monthly data to predict the yearly government deficit see
Moulin et al. (2004) and Pérez (2007). 
¥2∂ The 1999 report, and a series of subsequent progress reports and status
¥4∂ For example, in the Commission recommendation for a Council decision
abrogating Decision 2003/487/EC on the existence of an excessive deficit
in France (SEC(2006) 1529 final of 29 November 2006), the assessment of114
reports are available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?
id=741&lang=en&mode=g
¥3∂ On the several steps leading to the publication of quarterly government
accounts, see Section II.4.4.3 of the 2006 edition of this report.
debt developments refers to the quarterly debt.
¥5∂ Though there are not yet concrete plans on the seasonal adjustment of
quarterly government accounts, one may expect that this issue will be con-
sidered by the statisticians in the coming years.
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the trough of the latest cycle of deterioration in the defi-
cit ratios was reached in the second quarter of 2004 (see
Graph II.2.7), a view which is consistent with the avail-
able information on real GDP, as well as with govern-
ment debt data (see Graph II.2.9).   
Graph II.2.7:  Quarterly government deficit (euro area)
Source: Commission services.
Table II.2.3
Availability of quarterly government accounts
Revenue, expenditure 
and deficit Gross debt
Revenue, expenditure 
and deficit Gross debt
BE y y HU x (*) y
BG y y MT y y
CZ y y NL y y
DK y y AT y y
DE x (**) y PL y y
EE y y PT y y
IE y y RO x y
EL x (*) y SI y y
ES y y SK y y
FR x (**) y FI y y
IT y y SE y y
CY y y UK y y
LV y y Euro area y (***) y
LT y y  
LU x (*) y EU-27 y (***) y
Legend and notes:
y = data available.
x = data not yet available, not complete or not released timely.
(*) A few components of the revenue and expenditure account are available, but the quarterly deficit/surplus figures have not been released timely.
(**) A few components of the revenue and expenditure account are available, but the quarterly deficit/surplus figures are not released yet. The quarterly deficit/surplus
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figures are released when the annual figures are published.
(***)  Data for the EU and the euro area are an aggregation of national data, including of Member States that do not publish their own figures.
Source: Commission services.
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have indicated improvements in budgetary situation.
This improvement was due to both dynamic revenue and
a deceleration of expenditure (see Graph II.2.8). How-
ever, a significant acceleration in expenditure is reported
for the second half of 2006. It remains to be seen whether
this dynamism of expenditure in the latest quarters of
2006 puts progress in fiscal consolidation at risk.
Another difficulty in the interpretation of quarterly data
is related to the reliability of statistics. It is useful to dis-
tinguish reliability from volatility. Volatility refers to the
rises and falls of a given indicator from one period to the
next.
As discussed above, in the case of government accounts,
the volatility of series is mainly related to the fact that
quarterly government accounts are not yet seasonally
adjusted. Reliability refers to the revision in the statisti-
cal series between successive data transmissions. Quar-
terly data, not only data on government accounts but also
many other macroeconomic indicators, are less reliable
than annual accounts. This means that the first data trans-
missions are less precise and are subject to wider revi-
sions than annual figures. The revisions in quarterly data
are related to the technical difficulty in compiling gov-
ernment accounts on the basis of limited information and
in a relatively short period of time.
The revisions in the quarterly deficit ratios for the euro
area are illustrated in Graph II.2.10. The graph shows
three series. The blue dots depict the first transmission of
data, that is, how each specific quarter was measured
when data were published for the first time (1). The yel-
low diamonds show how the quarterly deficit ratios were
revised at the moment the annual figures were made pub-
lic; that is at the time quarterly accounts were calibrated
to be consistent with annual data. The solid line shows
the latest available series, that is taking into account all
successive data revisions.
The comparison between the dark dots and the solid line
indicates that quarterly figures have been subject to large
revisions. However, the quality of quarterly data should
not be assessed by comparing the first and the latest trans-
mission. A more appropriate comparison is between the
blue dots and the yellow diamonds, that is, the revision
that took place by the time of publication of annual data
and the calibration of quarterly and annual series. Indeed
the revisions between the yellow diamonds and the solid
line are the result of revisions in annual data which imply
¥1∂ Usually, the first transmission takes place within three months after the
end of the respective quarter. Thus data for the fourth quarter of 2002, the
first period in Graph II.2.10, were compiled (though data were not made
public at the time) by end March 2003.
Graph II.2.8:  Government expenditure and revenue (euro area) (% of GDP)
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NB: Data exclude the proceeds of the allocation of UMTS licences in 2000.
Source: Commission services.
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series (1). Therefore, while the quarterly figures may devi-
ate quite considerably from final data, they are useful to
predict the first transmission of annual accounts.
2.4.3. Conclusions
Graph II.2.9:  Quarterly government debt (euro area)
Source: Commission services.
Graph II.2.10:  Revisions in quarterly government deficit figures (euro area)
NB: Because of missing observations, this graph does not include data of Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Slovenia
Source: Commission services.
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Although the formal implementation of fiscal surveil-
lance in the EU is, and should remain, based on annual
¥1∂ The difference between the yellow diamonds and the solid line in Graph
II.2.10 is mainly due to revisions in the annual data of Italy for 2002,
2003 and 2004. On the revisions of annual data see Gordo and Nogueira
Martins (2007).
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a significant contribution to fiscal analysis. In particu-
lar, infra-annual data can give early signals on fiscal
policy development, thus allowing analysts to better
understand the underlying developments, and policy-
makers to better calibrate the implementation of their
budgets.
However, differences in the volatility and reliability of
annual and quarterly data mean that the interpretation of
quarterly figures must be very careful.118
3. Advances in the assessment 
of the long-term sustainability 
of public finances
3.1. Introduction
The comprehensive assessment by the Commission
services of the long-term sustainability of public finance
based on common budgetary projections, as laid out in
the Sustainability Report, is the basis for the annual
examination of the stability and convergence pro-
grammes (SCPs) (1).
In 2006, the Ecofin Council has given a mandate to the
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) to update and to fur-
ther deepen its common exercise of age-related expend-
iture projections by the autumn of 2009, in time for the
assessment of the SCPs to be delivered during that year,
on the basis of a new population projection to be pro-
vided by Eurostat (2). The Ecofin Council also consid-
ered that a new Sustainability Report should be prepared
by the Commission once the new common age-related
expenditure projections become available in 2009.
The purpose of the new common projection exercise is
twofold: (i) provide further insights into the economic
and budgetary impact of ageing and (ii) update the long-
term projections for the assessment of the sustainability
of public finances.
Given the substantial advances made during the previous
exercise, the scope, basic approach and principles to
underpin the new common projections exercise should
remain essentially the same as set down in the two rele-
vant reports by the EPC and the Commission (3). Follow-
ing the mandate received by the Ecofin Council in 2006,
efforts will be mainly devoted to refinements and
improvements of the methodological underpinnings in
specific areas and to an extension of the country coverage.
3.2. Envisaged improvements of the long-
term budgetary projections
Bulgaria and Romania, who joined the EU in January 2007,
will participate for the first time in the projection exercise.
As for the other Member States, the Commission and the
working group on ageing of the EPC (AWG) should exam-
ine the full set of expenditure items also for these two coun-
tries, i.e. public spending on pensions, healthcare, long-
term care, education and unemployment benefits.
In addition, and in line with the invitation of the Ecofin
Council, the new exercise will also assess the feasibility
of accounting for the expected impact of ageing popula-
tions on government tax revenues; especially revenues
from taxes on pensions will be considered (4).
¥1∂ See European Commission (2006b).
¥2∂ The Council invited:
— the EPC to deepen its analysis of the labour market implications of ageing
populations, and on policy measures, including reforms aiming at the mod-
ernisation of social protection and welfare systems, which can contribute
to extending working lives and lead to a better control and management of
public expenditures;
— the EPC to update and further deepen its common projection exercise of
age-related expenditure projections by the autumn of 2009 on the basis of
a new population projection to be provided by Eurostat; and
— the Commission, on the basis of the projections, to undertake a compre-
¥3∂ See Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2005) and
Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2006).
¥4∂ The Ecofin Council invited the EPC and the Commission to explore fur-
ther improvements in the methodology in dealing with the impact of age-119
hensive assessment of the sustainability of Member States’ public finances
by autumn 2006, using the commonly agreed framework. It invites the
EPC on the basis of that assessment to report back to the Council by the
end of 2006.’ See Council of the European Union (2006).
ing on government revenues over the long-term, including the feasibility
and value-added of more detailed projections. Conclusions of the Council
of the European Union on the long-term sustainability of public finances in
the EU, 14615/06, 30 October 2006.
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least 2060, from currently 2050. As regards the method-
ology, Eurostat’s population projection will form the
basis of the exercise. All other layers of the projection
such as labour market, productivity and government
spending will be built upon the demographic scenario. 
The commonly agreed underlying economic and employ-
ment assumptions should be used for all expenditure pro-
jections in the new exercise and, if agreed to do so, reve-
nue projections.
The basic approach for projecting pensions, healthcare,
long-term care, education and unemployment should be
largely unchanged from the previous exercise. In partic-
ular, the models of the national authorities will again be
used to project pension expenditures whereas the com-
mon methodology and models already developed for the
previous projection exercise will be used for other
expenditure items.
However, further efforts are envisaged to improve the
quality of data used. Also, the feasibility and usefulness
of upgrading the projections for public spending on
healthcare and long-term care in order to better take
account of non-demographic drivers such as technology
and how to address the issue of inadequate provisions in
the face of growing needs will be addressed.
3.2.1. Common demographic and macroeconomic 
assumptions
The new round of projections will continue to rely on
commonly agreed demographic and macroeconomic
assumptions for each Member State. They will be used
for all expenditure items covered by the projection exer-
cise and possibly for revenues, in case an agreement is
reached to make revenue projections endogenous. Reli-
ance on commonly agreed assumptions ensures that
Member States take ‘ownership’ of the results and safe-
guards consistency of the whole exercise. Commonly
agreed assumptions will cover population, labour market
developments (labour force, employment and unem-
ployment), and productivity.
Population projections
Considerable progress was made in the previous projec-
tion exercise as regards the demographic assumptions. In
particular, considerable resources were invested in gain-
expectancy’ scenario based on changes in age-specific
mortality rates.
For the new exercise, the new population projection
Europop 2007 will be used as a basis for the age-related
expenditure projections. Eurostat has already started
working on these projections with the appropriate
involvement of national statistical institutes, represented
in the Eurostat working group on population projections.
It is expected to deliver new population projections by
March 2008.
In order to ensure that appropriate coordination takes
place at national level between members of the EPC
working group on ageing and members of the working
group on population projections, Eurostat will keep the
Secretariat of the EPC working group on ageing
informed of planned meetings so that the members of the
EPC working group on ageing can make the necessary
arrangements in their home country. Also the relevant
issues and outcomes of the population projection work-
ing group should be represented at the EPC working
group on ageing meetings in order to ensure sufficient
information and exchange of views.
Labour market developments
The labour force projection and notably the cohort
approach allowing to model employment patterns by age
group was one of the most significant advances of the
recent projection exercise. It is suggested that the cohort
component approach be replicated for the 2009 exercise,
with some refinements. In particular, a closer look at the
following issues is envisaged: (i) the disaggregating of
the labour force projection between full-time and part-
time workers; and (ii) the transformation of employment
(both full-time and part-time) in hours worked to be used
as input in the production function model to estimate the
impact of ageing on GDP growth.
Labour productivity
As regards the assumptions on labour productivity (and
on labour input and potential GDP growth) the starting
point and reference values over the first three years of the
projection (medium-term reference period) should con-
tinue to be those stemming from the calculations of the
output gap using the commonly agreed method. This is
necessary to guarantee consistency across the medium-120
ing a better understanding of main forces driving demo-
graphic change. Progress was also made in the design of
sensitivity tests, especially the execution of a ‘high life
term assessment of budgetary conditions and long-term
fiscal sustainability. The revised production function
approach developed in the EPC output gap working
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be applied (the commonly agreed method for estimating
potential output and the output gap is presented in
Part VI of this report).
3.2.2. Projections of specific expenditure items
Pension projections
As regards the coverage of the pension projection exer-
cise the forthcoming update will be built on the experi-
ences of the previous exercise. Projections should be
made for pensions, contributions and asset accumula-
tion. The definitions should be kept largely unchanged.
Pension schemes should include those classified within
the general government sector and the statutory private
schemes that replace earlier public schemes, and for
which a full coverage was achieved in the previous exer-
cise. Moreover, an effort should be made to cover more
broadly also occupational pensions based on agreements
between social partners and managed by the private sec-
tor. In particular, it would be important to cover these
schemes in countries where they play an important role
in the total pension provision. Also, information regard-
ing the contributions to occupational schemes would be
important for checking the consistency between contri-
butions and outlays and would be required if the EPC
working group on ageing started modelling tax revenues.
As regards the common interest rate and the rate of
return on pension fund investments, a further discussion
is needed on the assumption against the background of
the projected GDP growth rates (1).
More generally, there is a need for a more in-depth
understanding of pension systems and pension models,
including possible risks stemming from large declines in
the benefit ratio, i.e. average pension expenditure in rela-
tion to GDP per worker (2). A workshop will be organ-
ised to improve the consistency between macroeco-
nomic projections and their translation into pension
expenditure projections.
It should be noted that several countries will have
enacted pension reforms by the time the new common
projections are completed in 2009. Separate estimates
of their budgetary impact will be necessary to follow up
progress made in reforming pension schemes over the
forthcoming rounds of assessment of stability and con-
vergence programmes (SCPs). In order to ensure the
comparability of the long-term projections used in the
assessments and the transparency of the assessments of
the Commission and the Council of the SCPs, new
long-term projections should be submitted to a peer
review in the EPC working group on ageing before
being used in the calculations in the baseline sustaina-
bility indicators (3).
Healthcare and long-term care
In the previous exercise, some doubt and confusion on
the functions belonging to health and long-term care
became apparent when gathering basis data. There is
therefore a need to ensure that consistent data are used in
the coming projection exercise. In particular with respect
to the delimitation between healthcare and long-term
care expenditure.
Regarding coverage and methodology, the previous
round of projections was based on a pure demographic
methodology. The age-related expenditure profiles in the
base year have been matched with the demographic pro-
jections under simple cost assumptions. While this
approach has the advantage of simplicity and reflects the
pure demographic impact, it does not take into account
that in practice demographic change has not been the
major driver of increasing levels of healthcare expendi-
tures in recent decades, but rather demand and supply
factors have prevailed. Consideration will be given to
whether it would be feasible and useful to analyse
demand and supply factors in more detail.
Education
The first two exercises of education projections were
based on a ‘quasi-demographic’ methodology. It
included the impact of demographic trends as well as
¥1∂ By using a common interest rate (3 % real) and country-specific (non-
common) GDP growth rates, the discount rates used in the fiscal sustaina-
¥3∂ According to the EPC opinion ECFIN/EPC(2006)REP/56232 final of
25 October 2006 on the Commission’s report on the long-term sustainabil-
ity of public finances in the EU (2006), ‘[…] new projections prepared by
Member States in the event of a major pension reform can be taken into
account for the purposes of the annual assessment of sustainability in the
context of the examination of the stability and convergence programmes
under certain conditions. These conditions are that it has been subject to a
peer review and an ensuing opinion by the EPC working group on ageing
and the EPC, so as to ensure comparability of the results in an EU perspec-121
bility analysis are not the same across the Member States. 
¥2∂ Large projected decreases in relative pensions, the benefit ratio, may imply
some risks concerning the ‘social’ sustainability of current pension
arrangements, See further Chapter IV.2 in European Commission (2006b).
tive’. See also the EPC opinion ECFIN/EPC(2006) REP/58042 final of
15 January 2007 on the framework for taking into account new major pen-
sion reforms in the long-term sustainability assessment of stability and
convergence programmes.
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It needs to be considered whether and how the next
round of projections should go beyond this approach and
include other non-demographic factors so as to take into
account the way public consumption adjusts to demo-
graphic changes.
Unemployment benefits
The projections for unemployment benefits will follow
the same methodology as in the previous projection
exercises. In broad terms, per capita unemployment
insurance spending in a base year is multiplied by the
projected number of unemployed persons in future
years.
3.2.3. Sensitivity of the projection results
During the 2006 common projections exercise, a number
of sensitivity tests were run. These sensitivity tests pro-
vide useful information on the robustness of the projec-
tions to possible changes in the key underlying assump-
tions. The results can be used as kinds of ‘elasticity’
parameters (1).
However, in order to better compare the relative impor-
tance of different factors in terms of their impact on both
the economic and budgetary consequences of ageing, the
design of sensitivity tests could explore giving more
consideration to ensure that shocks are of a similar size.
For example, assuming linearity in the relevant models,
one can use the estimated impact on pension spending of
a 5 percentage point increase in the employment rate of
older workers to get a rough indication of the impact of
a future reform that would increase the overall employ-
ment rate by 1 % percentage point.
Moreover, when designing the sensitivity test to be con-
ducted it would be important to consider what those tests
intend to illustrate (general uncertainties, policy
changes, impact of reforms, the rate of return on assets in
pension schemes, demographic variants, income elastic-
ity of healthcare expenditure, etc.).
3.3. Improving the assessment of public 
finance sustainability
The Commission’s Sustainability Report included a
comprehensive assessment of the sustainability of the
public finances in the EU (2). The Council considered
that this multiannual assessment by the Commission, the
Sustainability Report, should be the basis for the annual
examination of the SCPs (3).
The assessment of fiscal sustainability based on the
budgetary information in the 2006/07 updated SCPs was
the first update of the comprehensive assessment in the
Sustainability Report. The assessment focused on the
changes that had occurred since the completion of the
Sustainability Report. This notably involves the most
recent budgetary developments and in some cases policy
measures taken by Member States with an assessment of
the impact on the long-term budgetary trends.
Further refinements of the assessment are envisaged. In
particular, the feasibility of long-term projections of
government revenues is going to be discussed in 2007.
Currently, government revenues are held constant as a
share of GDP. This simplifying assumption has been
questioned especially in the light of the fact that popula-
tion ageing is expected to have a significant impact on
some tax categories. For example, if pensions are taxed,
the projected gross public pension expenditure on public
pensions may be higher than pension expenditure net of
income taxes. Moreover, if contributions to private pen-
sion schemes (for example occupational pensions) are
tax deductible while pension disbursements are subject
to taxation, pension tax revenues might increase as a
share of GDP in the future. The main aspects are
included in the Sustainability Report (4).
Moreover, a projection of revenues from property
income would be an improvement of the analysis. Under
the assumption that there are no stock flow adjustments
(SFA) and that the rate of return on pension fund invest-
ments is the same as on government bonds, the nominal
return on pension fund investment is constant while their
share of GDP would decrease (5). One method to do this
was included in the Commission’s Sustainability Report,
¥1∂ Assuming linearity in the relevant models, one can use the estimated ¥2∂ See European Commission (2006b).122
impact on pension spending of the increase of 5 percentage points in the
employment rate of older workers to get a rough estimate of the impact of
a future reform that is estimated to increase this rate by only 1 % percent-
age point.
¥3∂ See the Council conclusions on the long-term sustainability of public
finances in the EU, 14615/06, 30 October 2006.
¥4∂ See Chapter IV.3.in European Commission (2006b). 
¥5∂ Assuming positive GDP growth.
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income overall was the same for all countries (equal to
that of German bonds and converging significantly over
the medium term to 3 % real) (1). However, the exact
implementation of the projection methodology, notably
regarding how to treat different revenue categories (such
as fixed income, shares, and rents on subsoil assets) will
be addressed.
Furthermore, there is a need to discuss in more detail how
the projection results should be interpreted for the pur-
poses of assessing the sustainability of public finances.
For example, projected changes in relative pension (the
benefit ratio) may entail risks concerning the ‘social’ sus-
tainability of current pension arrangements (2). For health-
care, the projections show quite different results depend-
ing on the assumptions. For long-term care, there is a large
variation in the projected spending increases, depending
largely on whether formal care systems are well devel-
oped or not. The projections also show a growing gap
between those who may need formal care services and
those who will receive formal care on the basis of current
policies, which could have public finance implications.
For education, the possible savings due to demographic
factors might not be realised in view of possible policy
goals of raising quality in education or expanding educa-
tional attainment.
¥1∂ See Chapter IV.3.3 in European Commission (2006b). ¥2∂ See Chapter IV.2 in European Commission (2006b).123
4. Systemic pension reforms in the revised 
Stability and Growth Pact
4.1. Introduction
Many EU Member States have reformed or will reform
their pension systems to improve the sustainability of
their public finances. There are several options for
reform, ranging from small parametric changes to more
radical reforms, implying for instance the introduction of
mandatory, fully funded pension schemes (1). Reforms
can take place in one go, or be spread over the years with
a series of incremental changes. The favourable impact
on fiscal sustainability of pension reforms may take
place directly, by curbing entitlements, or indirectly by
increasing participation in labour market and potential
output. However, some of these pension reforms may
also entail entry costs as reforms may need time to pay
in or simply because acceptability of reforms must be at
the price of lower taxes or higher expenditure addressed
to specific categories of population.
Reform costs may be direct and particularly large in the
case of pension reforms introducing a multi-pillar sys-
tem that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar (to
simplify, these reforms are denominated in this section
as ‘systemic’ pension reforms) (2). When a government
creates a new funded defined-contributions pension
scheme and shifts to this new scheme a share of social
contributions that were previously collected by social
security, government revenues fall. The pensions that
will be paid by the new scheme will no longer be govern-
ment expenditure. However, such a gain will not materi-
alise before long. Therefore, a systemic pension reform
that establishes a funded pension pillar improves the
government balance in the longer term, at the cost of an
increase in deficits in the short and medium term. This is
because, according to the ESA 95 rules, funded defined-
contributions pension schemes are classified in the
financial sector and not in social security (3). In other
words, the reform consists, inter alia, in making implicit
liabilities explicit. Table II.4.1 shows that the estimated
cost of such pension reforms can be important in a
number of EU Member States.
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), as reformed in 2005,
contains specific provisions on how to take into account
the implementation of pension reforms in its preventive
and corrective arms. The aim of those legal provisions is
avoiding that the SGP discourages structural reforms
addressing longer-term sustainability issues (4). The
remainder of this chapter describes and clarifies how to
implement those provisions in the excessive deficit proce-
dure. The role of pension reforms in the preventive arm is
assessed in Box II.4.1.
¥1∂ For a survey of pension reforms in OECD countries, see Whiteford and
Whitehouse (2006).
¥2∂ The terminology used here is the same as in Regulation (EC) No 1467/97
as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005. The negative impact on
the general government deficit of such reforms stems from the fact that
revenue, which used to be recorded as government revenue, is diverted to a
pension fund, which is fully funded and classified in a sector other than
general government, and that some pensions and other social benefits,
¥3∂ For the Eurostat decision clarifying the ESA95 rules on the sectoral classi-
fication of pension schemes, see Eurostat news release No 30/2004 and
Chapter I.1.3, ‘Classification of funded pension schemes and impact on
government finance’ of Eurostat’s manual on government deficit and debt,
available for download at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/
ITY_OFFPUB/KS-BE-04-002/EN/KS-BE-04-002-EN.PDF 
There was a transitory period until 1 April 2007 for the implementation
of such a decision (see Eurostat news release No 117/2004 of 23 Septem-
ber 2004).
¥4∂ In the debate prior to the SGP reform of 2005, several authors argued that
the Pact provided disincentives against pre-funding of ageing-related
costs. In a two-period model of a government subject to a SGP-type rule,
Buti et al. (2006) show that the complementary/substitutability of fiscal
discipline and structural reforms depend on the degree of myopia of the124
which used to be government expenditure, will, after the reform, be paid
by the pension scheme.
government: strict budgetary constraints lead to more (less) reforms if the
government is myopic (forward looking).
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deficit procedure
Under the provisions of the revised SGP other relevant
factors can be taken into account in the various steps of
the excessive deficit procedure. In view of their impact
on public finances, where costs may be frontloaded and
benefits spread out over time, some pension reforms
qualify as other relevant factors in the excessive deficit
procedure. Such reforms can be taken into account,
under well-specified conditions, when deciding on the
existence of an excessive deficit. They can also be con-
sidered when setting the deadline for the correction of an
excessive deficit. The reformed SGP also foresees that
systemic pension reforms can be taken into account
when abrogating the excessive deficit procedure.
4.2.1. Pension reforms as an ‘other relevant factor’
Based on the provisions of Article 2(3) and 2(6) of Coun-
cil Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 all pension reforms (not
only systemic pension reforms) can be taken into account
in the excessive deficit procedure as one of the other rele-
vant factors. The implementation of such reforms can
therefore be considered as a positive factor when deciding
on the existence of an excessive deficit if, and only if, the
deficit remains close to 3 % of GDP and is only temporar-
ily above that reference value. The implementation of
pension reforms can also be considered when setting the
deadline for the correction of an excessive deficit. Other
relevant factors are however not given any specific con-
sideration when deciding whether a Member State can
benefit from a repetition of steps in the procedure: this is
primarily based on an assessment of effective action.
However, given the importance of systemic pension
reforms for the sustainability of public finances and the
potentially large and protracted costs for the government
deficit of those reforms, the revised Pact makes an
exception to this principle for systemic pension reforms.
The revised SGP states that the direct budgetary costs,
i.e. the increase in government deficits implied by the
implementation of systemic pension reforms, should be
taken into account in all steps of the excessive deficit
procedure, including when deciding on abrogation. The
next section elaborates further on this (1).
4.2.2. The ‘degressive scale’ when abrogating a 
decision on the existence of an excessive deficit
The Treaty and the Pact do not precisely specify the con-
ditions for abrogation of decisions on the existence of an
excessive deficit. Article 104(12) of the Treaty states that:
‘The Council shall abrogate some or all of its decisions
referred to in paragraphs 6 to 9 and 11’ … (i.e. the deci-
sions establishing that an excessive deficit exists, the rec-
ommendation and notices for its correction, the decision
whether the recommendations are being put into practice
and the decision to apply sanctions) … ‘to the extent that
the excessive deficit in the Member State concerned has,
in the view of the Council, been corrected.’ Logically, the
Council should abrogate a decision on the decision of an
excessive deficit when the conditions for initiating an
excessive deficit procedure no longer exist. Leaving aside
the debt criterion, this means that the deficit ratio should
have fallen durably to below 3 % of GDP or, in case it still
Table II.4.1
Estimated budgetary impact of systemic pension reforms (in % of GDP)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
DK 1.0 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
EE 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8
LV 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.3
LT –– –– 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8
HU 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.6
PL 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1
SK –– –– –– 0.6 1.2 1.2 1.2
SE 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ Systemic pension reforms can also be taken into account when deciding on125
Moreover, the other relevant factors are not taken into
account when considering whether the decision on the
existence of an excessive deficit should be abrogated.
a repetition of steps in the EDP. This means that if a Member State’s fail-
ure to stick to the adjustment path required by the Council reflects higher-
than-planned costs of a systemic pension reform, a repetition of the respec-
tive step could be considered.
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uously and comes close to that reference value.
This is clarified in Article 2(7) of Council Regulation
(EC) No 1467/97: ‘In the case of Member States where
the deficit exceeds the reference value, while remaining
close to it, and where this excess reflects the implemen-
tation of a pension reform introducing a multi-pillar sys-
tem that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar, the
Commission and the Council shall consider the cost of
the reform to the publicly managed pillar when assessing
developments in EDP deficit figures. For that purpose,
consideration shall be given to the net cost of the reform
on a linear degressive basis for a transitory period of five
years (…)’. The same article stresses that ‘(…) This net
cost shall be taken into account also for the decision of
the Council under Article 104 (12) of the Treaty on the
abrogation (…), if the deficit has declined substantially
and continuously and has reached a level that comes
close to the reference value’. By repeating and elaborat-
ing on a provision already contained on the Treaty, Arti-
cle 2(7) of Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 should be
understood as reinforcing the case for early abrogation
of decisions on the existence of an excessive deficit.
The code of conduct clarifies what is the cost of reform
to be taken into account and how such a cost should be
considered: ‘The net cost of the reform is measured as its
direct impact on the general government deficit. (…)
Consideration to the net cost of the reform will be given
for the initial five years after a Member State has intro-
duced a fully funded system, or five years after 2004 for
Member States that have already introduced such a sys-
tem. Furthermore, it will also be regressive, i.e. during a
period of five years, consideration will be given to 100,
80, 60, 40 and 20 % of the net cost of the reform to the
publicly managed pillar’. Therefore, the following issues
are crucial to apply the SGP provisions on systemic pen-
sion reforms, in particular when deciding whether an
excessive deficit should be abrogated.
• Systemic pension reforms: the SGP provisions on
pension reforms apply only in case of reforms which
consist in the establishment of multi-pillar system that
includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar. Parametric
pension reforms that change social contributions,
retirement age, pension award formulae, etc. are not
• Direct costs: a systemic pension reform does not
necessarily have direct budgetary costs. For example,
there may be no direct budgetary cost when the estab-
lishment of a new pension scheme leads to an
increase in the overall level of social contributions.
The code of conduct clarifies that the costs to be con-
sidered are those that ‘stem from the fact that revenue,
which used to be recorded as government revenue, is
diverted to a (…) sector other than general govern-
ment’. Moreover, indirect budgetary costs, such as
reduction in taxes or increases in spending that may
be necessary to make a reform that is socially painful
acceptable, are not taken into account either.
• First year of the reform: the specific provision of the
Pact on systemic pension reforms applies for a limited
period of time (‘on a linear degressive basis for a tran-
sitory period of five years’), while those costs may
extend over a much longer period. Therefore, it is
important to identify what is the initial year of the
reform. Such an initial year should be defined in rela-
tion to the appearance of direct budgetary costs. It
does not necessarily correspond to the year the reform
was formally adopted by national parliaments. It
should be noted that pension reforms may lead to a
progressive increase in costs. In particular it may hap-
pen that the direct costs are very small during the first
years of the reform and increase quickly
afterwards (1). This is relevant when reforms are
adopted in stages, or when a single reform progres-
sively covers more and more categories of popula-
tion. In these cases, the degressive scale should be
applied taking into account the marginal increase of
reform costs (see second example in the following
section).
• Measuring the pension reform costs: the cost of the
reform is made up of three main elements: (i) the
social contributions or other revenue collected by the
new pension scheme which otherwise would be col-
lected by social security; (ii) the interest expenditure
that the government has to bear since the diversion of
revenue to the new pension scheme leads to a higher
deficit and an accumulation of debt, less (iii) the pen-
sions paid by the new pension scheme which other-
wise would be paid by the government. For the
recently adopted reforms, (iii) is expected to be very126
specifically relevant in the excessive deficit proce-
dure.
¥1∂ See, the concrete examples in Table II.4.1 above, in particular the case of
Latvia, Hungary and Slovakia.
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by the difference between the government deficit as
compiled according to ESA95 rules and an alternative
government deficit compiled as if the new pension
scheme were classified in the government sector.
• Not a statistical issue: the SGP provisions on systemic
pension reform leads to consider a government deficit
temporarily adjusted for the costs of the pension
the new funded pension schemes will progressively be
classified in a sector other than government. The gov-
ernment deficit adjusted for the pension reform costs
will be taken into account during the economic analy-
sis and does not imply the creation of new balancing
items in the government accounts.
• Closeness to 3 % of GDP: the SGP provisions on
systemic pension reforms are relevant only when the
Box II.4.1: Pension reforms in the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact
The 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact introduced the possibility for Member States to deviate from the agreed
benchmark of a 0.5 %-of-GDP annual adjustment for Member States not yet at their medium-term objective (MTO), or
from the MTO itself, where major structural reforms (including pension reforms) are implemented. Moreover, the MTO
can be revised when structural reforms are adopted.
Article 5(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, as amended, stipulates the following: ‘(…) When defining the adjust-
ment path to the medium-term budgetary objective for Member States that have not yet reached this objective and in allow-
ing a temporary deviation from this objective for Member States that have already reached it,(…) the Council shall take
into account the implementation of major structural reforms which have direct long-term cost-saving effects, including by
raising potential growth, and therefore a verifiable impact on the long-term sustainability of public finances. Special atten-
tion shall be paid to pension reforms introducing a multipillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar (…)’.
The same language appears in Article 9(1). Article 5 applies to Member States that have already adopted the euro as their
national currency, while Article 9 applies to those that have not yet adopted the euro.
The following issues are relevant for allowing deviations from the MTO, or from the adjustment path towards it.
• Only major reforms that have a verifiable positive, clear and certain impact on the long-term sustainability of public
finances should allow deviations from the MTOs or the adjustment path towards it. A detailed cost-benefit analysis of
the reform needs to be provided in the stability and convergence programmes submitted by the Member States con-
cerned. It is up to the Member State to provide evidence of the impact of a given major structural reform.
• The code of conduct clarifies that ‘only adopted reforms should be considered’ in this context. No deviation from the
adjustment path towards the MTO should be allowed for vaguely planned or announced reforms. However, adopted
reforms do not mean that the reform must have been formally voted by national parliaments. A reform decided by the
government, for which the crucial features are known could be considered even if it still needs to be formally adopted.
• The reformed SGP does not include any specific provision on the magnitude of deviations from the adjustment path to
the MTO or from the MTO itself. However, two elements impose de facto limits to the size and duration of deviations.
First, a safety margin needs to be guaranteed to ensure the respect of the 3 % of GDP reference value. This implies that
no deviation should be allowed for countries which are not yet at their minimum benchmark. Second, Member States
are expected to reach the MTO within the period covered by their stability or convergence programme.
Moreover, according to Article 2a of the same regulation, ‘the medium-term budgetary objective can be revised when a
major structural reform is implemented’. Since systemic pension reforms improve the long-term sustainability of public
finances, they will allow somewhat less ambitious MTOs. Therefore, the Pact not only allows Member States to deviate
from their MTO, but recommends Member States to adapt their MTO to their post-reform sustainability situation. This
assumes that the situation of each country in relation to their implicit liabilities and long-term sustainability is taken into
account in defining the medium-term objective. This will be the case as soon as criteria and modalities for doing so are
appropriately established and agreed by the Council.127
reform (on degressive basis). This is an economic, not
a statistical issue, in the sense that the statistical
authorities will not publish alternative deficits, or that
overall deficit (i.e. including the pension reform bur-
den) is close to 3 % of GDP. Therefore, the degres-
sive scale is not applicable when the overall deficit
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excess over the reference value is the result of the
pension reform. The concept of closeness has not
been explicitly defined and will have to be assessed
by the Commission and the Council in the presence
of concrete situations. However, there are grounds
to presume that the Council and the Commission
will be rather strict in that assessment.
• Deficit declining substantially and continuously: the
provisions on systemic pension reforms, in particular
the abrogation of decisions on the existence of exces-
sive deficits, are applicable only ‘if the deficit has
declined substantially and continuously’. The Treaty
and the Pact do not elaborate on the meaning of a sub-
stantial and continuous decline in the deficit. There-
fore, the interpretation of this provision will have to be
made on a case-by-case basis. A key consideration
seems to be the existence of a credible trend of deficit
reduction (towards below 3 % of GDP) that would
continue in the years following the decision.
• Sustainable correction of the excessive deficit: the
abrogation of a decision on the existence of an exces-
sive deficit is primarily based on actual data, rather
than forecasts. However, given the SGP reform which
has strengthened the relevance of budgetary consoli-
dation in a sustainable manner, it is also important to
look at planned developments. Although this is valid
in general, it is all the more important when the provi-
sions on systemic pension reforms are being consid-
ered, since the costs to be taken into account by the
Council and the Commission will fade out over time.  
Table II.4.2
Numerical example on the implementation of the Pact provision on systemic pension reforms, when considering 
an abrogation of the procedure (Case 1)
% of GDP, except (4) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
(1) Government deficit 3.8 4.4 4.2 3.2 3.1 2.5 2.4 2.4
(2) Alternative deficit, calculated as if the new pension 
scheme was classified in the government sector (*)
3.8 3.4 3.2 2.2 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.4
(3) Cost 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
(4) Degressive scale — 100 % 80 % 60 % 40 % 20 % — —
(5) Cost to be considered — 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 — —
(6) Government deficit adjusted by the cost to be considered 3.8 3.4 3.4 2.6 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.4
(*) This is the deficit concept reported by Member States which benefited from the transitory period granted by Eurostat until 1 April 2007.
Source: Commission services.
Table II.4.3
Numerical example on the implementation of the Pact provision on systemic pension reforms, when considering 
an abrogation of the procedure (Case 2)
% of GDP, except (4) 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
(1) Government deficit 3.8 4.4 4.2 3.8 3.6 3.3 2.4 2.4
(2) Alternative deficit, calculated as if the new pension 
scheme was classified in the government sector (*)
3.8 4.1 3.9 3.5 3.3 2.4 1.5 1.5
(3) Cost (total) 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.9
(3a) Cost (stage 1) 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
(3b) Cost (stage 2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.6
(4a) Degressive scale (stage 1) — 100 % 80 % 60 % 40 % 20 % — —
(4b) Degressive scale (stage 2) — — — — — 100 % 80 % 60 %
(5a) Cost to be considered (stage 1) — 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 — —
(5b) Cost to be considered (stage 2) — — — — — 0.6 0.5 0.4
(5) Cost to be considered (total) 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.4128
(6) Government deficit adjusted by the cost to be considered 3.8 4.1 4.0 3.6 3.5 2.6 1.9 2.0
(*) This is the deficit concept reported by Member States which benefited from the transitory period granted by Eurostat until 1 April 2007.
Source: Commission services.
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A few numerical examples displayed in Tables II.4.2 and
II.4.3 may be useful to illustrate the application of the
above considerations. In each of the examples, line (1)
shows the government deficit, compiled according to
ESA 95 rules, that is including the pension reform costs.
Line (2) shows the government deficit if the new pension
scheme was classified in the general government sector.
Such a deficit is not officially published by the statistical
institutes; it appears in the table to help understand how
the pension reform costs are calculated. The difference
between (1) and (2) corresponds to the pension reform
cost (3). The degressive linear scale, from 100 % to 20 %
during the first five years of the reform is shown in line
(4). Line (5 = (3)x(4)) shows the reform cost to be spe-
cifically considered by the Council and the Commission
in the application of the excessive deficit procedure.
Finally line (6 = (1)–(5)) shows the government deficit
adjusted for the pension reform cost to be considered in
application of the SGP provision on pensions. As dis-
cussed above, such a deficit would not be published by
the statistical offices. Since the aim of the examples is
illustrating the implementation of the Pact provision on
systemic pension reforms, all cases assume that Member
States were already in excessive deficit even before the
pension reform.
In case 1 reported in Table II.4.2, there is a pension
reform in 2005 which increases the deficit by 1.0 % of
GDP per year. This cost is assumed to be constant over
time. In 2005 and 2006, the overall deficit including the
pension reform costs is well above 3 %. Therefore, the
Member State should remain in a situation of excessive
deficit. In 2007, the deficit (3.2 % of GDP) is relatively
close to 3 % of GDP and has been declining for two
years. In that year, the pension reform cost to be consid-
ered is 0.6 % of GDP (i.e. 60 % of the pension reform
costs, since it is the third year of the reform). The gov-
ernment deficit adjusted for the reform cost and the
degressive scale is below 3 % of GDP. Moreover, plans
show that the conditions for abrogation would also be
applicable in the following years. Therefore, an abroga-
tion of the excessive deficit procedure could be consid-
ered in 2008 on the basis of 2007 data.
Case 2, in Table II.4.3, shows a situation with pension
reform costs which are not constant. The pension
reform costs appear in 2005 and remain constant until
2008. In 2009, the pension reform costs jump signifi-
cantly (from 0.3 % to 0.9 % of GDP) because either an
increasing fraction of the population became affiliated
to the new pension funded scheme or a second stage of
the reform was adopted. The interesting case concerns
2009. In that year, the overall deficit could be judged
close to 3 % of GDP, and be considered as sufficiently
declining. The fifth year of the reform is 2009. There-
fore, a simple application of the degressive scale
would imply that only 20 % of the reform costs would
be specifically taken into account. In that case, the
government deficit adjusted for the total cost and by
the degressive scale (3.3-0.9x20 %=3.1) would remain
above 3 % and the decisions on the existence of exces-
sive deficits could not be abrogated. However, given
the increasing reform costs associated with two reform
steps, the Council and the Commission could consider
applying the degressive scale twice: first from 2005 to
2009 in relation to the initial reform costs, and a sec-
ond time from 2009 to 2013 in relation to the second
stage of costs. In this case, the costs to be considered
in 2009 would be 0.7 % of GDP, which could allow
abrogation if the deficit is considered sufficiently close
to 3 %.
4.4. Conclusion
The reformed SGP contains specific provisions on how
to take into account the implementation of pension
reforms in its preventive and corrective arms. A relevant
issue concerns the treatment of systemic pension reforms
when considering the abrogation of an excessive deficit
procedure. The implementation of such a provision was
precisely codified. The Council and the Commission
explicitly consider the costs of systemic pension
reforms, but this is only the case when the overall deficit
remains close to the reference value, the excess reflects
direct costs of the reform and if the deficit has declined
substantially and continuously. Moreover, the costs to be
considered are taken into account for a limited number of
years in a declining way. The SGP provisions on sys-
temic pension reforms are the result of a delicate balance
between avoiding discouragement of pension reforms
and the imperative of the SGP ensuring fiscal discipline
and remaining simple, based on observed variables and
robust to moral hazard.129
5. Strengthening budgetary procedures
5.1. Introduction
An extensive strand of literature has developed addres-
sing the question of how to design fiscal frameworks that
promote sound fiscal policy. Three different elements
are generally distinguished: (i) procedural rules of the
budgetary process, (ii) numerical fiscal rules that con-
strain the discretion of policymakers, and (iii) independ-
ent bodies or institutions that provide inputs and formu-
late recommendations in the area of fiscal policy.
While national fiscal rules and independent institutions
have extensively been surveyed in the context of the EU
budgetary surveillance framework less attention has
been given to procedures related to the preparation,
legislation and execution of the budget (1). This section
is a first step to close this gap. It reviews budgetary pro-
cedures in the EU with a view to take stock of the quality
and effectiveness of current arrangements across
18 Member States. The analysis does not cover all EU
Member States because it relies on the OECD/World
Bank budget practices and procedures database, which
collects the results of an extensive survey covering a
wide range of features of national budgetary procedures.
The structure and content of the database is described in
Box II.5.1.
The review of budgetary procedures in the EU is carried
out in three steps. The first step discusses the main fea-
tures of budgetary procedures identified in the literature.
The second step consists in building numerical indica-
tors that capture the quality of national budgetary proce-
dures for the individual features. The third and last step
examines the link between the quality of budgetary pro-
cedures and other country-specific variables, e.g. meas-
ures of budgetary performance.
5.2. Basic features of budget procedures
The literature pinpoints a number of basic features of the
budget process that may contribute to better budgetary
outcomes and/or a greater efficiency of public spending.
Blöndal (2003) summarises common trends in the
budget reforms in OECD member countries and high-
lights some features that are necessary to effectively
control public expenditure, inter alia medium-term
budgetary frameworks, prudent economic assumptions,
top-down budgeting techniques, focus on results and
budget transparency. Moreover, a branch of literature
following von Hagen (1992) and Alesina et al. (1996)
finds empirical evidence that budgetary institutions play
a role in explaining the budgetary performance of a
country. They particularly focus on measures aimed at
centralising the budget process, but also budget transpar-
ency and long-term planning (2).
Reflecting the findings in the literature and based on the
information provided in the OECD/World Bank data-
base the focus in this section is on seven different dimen-
sions of the budgetary processes:
• transparency,
• multiannual planning horizon,
• centralisation of the budget process,
• centralisation during execution,
• the use of top-down budgeting techniques,
• prudent economic assumptions and reserves,
• performance budgeting (3).130
¥1∂ See for instance European Commission (2006a) and Ayuso et al. (2006).
¥2∂ See also von Hagen and Poterba (1999) for an overview.
¥3∂ Performance budgeting is an arrangement which aims at strengthening the
link between funds provided for a programme and its output or outcome.
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budget process, notably planning, legislation and imple-
mentation, in different ways. Budget transparency, top-
down budgeting techniques and performance budgeting
cover all three stages. Multiannual planning horizon and
prudent economic assumptions are mainly concerned
with the planning stage, while the centralisation of the
budgeting process covers the two first stages only. Cen-
tralisation during execution is concerned with the imple-
mentation stage.
For each of the seven dimensions or features the infor-
mation provided in the OECD/World Bank database is
used to construct numerical indices. The score of the
index reflects the quality of the specific features of the
budgetary process in the national context. Details
regarding the construction of the indices are provided in
Box II.5.1. Before commenting on the data a word of
caution is in order.
The OECD/World Bank database refers to the year 2003
only. Hence, recent developments are not reflected. An
update of the database is planned for the year 2007.
Nevertheless, the information is still useful to get a first
idea of budgetary procedures across countries.
5.2.1. Budget transparency
A feature which according to the literature is particularly
important for the quality of the budgetary process is
transparency. It encompasses all elements ensuring that
the government can be held accountable for its policies
by the electorate. This can only be achieved if the gen-
eral public has the possibility to assess (i) the accuracy
Box II.5.1: Construction of indices based on information from the OECD/World Bank budget practices 
and procedures database
The OECD/World Bank budget practices and procedures database (1)
During 2003 the OECD and the World Bank conducted a comprehensive survey on national budget procedures in 44 coun-
tries, both OECD members and others, including 18 EU Member States. The nine EU Member States not included are Bul-
garia, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland and Romania. The survey was very extensive and
detailed, and included close to 400 questions. The questions are divided into seven parts covering: general information,
formulation, budget execution, accounting, control and monitoring systems, budget documentation and performance man-
agement, fiscal relations among levels of government, and special relationships/issues. The collected data are not time-
varying, i.e. they describe the current budget procedures in the country at the time when data were collected. Part of the
data are already applied by Filc and Scartascini (2004) and European Commission (2004). The OECD is now in the process
of updating the 2003 survey, with an extensive revision of the questionnaire. The results will be made public during 2007.
Construction of indices on the quality of budget procedures
The information in the database on budget practices and procedures was categorised according to whether they could pro-
vide information on the seven dimensions for our analysis. Four to eight questions were selected for each dimension cov-
ering different aspects of each dimension (2). To have a numerical representation, the answers to each of the selected
questions were given a score between 0 (lowest) and 5 (highest). If there were more than two alternatives, intermediate
values were used (3). For each of the seven dimensions a numerical index was constructed by finding the average scores
on all answers regarding this dimension for each country. In absence of an empirical or strong theoretical basis to choose
a particular weighting of each question, all questions were given equal weight.
¥1∂ http://ocde.dyndns.info
¥2∂ All answers selected were discriminating, meaning that questions where all countries gave the same answer were excluded.
¥3∂ When the answer included a written specification the scoring was done individually based on the specification. Missing data were filled by expertise at
the European Commission, DG ECFIN in contact with national authorities when necessary.131
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policy measures. Some of the key elements for the trans-
parency of the budget considered in the literature are (1):
• the budget proposals and accounting reports must be
released systematically and timely;
• the budget documentation should be as comprehen-
sive as possible; also reporting extra-budgetary
funds, the level of tax expenditure and all liabilities,
including contingent liabilities in the form of loan
guarantees and public–private partnership;
• the multi-year effects of new policy measures
should be revealed in the basis for decision-making;
• all economic assumptions and the models used
should be disclosed explicitly;
• the legislature must be able to play an active role in
independently scrutinising the budget and hold the
government accountable for the implementation of
the policy. This requires clarity of roles and respon-
sibilities, and that the legislature is given both
enough time and resources to review the budget and
accounting reports in detail;
• the media and non-governmental organisations
should be allowed to act as a watchdog for the public.
The information in the OECD/World Bank database
covers the majority of these elements. Our index
includes timeliness of general government accounts, the
disclosure of macroeconomic assumptions and the mac-
roeconomic model used, the follow up on recommenda-
tions from national audit body, the time for the auditor
and legislator to scrutinise the budget, the existence of
multi-year cost estimates for new spending and the com-
prehensiveness of the budget information in the sense
that also off-budget funds are reported.
Graph II.5.1 summarises the scores of our budget trans-
parency-index. The countries with the highest scores are
the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. These countries
make the assumptions underpinning the budget publicly
available, and present multiannual implications of new
policy measures. In Netherlands the parliament is given
a long time span to review the budget proposal, and off-
budget funds are reported in the budget documentation.
The lowest scores are recorded for Greece, Ireland and
France. These three countries lacked a well-developed
system for reporting multiannual effects of new policy
measures and the economic model underpinning the
budgetary projections was not available for scrutiny.
Greece also reported that the economic assumptions
underpinning the budget were not publicly available.
¥1∂ See for instance OECD (2002), Alt and Lassen (2003), Blöndal (2003),
IMF (2001).
Graph II.5.1:  Budget transparency index
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A fully developed medium-term budgetary framework is
found to be strengthening the quality of budget proce-
dures. The benefits of a well-defined medium-term budg-
etary framework are relatively clear. Firstly, it provides an
incentive for the government to commit to a predefined
path for the main aggregates of government finances. Sec-
ondly, it is an instrument to present the multiannual budg-
etary effects of new policy measures. A comprehensive
overview of the literature on medium-term budgetary
frameworks is provided in Part III of this report.
The concept of a medium-term budgetary framework is
very broad and covers several of the aforementioned basic
features of a budgetary framework in general. For the pur-
poses of the present exercise, our index of multiannual
planning horizon focuses attention on one particular
aspect: the multiannual orientation of the budget process.
The information used to construct the index of the multi-
annual planning horizon coves the existence of national
medium-term budget targets, the legal basis for the
medium-term budgetary framework (e.g. law, constitu-
tion), the identification of deviations between the
medium-term target and the annual budget, the existence
of multi-year expenditure estimates and macroeconomic
forecasts for several years.
Graph II.5.2 summarises the scores of the index. The
countries with highest scores are the United Kingdom
and Sweden. Both countries have well-developed
medium-term budgetary frameworks which ensure the
multiannual perspective of the budget process. The low-
est scores are recorded for the Czech Republic and Aus-
tria. Austria reported that there were no multiannual
macroeconomic forecasts underpinning the multiannual
budget plans, and that there was no systematic reporting
on deviation in the annual budget from the medium-term
fiscal policy objectives. As regards the Czech Republic,
the budget documentation did not contain multi-year
expenditure projections and there were shortcomings
regarding the framework for multiannual planning. 
5.2.3. Centralisation of the budget process
Another characteristic which has attracted a great deal of
attention in the literature is the centralisation of the
budget process (1). The starting point is generally the so-
called ‘common pool resource’ problem in public
finances. Individual policymakers consider the full ben-
efits from expanding projects in their policy areas or dis-
trict, but do not take into account the whole cost of
increased taxation or borrowing. A fragmented budget
¥1∂ The main contributions are by von Hagen et al. (1992, 1999, 2001b, 2006),
Alesina et al. (1996), Gleich (2003) and Yläoutinen (2004). 
Graph II.5.2:  Multiannual planning horizon index
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number of participants can thus lead to excessive spend-
ing and a deficit bias. One way to solve the common pool
resource problem is to centralise the budget process by
delegating budgetary power to the Prime Minister or the
Finance Minister, and thereby better internalise the true
costs of new policy measures. Another instrument to
cope with the common pool resource problem during the
legislative stage is to impose limits to the parliament to
amend the draft budgets.
The information from the OECD/World Bank database
used to construct the index for the ‘centralisation of the
budget process’ essentially includes two elements: the
power of the Finance Minister (or Prime Minister) and
restrictions on the legislature to amend the budget. The
index only covers the first two stages of the budget pro-
cess: the preparation by government and legislation in
parliament. The execution stage is treated separately (see
below).
Graph II.5.3 summarises the scores of the index of the
‘centralisation of the budget process’. The countries with
highest scores are France, Spain and Slovakia. In both
France and Spain there are restrictions on parliament
amendments to the budget. Disagreement between the
central budget authority and the ministries is solved by a
strong principal executive. The lowest scores are
recorded for Denmark, Greece and Italy. In Denmark the
parliament is reported to have a strong amendment
power, while the disputes inside government were
solved in a Ministerial Committee instead of delegating
the power to the Finance Minister or Prime Minister. 
A separate index was constructed to measure the degree
of centralisation during the execution stage of the
budget. The reason for this analytical distinction is that a
strong centralisation of the execution stage could be
more in conflict with other features of the budgetary pro-
cedures which requires greater flexibility in the execu-
tion stage, e.g. a well-functioning top-down budgeting
approach or performance budgeting. The information
used to build this index refers to the following elements:
power of the central budget authority to withhold funds
during implementation of the budget, existing restric-
tions on changes in expenditure outside the budget proc-
ess, and the participation of the central budget authority
in the evaluation of the budget implementation.
Graph II.5.4 summarises the scores of the ‘centralisation
during execution’ index. The countries with highest
scores are Belgium, the Czech Republic, Greece and
France. In Greece the central budget authority can with-
hold funds during budget execution, and there are no
Graph II.5.3:  Centralisation of the budget process index
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process. The lowest scores are recorded for Denmark,
Ireland and Sweden. These three countries reported that
the central budget authorities had no authority to with-
hold funds during budget execution either for entitle-
ments or other appropriations.
Earlier studies of centralisation of the budget process
include a somewhat greater variety of dimensions as com-
pared to the information available in the OECD/World
Bank database. It can therefore be useful to check whether
our indices show the same pattern as corresponding indi-
ces in the literature. To construct a reference index which
includes the same countries as in our study we integrated
data from Hallerberg et al (2006) on the EU-15 countries
with the data of Gleich (2003) on new Member States (1).
The correlation coefficient between a synthetic index of
our two centralisation indices and the reference index
covering all three stages of the budget process is found
to be positive and reasonably high (0.46).
5.2.4. Top-down budgeting techniques
Within the traditional bottom-up approach, the budget
process starts with the line ministries submitting their
budget requests to the Ministry of Finance. These
requests usually contain bids that are generally higher
than what line ministers expect as the final outcome of
the budget negotiation. At the same time there are no
incentives for the line ministries to reveal possibilities
for expenditure reductions in their programmes if they
do not get assurances that the saving will be allocated
back to the same policy area.
One way indicated in the literature to reduce the upward
pressure on spending associated with bottom-up budget-
ing is to reverse the process (2). The main principle of
top-down budgeting is to start the budget planning pro-
cess with a binding decision on the total amount of the
budget, which is subsequently divided on different sub-
sectors managed by line ministers. Similarly, in parlia-
ment top-down budgeting techniques imply that the vot-
ing process starts by a vote on hard ceilings for the total
budget, and allocations on the budget are subsequently
done within this hard ceiling (3).
A key success factor of the top-down budgeting
approach is that the detailed allocation of resources
Graph II.5.4:  Centralisation during execution index
Source: Commission services.
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¥2∂ Kim and Park (2006) and Blöndal (2003).135
¥1∂ To ensure comparability information naturally sorted under other headings
in our study were excluded, e.g. questions on fiscal rules, sequences of
voting (top-down budgeting).
¥3∂ Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) and von Hagen and Hallerberg (1997), how-
ever, argue that a change in voting order is not in itself sufficient to lower
the size of the budget. They also show theoretically that a top-down voting
order under some conditions might lead to higher total spending. 
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managers. The idea is that by giving the line ministers/
agency managers wide latitude to operate as they find
best within their ceilings, the right incentives are pro-
vided to allocate funds more efficiently.
Unfortunately, the information in the OECD/World
Bank database is not particularly suited to measure the
concept of top-down budgeting. In particular, it would
be useful to have more information on the sequencing of
the decision-making process in the preparation stage, as
well as on the degree with which the ceilings decided
upon at different points of the process are really binding
or are subject to frequent revisions. In the light of these
restrictions, our index for the degree of top-down budg-
eting mainly includes information about the link
between the medium-term framework and the annual
budget process. We also exploit information about the
sequence of the voting in parliament. Finally, there are
some pieces of information that give an idea of the
degree of flexibility of the line ministers/agency manag-
ers within their budget area. Overall, in spite of the lim-
itations the available data should allow for a fairly good
approximation of the concept of top-down budgeting.
Graph II.5.5 summarises the scores of the index measur-
ing the degree of top-down budgeting. The countries
with highest scores are Sweden, Finland and the United
Kingdom. In Sweden the link between the medium-term
budgetary framework and the annual budget is strong,
both concerning the process in government and in parlia-
ment, and the flexibility during the execution stage is
high. The lowest scores are recorded for Austria, Greece
and Italy. None of these countries reported arrangements
for the parliament to establish aggregate expenditure
ceilings before beginning debate on individual expendi-
ture items. The links from the medium-term budgetary
frameworks to the annual budgets seem to be weak and
the flexibility given to line ministers during budget exe-
cution was reported to be small.
5.2.5. Prudent economic assumptions and reserves
One of the most critical factors in the budget process is
consistent and prudent macroeconomic assumptions.
There is evidence in the literature that governments may
have an incentive to build budgetary projections on over-
optimistic projections so as to justify a higher level of
spending and ex post blame bad luck for not achieving
budgetary targets (1). 
¥1∂ Milesi-Ferreti and Moriyama (2004) and Jonung and Larch (2006). 
Graph II.5.5:  Top-down budgeting index
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to let an independent institution make the forecasts. This
was extensively discussed in European Commission
(2006a). Making the assumptions more independent
does, however, not fully remove the uncertainty. Opti-
mistic forecasts are particularly problematic, since it is
especially hard to downsize expenditure at a late stage in
the budget process. The literature therefore suggests that
a safety margin should be built in by making more ‘pru-
dent economic assumption’, i.e. systematically down-
ward adjustment of economic assumptions (1). Another
way to safeguard against unpleasant surprises is to incor-
porate contingent reserves in the budget which can be
used for instance for unexpected expenditures. A key
success factor in applying reserves is to have clear rules
for their use to protect against the pressure for new pol-
icy measures.
The information used to construct our index of prudent
economic assumptions and reserves covers the degree of
prudence of the economic assumptions, the delegation of
forecasting to independent institutions, the review of the
macroeconomic assumptions by independent institu-
tions, the existence of budget reserves and the formal
rules for the use of the reserves.
Graph II.5.6 summarises the scores of the ‘prudent eco-
nomic assumptions and reserves’ index. The countries
with highest scores are Slovakia, the United Kingdom
and Austria. Slovakia used a margin of prudence for the
forecasts in their medium-term budgetary framework. In
Austria an independent body makes the forecasts used in
the budget, while in United Kingdom the audit office has
a special role in independently reviewing the economic
assumptions. Those with the lowest scores are Finland,
Germany and Ireland. Both Ireland and Germany
reported to be using neither prudent economic assump-
tions nor budget reserves. Both Ireland and Finland
reported to have no kind of independent review of the
economic assumptions. 
5.2.6. Performance budgeting
In view of the impending increase in age-related spending
the more efficient use of scarce public resources in Mem-
ber States will be a key element in safeguarding a high
level of public services while keeping public finances sus-
tainable. The effectiveness and the efficiency of public
expenditure has thus become an issue of growing impor-
tance in political debate. The literature emphasises that the
traditional input-oriented budget approach has its short-¥1∂ Blöndal (2003).
Graph II.5.6:  Prudent economic assumptions and reserves index
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allocated, but does not assess whether the resources were
used efficiently (1). Increased attention has therefore been
given to methods of performance budgeting, which
strengthen the link between the resources provided for a
programme and its output or outcome (2).
An extreme variant of performance budgeting consists in
establishing an automatic link between output or out-
come measures and the budget appropriation. Since out-
come seldom can be precisely defined or quantified, the
link is often made to output. Experience shows, how-
ever, that this variant sometimes can become a pitfall
since the achievement of output targets can overshadow
the real policy goals (3).
In our analysis we follow a broader definition, including
also elements referred to in the literature as ‘perform-
ance-informed budgeting’. The key characteristic of per-
formance budgeting is to ex ante mark out an expected
performance in terms of outcome for each spending pro-
gramme. Secondly, the assessment of agencies and man-
agers is based on the degree to which they achieve pre-
defined target. To give managers the possibility to find
the best solutions, a certain loosening of input controls
may be required. However, this can only be done if the
managers face overall budget constraints. The last issues
are in our study sorted under the top-down-budgeting
dimension.
A related issue is the use of cost-benefit analyses. They
ensure that the potential benefits (outcomes) and costs of
new policy measures are compared ex ante and the
expected most efficient composition of expenditure is
disclosed. Due to lack of data this dimension is not
assessed in our study.
The information used to construct our index of perform-
ance budgeting cover the following items: the regular
presentation of non-financial performance data in the
budget documentation, the responsibility for achieving
the performance targets, the monitoring of the perform-
ance against targets and the use of performance indica-
tors in determining budget allocations. 
Graph II.5.7 summarises the scores of the index. The coun-
tries with highest scores are the Netherlands, Slovakia,
¥1∂ See for instance Joumard et al. (2004), Robinson and Brumby (2005) and
Curristine et al. (2007).
¥2∂ Output stands for the goods and services produced by the government such
as number of health operations, schools etc., while outcome represents the
policy result the policymakers want to achieve for instance improvements
in health condition.
¥3∂ See Robinson and Brumby (2005).
Graph II.5.7:  Performance budgeting index
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system for reporting targets and actual performance in the
budget. It also reported clear links between the achievement
of target and allocation of funds. Currently the Dutch sys-
tem is also being revised to improve the design of targets
and thereby avoid possible perverse effects of a strict link
between the outcome achieved and resources allocated.
Those with the lowest scores are Ireland and Hungary. Both
countries inter alia reported that performance data or targets
were not systematically included in the budget documenta-
tion and the achievement of performance targets were not
used to determine budget allocations.
5.2.7. Construction of overall indexes
From the indices covering individual features of the
budgetary process three composite indices were con-
structed: an index summarising the overall degree of
centralisation, an indicator of quality and an overall
index of budgetary procedures (1).
The quality-index includes four different dimensions:
(i) budget transparency, (ii) multiannual planning hori-
zon, (iii) prudent economic assumptions and reserves
and (iv) performance budgeting.
Graph II.5.8 presents the scores of the quality-index for all
countries in our sample. The countries with highest scores
are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden.
Those with the lowest scores are the Czech Republic,
Greece and Ireland.
The index summarising the degree of centralisation
encompasses the dimensions that aim at reducing the so-
called ‘common pool’ resource problem. This includes (i)
centralisation of the budget process and (ii) the use of top-
down budgeting techniques. We also found it natural to
include the use of numerical fiscal rules under this heading,
since the literature highlights numerical fiscal rules as one
of the main contributors to solve the common pool
resource problem. Instead of building a new index on fiscal
rules, we used the more comprehensive index established
by Ayuso et al. (2006), which takes into account both the
coverage and the characteristics of numerical fiscal rules.
The index measuring the centralisation during budget
execution was, however, not included in the overall index,
since the findings in literature are more ambiguous when it
comes to the desirability of detailed centralisation of this
stage. The approaches of top-down budgeting and
performance budgeting particularly call for greater
flexibility in this stage of the budget process.
¥1∂ The indices were constructed by finding the unweighted average of the
individual indices for the dimensions included. All indices were standard-
ised (Over the sample the average is set to 0, and the standard deviation to
1.) By standardising the indices before the summation, we only focus on
the mutual differences between the countries included in the study on each
characteristic, and the index level cannot be compared to countries not
included in the study.
Graph II.5.8:  Overall quality index
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2 0 0 7Graph II.5.9 summarises the scores of the overall index
of centralisation. The countries with highest scores are
Sweden, the United Kingdom and Spain. The lowest
scores are recorded for Greece, Hungary and Italy.
The overall total index of budget procedures incorpo-
rates all the individual dimensions used for the other two
overall indexes: Budget transparency, multiannual plan-
ning horizon, centralisation of the budget process, top-
down budgeting, prudent economic assumption, per-
formance budgeting and numerical fiscal rules. The
scores of the index for the countries in our sample are
presented in Graph II.5.10.
The United Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands are
the countries with the highest scores, whereas Italy, Ire-
land and Greece end up at the lower end of the range.
Graph II. 5.11 presents the overall index of budget pro-
cedures together with the range from the highest value to
the lowest value of sub-indices. Some interesting pat-
terns emerge. Countries with a high score on the total
index also tend to rank high on individual indices. The
United Kingdom for instance scores above average on
all indices included in the overall budget procedures
low values across most of the features captured by the
overall index. This is the case for Austria, Hungary,
Italy, Ireland and Greece. The picture is comparatively
mixed in the middle section of the ranking. For most
countries of that section, the overall index reflects a rel-
atively wide dispersion on the individual components.
Although our overall index is more comprehensive than
comparable indices found in the literature, a number of
caveats need to be noted. First, the information extracted
from the OECD/World Bank database was not specifi-
cally designed for our purposes leaving out some rele-
vant pieces of information. Moreover, the data are based
on self-reporting with no control-check. The robustness
of the index should also be further tested. Finally, as
mentioned above the information refers to the year 2003.
Subsequent changes are not covered. The planned
update of the OECD/World Bank database in 2007 will
give an improved basis for developing the study further
along the avenues outlined in this section.
5.3. Descriptive analysis of the budget 
procedures
5.3.1. Relations between different characteristics 
Graph II.5.9:  Overall centralisation index
Source: Commission services.
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index, and with a few exceptions this is also the case for
Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain and Slovenia. Similarly,
countries at the lower end of the ranking attain relatively
of the budget procedures
In the preceding section we described the budget proce-
dures in 18 EU Member States on the basis of seven
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the links between the various dimensions of budgetary
procedures. The demarcation between the individual fea-
II.5.1 presents the correlation coefficients between the
different indices.
Graph II.5.10:  Budgetary procedures
Source: Commission services.
Graph II.5.11:  The index of budget procedures and range of sub-indices
NB: The index of budget procedures is not an arithmetical average of the subindices because it is standardised after summarising the indexes.
Source: Commission services.
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tures is not always clear cut. A certain degree of overlap-
ping exists. It is therefore interesting to investigate the
relations between the various characteristics. Table
We find that performance budgeting, the use of top-
down budgeting techniques and the fiscal rules are posi-
tively correlated. The common theme of all these three
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an early stage of the process, leaving high degree of flex-
ibility for operating managers and line ministers to find
the right methods to reach overall goals within the pre-
defined frames. It is therefore also not surprising that
these features are to various extents negatively corre-
lated with the index of centralisation during the execu-
tion stage.
The index of top-down budgeting is also positively cor-
related with the degree of multiannual planning, as both
factors are two important parts of a well-designed
medium-term budgetary framework. Surprisingly, these
two indices are, however, not correlated with the index
measuring the degree of prudence of economic assump-
tions, which also can be viewed as a required feature for
a successful medium-term budgetary framework.
Budget transparency is positively correlated with multi-
annual planning horizon, the use of top-down budgeting
and performance budgeting. Multiannual planning hori-
zon could be included in a broad definition of transpar-
ency, and it is not surprising that the same countries are
in the forefront on both dimensions.
5.3.2. Budget procedures and other country-specific 
elements
to explore some common trends in the budget proce-
dures on the basis of national characteristics. 
First we investigate the relation between the size of a coun-
try and the degree of federalism and the total budgetary
procedures index (1). As shown in Graph II.5.12, we find
that large countries score higher on the ‘budget proce-
dures’ index than small countries, while federal countries
score higher than their counterparts. Both results seem rea-
sonable, since both a high degree of federalism and the size
of a country tend to make budgetary procedure more com-
plex. For federal countries we find that the use of fiscal
rules and top-down budgeting procedures are more devel-
oped than more centralised countries, most likely follow-
ing the need for central government to define clear frames
for lower level of governments. Large countries do rely
more on fiscal rules, multiannual planning and centralisa-
tion of the budget process than small countries. 
The branch of literature called ‘fiscal institutionalism’
has in particular pointed to the relation between different
political variables and budgetary procedures (2). On the
basis of a set of political variables countries are divided
into two broad categories; delegation countries and con-
tract (or commitment) countries. Delegation countries
Table II.5.1
Correlation coefficients between the indices reflecting features of the budget procedures
TRA MAPH CBP TDB PEAR PB CDE FR OQ OC TB
TRA 1.00 0.50 – 0.11 0.55 0.12 0.45 – 0.56 0.41 0.76 0.42 0.68
MAPH 1.00 0.14 0.43 0.09 0.16 – 0.48 0.28 0.64 0.41 0.61
CBP 1.00 0.25 0.33 0.25 0.14 – 0.02 0.23 0.59 0.44
TDB 1.00 – 0.25 0.46 – 0.48 0.44 0.44 0.81 0.68
PEAR 1.00 0.34 0.28 0.01 0.57 0.05 0.39
PB 1.00 – 0.13 0.66 0.74 0.65 0.78
CDE 1.00 – 0.29 – 0.32 – 0.33 – 0.37
FR 1.00 0.52 0.69 0.68
OQ 1.00 0.58 0.92
OC 1.00 0.86
TB 1.00
NB: TRA = Transparency, MAPH = Multiannual planning horizon, CBP = Centralisation of the budget process, TDB = Top-down budgeting, PEAR = Prudent eco-
nomic assumptions and reserves, PB = Performance budgeting, CDE = Centralisation during execution, FR = Fiscal rules, OQ = Overall quality index, OC = Over-
all centralisation index, TB = Total budget procedures index.
Source: Commission services.
¥1∂ Federalism is measured as the size of local and State government expendi-142
The observed budget procedures are a result of many
factors: government structure, administrative traditions,
political systems and history. In this section we will try
tures compared to central government expenditure. A value above average
of the countries in our study on this index is defined as high degree of fed-
eralism. Source: Eurostat.
¥2∂ The tradition following von Hagen (1992).
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landscape which tends to produce one-party govern-
ments or coalition governments of parties with small ide-
parties with large ideological distance are observed. Von
Hagen et al. (2001b) and Hallerberg et al. (2006) (1)
Graph II.5.12:  Budgetary procedures and country-specific features
Source: Commission services.
Graph II.5.13:  Budgetary procedures and political variables
Source: Commission services.
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ological distance. Contract countries, on the other hand,
are countries where coalition governments consisting of ¥1∂ See, for instance, von Hagen et al. (2001) and Hallerberg et al. (2006). 
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types of countries are very different.
An interesting exercise will therefore be to take a close
look on the relation between our budget indexes and some
political variables. We find that there are no differences
between delegation and contract countries in the score of
the total budget procedures (see Graph II.5.13) (1). We
also checked against another related variable, ‘govern-
ment fractionalisation’, which only takes into account the
number of parties in government and not the ideological
distance, and the result is the same (2). However, if we
look closer into the scores on the indices for specific char-
acteristics, we find a picture in line with the ideas of von
Hagen et al. (see Graph II.5.14). Contract countries rely
highly on fiscal rules, performance budgeting and top-
down budgeting, which are all characteristics which
depend on each other. Interestingly, we also observe that
they score somewhat higher on budget transparency,
which might also be seen as a condition for success in
these budgetary frameworks where responsibilities are
widely delegated within predetermined rule-based frames. 
Delegation countries exhibit a higher degree of centrali-
sation in budget procedures, prudent economic assump-
tions and a multiannual planning horizon. Since we have
split the centralisation into two indexes we can observe
that the differences are particularly large in the execution
stage of the budget process, while centralisation of the
two first stages of the budget process is more compatible
with the performance and top-down budgeting charac-
terising the contract countries.
In Graph II.5.13 another political variable measuring
notably the political stability is included: average
number of years the Prime Minister or Head of State
stays in office (3). Not surprisingly, the countries with a
high degree of political stability score higher on the
‘budget procedures’ index than other countries.
5.3.3. Budget procedures and budget outcomes
Several studies show that developed budgetary procedures
can contribute to improve budgetary performance (4). It is
therefore interesting to check whether our index of budget
procedures is positively related to measure for budgetary
¥1∂ The classification used in our analysis is based on von Hagen et al. (2001)
and Yläoutinen (2004).
¥2∂ Values for the years 1990-2004 compared to average across countries. The
data source is the World Bank database of political institutions (2004).
¥3∂ Values for the years 1990-2004 compared to average across countries. The
data source is the World Bank database of political institutions (2004).
¥4∂ Hallerberg et al. (2006), Fabrizio and Mody (2006), Alt and Lassen
(2003), Alesina et al. (1996).
Graph II.5.14:  ‘Contract’ versus ‘delegation’ and budgetary procedures
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index and average changes in primary cyclically – adjusted
balance in the years 1995–2006. Following the results of
existing studies, it is not surprising to see that this compre-
hensive index is positively related to the budget balance (1).
Clearly, the correlation is not necessarily an indication of
causality and factors other than budget procedure may be
at play as well. A more detailed analysis of the relation
between budget procedures and fiscal performance
would go beyond the scope of this section and is a topic
for further research. 
5.3.4. Conclusions
Based on 2003 data, we reviewed the budget procedures
of 18 EU Member States. Particular attention was given
to seven dimensions of the budget procedures which
were aggregated to one overall index.
Our analysis shows that Member States differ signifi-
cantly in terms of budget procedures, reflecting a
number of country-specific elements plus history.
Although there is no single best framework that would
be suitable for all countries, some interesting patterns are
observed.
In line with expectations, federal and large countries
were found to have high scores on the overall index; the
same applies to countries with high degree of political
stability. No significant differences concerning the over-
all index of budget procedures between ‘delegation’
countries and ‘contract’ countries were found. However,
at the level of individual components of the overall index
a number of notable features are recorded. ‘Contract’
countries seem to rely more on fiscal rules, top-down and
performance budgeting.
In line with expectations, the overall index of budget
procedures is positively correlated with budgetary out-
comes.¥1∂ Since the condition for choosing dimensions for the study were that they
were found to be conducive to better budgetary outcome in the existing lit-
erature, such a relationship should be expected.
Graph II.5.15:  Budgetary procedures and budget outcome
Source: Commission services.
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Part III
How to stick to medium-term 
budgetary plans

Summary
A number of EU countries faced in the past chronic diffi-
culties in respecting the medium-term budgetary targets
set in their stability and convergence programmes (SCPs).
The ‘close to balance or in surplus’ objective of the origi-
nal Stability and Growth Pact became, in these countries,
a moving target. Against this background, the finance
ministers of the EU Member States decided, in the context
of the 2005 SGP reform, to take concrete actions to
strengthen the preventive arm of the Pact. To ensure a bet-
ter functioning of the SGP, the Council notably empha-
sised the importance of improving national fiscal govern-
ance and formulated concrete proposals to strengthen the
national ownership of the medium-term budgetary targets
set in the SCPs. The aim of this chapter is to assess which
factors explain that some countries were able to stick to
their medium-term budgetary plans while this was not the
case for others. It is notably analysed to what extent reli-
ance on a proper medium-term budgetary framework
helps respect multiannual budgetary targets.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it presents
the main arguments in favour of medium-term budgetary
frameworks. Based on concrete examples in the EU
countries and existing literature, it reviews the various
types of frameworks and identifies a number of desirable
characteristics. Secondly, the analysis reviews the
medium-term budgetary plans formulated by Member
States in their SCPs and compares them with outcomes.
The aim is to identify possible origins for the difficulties
of some Member States to achieve the planned improve-
ments in the government balance. Thirdly, it assesses
which factors explain that some countries were able to
stick to budgetary plans while this was not the case for
others. It is notably examined whether reliance on a
proper medium-term budgetary framework (MTBF)
favours better adherence to medium-term fiscal plans.
Functions of medium-term budgetary frameworks
sions have economic and budgetary implications which
go well beyond the year in which they are taken. A major-
ity of EU countries have therefore decided to supplement
their budgetary institutions with MTBFs. The literature
has underlined the benefits of such instruments, which
contribute to improved transparency in the conduct of fis-
cal policy and provide the fiscal authorities with a better
planning tool supporting effective expenditure manage-
ment and the implementation of structural reforms.
Design of medium-term budgetary frameworks
There is a wide range of possibilities concerning the design
and status of MTBFs, depending on country preferences. A
number of characteristics appear however desirable to
ensure that such frameworks play a meaningful role in the
conduct of fiscal policy. MTBFs should preferably cover
the whole of the general government sector, to fully take
into account the medium-term budgetary impact of policy
decisions. Medium-term budgetary targets should be
vested with a sufficient degree of political commitment, by
the executive and the legislative branches. They should
also preferably be set following a proper coordination
between various levels of government involved in the con-
duct of fiscal policy. Moreover, there should be a strong
connection between the MTBF and the annual budget pro-
cedure, in the sense that the multiannual targets set in the
previous years should form the basis upon which the
budget is prepared. Finally, the preparation of macroeco-
nomic assumptions underpinning budgetary projections
should be devoted a careful attention, as these assumptions
largely determine the amount of public resources available
in the medium term to finance policies.
Situation in the EU Member States
The situation of the EU Member States varies considera-
bly concerning the degree to which their fiscal policy is
placed in a medium-term perspective. While in some149
In most EU countries, the preparation of the annual budget
is the budgetary step in which crucial fiscal policy deci-
sions are taken. At the same time, most fiscal policy deci-
countries developed national MTBFs have been intro-
duced a long time ago and play a key role in fiscal policy-
making, in some other Member States the only instrument
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context is the SCP. In some countries, the medium-term
budgetary targets are prepared by the government with no
or little coordination with other levels of governments and
virtually no involvement of the national parliament. In
other countries, the medium-term budgetary targets are set
following coordination between all levels of governments
and the approval of the national parliament. The situation
also varies substantially concerning the link between the
MTBF and the annual budgetary procedure. In a number
of EU countries, this link can be assessed as relatively
strong while in other cases the medium-term budgetary
projections seem to be only indicative and hardly taken
into account in the preparation of the annual budget laws.
Overall, the analysis on the existence and properties of
MTBFs currently in force in the EU countries points, on
average, to a relatively large gap between what would be
desirable and current practice.
Medium-term fiscal plans and outcomes
A critical question is whether reliance on proper MTBFs
favours the respect of multiannual budgetary targets. A
detailed examination of the reasons for the difficulties to
respect these targets in the past provides necessary back-
ground material for this analysis. The analysis of multi-
annual budgetary plans formulated by Member States in
the SCPs shows that the EU countries have typically
planned expenditure-based fiscal adjustments: the
expenditure-to-GDP ratio has on average been projected
to decline by about 1â percentage points over the three-
year horizon typically covered by a SCP.
When comparing budget plans to outcomes, it appears that
there were on average sizeable deviations from the
planned adjustment paths. In about two thirds of cases the
improvement in the government balance was less pro-
nounced than targeted. Difficulties in the implementation
of medium-term expenditure plans can be considered the
main cause for the underperformance in attaining budget
balance targets. The increase in nominal government
expenditure over the three-year period covered by SCPs
was higher than planned in more than three quarters of
cases. Such a result contrasts with the expected benefits of
MTBFs: negative and positive risks should tend to offset
each other over time so that in the medium-term devia-
tions from medium-term expenditure plans should be lim-
almost consistently successful in sticking to expenditure
targets, others were almost always unsuccessful.
The analysis suggests that deviations from the planned
improvements in the government balance also partly
result from negative GDP growth surprises compared to
the projections in the SCPs. While the frequencies of pos-
itive and negative surprises in real GDP growth are simi-
lar, the average size of negative surprises has been signif-
icantly higher than that of positive surprises. Interestingly,
the picture is different when looking at developments in
nominal GDP. When considering this variable, the fre-
quency and size of positive and negative GDP growth sur-
prises are very similar. This explains that developments in
government revenue were on average in line with
medium-term plans, or even slightly more favourable.
Which factors help respecting medium-term 
expenditure plans?
The analysis brings a number of answers on the determi-
nants of government expenditure overruns in the EU. It
shows notably that there is a statistically significant rela-
tion between the ‘degree of ambition’ of medium-term
expenditure plans, in terms of the planned reduction in
the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, and the size of the dis-
crepancy between the planned and observed increase in
government expenditure. Member States projecting
large cuts in their expenditure-to-GDP ratio tend, ceteris
paribus, to show a lower degree of adherence to plans.
The analysis also confirms that it is relatively easier for
countries with a relatively large public sector to achieve
ambitious expenditure-based fiscal consolidations.
Another interesting result is that expenditure overruns
seem to be independent from macroeconomic develop-
ments. The frequency and size of expenditure overruns
were similar in periods of positive and negative growth
surprises. Finally, and this can be considered the main
result of the analysis, there is a statistically significant
relation between the quality of institutions for medium-
term budgetary planning and the capacity to achieve
multiannual expenditure targets. Overall, the implemen-
tation in the EU countries of adequate MTBFs seems to
be a promising way forward to ensure better compliance
with medium-term expenditure targets. Controlling for
other variables, reliance on developed medium-term
budgetary frameworks can significantly contribute to
limit the size of the discrepancy between planned and
observed increase in real primary expenditure. This sug-150
ited in frequency and size. It should however be stressed
that there was a considerable heterogeneity of perform-
ance across Member States. While some countries were
gests that the implementation in the EU countries of ade-
quate MTBFs is a promising way forward to ensure bet-
ter compliance with medium-term expenditure targets.
1. Introduction
Several EU countries faced in the past difficulties in
respecting the medium-term budgetary targets set in
their stability and convergence programmes (SCPs) and
the ‘close to balance or in surplus’ objective of the orig-
inal Stability and Growth Pact became, in these coun-
tries, a moving target. The finance ministers of the EU
countries decided, in the context of the 2005 SGP
reform, to take concrete actions to strengthen the preven-
tive arm of the Pact. Country-specific medium-term
budgetary objectives (MTOs) were set for all Member
States and a number of simple provisions relating to the
appropriate speed of adjustment towards the MTOs were
introduced in the SGP (1). To ensure a better functioning
of the SGP, the Council also emphasised the importance
of improving national fiscal governance and formulated
concrete proposals to strengthen the national ownership
of the medium-term budgetary targets set in the stability
and convergence programmes (SCPs)(2). The Council
notably encouraged newly elected governments to
present a ‘stability or convergence programme for the
legislature’, providing information on the means and
instruments they intend to employ to reach the medium-
term targets. It also invited governments to strengthen
the status of their SCP by presenting it, as well as the
Council opinion thereon, to their national parliament.
The aim of this chapter is to assess which factors explain
that some countries were able to stick to their medium-
term budgetary plans while this was not the case for oth-
ers. It is notably analysed to what extent reliance on devel-
oped medium-term budgetary framework (MTBF) helps
respect multiannual budgetary targets. According to a sur-
vey launched by the European Commission in 2006, the
situation of the EU Member States varies considerably
concerning the degree to which their fiscal policy is
placed in a medium-term perspective. While in some
countries developed national MTBFs have been intro-
duced a long time ago and play a key role in fiscal policy-
making, in some other Member States the only instrument
putting annual fiscal policy decisions in a multiannual
context is the SCP. Moreover, the status and role of SCPs
vary considerably from one country to another. In some
Member States, they are prepared by the government with
no or little coordination with other levels of governments
and virtually no involvement of the national parliament. In
other countries, the medium-term budgetary targets are set
following coordination between all levels of governments
and the approval of the national parliament. Several stud-
ies have already demonstrated the potential benefits of
MTBFs, notably on fiscal discipline. Compared to exist-
ing literature, this part of the report takes an original per-
spective and seeks to assess whether reliance on such
institutional devices can effectively help a country to
attain its medium-term budgetary targets.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it presents
the main arguments in favour of MTBFs. Based on con-
crete examples in the EU countries and existing litera-
ture, it reviews the various types of frameworks and
identifies a number of desirable characteristics. The
analysis exploits newly-collected survey data on MTBFs
in force in the EU Member States and on the preparation
and status of SCPs. Secondly, this part of the report
reviews the medium-term budgetary plans formulated by
Member States in their SCPs and compares them with
outcomes. The aim is to identify possible origins for the
difficulties of some Member States to achieve the
planned improvements in the government balance. The
analysis is based on a comprehensive database compar-
ing multiannual budgetary projections and observed
developments. Thirdly, it assesses which factors explain
that some countries were able to stick to budgetary plans
while this was not the case for others. It is notably exam-
ined whether reliance on a proper MTBF favours better151
adherence to medium-term fiscal plans. The respective
influences of the initial budgetary position and of macro-
economic developments are also examined.
¥1∂ For a detailed description of the changes introduced by the 2005 SGP
reform, see European Commission (2005a).
¥2∂ For a review and assessment of the influence of national fiscal rules and
institutions, see European Commission (2006a).
2. The functions of medium-term 
budgetary frameworks
2.1. Introduction
The preparation of the annual budget law is, in all Euro-
pean countries, the budgetary step in which crucial fiscal
policy decisions are taken. At the same time, most fiscal
policy decisions have economic and budgetary implica-
tions which go well beyond the year in which they are
taken. In some cases, the budgetary consequences of pol-
icy measures even only show up in the medium or long
run. Moreover, there is widespread recognition that a
single-year budget perspective gives fiscal policymakers
a poor basis for strategic budgetary planning and the
implementation of structural reforms, the positive effects
of which generally materialise in the medium term.
These considerations have led a majority of EU coun-
tries to supplement their budgetary institutions with
MTBFs. Such frameworks today exist in most of the EU
Member States. This section presents the functions and
benefits of MTBFs and reviews the various types of
frameworks. It also provides an overview of the MTBFs
in force in the EU countries and discusses the properties
of SCPs as a MTBF.
2.2. Functions of medium-term budgetary 
frameworks
A MTBF can be defined as an institutional device allow-
ing fiscal authorities to extend the horizon for fiscal pol-
icymaking beyond the annual budgetary calendar.
MTBFs are typically based on a macroeconomic sce-
nario, which determines the availability of government
resources in the medium term to finance policies. On this
basis, the fiscal authorities provide medium-term projec-
tions for the main aggregates of government finances
2.2.1. Expected benefits from medium-term 
budgetary frameworks
MTBFs have several benefits. They contribute to an
increased transparency on the medium-term budgetary
objectives of the country, which allows economic agents
to be better informed on the ongoing trends in govern-
ment finances. MTBFs also allow to better take into
account future budgetary implications of policy meas-
ures in the decision-making process. Taken together,
these elements contribute to sound fiscal policies and
help address the main causes for the deficit bias in fiscal
policymaking.
MTBFs notably contribute to better time consistency in
the conduct of fiscal policy. The literature has high-
lighted that governments may have a short-term focus
when taking fiscal policy decisions (1). Reliance on
MTBFs helps address the time inconsistency issue in
two ways. Firstly, the existence of a developed MTBF
will make it more difficult for governments to hide or
understate the multiannual budgetary effects of new pol-
icy measures. Secondly, well-defined MTBFs force the
fiscal authorities to commit to a predefined path for the
main aggregates of government finances in the medium
term. This makes it more difficult to postpone the imple-
mentation of difficult fiscal consolidation measures.
MTBFs also help address the common pool problem of
public resources, which is according to literature the
other main reason for overspending and accumulation of
deficits and debt over time. This problems arises when
¥1∂ See Persson and Svensson (1989) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990). The
main argument is that governments not sure of being re-elected may have a
tendency to implement generous fiscal policy measures to increase their
re-election chances and to overlook the medium to long-term conse-152
(government balance and debt; government expenditure
and revenue and their composition), for part or the whole
of the general government sector.
quences of budgetary decisions. This is possible because individuals (vot-
ers) tend to see the short-term benefits they can get from lower taxes and
increased government spending but are not always fully aware of the pos-
sible long-term costs of such policies. 
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spending or tax exemption do not fully internalise the
costs of such measures, since the financing is generally
spread among a wide set of contributors (1). By allowing
to better take into account future consequences of budg-
etary decisions, in the context of a centralised frame-
work, reliance on a well-defined MTBF will contribute
to reduce the common pool problem and shift the focus
from the size of total government spending to the possi-
bilities for reallocations within programmes over a pre-
defined period.
Another argument in favour of MTBFs is that such
frameworks provide the fiscal authorities with a better
planning tool for the conduct of their policies. In the
absence of a proper MTBF, the risk exists that resource
allocation is made on an ad hoc or piecemeal basis, with
the implications of past and present decisions being
overlooked. MTBFs are a way to bridge this gap and to
improve the quality and stability of the decision-making
process. A number of authors have highlighted that
MTBFs favour the implementation of structural reforms
targeting, for instance, significant re-allocations across
general government subsectors or government pro-
grammes, or major changes in the level and structure of
taxation. Such reforms are generally implemented over
several years, and reliance on a MTBF permits to give
visibility to economic agents on the benefits of such
reforms in the medium term. This contributes to
increased acceptability and feasibility of reforms.
2.2.2. Key conditions for the effectiveness of 
medium-term budgetary frameworks
Cautious macroeconomic assumptions
The literature has pointed out a number of key conditions
for the effectiveness of MTBFs. To the preparation of
macroeconomic assumptions underpinning budgetary
projections particular careful attention should be
devoted as these assumptions determine the amount of
public resources available in the medium term. A deli-
cate issue is related to the uncertainty associated with
multi-year macroeconomic projections. The basic idea is
that overestimation of GDP growth over the medium
term may create ex ante an upward pressure on multian-
nual public expenditure plans. Moreover, line ministries
and departments may see the resource allocation defined
in the context of the MTBF as an entitlement, making ex
post downward revisions of expenditure difficult in the
event of a shortfall in GDP growth developments
(OECD, 2003). The difficulty is that projecting macro-
economic developments in the medium term is a genu-
inely difficult exercise. A way to address this question is
to deliberately base medium-term budgetary projections
on conservative assumptions. A number of EU countries
have to this end introduced so-called ‘prudence factors’
in their MTBF. This is done either through a systematic
downward adjustment of economic assumptions com-
pared to the central scenario, or by incorporating contin-
gent reserves which can only be activated in case of a
negative surprise on macroeconomic or government rev-
enue developments (e.g. in Sweden). To avoid possible
use of macroeconomic forecasts to artificially increase
the amount of resources available in the medium term, a
number of Member States (e.g. Belgium, the Nether-
lands and Austria) have decided to delegate the prepara-
tion of the medium-term macroeconomic scenario used
in the MTBF to independent bodies.
Budgetary objectives need to be credible
The literature also mentions the risk of opportunistic use
of MTBFs. The temptation may exist for opportunistic
governments to avoid or postpone the implementation of
difficult (politically costly) fiscal consolidation meas-
ures by presenting an overly favourable picture of
medium-term prospects for government finances, pro-
jecting for instance large reductions in the government
deficit and debt. To avoid such a risk, a number of con-
ditions should be fulfilled for budgetary targets to be
credible.
Firstly, medium-term budgetary targets should be vested
with a sufficient degree of political commitment by all
actors playing a role in the conduct of fiscal policy. In
this respect, the involvement of the national parliament
in the preparation of the budgetary targets is a relevant
indicator. The medium-term targets should also prefera-
bly be set following a proper coordination between the
various levels of government involved in the conduct of
fiscal policy. Secondly, for the MTBF to have a mean-
ingful role and influence in the conduct of fiscal policy
there should be a clear link with the annual budget law,
in the sense that the preparation of the annual budget
should start by considering the projections elaborated in
the preceding year(s) in the context of the MTBF. Devi-153
ations from previous plans should be explained and jus-
tified. Thirdly, there should be a high degree of transpar-
ency concerning the nature of the budgetary projections¥1∂ See Weingast et al. (1981).
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notably be a clear indication of whether the medium-
term budgetary projections are forecasts or targets; in
other words whether the projected path for the main
budgetary aggregates is attainable under unchanged pol-
icies or whether policy action will be needed in the future
to achieve the fiscal targets. In case policy actions will be
needed to reach the targets the framework should request
the specification of the financial gap between the objec-
tives and developments in government finances under
unchanged policies.
2.2.3. Main types of medium-term budgetary 
frameworks
Experience shows that the nature and properties of
national MTBFs vary considerably from one country to
another. This section reviews the main options in the
design of MTBFs and identifies a number of desirable
characteristics.
Share of government finances covered and time horizon 
of MTBFs
MTBFs can cover part or the whole of the general gov-
ernment sector. A wide coverage is preferable (IMF,
2001) as partial coverage may not allow considering the
total implications of new policy measures, which is one
of the main objectives of MTBFs. In the case of MTBFs
covering several general government subsectors, a suffi-
cient degree of coordination between various general
government tiers should be ensured when setting the
multiannual budgetary targets. This is crucial to ensure a
sufficient degree of political commitment of all actors
taking part in the conduct of fiscal policy to implement
the necessary policies to respect these targets. As regards
the time horizon, MTBFs generally cover three or four
years, including the budget year. This can be considered
a good compromise between the need to stay within fore-
seeable time horizons for the macroeconomic aggregates
and the objective of providing fiscal authorities with a
proper medium-term planning tool.
Flexible versus fixed frameworks; rolling versus 
periodical frameworks
A distinction should be made between ‘flexible’ and
‘fixed’ MTBFs. Flexible frameworks allow for revisions
of the overall objectives from year to year to adjust for
economic developments or changes in the fiscal policy
agenda. In a fixed framework, a number of key budget-
ary objectives are set once for all and are not adjusted
over time. Fixed frameworks are generally articulated
around a medium-term path for government expenditure
(in real or nominal terms) which cannot be revised from
year to year, unless exceptional events occur (e.g. sharp
economic slowdown, change of government). These
frameworks have the big advantage to provide strong
guarantees against temptations to revise expenditure tar-
gets in good times. By construction, they also ensure a
strong connection between the MTBF and the annual
budget process.
A distinction is also made between ‘rolling’ and ‘peri-
odical’ MTBFs. A periodical framework covers a defi-
nite period of time, in the sense that a new framework
is not drawn up before this period ends, unless excep-
tional events occur (e.g. change of government, major
slippages compared to initial targets, etc.). The period
covered by a periodical framework is generally aligned
with the term of a legislature. In a rolling framework,
on the contrary, a new year is added at the end of the
period covered by the previous projections at the occa-
sion of every annual update. It should be stressed that
Table III.2.1
Medium-term budgetary frameworks — A typology
Fixed frameworks Flexible frameworks
Rolling frameworks Rolling fixed frameworks
A new year is added every year, but the targets already 
set in the previous years for the intermediate years are 
not updated. 
Rolling flexible frameworks
A new year is added to the framework every year, and at 
the same time the targets for the intermediate years are 
revised. 
Periodical frameworks Periodical fixed frameworks
The medium-term targets are set once and for all for a 
Periodical flexible frameworks
The medium-term targets are set for a definite time 154
definite time period. There is no updating of the targets 
during the period. 
period (e.g. 2005–10), but the targets are revised during 
the period.
Source: Commission services.
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Table III.2.1 and the description of the Swedish MTBF
in Box III.2.3). However, practice shows that most of
the rolling frameworks turn out to be flexible as in the
annual process of adding a new year to the framework
the opportunity also to revise targets for the intermedi-
ate years is typically exploited.
Level of detail and nature of the projections
Another important feature concerns the level of detail
of the medium-term budgetary projections. The provi-
sion of sufficient detail on the evolution of the compo-
sition of taxes and government spending is an element
favouring the stability and credibility of the medium-
term budgetary objectives. Detailed indications on the
medium-term appropriations (by programmes of min-
istries) will allow line ministers and agency managers
to have a clearer view of the resources available in the
medium term to finance policies, and will possibly
favour savings in programmes with less priority. The
preparation of detailed projections should, on the
expenditure side, be based at least in part on ‘bottom-
up’ information from the line ministries (for central
government) and from other authorities responsible for
part of government spending (local and regional gov-
ernments, authorities in charge of social security),
which are the economic agents with the best knowl-
edge of the underlying spending trends. The incorpo-
ration in the MTBF of efficiency targets will also
improve the accurate costing of expenditure pro-
grammes.
Box III.2.1: The medium-term budgetary framework in the Netherlands
Description
The Dutch MTBF has a four-year-ahead horizon (t to t+4). The medium-term budgetary targets are set when a new gov-
ernment arrives in office. These targets are not enshrined in law, but are based on a coalition agreement between the parties
in government. During the design of the coalition agreement, the Central Planning Bureau (CPB), an independent govern-
mental forecasting institution, plays an important role. It is responsible for the medium-term forecasts assuming unchanged
policy, which is the baseline scenario in the medium-term. During the negotiations between the government parties, the
CPB also estimates the effects of the main proposals for new policy measures.
A key element of the Dutch MTBF is the expenditure ceiling. This ceiling is divided into three subceilings: the ‘core’ cen-
tral government sector, the social security sector and the healthcare sector. While the two last sectors usually are the respon-
sibilities of a single minister respectively, the responsibilities for the ‘core’ are divided between many ministers and the
MTBF also contains projections of expenditure on these different policy areas. The expenditure ceiling is set in real terms.
As opposed to the flexible medium-term frameworks in many other EU countries, the overall expenditure ceiling in the
Netherlands is fixed, i.e. it is usually not revised as long as the coalition stays in office. The allocation between different
sectors and programmes are, however, frequently revised. The automatic stabilisers are, in principle, allowed to work on
the revenue side.
Monitoring and enforcement
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for reporting about compliance of the medium-term fiscal targets, and all budgetary
memorandums sent to parliament are supposed to include such a report. In practice the ceiling is well respected. The suc-
cess is linked to the fixed nature of the framework, which turns the attention away from the total expenditure and gives
incentives for line-ministers to look for expenditure reallocations to finance new policy measures. It also reflects the fact
that economic forecasts used to calculate the ceilings in the medium-term budgetary framework are based on a cautious
scenario, prepared by an independent institution. The framework also contains a signal value for the government deficit:
when the deficit approaches 2.5 % of GDP, measures to increase revenues or cut expenditure should be taken.
Functioning
The Dutch MTBF has regularly been assessed as one of the most developed example of such frameworks. It is based on a
sound economic rationale (reliance on fixed expenditure ceilings) and benefits from the involvement of a credible inde-155
pendent institution. Nevertheless, like for other MTBFs which are highly dependent on expenditure ceilings, the question
of circumvention through tax expenditures has been raised.
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As seen above, MTBFs can be designed in several differ-
ent ways. To some extent, the choice depends on the insti-
tutional characteristics of each country. A number of key
characteristics appear however desirable in most of cases.
Firstly, careful attention should be devoted to the prepara-
tion of the macroeconomic assumption. Secondly,
MTBFs should cover a large part of the general govern-
ment sector, to fully take into account the medium-term
budgetary impact of policy decisions. Where several gov-
ernment subsectors are covered, there should be a proper
coordination between various government tiers when set-
ting the multiannual budgetary targets. This is crucial to
ensure a sufficient degree of ownership of these targets by
all actors taking part in the conduct of fiscal policy.
Thirdly, there should be a strong connection between the
MTBF and the annual budget procedure in the sense that
multiannual targets set in the previous years should form
the basis upon which the budget is prepared. Finally, the
medium-term targets should be vested with a sufficient
degree of political commitment, by the executive and the
legislative branches. The reliance on ‘fixed’ MTBFs,
articulated around a fixed path for government spending,
generally ensures a strong degree of political commitment
to the medium-term targets and connectedness with the
annual budget procedure.
2.3. What types of medium-term 
budgetary frameworks in the EU?
This section provides an overview of the MTBFs cur-
rently in force in the EU countries. The first subsection
concerns the properties of the national MTBFs. The sec-
ond subsection is about the preparation and status of the
SCPs in the Member States. While the primary aim of
SCPs is to ensure a proper coordination of fiscal policies
in the EU, these programmes can also be used domesti-
cally as a MTBF, as Member States are requested to
present in these programmes detailed information on
their medium-term macroeconomic and budgetary tar-
gets for the whole of the general government sector (1).
The analysis is based on original survey data collected
by the European Commission by the end of 2006 (2). 
2.3.1. National MTBFs
Of the EU-25, 20 Member States have complemented
their fiscal institutions with a national MTBF (3). The
only exceptions are Greece, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Hun-
gary and Portugal. The properties of these MTBFs vary
significantly across countries.
Time horizon and share of public finances covered
In almost all EU countries the MTBF covers a period of
three to four years including the budget year. There are
however exceptions. In Latvia, for instance, medium-
term budgetary projections cover a period of five years,
including the budget year. The diversity is larger for
what concerns the part of government finances covered
by national MTBFs. In 14 countries, the national MTBF
covers the whole of the general government. In the Neth-
erlands and Sweden the MTBF covers the central gov-
ernment and the social security sectors; in Ireland, it cov-
ers the central and local governments. In the remaining
three countries, the MTBF only covers the central gov-
ernment. Among the 17 countries in which the MTBF
covers all or several general government subsectors, in
only nine cases there is a proper ex ante coordination
exercise involving all government subsectors covered by
the MTBF (see Graph III.2.2). In the remaining cases the
fiscal targets seem, at least to some extent, imposed by
the central government. In these countries the ownership
of the medium-term budgetary targets by sub-central
governments may not be sufficient to ensure a strict
adherence to plans.
Rolling versus periodical and flexible versus fixed MTBFs
Most of national MTBFs are flexible rolling frameworks.
This means that, every year, a new year is added at the end
of the period covered by the previous projection. It also
means that revisions to budgetary objectives (and notably
expenditure targets) generally occur within the period
covered by a multiannual plan. In only a limited number
of cases, the MTBF is articulated around a fixed path for
government expenditure. This is notably the case in the
UK, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. In the first two
countries the framework is fixed and periodical. In the
Netherlands, for instance, new multi-year expenditure
ceilings are announced for a period of four years when a
new government arrives in office. The expenditure ceil-¥1∂ In five EU-25 countries, the SCP is the only public instrument placing fis-
cal policy in a multiannual perspective. In countries where a national
MTBF exists, the SCPs projections are largely based on those formulated156
in the context of the national MTBF.
¥2∂ Note by the Commission services for the attention of the Economic and
Financial Committee on stability and convergence programmes and budg-
etary procedures in the Member States: a questionnaire.
¥3∂ The analysis in this part of the report focuses on the EU-25 Member States.
The case of Romania and Bulgaria are not treated as these Member States
have submitted their first convergence programme only by end-2006.
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only after expiration of the period (see Box III.2.1 for a
detailed description of the Dutch MTBF).
Level of detail and nature of the projections
The situation varies considerably across Member States
concerning the level of detail of the projections provided
in the context of the national MTBF. An example of coun-
try with very detailed medium-term budgetary projections
is Slovenia. In this country, the government prepares
every year a fully detailed budget for the two following
years. Another example is Sweden, where the MTBF
revolves, to a large extent, around the expenditure ceiling
and where the government makes projections for
27 expenditure areas for all the years covered by the
MTBF. In the UK, the budget preceding a multiannual
spending review sets an overall envelope for public
spending that is divided between government depart-
ments, giving them fixed three-year budgets. In most
other countries, medium-term budgetary projections
cover the main government finances aggregates
(i.e. budget balance and debt; government expenditure
and revenues) but there is only little quantified indication
Degree of political commitment and connectedness 
to the annual budget
The degree of political commitment attached to the multi-
annual budgetary targets varies considerably from one
country to another. In several cases, the budgetary targets
are considered by policymakers as purely indicative tar-
gets, resulting from a technical exercise. Some countries
set, on the contrary, constraining budgetary targets for the
general government and/or its subsectors. In a few coun-
tries the fiscal targets themselves are approved by the par-
liament and written into law (e.g. Slovenia, Sweden). In
other countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Austria) the
medium-term budgetary targets are part of the coalition
agreement between parties in government. In Finland the
medium-term budgetary targets are set when a new gov-
ernment arrives in office (1). In a number of countries (e.g.
France, Poland) a medium-term path for the main general
government finances aggregates is set in documents
annexed to the budget law.
Graph III.2.1:  Features of national medium-term budgetary frameworks
Source: Commission services.
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on the composition of government spending and taxation
in the medium term. In most cases, little information is
also provided on the ways to attain the objectives.
¥1∂ Each year in the spending limits decision a revision is made taking into
account price changes and changes in the structure of the budget. In addi-
tion the government is free to change the allocation of expenditure
between administrative branches.
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MTBF in the fiscal policy setting of a country concerns
the degree of connectedness between the MTBF and the
annual budget. In about half of the cases, this link was
assessed, on the basis of the questionnaires submitted by
the Member States, as strong or relatively strong, in the
sense that expenditures plans in the budget have to
remain within the multiannual real expenditure ceilings
set previously (e.g. the Netherlands) or that the multian-
nual targets form the basis on which the budget proposal
is prepared (e.g. Finland). In a number of other cases the
link between the MTBF and the preparation of annual
budgets is either not very clear or appears relatively
weak. In a number of countries budgets for the following
years are in practice rarely consistent with the previously
announced budgetary or expenditure targets.
Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
In most cases, there is no predefined action in case of
deviation from the targets set in the multiannual projec-
tion and the objectives are simply adjusted in the context
of the following medium-term planning exercise. Only
in a few countries, the compliance with the multiannual
Slovakia are interesting. In Spain, when a risk of devia-
tion is detected, the government sends a warning to the
administration concerned and informs the relevant
authorities. If the deviation is confirmed, a three-year
plan to restore the budgetary situation has to be prepared.
In Slovakia, the Ministry of Finance publishes regular
reports on fiscal developments and assesses whether the
medium-term budgetary targets will be achieved or not.
If a risk of slippage is identified in the report, measures
should be proposed to correct the situation.
2.3.2. The role of stability and convergence 
programmes
In the EU context, the EU Member States prepare every
year stability and convergence programmes (SCPs) in
which they provide medium-term budgetary objectives
for the general government sector and its subsectors (1).
These programmes are then assessed by the Commission
and the Ecofin Council. The preparation of SCPs has
been, since 2001, guided by a code of conduct on the for-
mat and content of SCPs. This document, which was
updated in the context of the SGP reform in 2005, stipu-
lates that SCPs should provide macroeconomic and
Graph III.2.2:  Features of national medium-term budgetary frameworks
Source: Commission services.
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targets is formally monitored, and the government regu-
larly publishes reports assessing compliance with the
previous multiannual targets. The examples of Spain and
¥1∂ Euro area countries prepare stability programmes and non-euro area coun-
tries prepare convergence programmes. 
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The empirical research on the effectiveness of MTBFs covers two broad families of studies. (I) horizontal quantitative
studies covering a large number of countries; these studies are generally based on the construction of numerical indexes
measuring the quality of budget procedures (including the existence of a MTBF), and test the significance of such indexes
in explaining budgetary developments; (II) detailed country studies assessing the procedures of one or a group of countries.
Horizontal studies
Von Hagen (1992) investigates, for a sample of 12 EU countries, whether the degree of fiscal discipline increases when
budgetary procedures force policymakers to consider the medium and long-term trends and consequences of their policy.
The main result of the analysis is that the influence of MTBFs is in most cases positive, but that a MTBF alone is not suf-
ficient to overcome the problems of fiscal discipline for a country where budgeting procedures have structural weaknesses.
Yläoutinen (2004) highlighted that most of the new Member States have introduced MTBFs. The medium-term fiscal tar-
gets are however generally relatively weak (not binding) and in many cases there is no clear link between the MTBF and
the annual budget. He concludes that strengthening the MTBFs in these countries is a promising avenue for promoting fis-
cal discipline. Other relevant studies were made on a sample of South American countries, which provide evidence of the
positive role of MTBFs. Notably, Filc and Scartascini (2004) find that the existence of a MTBF is significant to explain
differences in budget outcomes.
A frequent argument in this body of the literature is that a medium-term orientation in the budget process is particularly
suited for countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions, and in which agreement on multiannual budget plans between
various government parties is conducive to fiscal discipline. These countries are generally denominated in the literature as
‘contract countries’. Some authors have argued that MTBFs may be less efficient in ‘delegation countries’, i.e. countries
with one-party governments or coalition governments of closely aligned parties. The main arguments for the introduction
of MTBFs are, however, valid for both categories of countries and most authors are viewing MTBFs as a useful tool for
all countries.
Case studies
Based on the experience with MTBFs in Germany, the United Kingdom and Australia, the IMF (2001) draws a number of
conclusions on the desirable features of MTBFs: (i) fiscal policy objectives and quantitative fiscal targets need to be artic-
ulated and defended at the highest level of government; (ii) robust revenue forecasts are critical; (iii) budget estimates are
better set in nominal terms; (iv) the framework should be based on clearly defined and fully costed policy proposals; (v) the
MTBFs should be accompanied by strengthened measures to review individual expenditure policies. It is notably empha-
sised that MTBFs will only be effective if there is a real stable, transparent fiscal control.
In a study on Finland, Blöndal, Kristensen and Ruffner (2002) stress the importance of developing a better rolling multi-
year expenditure framework to support the targets set in the coalition agreements between government parties. They con-
sider the link between the medium-term targets and the annual budget process too weak. The Finish budget system was
revised in 2004, introducing a firmer framework with annual expenditure limits. In a recent study, Kraan and Wehner
(2005) analyse the Slovenian budgetary framework, which is a unique system of annual formulation of detailed budgets
for two consecutive years. They conclude that such a framework provides an interesting compromise between the needs to
give medium-term visibility to the budget process and to maintain flexibility in the face of macroeconomic circumstances.
Blöndal and Kristiansen (2002) evaluate the periodical MTBF set in coalition agreements in the Netherlands. They find
that the system is an excellent instrument for control of public finances and an example for other countries to follow. Kraan
(2005) finds that one particular advantage with the Dutch framework is that the framework is fixed. Boije and Fischer
(2007) assess positively the Swedish MTBF noting among other things that the expenditure ceilings have been met in all
years since their introduction. They suggest that one reason to its success is the critical surveillance of several national insti-
tutions and the relatively extensive media coverage.159
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three following years (1). It leaves the possibility for
Member States to cover a longer period if they so wish.
Projections have to be provided for all the main budget-
ary aggregates. Moreover, the code of conduct specifies
that SCPs should be based on realistic and cautious mac-
roeconomic forecasts and describe the budgetary and
other economic policy measures being taken or proposed
to achieve the medium-term budgetary targets. In many
respects, SCPs can therefore be considered a type of
MTBF. In countries where a national MTBF exists, the
SCP is typically largely based on the budgetary plans
formulated in the context of the national framework. The
SCPs are rolling frameworks in the sense that they are
adding a new year in every update. In most of the cases
they are also flexible frameworks, except in countries
relying domestically on a fixed MTBF. According to the
results of the survey, the preparation and status of the
SCPs vary considerably from one country to another (2).
Coordination across levels of government
SCPs have to present budgetary projections for the
whole of the general government sector. However,
according to available information, these programmes
are typically prepared with only little, in several cases
without, coordination between the various levels of gov-
ernment (see Section II.1.2). In some cases, the targets
set for local governments are based on the expected
adherence to existing numerical budget balance or debt
rules, but then it is not clear how projections for devel-
opments in expenditure are made (e.g. France). In a
number of cases the budgetary targets for the social secu-
rity and territorial levels of governments are based on
agreements reached in the context of a national MTBF.
Involvement of national parliaments in the preparation 
of SCPs
In the context of the 2005 SGP reform, the Council formu-
lated concrete proposals to strengthen the national owner-
ship of the medium-term budgetary targets set in the SCPs
and the degree of political commitment to reach them. The
Council notably encouraged newly elected governments
to present a ‘stability or convergence programme for the
legislature’, providing information on the means and
instruments they intend to employ to reach the medium-
¥1∂ See opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee on the content and
format of the stability and convergence programmes, endorsed by the
Ecofin Council on 10 July 2001; and specifications on the implementation
of the Stability and Growth Pact and guidelines on the format and content
of stability and convergence programmes, endorsed by the Ecofin Council
in September 2005.
¥2∂ Complementary information on the relation between SCPs and the annual
budget process can be found in Section II.1.2.
Graph III.2.3:  Preparation of the stability and convergence programmes
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Source: Commission services.
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status of their SCP by presenting it, as well as the Council
opinion thereon, to their national parliaments. According
to the survey in only two countries the SCP is the object of
a vote in the national parliament (see Graph III.2.4). In
five other cases, the SCP is derived from a document
which was previously adopted by the national parliament
(generally in the context of the national MTBF). In about
half of the cases, the SCP is presented to the national par-
liament, but there is no vote on it. In five cases, the pro-
gramme is not even presented to the national parliament.
The survey also provides interesting information on the
follow-up in the Member States to the adoption of the
Council opinion on the SCP. It appears that in about half
of cases, the Council opinion is formally discussed by
the government of the country concerned. This opinion
is systematically presented and discussed in the national
parliament in only six countries. These results suggest
that, in a significant number of EU countries, the opinion
of the Council on the SCP does not lead to a formal dis-
cussion in the domestic context. This of course does not
questionnaires, the release of the Council opinion seems
to draw more attention from the media and public opin-
ion than the release of the SCP itself.
2.4. Conclusions
The preparation of the annual budget is typically the
budgetary step in which crucial fiscal policy decisions
are taken. At the same time, most fiscal policy decisions
have economic and budgetary implications which go
well beyond the year in which they are taken. A majority
of EU countries have therefore decided to supplement
their budgetary institutions with MTBFs. Such instru-
ments contribute to improved transparency in the con-
duct of fiscal policy and provide fiscal authorities with a
better planning tool supporting effective expenditure
management and the implementation of structural
reforms. In the context of a MTBF the fiscal authorities
set their medium-term budgetary targets and a path
towards these targets. Budgetary projections are based
on a multiannual macroeconomic scenario which deter-
Graph III.2.4:  Involvement of national parliament in the preparation of the stability and convergence 
programmes and status of the Council opinion
Source: Commission services.
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mean that the Council opinions do not have influence on
the conduct of national fiscal policies. An interesting ele-
ment in this respect is that, according to answers to the
mines the amount of resources available in the medium
term to finance policies. The preparation of these
assumptions therefore deserves particular attention.
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design of MTBFs may vary significantly, reflecting
notably country-specific preferences. A number of char-
acteristics appear however desirable. Firstly, MTBFs
should preferably cover the whole of the general govern-
ment sector, to fully take into account the medium-term
budgetary impact of policy decisions. Secondly, there
should be a proper coordination between various govern-
ment tiers when setting the multiannual budgetary tar-
gets. This is crucial to ensure a sufficient degree of own-
ership of these targets by all actors taking part in the
years should form the basis upon which the budget is
prepared. Finally, the medium-term targets should be
vested with a sufficient degree of political commitment,
by the executive and the legislative branches. The reli-
ance on ‘fixed’ MTBFs, which are articulated around a
fixed path for government spending, generally ensures a
strong degree of political commitment to respect the
medium-term targets and strong connectedness with the
annual budget procedure.
Of the EU-25, 20 Member States have a national MTBF.
Box III.2.3: The medium-term budgetary framework in Sweden
Description
The Swedish MTBF has a three-year-ahead horizon (t to t+3). In both the spring fiscal policy bill and the budget bill the
budgetary information is presented in a three-year perspective. The budgetary framework revolves, to a large extent,
around the expenditure ceiling, which covers the central government and the pension system. Interest payments are
excluded. The ceiling sets a restriction for nominal expenditure in budget accounted terms (cash-based). A new third addi-
tional year (t+3) is added each year in the context of the preparation of the budget, and is approved by parliament. For
example, the ceiling for 2010 is proposed to parliament in the budget bill for 2008. In principle, the parliament can also
make changes to the previously approved expenditure ceilings of year t+1 and t+2, but this is rarely the case. The Swedish
MTBF can therefore be characterised as a fixed framework.
In a formal sense, parliament only approves the detailed budget for the upcoming fiscal year and the overall expenditure
ceiling for year t+3. However, parliament is also asked to vote on a preliminary allocation of expenditure to 27 expenditure
areas. In this way, the government seeks to anchor its medium-term fiscal policy at an early stage. The budget also contains
the estimated levels of appropriations for the second and third additional years, which makes it possible to compare the
government’s projected fiscal development to the expenditure ceiling. This level of detail is, however, only presented as
information. There is also a government agency, the National Financial Management Authority, that makes in-year and
medium-term forecasts, which are publicly disclosed. These forecasts also help the public assess the performance of the
government in relation to the expenditure ceiling.
Monitoring and enforcement
There are no ex ante specified sanctions if the ceiling is exceeded. But so far the expenditure ceiling has been observed for
every year since its introduction in 1997. The success in this case is probably connected with the strong ‘top-down’-
approach, which makes the ceiling binding also throughout the execution of the budget with a great amount of freedom for
the line minister to make reallocations within their policy area. Also the parliamentary approval process follows the ‘top-
down’ approach starting with the approval of ceilings and subceilings, followed by the approval of appropriations within
the ceiling. There is also an informal budget margin built in the system against forecasting errors as the total sum of the
indicative subceilings normally is less than the overall expenditure ceiling. This can be considered a relevant prudence fac-
tor. As from 2000 the MTBF has contained a surplus target for the general government sector requiring that average net
lending should average 2.0 % of GDP over the business cycle.
Functioning
According to several authors, the first 10 years with the framework can be defined as a success story. Some criticisms were
however recently put forward, notably concerning the link between the surplus target and the expenditure ceilings. Some
authors have also raised the question of circumvention of the ceiling through tax expenditures and creative accounting.162
conduct of fiscal policy. Thirdly, there should be a strong
connection between the MTBF and the annual budget
procedure. The multiannual targets set in the previous
Most of these frameworks cover the whole of the general
government sector or several subsectors of general gov-
ernment. However, there is a proper ex ante coordination
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about one third of cases. Most national MTBFs are flex-
ible frameworks, in the sense that revisions to the budg-
etary objectives generally occur within the period cov-
ered by a multiannual plan. The situation also varies
substantially across Member States concerning the link
between the MTBF and the annual budgetary procedure.
In about half of cases, this link can be assessed as rela-
tively strong. In other cases the medium-term budgetary
projections seem to be largely indicative and hardly
taken into account in the preparation of the annual
budget laws.
In the context of the preventive arm of the SGP all Mem-
ber States are requested to present annually SCPs in
which they provide medium-term macroeconomic and
budgetary forecasts for the whole of the general govern-
ment sector. While the main aim of such programmes is
to ensure a proper coordination of fiscal policies in the
EU, they can also be used domestically as a MTBF. Even
if such programmes have to present budgetary projec-
tions for all general government subsectors, it appears
that the degree of coordination with other levels of gov-
ernment in the preparation of SCPs is generally rela-
tively low. Moreover, budgetary targets in the SCPs are
on average vested by a relatively low degree of political
commitment. In only a few EU countries the SCP is the
object of a vote or derived from a document which was
previously adopted by the national parliament.
Overall, the analysis in this part of the report on the exist-
ence and properties of MTBFs currently in force in the
EU countries points to a relatively large gap between
what would be desirable according to theory and the
actual practice. Considerable progress can be made by
most of the EU Member States to establish MTBFs or to
strengthen the existing ones. A number of good exam-
ples can however be identified in the EU. According to
the information provided by Member States in the 2006/
07 updates of SCPs, there seems to be ongoing progress
in a number of countries towards the introduction of
national MTBFs, or reforms of existing ones.163
3. Experience with stability and convergence 
programmes under the preventive arm 
of the Stability and Growth Pact
3.1. Introduction
This section analyses the medium-term budgetary plans
formulated by Member States and compares them with
outcomes. The analysis exploits an updated and
extended version of a database summarising the
medium-term budgetary plans laid down in the SCPs (1).
Every year before December, the EU Member States
prepare such programmes in which they provide
medium-term economic and budgetary projections. The
EU-15 Member States submitted their original SCP in
1998. The ‘new’ EU-10 Member States submitted their
first SCP in June 2004. These programmes have since
then been updated annually, so that a total of nine vin-
tages of SCPs have so far been submitted by the EU-15
Member States (four for the EU-10 countries).
The content of SCPs has become more and more stand-
ardised over time with the adoption by the Council of a
code of conduct on the content and format of SCPs in
July 2001. This document was revised and enriched in
the context of the 2005 reform of the SGP. The objec-
tives have also evolved over time. The original Stability
and Growth Pact stated that Member States should target
in their SCP the attainment of a budgetary position close
to balance or in surplus. The 2005 SGP reform changed
this requirement and the revised SGP requests Member
States to target the attainment of country-specific
medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs) (2). The
2005 SGP reform has also introduced a number of sim-
ple principles guiding the adjustment towards the
MTO (3). The EU Member States have provided a con-
siderable amount of information in their SCPs. In prac-
tice, these programmes contain medium-term projec-
tions for the general government balance and debt, but
also on the expected developments in government
expenditure, interest payments and revenue. Information
is also provided on the macroeconomic assumptions
underpinning the budgetary projections and on the pol-
icy measures being envisaged to achieve the objectives
of the programme. SCPs have a medium-term perspec-
tive and programmes submitted before December of year
t contain projections for the years t+1, t+2 and t+3 (4).
This section first reviews the medium-term fiscal consol-
idation strategies followed by the Member States in their
SCP in terms of the size and composition of the planned
fiscal adjustments. In a second step, it assesses to what
extent Member States achieved their multiannual budg-
etary targets and the reasons for possible deviations.
3.2. Stylised facts about a typical stability/
convergence programme
3.2.1. Member States have on average planned 
significant improvement in public finances
Table III.3.1 summarises the plans formulated by
Member States in the SCPs submitted over the period
¥1∂ A description of this database, which was first built-up and used by Moulin
and Wierts (2005), is provided in Box III.3.1.
¥2∂ MTOs are defined taking into account the current debt ratio and potential
¥3∂ Notably, the countries of the euro area or participating in ERM II which
have not yet reached their MTO have to pursue an annual adjustment of
their structural balance by 0.5 % as a benchmark. Larger efforts have to be164
growth prospects. Considerations on implicit liabilities, i.e. the budgetary
impact of ageing population, will be taken into account as soon as modali-
ties for doing so are appropriately established and agreed by the Council
(see Section II.1.6).
made in good times.
¥4∂ A number of programmes cover a longer time horizon (up to t+5 in some
cases). However, for comparability reasons, it was decided to base the
analysis on the years t to t+3. 
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of their SCP, the EU-15 countries have on average
planned a cumulated improvement in the government
balance by 0.7 percentage point of GDP. Interestingly,
the projected improvement in the first year covered by
the SCP (0.1 % of GDP on average) has on average
been lower than in the following two years (0.3 % of
GDP). Such a result is surprising. It could on the con-
trary have been expected that countries which have not
yet reached a sound fiscal position plan significant
efforts in the early years covered by the SCP to reach
such a position and plan to stabilise the government
balance thereafter.
The tendency to project larger adjustments in the outer
years of the periods covered by SCPs has regularly been
highlighted by the Commission in its assessments. A
possible interpretation is that some EU countries have
sought to avoid the implementation of difficult measures
by delaying the consolidation efforts to the end of the
period covered by their SCP. The announced budgetary
targets for these years are indeed vested by a much
Table III.3.1
Medium-term budgetary plans formulated by Member States in their stability and convergence programmes 
over the period 1998–2006
% of GDP Initial gen. gov. balance (1)
Initial 
debt ratio (2)
Planned change 
in the balance 
ratio
Planned change 
in the exp. ratio 
Planned change 
in the prim. 
exp. ratio
Planned change 
in the revenue 
ratio 
Planned change 
in the debt ratio 
EU-15 Member States — Simple averages
t – t+1 – 0.6 65.8 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 1.6
t – t+2 
(cumulated) 
0.4 – 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 3.3
t – t+3 
(cumulated)
0.7 – 1.6 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 5.2
Before SGP reform —  EU-15 Member States —  Simple averages
t – t+1 – 0.5 66.4 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 1.6
t –  t+2 
(cumulated) 
0.3 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.7 – 3.4
t – t+3 
(cumulated)
0.6 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 5.2
After SGP reform —  EU-15 Member States — Simple averages
t – t+1 – 1.0 63.7 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 1.4
t –  t+2 
(cumulated) 
0.4 – 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 3.0
t – t+3 
(cumulated)
0.8 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 0.5 – 4.9
EU-10 Member States — Simple averages
t – t+1 – 2.8 38.7 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.4 0.1 – 0.6
t – t+2 
(cumulated) 
0.9 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 0.5 – 1.4
t – t+3 
(cumulated)
1.5 – 2.6 – 2.5 – 1.1 – 2.5
EU-15 Member States with a large initial deficit (above 2% of GDP) — Simple averages
t – t+1 0.0 71.6 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.3 0.1 – 0.3
t – t+2 
(cumulated) 
1.1 – 1.1 – 1.0 0.0 – 1.4
t – t+3 
(cumulated)
1.7 – 1.8 – 1.6 – 0.1 – 2.8165
NB: (1) and (2) show the budget balance and the debt ratios in year t, which is the year of submission of the programme.
Source: Commission services.
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2 0 0 7weaker degree of political commitment, potentially for
two reasons. Firstly, the outer years of the programme
may fall after the term of the current legislature. Sec-
ondly, the status of budgetary projections for the outer
years of SCPs is by nature different from those for the
year following its submission, which is generally the
year covered by the budget and for which budgetary
objectives and measures to achieve them were approved,
or are about to be approved, by the national parliament.
Unsurprisingly, there is a strong link between the level
of the initial government balance and the magnitude of
the planned fiscal adjustment. Countries with a relatively
large government deficit (larger than 2 % of GDP) in the
year of submission of the SCP have on average planned
an annual improvement more than twice as high as the
average. The fiscal adjustments planned by these coun-
tries were also spread more evenly across the time hori-
zon of the SCP: the planned improvement in the deficit
in the first year of the programme was broadly the same
as that planned in the following two years. A possible
reason for these differences with the average pattern is
that a significant proportion of these SCPs was submit-
ted by countries subject to an excessive deficit procedure
and therefore to obligations to bring their government
deficit below 3 % of GDP within specified time limits.
Graph III.3.1 points to a linear relation between the aver-
age starting point for the general government balance (as
a percentage of GDP) and the planned change in this var-
iable over the following three years. On average, a worse
starting position for the general government balance by
one percentage point of GDP implied a larger planned
adjustment cumulated over a three-year period by about
â % of GDP (see Table III.3.2 for detailed data).
Data in Table III.3.1 also show that the EU-10 Member
States have on average planned large fiscal adjustments
in their SCPs. These countries have planned a cumulated
improvement of their government balance by 1â per-
centage points of GDP over three years, as against about
ã percentage point for the EU-15 countries. To a large
extent this reflects the fact that the initial fiscal position
was significantly worse in these countries (by about two
percentage points of GDP on average).
3.2.2. Composition of the planned adjustment
As already pointed out by the European Commission
(2005a) and Moulin and Wierts (2006), the EU countries
have typically planned expenditure-based fiscal adjust-
ments. Member States have on average projected a
decline in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio by about â per-
centage point per year (1â percentage points over a
three-year horizon). About half of the savings expected
from such a decline were planned to be allocated to an
improvement in the government balance; the other half
Graph III.3.1:  Initial fiscal position and planned consolidation over a three-year horizon 
(simple average of EU-15 Member States)
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ratio (1). Interestingly, Member States with high initial
deficits (more than 2 % of GDP) have on average planned
reductions in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio of a similar
size compared to those with small initial deficits. How-
ever, these Member States planned to allocate virtually all
the budgetary margins created on the expenditure side to
the improvement in the government balance. About one
third of the envisaged fall in the ratio of government
expenditure to GDP was expected to stem from a decline
in the debt interest burden. Such a reduction was supposed
to be triggered by (i) a planned reduction in the debt inter-
est rate (reflecting past and, in some cases, projected
declines in interest rates) and (ii) a planned decline in the
debt ratio, by a total of five percentage points of GDP on
average over a three-year period.
Graph III.3.2 complements the information in
Table III.3.1 by providing a synthetic representation of
the composition of the planned change in the govern-
ment balance ratio in the SCPs considered in the analy-
sis. It shows that almost 90 % of SCPs have planned a
decline in the government expenditure-to-GDP ratio
over a three-year period. About 80 % of SCPs have
planned a decline in both the expenditure and the reve-
nue ratio. As already pointed out by Moulin and Wierts
(2005), in only 15 % of cases the fiscal adjustment
planned in the programme was also based on an increase
in the revenue ratio.
An interesting result is that the planned decline in the
ratio of government expenditure to GDP was signifi-
cantly larger in the programmes submitted in the early
years of the period considered (1998–99) than in the
latest years (2005–06), despite the comparatively better
starting fiscal position in the early years (see
Table III.3.2). The more favourable medium-term
growth assumptions in the SCPs submitted in the early
years of the period considered explain only part of the
difference between the two periods (denominator
effect), suggesting that expenditure targets have
become less ambitious over time. A possible explana-
tion is that the expenditure-to-GDP ratio has declined
significantly in a number of countries over the period
considered: countries may then have felt a less pressing
need for expenditure restraint in the recent period.
Another possible reason is that recurrent difficulties in
attaining ambitious expenditure targets (see Section
3.3.4 below) have led Member States to project more
realistic and attainable expenditure targets.
¥1∂ The information available in the database does not allow drawing a firm
conclusion on whether the projected decline in the ratio of government
revenue to GDP in the SCPs reflected expected unfavourable tax-to-GDP
elasticities developments or planned tax cuts. However, given the rela-
tively long time period considered and the evidence in the programmes,
the second assumption is to be privileged.
Table III.3.2
Medium-term budgetary plans formulated by Member States in the successive stability and convergence 
programme updates over the period 1998–2006 (change over three years, simple averages)
% of GDP
Initial 
gen. gov. balance 
(1)
Initial GG 
expenditure 
ratio (2)
Initial GG 
revenue 
ratio (3)
Planned change 
in the gen. gov.  
balance (over 
three years)
Planned change 
in the GG exp. 
ratio  
(over three 
years)
Planned change 
in the GG rev. 
ratio 
(over three 
years)
Planned increase 
in real GDP 
(over three 
years), 
% change
EU-15 Member States — Simple averages
1998 SCP – 0.8 49.1 48.2 0.8 – 2.1 – 1.2 8.9
1999 SCP – 0.2 48.4 48.3 0.7 – 2.0 – 1.3 9.3
2000 SCP 0.7 47.0 47.7 0.5 – 1.9 – 1.4 9.9
2001 SCP 0.5 46.9 47.3 0.1 – 1.1 – 1.0 8.2
2002 SCP – 0.6 47.4 46.8 0.6 – 1.4 – 0.8 8.1
2003 SCP – 1.3 47.8 46.5 0.8 – 1.6 – 0.7 8.0
2004 SCP – 1.6 47.9 46.3 1.0 – 1.5 – 0.5 8.3
2005 SCP – 1.4 47.3 45.9 0.8 – 1.3 – 0.5 7.8
2006 SCP – 0.5 46.4 45.9 0.8 – 1.2 – 0.4 8.0167
NB: (1), (2) and (3) show the ratios as a % of GDP in the year of submission of the programme.
Source: Commission services.
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2 0 0 73.2.3. Macroeconomic assumptions
The EU-15 Member States have on average planned an
annual increase in real GDP by 2ã % over the period
covered by the SCPs (unweighted average) (1). This is
slightly higher than the average rate observed in the last
two decades for the same sample of countries (2). The
planned rate of real GDP growth has on average been the
same for the first, second and third year of the period
covered by the programme. EU-10 Member States have
on average planned an increase in GDP by 4.8 % per
year in real terms and 8 % in nominal terms. This is
clearly above the average observed in the period preced-
ing the submission of the first programme by these
Member States.
Interestingly, there were over time significant fluctuations
in the medium-term real GDP growth forecasts (see
Graph III.3.2:  Composition of the consolidation planned in the programme (EU-15 Member States)
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ In the case of SCPs containing several macroeconomic scenarios only the
cautious scenario was considered.
¥2∂ The simple average of real GDP growth rates of the EU-15 countries over
the period 1980–2000 is 2.5 %.
Table III.3.3
Medium-term macroeconomic projections in the stability and convergence programmes
Planned increase 
in nominal GDP (%) Planned increase in real GDP (%)
Planned increase in the GDP 
deflator (%)
EU-15 Member States — Simple averages
t – t+1 4.9 2.7 2.1
t – t+2 (cumul.) 10.1 5.6 4.2
t – t+3 (cumul.) 15.4 8.5 6.3
EU-10 Member States — Simple averages
t – t+1 8.1 4.8 3.1168
t – t+2 (cumul.) 16.3 9.8 5.9
t – t+3 (cumul.) 25.2 15.3 8.5
Source: Commission services.
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temporaneous macroeconomic developments have had a
significant influence on the medium-term macroeconomic
forecasts included in the SCPs. Graph III.3.3 exhibits a
link between real GDP growth in the year of submission
of a SCP and the average annual real GDP growth rate
projected in the three following years covered by the SCP.
The macroeconomic assumptions underlying the SCPs
submitted in the midst of the high-growth period at the
turn of the decade were particularly high. Real GDP
growth was projected to average 3ä % over the period
2001–03 in the EU-15 Member States (simple average).
The fact that SCPs elaboration in high-growth periods
were based on more optimistic macroeconomic assump-
tions suggests that forecasters and policymakers tend to
extrapolate contemporaneous developments to the
medium term. The indicators commonly used in the
analysis of cyclical developments may also have played
a role, as real-time estimates of potential growth, which
generally constitute one of the elements used in the prep-
aration of medium-term macroeconomic forecasts, are to
some extent influenced by ongoing macroeconomic
developments. It should be noted that the tendency to
revise growth forecasts upwards in favourable growth
periods seems to have come to an end in the recent
period and notably since the 2005 SGP reform. The pos-
itive macroeconomic developments in 2006 has not led
to upward revisions in medium-term growth forecasts
for the period 2007–09.
3.3. Comparing plans to outcomes
This section compares the multiannual budgetary plans
submitted by Member States in their SCPs to outcomes. A
number of papers have provided analysis on the capacity
of Member States to respect their medium-term budgetary
targets. Strauch et al. (2004) evaluated the performance of
budget and growth forecasts in the convergence reports
and SCPs over the period 1991–2002. Their analysis nota-
bly concluded that national forecasts of budget balances
and economic growth are marked by a cautionary bias in
some countries, while in others they seem to be affected
by an optimistic bias. These authors also found that gov-
ernments do not seem to use available information effi-
ciently to minimise the forecast error of their budgetary
projections, as forecasts of budget balances and economic
growth produced by the Commission services generally
show better results than those included in the multiannual
programmes submitted by Member States (1).
¥1∂ These authors argue that political and institutional variables can explain
these patterns. Notably, they find that the forms of fiscal governance are
important determinants of biases in budgetary and GDP growth forecasts.
Those governments where budgetary targets are based on pre-negotiated
contracts seem to have a cautionary bias.
Graph III.3.3:  Contemporaneous growth conditions and macroeconomic forecasts 
(simple average of EU-15 countries)
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2 0 0 7Moulin and Wierts (2006) showed that problems to
achieve the projected improvements in the general gov-
ernment balance reflect primarily difficulties to adhere
to expenditure plans (in nominal or real terms). The
analysis in this section updates and complements the
previous findings by these authors. The analysis of the
reasons for the deviation from budgetary targets is
extended, notably by not only looking at average devel-
opments but also at the distribution of SCPs depending
on the reasons for the difficulties to reach multiannual
budgetary targets. The analysis is extended to the EU-10
Member States (1). The analysis of the respective influ-
ence of developments in government revenue and
expenditure, as a share to GDP but also in level (in nom-
inal and real terms), is also deepened. The aim of the
analysis in this section is to identify broad trends in the
reasons for the difficulties to respect the budgetary tar-
gets, rather than to provide a detailed country-by-coun-
try analysis. Box III.3.2 provides indications on the rela-
tive positions of the various Member States. 
3.3.1. Planned improvements in the general 
government balance were not achieved
The previous section has shown that Member States
have on average planned significant improvements in
their government balance over the three-year horizon of
their SCP. Graph III.3.4 shows that there were on aver-
age sizeable deviations from the planned adjustment
paths. It also indicates a better performance in the recent
years, which correspond to those following the 2005
reform of the Stability and Growth Pact and to a context
of improving macroeconomic conditions.
Graph III.3.5 provides complementary information. It
plots the planned changes in the government balance ratio
on the horizontal axis and the observed changes on the
vertical axis, for the EU-15 Member States and for various
time horizons (t–t+1; cumulated over t–t+2; cumulated
over t–t+3). The focus on changes in government finances
aggregates is justified by the need to neutralise possible
base effects resulting from statistical revisions in the ini-
tial years (2). The main message is that in about two thirds
of cases the improvement in the general government bal-
ance was less pronounced than planned (or there was a
worsening). Interestingly, the frequency of negative sur-
prises increases when lengthening the time horizon con-
sidered. When considering the gap between plans and out-
comes for the first year covered by the SCPs, i.e. the year
Box III.3.1: The database comparing multiannual budgetary plans and outcomes
The analysis of the medium-term budgetary plans of Member States is based on an updated and extended version of a data-
base summarising the macroeconomic and fiscal projections included in the SCPs submitted by Member States from 1998
to 2006. This database contains data on the macroeconomic assumptions underlying budgetary projections (real GDP,
nominal GDP, GDP deflator) and on the projected developments in the main aggregates of government finances (budget
balance, government expenditure, interest payments, government revenue and debt). The database contains information on
these aggregates (projected and observed) expressed as a percentage of GDP, but also in level.
The database covers all EU Member States, except Bulgaria and Romania. As the EU-15 Member States submitted their
initial SCP in 1998, a total of nine vintages of SCPs are included in the database. The new EU-10 Member States submitted
their first SCPs in July 2004. Due to their different submission date (July vs November) and to the need to base compari-
sons on a homogeneous basis, these programmes were not included in the database. The three updates of these SCPs, sub-
mitted in November 2004, 2005 and 2006 were included in the database. The database therefore consists of a total of
165 SCPs (15 countries times 9 SCPs, plus 10 countries times 3 SCPs). Each SCP has three observations (t – t+1; t – t+2;
t – t+3), so that the database has a total of 495 observations.
A number of SCPs do not contain all the information. Notably, SCPs for EL (1998), BE (2000), NL (1999, 2000, 2001)
and LU (1998) did not provide information on projected developments in government expenditure and revenue. In some
cases (e.g. FR 1998, FR 1999, FR 2000) linear extrapolations were made as data were only provided for the initial and end-
year covered by the SCP. In a number of other cases, there were no data on primary expenditure and interest payments.
¥2∂ The influence of base effects cannot however be fully neutralised. In some170
¥1∂ The analysis for these countries is less detailed than for the EU-15 Mem-
ber States, for data availability reasons. 
Member States, better-than-expected or worse-than-expected budgetary
outcomes in the year of submission of the SCP may indeed have had an
influence on the fiscal policy decisions in the following years and implied
deviations from plans. 
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almost balanced: changes in the government balance were
disappointing in only 55 % of cases. Cumulated changes
in the government balance over three years were worse-
than-planned in more than 70 % of cases.
The same message emerges when looking at the average
difference between the projected and observed change in
the government balance-to-GDP ratio (simple averages of
the EU-15 Member States). Table III.3.4 shows that the
gap between the planned and observed improvement in
the general government balance tends to increase when
lengthening the time horizon considered. Such a result,
which is surprising as negative and positive risks (e.g.
growth and tax elasticity surprises) should offset each
other over time provided that GDP growth evolves around
a stable trend, calls for further investigation on the reasons
for the negative surprises in budgetary developments.
Data for the EU-10 Member States show a different pattern.
There were on average fewer surprises in government
finances developments in these countries compared to the
based on the comparison of plans submitted in the 2004 and
2005 SCPs with budgetary outcomes in 2005 and 2006.
3.3.2. Developments in GDP growth
A possible explanation for the worse-than-planned
developments in the government balance is that macro-
economic developments turned out to be less favourable
than expected. Graph III.3.6 compares the cumulated
increase in real GDP over various time horizons (t–t+1;
t–t+2; t–t+3) projected in the SCPs to the observed
increases over the corresponding period. It appears that
the frequency of positive surprises in real GDP develop-
ments is roughly equivalent to the frequency of negative
surprises. This could suggest that real GDP growth has,
on average, been in line with projections. However, a
closer look at the data shows that the size of negative sur-
prises has on average been twice as high as the size of
positive surprises, implying that there were on average
substantial negative surprises in real GDP growth devel-
opments compared to plans (see Table III.3.5).
An interesting exercise is to assess what may have been
Graph III.3.4:  Budget balance ratio — Successive plans in the stability and convergence programmes 
and outcomes (% of GDP) — Simple average of EU-15 countries
Source: Commission services.
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projections of the SCPs. The conclusions for the EU-10
countries should however be taken with care as the analysis
for these countries relies on a much smaller sample. It is
the consequences of negative growth surprises on budg-
etary developments. A proxy can be estimated by apply-
ing the standard budgetary sensitivity to the cycle to the
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a significant part (from one third to half) of the differ-
ence between the planned change in the government bal-
ance and the observed change can be attributed to nega-
tive GDP growth surprises.
The assessment of real GDP growth developments com-
Table III.3.5, nominal GDP growth developments were in
fact on average very much in line with plans (frequency
and size of negative and positive surprises are similar).
The analysis for the EU-10 countries shows a signifi-
cantly different picture than for the EU-15 Member
States. On average there were, over the short period of
Graph III.3.5:  Plans versus outcomes — General government balance (ratio) — EU-15 Member States
Source: Commission services.
Table III.3.4
Planned and observed changes in the government balance ratio
Contributions of developments in
% of GDP Surprise in the change in the budget balance (1)
Primary expenditure 
ratio
Interest payments 
ratio
Government revenue 
ratio
EU-15 Member States — Simple averages 
t–t+1 – 0.1 – 0.4 0.1 0.2
t–t+2 (cumul.) – 0.5 – 1.1 0.2 0.5
t–t+3 (cumul.) – 1.1 – 1.8 0.2 0.6
E-10 Member States — Simple averages 
t–t+1 – 0.4 – 0.7 0.0 0.2
t–t+2 (cumul.) – 0.2 – 1.3 0.1 1.1
NB: (1) Difference between the planned and observed change in the budget balance (% GDP) for different time horizons.
Source: Commission services.
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pared to plans does however not tell the full story, and the
picture is significantly different when considering devel-
opments in nominal GDP. As shown in Graph III.3.7 and
time considered, large positive GDP growth surprises
compared to the macroeconomic assumptions included
in the SCPs (in both real and nominal terms).
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H o w  t o  s t i c k  t o  m e d i u m - t e r m  b u d g e t a r y  p l a n s3.3.3. Developments in government revenue increase in government revenue over various time hori-
zons (t–t+1; t–t+2; t–t+3) to the observed increases over
Graph III.3.6:  Plans versus outcomes — Real GDP growth — EU-15 Member States
Source: Commission services.
Graph III.3.7:  Plans versus outcomes — Nominal GDP growth — EU-15 Member States
Source: Commission services.
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The previous section has shown that nominal GDP has
increased roughly in line with plans in the EU-15 Mem-
ber States. Graph III.3.8 compares the cumulated
the corresponding period. It appears that developments
in government revenue were more favourable than
expected in more than half of cases. This is confirmed by
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2 0 0 7the data in Table III.3.6 which show that, over the three-
year horizon of a SCP, nominal government revenue
increased significantly faster than expected in the SCP.
The fact that government revenue increased faster than
expected, while nominal GDP increased in line with
plans, calls for an explanation. A first possibility is that
there were recurrent positive surprises on the develop-
ments in the ‘spontaneous’ (i.e. before the impact of
policy measures) tax elasticities. Given the period consid-
ered (eight years), systematic positive tax elasticity sur-
prises appear however unlikely. An alternative explana-
tion is that part of the tax reductions initially planned in
the SCPs were not implemented or at least partly offset by
other measures affecting revenue developments.
3.3.4. Developments in government expenditure
The analysis of compliance with expenditure plans is
crucial for several reasons: (i) as seen in Section III.3.2
Table III.3.5
Planned and observed changes in GDP growth
Surprise in the variation 
of the budget balance (1) (%)
Surprise in nominal GDP 
growth (2) (%)
Surprise in real 
GDP growth (3) (%)
EU-15 Member States — Simple averages
t–t+1 – 0.1 0.3 0.1
t–t+2 (cumul.) – 0.5 0.2 – 0.4
t–t+3 (cumul.) – 1.1 0.1 – 1.1
EU-10 Member States — Simple averages
t–t+1 – 0.4 2.0 1.4
t–t+2 (cumul.) – 0.2 1.3 1.3
NB: (1) Difference between the planned and observed change in the government balance ratio (% GDP).
(2) Difference between the planned and observed change in nominal GDP.
(3) Difference between the planned and observed change in real GDP.
Source: Commission services.
Graph III.3.8:  Plans versus outcomes — Nominal revenue — EU-15 Member States
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Source: Commission services.
Planned increase over the period concerned (%)
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based fiscal adjustments; (ii) government expenditure is
the part of government finances that is the most directly
under the control of the government; (iii) the previous
section showed that there were on average positive sur-
prises on the revenue side, implying that the main source
for the difficulties in respecting medium-term budgetary
targets are to be found on the expenditure side.
Graph III.3.9 compares the planned cumulated increase
in nominal government expenditure over various time
horizons (t-t+1; t-t+2; t-t+3) for the EU-15 Member
States to the observed increases over the corresponding
period. It appears that the increase in nominal govern-
ment expenditure growth was larger than planned in
75 % of cases. This percentage falls to less than 70 %
when considering the discrepancy between the planned
and observed increase in government expenditure plans
for the year t+1, i.e. the year covered by the budget law,
and exceeds 80 % when considering the gap between the
planned and observed cumulated increase in government
expenditure over a three-year horizon.
Table III.3.7 shows that the larger-than-planned increase
in government expenditure is largely responsible for the
difficulties to achieve budget balance targets. It also
shows that the negative gap between the observed and
planned increases in government expenditure has had a
tendency to widen with the time horizon considered. On
average (simple average of EU-15 Member States), the
negative surprise in the increase in nominal government
expenditure reached 0.4 % of GDP after one year, 1.1 %
of GDP after two years and a cumulated 1.9 % over the
three-year horizon of a SCP. Such developments show
that the fiscal authorities have, on average, not compen-
sated expenditure overruns in a given year by restraint in
the following years of the period considered.
The analysis of the reasons for the negative surprises on
the expenditure side should take into account that nominal
government expenditure can also be affected by macr-
oeconomic developments. In particular, inflation develo-
pments and fluctuations in interest rates may have an
influence on government expenditure (depending on
indexation rules, the level of interest rates and the size of
government debt). A way to address this issue is to focus
the analysis on developments in government expenditure
net of interest payments and corrected for inflation devel-
opments. Graph III.3.10 compares developments in real
primary expenditure to initial plans. It shows that the fre-
quency of observations showing a larger-than-planned
increase in expenditure is even higher when considering
this variable. This is because developments in interest
expenditure have contributed to limit the increase in gov-
ernment expenditure compared to plans, due to the unex-
pected fall in interest rates over the period.
Another element possibly explaining the larger-than-
planned increase in government expenditure is the direct
effect of negative growth surprises on government
expenditure, e.g. through higher unemployment benefits
and other social transfers. This effect is neglected here
due to the very low level of the sensitivity of government
expenditure to cyclical developments (less than 0.1 on
Table III.3.6
Planned and observed changes in the government revenue ratio
Surprise in the revenue 
ratio (1) (%) Numerator effect (2) (%) Denominator effect (3) (%)
EU-15 Member States — Simple averages
t–t+1 0.2 0.3 – 0.1
t–t+2 (cumul.) 0.5 0.6 – 0.1
t–t+3 (cumul.) 0.6 0.7 0.0
EU-10 Member States — Simple averages
t–t+1 0.2 1.0 – 0.7
t–t+2 (cumul.) 1.1 1.6 – 0.5
NB: (1) Difference between the planned and observed change in the revenue ratio (% GDP).175
(2) Contribution of the larger-than-planned increase in nominal government revenues.
(3) Contribution of developments in nominal GDP compared with plans.
Source: Commission services.
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2 0 0 7average in the EU). However, it is not excluded that for
some Member States having faced large negative growth
surprises, this may have explained a non-negligible part
of the expenditure overrun compared to plans (1).    
Another interesting exercise is to assess whether expend-
iture overruns in a given year reflect successive upward
revisions in expenditure plans or whether they reflect a
default in the implementation of plans which were consist-
ent over time. Given that SCPs are rolling and flexible
Graph III.3.9:  Plans versus outcomes — Nominal expenditure — EU-15 Member States
Source: Commission services.
Table III.3.7
Planned and observed changes in the government expenditure ratio
Surprise in the GG 
balance ratio (1) (%)
Surprise in the expenditure 
ratio (2) (%) Numerator effect (3) (%) Denominator effect (4) (%)
EU-15 Member States — Simple averages
t–t+1 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.4 0.1
t–t+2 (cumul.) – 0.5 – 0.9 – 1.1 0.1
t–t+3 (cumul.) – 1.1 – 1.7 – 1.9 0.0
EU-10 Member States — Simple averages
t–t+1 – 0.4 – 0.7 – 1.5 0.7
t–t+2 (cumul.) – 0.2 – 1.2 – 1.8 0.5
NB: (1) Difference between the planned and observed change in the government balance ratio (% GDP).
(2) Difference between the planned and observed change in the expenditure ratio (% GDP).
(3) Contribution of the larger-than-planned increase in the nominal expenditure to the surprise in the expenditure ratio.
(4) Contribution of developments in nominal GDP to the surprise in the expenditure ratio.
Source: Commission services.
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medium-term frameworks, growth in government expend-
iture in a given year t is typically projected three times: in
the SCPs submitted in November of year t–3, t–2 and t–1.¥1∂ See Moulin and Wierts (2006).
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government expenditure in a given year has on average
been revised in the successive SCP updates. It shows
that, on average over the period considered, about half of
plans (from the SCP submitted in year t–3 to the SCP
submitted in year t–1); the other half reflects expenditure
overruns compared to budget plans. This points to a rel-
atively high degree of inconsistency of expenditure tar-
Box III.3.2: Situation in groups of Member States
As indicated in the introduction, this chapter does not aim at identifying country-specific patterns. A number of interesting
messages can however be drawn when looking at developments in the various countries. A first relevant message emerging
from the data is that there was a large heterogeneity of performance across Member States, in the sense that some of them
were consistently successful in sticking to budgetary targets, notably expenditure targets, while others were almost always
unsuccessful. The analysis in the previous paragraphs has shown that two variables have played a crucial role in explaining
deviations from budgetary plans: (i) negative surprises in real GDP growth; and (ii) expenditure overruns. The table below
shows the distribution of the EU countries depending on whether the size of surprises in real GDP growth and government
expenditure developments compared to plans of the SCPs were larger or lower than the median. On this basis, four groups of
countries can be identified.
• A first group is made up of countries which experienced negative growth surprises, in some cases of a significant size
(e.g. Germany), and showed at the same time a relatively high degree of adherence to government expenditure targets.
This allowed them to limit the negative budgetary consequences of unfavourable economic developments for govern-
ment finances. This group consists of Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Austria. Within this group, the behaviour of
Belgium is very close to the average, while Denmark, Germany and Austria have shown a remarkably high degree of
compliance with expenditure plans compared to the average.
• The second group consists of countries which combined negative growth surprises and larger-than-average spending over-
runs. This group is made of France, Italy and Portugal. In the three cases the size of spending overruns was relatively close
to those observed on average in the EU-15 countries, but negative real GDP growth surprises were significantly larger in the
case of Portugal. This country experienced a significant deterioration in its budgetary position over the period considered.
• A third group consists of countries which experienced positive real GDP growth surprises and managed to keep expend-
iture in line with plans. This group is made of Finland and Sweden. The size of positive growth surprises was relatively
larger in the case of Sweden compared to Finland. The two countries in this group experienced over the period consid-
ered a large improvement in their government finances. In both countries, the general government balance improved
from a deficit of about 1 % of GDP in 1997 to a large surplus (more than 3 % of GDP) in 2006.
• Finally, a fourth group is made up of countries which experienced at the same time larger-than-planned increases in real
growth and larger-than-average expenditure overruns. Ireland, Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom are in this group.
The magnitudes of growth and expenditure surprises differ considerably from one country to another. Positive real GDP
growth surprises were particularly large in Ireland and Spain. The larger expenditure overruns were also observed in
these two countries. A key issue is of course to what extent real GDP growth surprises reflect temporary or permanent
factors, which could justify an upward revision in expenditure targets.
Situation of the EU-15 Member States compared with the median
Small or positive surprises 
in nominal expenditure growth
Large negative surprises 
in nominal expenditure growth
Negative surprises in real GDP growth BE, DK, DE, AT FR, IT, PT
Small or positive surprises in real GDP growth FI, SE IE, EL, ES, UK
Note: The Netherlands and Luxembourg were not inserted in the table due to a lack of data for these two countries.
Source: Commission services.177
the discrepancy between the first forecast for the
increase in government expenditure in year t (made in
year t–3) and the observed increase reflects revisions in
gets over time and, at the same time, to significant
defaults in the implementation of plans formulated in the
context of annual budgets.
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This section reviews the medium-term budgetary plans
formulated by Member States in their stability and con-
vergence programmes (SCPs) and compares them with
outcomes. The analysis shows that the EU-15 Member
States have on average planned significant improve-
ments of their government balance in their SCPs. Coun-
points over the three-year horizon typically covered by a
SCP. In about 80 % of cases, SCPs have planned, over a
three-year period, a decline in both the expenditure and
the revenue ratios. When comparing plans and out-
comes, it appears that there were on average sizeable
deviations from the planned adjustment paths. In about
two thirds of cases the improvement in the general
government balance was less marked than planned.
Moreover, the negative gap between the planned and
observed improvements in government finances is
smaller when considering the first year of the SCP, i.e.
the year generally covered by the budget law, than when
considering the gap for a cumulated period of two or
three years following the submission of the SCP.
While government revenue evolved broadly in line with
plans, there were considerable difficulties in the imple-
mentation of medium-term expenditure plans. This can
be considered the main cause for the underperformance
in attaining budget balance targets. The increase in nom-
inal government expenditure over the three-year period
covered by SCPs was higher than planned in more than
three quarters of cases. The frequency of spending over-
runs is similar when comparing developments in real pri-
Graph III.3.10:  Plans versus outcomes — Real primary expenditure — EU-15 Member States
Source: Commission services.
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Table III.3.8
Consistency of general government expenditure 
plans over time (EU-15 Member States), 2000–06
Observed and planned 
growth rates 
Nominal GG 
expenditure (%)
Real GG 
expenditure (%)
Observed increase in year t 5.4 2.8
Planned increase in the SCP 
submitted in t–1 
4.2 1.9
Planned increase in the SCP 
submitted in t–2 
3.7 1.7
Planned increase in the SCP 
submitted in t–3 
3.1 1.5
Source: Commission services.178
tries have typically planned expenditure-based fiscal
adjustments. The expenditure-to-GDP ratio has on aver-
age been projected to decline by about 1â percentage
mary expenditure to plans in the SCPs. The data show
that expenditure overruns in a given year were in general
not compensated in the other years of the multiannual
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there was a considerable heterogeneity of performance
across Member States. Some of them were almost con-
sistently successful in sticking to expenditure targets,
while others were almost always unsuccessful.
The EU-15 Member States have on average planned
annual increases in real GDP by 2ã % over the period
covered by their SCPs. This is above the average of the
last two decades. Interestingly, contemporaneous mac-
roeconomic developments seem to have had a signifi-
cant influence on the medium-term macroeconomic
forecasts included in the SCPs. The ambitious mac-
roeconomic assumptions of the SCPs submitted in the
midst of the high-growth period at the turn of the dec-
ade turned out to be clearly optimistic. This inclination
to revise medium-term growth forecasts upwards in
favourable growth periods seems however to be less
pronounced since the 2005 SGP reform. The analysis
confirms that part of the worse-than-planned develop-
ments in the government finances is related to negative
growth surprises. While the frequencies of positive and
negative surprises in real GDP developments are equiv-
alent, the average size of negative surprises has been
twice as high as that of positive surprises. Interestingly,
the picture is different when considering developments
in nominal GDP, for which the frequency and size of
positive and negative growth surprises were very simi-
lar. This explains that developments in government
revenue were on average broadly in line with multian-
nual plans.179
4. Which factors help stick 
to budgetary plans?
4.1. Introduction
The previous section has shown that difficulties in the
implementation of medium-term expenditure plans can
be considered the main cause for the underperformance
in attaining budget balance targets. It also pointed to a
possible role played by negative growth surprises. In a
first step, this section assesses which factors explain that
some countries were able to stick to expenditure plans
while this was not the case for others. It is notably ana-
lysed whether and how the initial fiscal position of a
country, the degree of ambition of a SCP in terms of the
planned reduction in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, or
differences in national fiscal governance arrangements
have influenced the capacity of Member States to
achieve their medium-term expenditure targets. The
analysis is based on newly collected survey data on the
existence and properties of national medium-term budg-
etary frameworks (MTBFs) in the Member States and on
the preparation and status of SCPs. In a second step, this
section discusses possible explanations for the negative
surprises in real GDP growth developments compared to
plans in some of the EU countries.
4.2. Which factors explain the difficulties 
in respecting expenditure plans?
Government expenditure is the part of government
finances that is most directly under the control of the fiscal
authorities. The capacity to achieve expenditure targets
therefore reveals, at least in part, the ability of policy-
makers to implement the chosen policies in the medium
term. In this context, the chronic difficulties faced by a
number of European countries to respect their own multi-
annual expenditure targets are a source of concern.
medium-term expenditure plans. The reference variable
in this assessment is the difference between the planned
and observed increase in real primary government
expenditure, for different time horizons. The choice to
focus the analysis on real primary expenditure, instead
for instance of nominal government expenditure, was
driven by the consideration that it is preferable to neu-
tralise the influence of fluctuations in interest payments
and in inflation, which are outside the control of govern-
ments (interpretation of results is easier) (1). The analysis
of the reasons for the negative surprises in government
expenditure is by nature complex, as the magnitude of
expenditure overruns can potentially depend on a
number of interrelated factors.
• Firstly, there may be a relation between the size of
the planned reduction in the expenditure-to-GDP
ratio, and the size of spending overruns. Large cuts
in the expenditure ratio may be more difficult to
implement. This relation may also depend on the ini-
tial size of the government sector, in the sense that
large cuts in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio may be
relatively easier to implement in countries with ini-
tially large public sectors.
• Secondly, expenditure overruns can result from vol-
untary, discretionary action in reaction to particular
macroeconomic developments, favourable or unfa-
vourable, or simply reflect an insufficient control by
the fiscal authorities on the dynamics of expendi-
ture.
• Thirdly, the institutional characteristics of a country
may play a role. A number of economists have180
This section examines which factors may have played a
role in the capacity of a country to stick to its own
¥1∂ The results and conclusions of this part of the report would be similar if the
analysis focused on developments in total nominal government expendi-
ture compared to plans.
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in the budget is particularly suited in countries with
governments typically formed by ideologically dis-
persed coalitions, than in countries with one-party
governments or coalition governments of closely
aligned parties (1).
• Finally, the performance in achieving expenditure
targets may depend on the quality of the institutions
which constitute the environment in which medium-
term budgetary plans are formulated and in which
adherence to plans is monitored and enforced. Reli-
ance on well-defined medium-term budgetary
frameworks can be expected to favour a better
adherence to plans.
The next section assesses the influence of these elements
in a descriptive way. The following one studies the inter-
actions between various dimensions.
4.2.1. Descriptive evidence on the influence 
of the various factors
Ambition of multiannual expenditure targets and size 
of governments
Difficulties to adhere to medium-term expenditure tar-
gets may partly reflect the fact that initial plans, in terms
of the envisaged cut in the government expenditure-to-
GDP ratio over the medium-term, were very ambitious.
Large cuts in the expenditure ratio may genuinely be
more difficult to implement. It also cannot be excluded
that in a number of cases — concerning notably Member
States with large government deficits the fiscal authori-
ties made the choice to plan very large reductions in the
government deficit, to be achieved through equally large
cuts in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, knowing that only
a share of them could actually be implemented. Such a
strategy could have been used to signal to private eco-
nomic agents the strong willingness of fiscal authorities
to cut government expenditure, with the aim of making
fiscal consolidation less costly in terms of growth.
Another possible explanation could be linked to a strat-
egy of the finance ministers to set in advance strong
negotiation basis for the preparation of budgets in the
following years (2). Such strategies would however have
been at the price of a loss of credibility for the national
medium-term budgetary projections.
Graph III.4.1 puts in relation, for various time horizons
(t–t+1; t–t+2; t–t+3), the degree of ambition of expend-
iture targets — in terms of the planned change in the
expenditure-to-GDP ratio over a given period and the
size of the discrepancy between the planned and
observed increase in government expenditure over the
same period. The graph exhibits a negative but rela-
tively weak relationship between the two variables.
This conclusion holds when considering separately the
various time horizons considered in the analysis (t–t+1;
t–t+2; t–t+3). This suggests that while the initial degree
of ambition may play a role in explaining the difficulties
to stick to expenditure targets, a number of other ele-
ments may be relevant to determine and explain differ-
ences in the degree of adherence to expenditure plans
across the EU Member States.
One of these elements is the initial size of the ratio of pri-
mary expenditure to GDP. The basic idea is that it may
be relatively easier to achieve a given reduction in the
expenditure-to-GDP ratio in countries with a relatively
large public sector than in those with a relatively small
public sector. Graph III.4.2, which shows a negative
relationship between the initial level of the ratio of pri-
mary expenditure to GDP and the size of expenditure
slippages, tends to confirm this view.
Policy action versus insufficient control of government 
expenditure
Expenditure overruns can result from voluntary, discre-
tionary action in reaction to particular macroeconomic
developments or simply reflect an insufficient control of
fiscal authorities on the dynamics of expenditure. For
instance, governments facing a severe economic down-
turn may deliberately decide to stabilise the economy via
a discretionary increase in expenditure compared to
plans. Another possibility, not exclusive with the previ-
ous one, is that governments facing positive growth and
tax revenue surprises deliberately choose to use part of
the revenue windfalls to finance additional government
expenditure compared to plans. In both cases, the larger-
than-planned increase in expenditure results from a
deliberate policy choice.¥1∂ The basic idea is that the deficit bias stemming from the common pool
problem may be more severe in countries with ideologically dispersed coa-181
litions. These countries however generally rely on multiannual budgetary
contracts agreed ex ante in the context of a coalition agreement. They are
generally denominated in literature as ‘contract’ countries. For a precise
definition see European Commission (2006a).
¥2∂ Some countries could have used such a strategy to delay the possible
imposition of sanctions in the context of the excessive deficit procedure.
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in the expenditure ratio — EU-15
Source: Commission services.
Graph III.4.2:  Plans versus outcomes — Expenditure overruns and size 
of general government — EU-15 
Source: Commission services.
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The alternative possibility is that the larger-than-planned
increase in expenditure reflected an insufficient control
by fiscal authorities on the dynamics of government
spending. This would be the case, for instance, if the cen-
tral government, which is ex ante in charge of the prepa-
ration of the SCP and therefore of setting expenditure
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succeed in imposing ex post fiscal discipline (on the
expenditure side) to the other levels of government. Such
a situation may occur in case of insufficient coordination
prior to the setting of the multiannual expenditure targets
for the whole of the general government. It may also
arise in case the multiannual budgetary targets are not
vested by a sufficient degree of political commitment
(e.g. adoption by the national parliament).
To shed light on this question, Graph III.4.3 shows the
relation between surprises in real GDP growth and sur-
prises in real primary government expenditure. Both var-
iables are measured as the difference between the
observed and planned increase over various time hori-
zons. A relatively larger frequency of observations in
quadrant I, which corresponds to episodes of higher-
than-planned increase in government expenditure in
periods of negative growth surprises, would tend to sup-
port the assumption according to which expenditure
plans were deliberately revised upwards to counter unfa-
vourable macroeconomic developments. A larger fre-
quency of observations in quadrant II (positive surprises
on growth and larger-than-planned increase in govern-
ment expenditure) would on the contrary support the
assumption according to which the larger-than-planned
increase in government expenditure reflected the deci-
sion to finance extra expenditure via tax windfalls in
periods of positive growth surprises.
The graph shows that the frequency and size of govern-
ment expenditure overruns observed in periods of pos-
itive real GDP growth surprises are remarkably similar
to those observed in periods of negative growth sur-
prises. This result can be interpreted in two ways.
Firstly, it can be argued that there is a significant spend-
ing bias in the EU countries, which leads to overspend-
ing both in good and bad economic times. According to
this view, the fiscal authorities would deliberately
choose to spend more than planned in both periods of
positive and negative growth surprises. An alternative
explanation of the high degree of dispersion (or ran-
domness) in the distribution of surprises in expenditure
developments is that there is, in some EU countries, a
lack of control in the dynamics of government spend-
ing. According to this view, the distribution of expend-
iture overruns would be independent from cyclical
developments as it does not result from the implemen-
tation of policy choices, but rather from the lack of the
adequate instruments (expenditure rules, medium-term
expenditure frameworks, internal stability pacts, etc.)
to keep expenditure in line with initial plans.
Graph III.4.3:  Plans versus outcomes — Expenditure overruns and real GDP growth surprises
— EU-15 
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countries)
Another element possibly explaining the discrepancy
between the planned and observed increase in govern-
ment expenditure concerns the type of governance in
place in a country. As stressed in Section III.2, a number
of authors have in the past argued that a medium-term
orientation in the budget process is particularly suited to
countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions. The
presumption is that in such countries the deficit bias
stemming from the common pool problem may be more
severe as various parties in coalitions will try to satisfy
their own electoral base. Experience however shows that
such countries have in the past introduced ‘contracts’,
under the form of multiannual fiscal rules, with a view to
taking into account spending claims in a centralised way.
It is also argued that checks and balances may be
stronger in these countries, which is conducive to fiscal
discipline and better adherence to budgetary targets. The
effect of the type of fiscal governance in a country on its
capacity to respect expenditure objectives is therefore a
priori undetermined.
When looking at the data, it appears that the track record
in the respect of plans in real government primary
expenditure was on average better in so-called
‘delegation countries’ than in ‘contract countries’ (see
Graph III.4.4). This conclusion applies to all the time
horizons considered in the study (t–t+1; t–t+2; t–t+3).
This result reflects the fact that a number of delegation
States managed to keep expenditure remarkably in line
with plans (Germany, Austria), while a number of con-
tract countries experienced important overruns in gov-
ernment expenditure (Ireland, Luxembourg). It indeed
confirms that sound fiscal institutions to place fiscal pol-
icy in a medium-term perspective are even more impor-
tant in countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions
than in countries with single or closely aligned parties in
government.
Quality of medium-term budgetary frameworks
A last relevant aspect in examining the reasons for
departures from medium-term expenditure targets is
related to the quality of the institutions which constitute
the environment in which such plans are formulated and
adherence to them is monitored. The basic idea is that
countries in which medium-term budgetary targets are
vested with a strong degree of political commitment are
less likely to show important deviations from their
expenditure plans. In the EU context, two types of insti-
tutions may play a role in this respect: the national
Graph III.4.4:  Planned and observed increases in real primary expenditure in groups of countries — 
EU-15 — Simple averages
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Source: Commission services.
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in Section III.2, 20 of the EU-25 Member States have a
national MTBF. However, there are big differences in
the design of these frameworks, concerning notably the
share of government finances they cover, the existence
of coordination mechanisms between levels of govern-
ments when setting the medium-term budgetary targets,
the link with the annual budgetary procedure, etc. Simi-
larly, while all Member States submit SCPs, there are
large differences in the preparation of the multiannual
budgetary targets in these programmes.
A way commonly used in economic literature to analyse
the link between the quality of institutions and budgetary
developments is to put in relation country-level fiscal
variables with synthetic indicators measuring the extent
to which the fiscal institutions of a country correspond to
the desirable features according to theory. To this end, an
index was built to capture the existence and properties of
national MTBFs and the preparation and status of the
SCPs. This index takes into account the following
dimensions (Box III.4.1 provides details on how scores
were attributed in constructing the index).
• Existence of a national MTBF: it was considered
that the existence of a national MTBF, on which the
SCP is generally based, constitutes per se a positive
element for the reliability of medium-term budget-
ary targets. The basic idea is that medium-term fis-
cal plans formulated domestically and supported by
sound domestic institutions are likely to benefit
from a higher degree of national ownership and
therefore to be respected.
• Connectedness between the multiannual budgetary
framework and the annual budget: in developed
MTBFs, the multiannual targets set in the previous
years typically form the basis upon which the budget
is prepared. Countries relying domestically on a
‘fixed’ medium-term budgetary framework, which
are typically articulated around a fixed path for gov-
ernment spending, can be expected to show a better
respect of medium-term expenditure plans than
countries relying on flexible medium-term budget-
ary frameworks.
• Involvement of the national parliament when setting
the medium-term budgetary objectives: countries
commitment, can be expected to show a better
adherence to medium-term expenditure plans.
• Coordination between levels of government: coun-
tries where multiannual budgetary targets for the
general government are set following a proper coor-
dination between the levels of government playing a
role in fiscal policy can also be expected to show a
better adherence to plans. Coordination is crucial to
ensure a sufficient political commitment of all actors
taking part in fiscal policy to respect the medium-
term budgetary targets of the country.
• Monitoring and enforcement procedures: countries
where the achievement of medium-term targets is
the object of a regular monitoring and predefined
action is foreseen in case of deviation from the
objectives in the multiannual projection, are
expected to show a better track record in terms of
adherence to their multiannual budgetary plans.
Graph III.4.5 exhibits a positive relation between the
level of the synthetic index measuring the quality of
institutions for medium-term budgetary planning and the
capacity of the country concerned to achieve its
medium-term expenditure targets. The average gap
between the planned and observed increases in real pri-
mary expenditure is, for all the time horizons considered
in the study (t–t+1; t–t+2; t–t+3), lower in countries with
values of the index higher than the median. The gap
between the two groups of countries seems to widen
when lengthening the time horizon considered and
becomes very significant when considering the three-
year horizon of a SCP. More generally, countries with a
high value of the index measuring the quality of institu-
tions for medium-term budgetary planning seem to per-
form better with respect to all the fiscal variables consid-
ered in the study (see Graph III.4.6). The track record in
terms of adherence to planned changes in the budget bal-
ance, debt, and expenditure ratios is better for all the time
horizons considered in the study.   
This section has shown that a number of factors may
explain the differences of country performances in
respecting medium-term government expenditure tar-
gets. The analysis has been based on simple, descriptive
analysis. However, in a number of cases, interactions
between the various factors may be relevant. For185
where the multiannual budgetary targets are for-
mally adopted by the national parliament, and there-
fore vested with a stronger degree of political
instance, countries with a high value of the index on the
quality of institutions for medium-term budgetary plan-
ning had on average better starting fiscal positions, in
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EU-15 — Simple averages
Source: Commission services.
Graph III.4.6:  Planned and observed budgetary developments in different groups of countries 
EU-15 — Simple averages
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fore have on average projected less ambitious cuts in the
expenditure-to-GDP ratio, which could in turn explain
the better-than-average performances in respecting
medium-term expenditure targets. Assessing the interac-
tions between all the dimensions considered requires
relying on more sophisticated empirical techniques. This
is made in the following section.
Box III.4.1: Construction of an index on the quality of institutions for medium-term budgetary planning
This box provides details on the construction of the index measuring the quality of institutions for medium-term budgetary
planning. The index was calculated taking into account both the existence and properties of national MTBFs and the prep-
aration and status of SCPs. A difficulty when constructing the index was to assess how national MTBF, when they exist,
interact with SCPs. In some cases, for instance, the SCP is entirely based on a pre-existing national MTBF: there is no
formal approval of the budgetary targets set in the SCPs in the national parliament, but the SCP is entirely based on a doc-
ument which was previously approved by the national parliament. This was taken into account when attributing scores for
the various dimensions considered. Another case concerns the situation where the national MTBF regards only the central
government sector. In such a situation, scores concerning the coordination between levels of government prior to setting
the multiannual targets were assigned taking into account the information on the preparation of the SCP. This box provides
details on the how scores were attributed and how the EU-25 countries rank with respect to this index.
Construction of the index
The synthetic index measuring the quality of institutions for medium-term budgetary planning is made of five components
(justifications for taking into account these dimensions are in the main text). For each criterion, the scores were attributed
as follows:
(1) Existence of a national MTBF (on which the SCP is based):
2 for a MTBF covering the whole of government sector or a large part of it (e.g. central government and social 
security)
1 for a MTBF covering central government
0 no national MTBF
(2) Connectedness between the multiannual budgetary targets and the preparation of the annual budget 
(domestic MTBF or SCP):
2 fixed framework (articulated around a pre-defined path for government expenditure, generally not revised over
time)
1 the medium-term budgetary targets form the basis upon which the budget is prepared but there can be deviations
0 flexible framework in which medium-term targets are only indicative (no clear link with the annual budget)
(3) Involvement of the national parliament in the preparation of the medium-term budgetary plans 
(domestic MTBF or SCP):
2 vote of the parliament on the main medium-term objectives (in the context of a national MTBF or of the SCP)
1 no vote but formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament
0 no formal presentation of the objectives to the national parliament
(4) Existence of coordination mechanisms prior to setting the medium-term budgetary targets (domestic MTBF or SCP):
2 in case there is a proper ex ante coordination mechanism between all levels of general government
1 coordination mechanisms only for some general government sub-sectors
0 no coordination mechanism
(5) Monitoring and enforcement of multiannual budgetary targets:
2 if there are well-defined actions in case of deviations form plans and a regular monitoring of targets (reports, etc.)
1 some monitoring and enforcement procedures187
(Continued on the next page)
0 no clearly defined monitoring and enforcement procedures
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 74.2.2. Empirical analysis
The main purpose of this section is to assess whether there
is a link between the adherence to medium-term expendi-
ture targets and the institutional settings of a country, con-
trolling for other variables. The approach followed is to
analyse econometrically the impact of various variables
on the capacity to achieve expenditure targets for various
time horizons (one, two and three years ahead).
ture. The explanatory variables are (i) the degree of ambi-
tion of expenditure targets, measured as the planned
change in the primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio; (ii) the
initial size of the government, as measured by the level of
the ratio of primary expenditure to GDP in the year of sub-
mission of the SCP; (iii) a dummy variable capturing the
type of fiscal governance in a country and the ideological
distance of parties in government coalitions (contract vs
Box III.4.1 (continued)
Scores concerning the existence and properties of national MTBFs
The graph below shows how the EU countries rank with respect to the index. The dark points show the value of the total
index. In absence of strong a priori on which of the five dimensions considered above is the most important, the same
weight was given to all the five components. The clear points show the limit within which 90 % of the values of the syn-
thetic index would fall if the synthetic index was calculated with 10 000 different sets of random weights applied to the
five dimensions. As expected, countries with well-developed MTBFs (Denmark, Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland,
Sweden, etc.) have relatively high scores.
Graph 1:  Index measuring the quality of medium-term budgeting institutions
Source: Commission services.
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The dependent variable is the difference between the
observed and planned increase in real primary expendi-
delegation); (iv) the gap between the planned and
observed real GDP growth over the period considered;
and (v) our synthetic index measuring the quality of insti-
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as detailed in Box III.4.1. The econometric relations were
estimated for the sample of EU-15 countries. Four regres-
sions were run: three to assess the determinants of the gap
between plans and outcomes for a given time horizon
(first year, first two years or first three years covered by a
SCP), and one combining all time horizons. In the latter
case two dummies were inserted in the specification to
capture the fact that the average deviation between the
planned and observed increases in real primary expendi-
ture has had a tendency to increase with the time horizon
considered. The results of the econometric estimates (see
Table III.4.1) can be summarised as follows.
• There is a statistically significant relation between
the size of the planned reduction in the expenditure-
to-GDP ratio and the size of the discrepancy
between the planned and observed change in real
primary expenditure. The relation is significant for
all the time horizons considered. This suggests that
Member States projecting large cuts in their expend-
iture-to-GDP ratio tend, ceteris paribus, to show a
lower degree of adherence to plans (1). A possible
explanation is that SCPs planning ambitious cuts in
government expenditure were not always backed
with equally ambitious policy measures.
• The variable capturing the level of the ratio of pri-
mary expenditure to GDP at the moment of the elab-
oration of the medium-term budgetary plans (year of
submission of the SCP) is also significant with a
negative sign. This confirms the presumption
according to which ambitious cuts in the expendi-
ture-to-GDP ratio are relatively easier to implement
in countries with a large initial ratio of primary
expenditure to GDP.
• The variable capturing the economic growth sur-
prises (difference between forecasts and outcomes
in real GDP growth) is not statistically significant in
explaining the deviations from expenditure plans.
The achievement of expenditure targets does not
seem to depend crucially on the sign and magnitude
of surprises in real GDP growth developments (2).
This result holds when taking into account surprises
in nominal GDP growth. Given the possible reverse
causation effects between surprises in government
expenditure and surprises in GDP growth develop-
ments, further empirical investigation would how-
ever be necessary to confirm this result.
• The dummy capturing the size of ideological distance
between parties in government and the type of fiscal
governance (contract vs delegation countries) is signif-
icant in the equations, with a negative sign. This sug-
gests that, on average and controlling for all the other
variables, delegation States tend to show a better adher-
ence to their budgetary plans than contract countries.
• Finally, and this can be considered the main result of
the analysis, the coefficient of the index measuring
the quality of the medium-term budgetary planning
institutions is negative and significant (at the 5 %
level) for all the time horizons considered in the study
(t–t+1; t–t+2; t–t+3). This means that, controlling for
other variables, reliance on developed medium-term
budgetary frameworks can significantly contribute to
limit the size of the discrepancy between planned and
observed increase in real primary expenditure.
4.3. Real GDP growth forecasts: 
the role of institutions
As seen in Section III.2, relying on unbiased or even cau-
tious macroeconomic projections is crucial for the effec-
tiveness of medium-term budgetary frameworks. Macr-
oeconomic forecasts are one of the main inputs for the
preparation of multiannual budgetary plans, as they
determine the global amount of resources available in
the medium term to finance envisaged policies. Optimis-
tically biased forecasts may create an upward pressure
on public expenditure in the medium term, which will be
difficult to correct ex post. In this context, the fact that
there were on average significant negative surprises in
real GDP growth developments in the EU-15 countries is
a cause for concern.
4.3.1. Possible explanations for the negative real 
GDP growth surprises
A key question concerns the reasons for the negative real
GDP growth surprises. A first possibility is that there
were genuine, unpredictable negative growth surprises.
It is relevant in this respect to compare real GDP growth
in the period considered in the study with the average
developments in the previous decades. Graph III.4.7189
shows that in the period considered in the study (1999–
2006) the simple average of annual real GDP growth
rates in the EU-15 countries reached 2.8 %. This is rela-
¥1∂ These are not necessarily Member States with high initial government def-
icits. See Section III.2 for more details.
¥2∂ This result holds when taking into account surprises in nominal GDP
growth.
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sample of countries over the period 1980–98 (2.6 %).
This result supports the view that the negative growth
surprises compared to plans experienced since 1999 can-
not be attributed to a genuinely unpredictable economic
slowdown over the period considered. This conclusion
however does not apply to individual countries. Real
GDP growth in the period considered in the study was
significantly lower than in the preceding 20 years in a
number of countries (notably Germany and Portugal). It
was significantly higher for a number of other countries,
e.g. Ireland, Greece, and Spain.
Another possibility is that medium-term macroeconomic
projections were, in a number of countries, deliberately
optimistic. Milesi-Feretti and Moriyama (2004) provided
an explanation for the possible optimistic bias in macro-
economic forecasts. These authors argued that opportun-
istic governments may try to avoid the political cost asso-
ciated with the implementation of difficult consolidation
measures by using overly favourable growth assumptions.
Corrective measures can then be avoided ex ante, while ex
post the deficit will turn out to be higher than expected as
Recent empirical analysis on the role of growth fore-
casts provides evidence of a forecast bias in a number
of EU countries. Larch and Salto (2005) found evi-
dence of a significant negative impact of such a bias on
budgetary outcomes in three of four large EU Member
States. Moulin and Wierts (2006) studied whether
growth forecast in the SCPs have been deliberately
optimistic since 1998. Taking the European Commis-
sion service’s autumn 2005 forecast as a benchmark,
they show that only in two cases growth was lower than
projected in the SCP and domestic growth projections
were significantly more optimistic than those released
by the Commission services. According to Larch and
Jonung (2006), a way to remedy possible politically
motivated biased macroeconomic forecasts is the estab-
lishment of institutions in charge of providing inde-
pendent macroeconomic forecasts. This may have a
direct beneficial impact if the government is obliged to
use the forecasts of the independent institution in the
preparation of the budgetary plans. A positive effect
can also be expected when there is no formal obligation
for the government to take into account these forecasts.
In such cases, the independent forecasts provide bench-
Table III.4.1
Dependent variable: difference between the observed and planned increase in real primary expenditure
Time-horizon 
considered
t–t+1 t–t+2 t–t+3 Whole sample
Coefficient t– stat Coefficient t– stat Coefficient t– stat Coefficient t– stat
EU-15 Member States
Constant 0.1 (***) 4.4 0.1 (***) 4.8 0.2 (***) 5.4 0.1 (***) 4.6
Planned change prim 
exp. ratio
– 0.6 (**) – 2.2 – 0.9 (**) – 2.8 – 1.3 (**) – 2.2 – 1.0 (**) – 2.3
Initial level prim exp. 
ratio
– 0.1 (***) – 3.4 – 0.2 (***) – 3.7 – 0.3 (***) – 4.1 – 0.2 (***) – 3.8
Dummy contract (0) 
delegation (1)
– 0.0 (***) – 3.0 – 0.1 (***) – 3.7 – 0.3 (***) – 3.7 – 0.2 (***) – 3.4
Real GDP growth 
surprises
0.1 1.1 0.0 0.2 – 0.2 – 1.4 – 0.1 – 0.9
Total index MTBF/SCP – 0.2 (**) – 2.2 – 0.6 (**) – 2.3 – 1.3 (**) – 2.6 – 0.6 (**) – 2.5
Dummy t+2 — — — — — — 0.1 (***) 3.8
Dummy t+3 — — — — — — 0.2 (***) 3.5
N. Obs. 109  94  79  282
R. Sq 0.18  0.28  0.53  0.48
NB: Estimation method: fixed-effect OLS with robust standard errors. (**) and (***) denote, respectively, significance at the 5 % and 1 % levels.
Source: Commission services.190
growth is lower than projected. The resulting higher defi-
cit can then be blamed on bad luck, even if it results from
a deliberate forecast bias in growth projections.
marks against which the plausibility of the macroeco-
nomic forecasts of the government can be assessed,
which may limit the temptation to deliberately overes-
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oped in European Commission (2006a).
4.3.2. The role of institutions
According to a survey launched by the European Com-
mission in 2005, 10 EU countries already have at least one
institution that regularly produces independent macroeco-
nomic forecasts against which the official projections can
be assessed (1). However, in the large majority of cases,
the government is free to base its budgetary plans on its
own forecasts, without having to provide any justification
in case there are deviations compared to the forecasts of
the independent institution. There are three exceptions to
this rule: in Belgium, the National Account Institute pro-
vides the macroeconomic forecasts to be used by the fed-
eral government in the budgetary process. The second
exception concerns the Institute of Economic Research in
Austria. The macroeconomic forecasts prepared by this
independent body almost always constitute the basis for
the preparation of fiscal plans. The third exception is the
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
Against this background, it is interesting to assess whether
negative real GDP growth surprises were less pronounced
in countries where the task of preparing macroeconomic
forecasts is delegated to independent institutions. Another
interesting question is to see whether these countries
project real GDP growth in the medium term more in line
with the currently estimated trend or potential growth.
When looking closely at the data comparing real GDP
growth projections in the SCPs and outcomes, it is striking
to observe that two of the three countries in which the task
of preparing macroeconomic forecasts used for annual
and medium-term budget planning are prepared by an
independent institutions experienced larger than average
negative surprises in real GDP growth developments (see
Graph III.4.8) (2). Similarly, when dividing the sample in
three groups of countries: (i) those delegating the macro-
economic forecast activity to independent institutions;
(ii) those in which an independent forecasting institution
exists, but there is no delegation of task; (iii) those in
which there is no such institution, it appears that the rela-
tion between forecast errors and the existence of an inde-
pendent institution is not clear cut. This result is largely
influenced by the large positive surprises in real GDP
Graph III.4.7:  Real GDP growth developments in the period considered by the study 
and in the two decades preceding it
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ See European Commission (2006a) for an overview of the results of this
survey.
¥2∂ According to Moulin and Wierts (2006), these countries experienced genu-
ine negative growth surprises, in the sense that other, independent fore-
casters did not predict better the economic downturn experienced by these
countries.
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countries in which no independent institution in charge of
preparing macroeconomic forecasts exist. For that reason,
and because the analysis is based on a short period of time,
during which most EU countries were affected by unex-
pectedly steep and protracted economic slowdown, the
conclusions should be taken with care.
4.4. Conclusions
This section assesses which factors explain that some coun-
tries were able to stick to their medium-term budgetary
plans while this was not the case for others. The analysis
first examines the reasons for the difficulties to adhere to
multiannual expenditure targets. This is crucial as medium-
term fiscal consolidation efforts planned by Member States
typically foresaw significant efforts on the expenditure side
and as government expenditure is the part of government
finances that is most controlled by the fiscal authorities.
The analysis brings a number of answers on the determi-
nants of expenditure overruns in the EU. It shows nota-
bly that there is a statistically significant relation
between the ‘degree of ambition’ of medium-term
expenditure plans, in terms of the planned reduction in
the expenditure-to-GDP ratio, and the size of the dis-
crepancy between the planned and observed increase in
government expenditure. Member States projecting
large cuts in their expenditure-to-GDP ratio tend, ceteris
paribus, to show a lower degree of adherence to plans.
Ceteris paribus, it is relatively easier to achieve ambi-
tious expenditure targets for countries with a relatively
large public sector. Another interesting result is that
expenditure overruns seem to be independent from
macroeconomic developments. Both the frequency and
size of expenditure overruns were similar in periods of
positive and negative growth surprises. Finally, and this
can be considered the main result of the analysis, there is
a statistically significant relation between the quality of
institutions for medium-term budgetary planning and the
capacity to achieve expenditure targets. Reliance on
developed MTBFs can significantly contribute to limit
the size of the discrepancy between planned and
observed increase in real primary expenditure.
In a second step, the analysis focuses on the causes for
the negative GDP growth surprises. The analysis in this
case is less conclusive. The data suggest that real GDP
growth surprises were on average not due to a genuinely
unpredictable economic slowdown, as real GDP growth
was in the period considered in line with the trend of the
previous two decades.
Graph III.4.8:  Real GDP growth projections in different groups of countries
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Part IV
Lessons from successful fiscal 
consolidations

Summary
Over past decades most EU countries underwent succes-
sive episodes of fiscal consolidation in the attempt to
achieve or restore sound public finances. Two major
waves can be distinguished. In the first half of the 1980s
consolidation was a relatively late but inescapable
response to the large fiscal imbalances accumulated in
the wake of the preceding two oil shocks. In the first half
of the 1990s and beyond, consolidation was largely
driven by the deadlines of the Maastricht Treaty. Mem-
ber States that wanted to be part of the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) from the beginning were
required to bring their public finances in line with the
requirements of the Pact. More recently, consolidation
efforts in the EU are largely determined by the provi-
sions of the Stability and Growth Pact according to
which Member States are required to achieve medium-
term budgetary positions taking into account the budget-
ary impact of ageing populations.
Main findings of the literature
While each consolidation episode has its specificities, a
relatively broad strand of empirical research has devel-
oped exploring two distinct questions: can fiscal consol-
idation have expansionary effects on economic growth
and what type of consolidations are successful, i.e. lead
to a lasting correction of budgetary positions. Especially
in the second half of the 1990s a number of influential
studies were carried out focusing attention on the expe-
rience of OECD countries. The effect on economic
growth and the success of a fiscal correction are to some
extent interrelated as an expansionary impact on growth
may contribute to improve the budget balance over a
longer period of time. Some studies cover both aspects,
others focus exclusively attention on one of the two.
As regards the issue of success, the findings in the liter-
ature have meanwhile turned into a kind of received wis-
dom. One of the most important results relates to the
based and if expenditure cuts are mainly on current pri-
mary outlays, in particular government wages. Findings
concerning other determinants such as the size of adjust-
ment or the role of the economic environment were less
clear cut.
Review of fiscal consolidation in the EU
This chapter reviews the experience of fiscal consolida-
tion in the EU since 1970 and reassesses the question of
what makes fiscal consolidation successful. The analysis
complements previous work on fiscal consolidation in
the EU which focused exclusively attention on the pos-
sible growth effects of fiscal consolidation (1).
The current reassessment of successful fiscal consolida-
tion in the EU is underpinned by an empirical analysis,
which, compared to the literature, explores a signifi-
cantly broader set of potential determinants. On top of
the traditional elements such as the fiscal and macroeco-
nomic conditions prevailing ahead of the fiscal correc-
tion and the composition of fiscal adjustment, our analy-
sis takes a look at the role played by structural reforms
and fiscal governance. A broad strand of the literature
has shown that the overall fiscal performance of a coun-
try benefits from strong and effective elements of fiscal
governance such as fiscal rules, fiscal councils and budg-
etary procedures and from structural reforms. The con-
jecture is that the same factors may be conducive to start
episodes of fiscal consolidation and to contribute to their
success.
The factors triggering fiscal consolidation
The findings of our empirical work can be grouped into
four different sets. The first relates to the factors that
trigger fiscal consolidation. It is fully in line with the lit-
erature and includes some new elements. Our EU sample
confirms the role played by the fiscal difficulties in the195
composition of adjustment, suggesting that the odds for
making a fiscal correction last increase significantly if
the adjustment is more expenditure and less revenue- ¥1∂ See European Commission (2003).
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deficit as well as a highly increasing debt ratio are signif-
icant in prompting fiscal consolidation. In addition to
these ‘traditional’ determinants we find clear evidence
that fiscal rules and effective budgetary procedures can
play a significant role in triggering fiscal consolidation.
The evidence concerning macroeconomic conditions
and structural reforms is less clear cut.
Gradual versus ‘cold shower’ consolidations
The second set of findings concerns the type of adjust-
ment, notably the choice between a relatively sharp and
short adjustment episode, which we refer to as ‘cold
shower’ consolidation, and a more measured and pro-
tracted episode, which we refer to as gradual consolida-
tion. Our empirical analysis supports a number of intui-
tive conclusions. If economic conditions at the start of
the consolidation are particularly bad, the fiscal correc-
tion is more likely to be gradual so as to avoid an addi-
tional negative impact on the cycle. The likelihood of
engaging in a gradual as compared to ‘cold shower’
adjustment also increases if the correction comes shortly
after an earlier episode. Finally, consolidation episodes
that rely heavily on reductions of politically sensitive
expenditure items such as subsidies, government wages
or pensions are also more likely to be gradual. The com-
mon thread of all three points is that a gradual adjustment
is likely to improve the political feasibility of the adjust-
ment.
Determinants of successful fiscal consolidation
The third and probably most important set of results
refers to the link between the composition of the fiscal
adjustment and the rate of success. The findings estab-
lished in the literature have so far been relatively clear:
corrections that are mainly based on current primary
expenditure, in particular the government wage bill, are
more likely to be successful than corrections relying on
higher revenues or cuts in investment expenditure. Our
empirical analysis substantiates this ‘received wisdom’
for the entire sample period 1970 and 2006. The estab-
lished recipe for success characterised by significant cuts
in primary government expenditure is not outdated. It
was particularly effective in the 1970s and 1980s and
was still used in the 1990s and beyond. However, since
the beginning of the 1990s the menu of options seems to
have widened. Successful consolidation still remained
expenditure is still found to have had a positive impact
on the likelihood of success, however the link has grown
weaker.
Moreover, in terms of individual items of primary
expenditure the recipe for success in the EU is more bal-
anced than suggested by the literature. Especially, in the
1990s and beyond lasting corrections were rather charac-
terised by across-the-board savings of primary expen-
diture rather than by cuts in one specific expenditure
category. The contribution of investment expenditure
declined compared to previous decades.
The slight yet notable change in the recipe of success
since 1990 is likely to reflect a number of factors of
which two may be of particular importance. Firstly, over
the past decades there has been a tendency towards
reducing the size of government which reduces the lee-
way for further ‘easy’ expenditure cuts on individual cat-
egories and may give rise to more balanced expenditure
restraints.
Secondly, in a bid to participate in the EMU from the
outset several EU Member States implemented some-
times impressive consolidation programmes, also in
favourable economic times, which, in view of their over-
all size, operated on a broader set of expenditure catego-
ries and also included revenue increases. In this context
the likelihood of success was somewhat less determined
by the composition of adjustment per se. Other factors
that helped safeguarding expenditure cuts or revenue
increases are likely to have gained importance.
The role of fiscal governance and structural reforms
Two particularly prominent examples of such other fac-
tors are fiscal governance and structural reforms. Their
impact on the likelihood for success forms the fourth set
of findings of our work. As regards fiscal governance our
analysis points to a relatively clear link. The likelihood
of success significantly increases with the strength and
coverage of fiscal rules; essentially the same hold for the
effectiveness of budgetary procedures. While the exact
mechanisms still need to be determined, the link between
fiscal governance and lasting fiscal corrections is likely
to work via at least two channels. First, comprehensive
and strong fiscal rules favour discipline-oriented budg-
ets. They provide incentives to draw up adjustments that
stand a larger chance to be sustainable, not least in view196
markedly more expenditure and less revenue-based than
unsuccessful episodes but the differences narrowed
somewhat. In the 1990s and beyond cutting primary
of the possible costs associated with the risk of running
afoul of the rules. Second, effective budgetary proce-
dures favour good planning, a balanced composition and
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as opposed to a situation in which measures are planned
over a short period of time and in an uncoordinated way.
The EU experience also supports the conclusion that the
success of fiscal consolidation increases significantly
when coupled with structural reforms. We find a signif-
icant link for a number of different types of reforms
including those focusing on product and labour markets.
The evidence concerning pension reforms is weak, prob-
ably because the associated dynamics cover a longer
period. Our analysis does not detail the precise channels
through which structural reforms help fiscal consolida-
tion. Further work is needed to clarify the relationship.
However, the favourable impact of structural reforms on
the success rate of fiscal consolidation, especially of
labour market reforms, does not come as a complete sur-
prise, and highlights the potential complementarities
between the Stability and Growth Pact and the Lisbon
process for growth and jobs. The empirical literature on
fiscal consolidation includes many references to poten-
tially beneficial feedback mechanisms between reforms
that contribute to wage moderation and fiscal adjust-
ment. Two channels can be at work. First, wage moder-
ation in the economy as a whole is likely to spill over to
government wages which help contain expenditure
growth. Second, wage moderation spurs economic activ-
ity and hence helps fiscal consolidation indirectly via a
higher level of GDP.
Expenditure dynamics of unsuccessful consolidations
As a final point, our study examines the expenditure
dynamics of consolidation episodes that do not lead to a
lasting correction of the underlying budgetary position.
Using expenditure data in terms of functions of govern-
ment (COFOG) the analysis shows that there are essen-
tially two items that rebound after the consolidation has
come to an end, namely health and social protection.
These two items are set to increase in size once the pop-
ulation ageing is going to produce its full effect on the
budget. Thus, the success of consolidation will increas-
ingly depend on the ability to control ageing-related
expenditure.197
1. Introduction
Episodes of fiscal consolidation reflect the attempt to put
public finances on a sustainable footing and to create
conditions for stable and successful economic develop-
ment. In the European context, sound public finances
acquire additional importance as they guarantee a
smooth functioning of the economic and monetary union
(EMU).
In the run-up to the EMU some Member States have
implemented impressive fiscal retrenchment pro-
grammes and today public finances are, overall, in a bet-
ter shape as compared to the early 1990s. However, the
scope for fiscal consolidation has not vanished. In recent
years, a large number of EU countries, both ‘old’ and
recently acceded Member States, faced the challenge to
restore or achieve budgetary discipline. Governments
responded with different cures that were implemented
under diverse economic and institutional circumstances
and gave rise to a varying degree of success.
This section of the report examines evidence on fiscal
consolidation in the EU since 1970 with a view to shed-
ding light on the factors that determine the success or
failure of consolidation. Following common practice in
the literature the notion of success refers to a more last-
ing as opposed to a merely short-lived correction of the
budgetary position and abstracts from the issue of
whether fiscal consolidation produces contractionary or
expansionary effects on economic growth. The question
of whether economic activity is spurred or hampered by
a fiscal correction was studied in an earlier edition of this
report (1).
Compared to the existing literature on successful fiscal
consolidation we add a number of new dimensions. First
of all, we explore a broader set of ingredients that may
determine the recipe for success. In addition to the com-
position of adjustment, which has extensively been
examined in the literature, we consider further elements
such as the recourse to ‘fiscal gimmickry’, the quality
and strength of fiscal governance and the implementa-
tion of structural reforms. Secondly, our analysis seeks
to differentiate between at least two different types of
consolidation episodes, one in which a relatively big fis-
cal correction is implemented in a short period of time,
dubbed ‘cold shower’ consolidation, as compared to
more gradual episodes of adjustment. Such a differenti-
ation is motivated by the conjecture that the recipe for
success may be conditional on the type of adjustment
chosen.
Our analysis combines different methods. Following
established practice, regression analysis is at the core of
our work. It explores whether and how different eco-
nomic, institutional and other factors affect the occur-
rence and the success of fiscal adjustment episodes. The
regression analysis is complemented by other quantita-
tive techniques such as mean comparisons to highlight
differences between years of consolidation and ‘normal’
times, between types of consolidation and, finally,
between successful and unsuccessful adjustment epi-
sodes. To round off the analysis and to illustrate the gen-
eral findings on the basis of country-specific evidence, a
number of country cases are presented.
The presentation is organised as follows. Chapter 2 pre-
pares the ground for a detailed examination of fiscal con-
solidation in the EU. It starts with the definitions of both
fiscal consolidation and success. The choice underlying
our work is set out and motivated against the definitions
used in the existing literature. The chapter also summa-
ries the existing stock of knowledge about the factors
explaining successful consolidation and includes a first
descriptive analysis of fiscal consolidations in the EU.198
Chapter 3 characterises the main differences between
‘normal’ times and years that qualify as years of fiscal
consolidation. The main purpose is to explore the ele-¥1∂ See European Commission (2003).
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fiscal adjustment.
Chapter 4 focuses attention on the features and elements
that separate successful from unsuccessful episodes of
fiscal consolidation. It also identifies the revenue and
expenditure categories that rebound after the end of
unsuccessful episodes.
Chapter 5 summarises and concludes. The main findings
of our analysis are set out against those in the literature.
The Annex presents four country cases: Spain, Italy, the
Netherlands and Hungary. They illustrate the findings of
our statistical analysis but also highlight a number of ele-
ments that are not necessarily captured by the statistical
regularities established in Chapters 3 and 4.199
2. Basic features of successful fiscal 
consolidations
2.1. Introduction
The empirical analysis of fiscal consolidation has
become a distinct and rich field of economic research.
The first comprehensive studies were published in the
mid-1990s starting with the seminal contribution of
Alesina and Perotti (1995). Initially, following up on
previous theoretical work, the focus was primarily on the
question of whether and what type of fiscal consolida-
tion would produce expansionary effects on the aggre-
gate level of economic activity. More recently, also due
to the looming budgetary impact of ageing population,
the focus has shifted towards a more in-depth study of
the factors that are conducive to the success of fiscal con-
solidation. Our study falls within this later line of
research and focuses on the experience in the 27 EU
Member States.
This section sets the scene for our own work in three
steps. In line with the literature, the first step consists in
establishing operational definitions of what is actually
meant by fiscal consolidation and when a consolidation
episode is thought to be successful. We motivate our
choice and compare it with definitions used in the exist-
ing literature. So far no commonly agreed definition has
been established, inter alia because some of the charac-
teristics are chosen as a function of the specific questions
being addressed. The second step is a brief review of the
main findings of the empirical literature on the determi-
nants of fiscal consolidation. It serves as background and
benchmark for our own analysis. The third step portrays
some basic features of the fiscal consolidation episodes
identified in our data sample. It highlights the distribu-
tion of consolidation episodes over time, the frequency
of large and smaller adjustments as well as the overall
success rate.
2.2. Defining episodes of successful fiscal 
consolidation
A definition of successful consolidation involves at least
three different elements: (i) a measure of fiscal consoli-
dation; (ii) a reference period over which a given size of
consolidation is implemented; and (iii) a criterion dis-
criminating between success and failure.
As regards the measure of fiscal consolidation, we use
improvements of the cyclically adjusted primary budget
balance (CAPB), derived as the difference between the
nominal primary balance and the cyclical component of
the budget (1). Interest expenditure is excluded because
it is generally not considered discretionary, unless
exceptional measures to reduce debt are taken.
In the literature, the most commonly used measure is an
indicator proposed by Blanchard (1990). It attempts to
isolate the discretionary components of the primary nom-
inal budget balance while maintaining a certain degree of
simplicity. This is done by calculating the balance that
would have prevailed if the unemployment rate had
remained unchanged with respect to the previous year. In
the 1990s measures of this type were clearly preferred
over more complex indicators involving potential output
estimates such as the CAPB (2). In the meantime, the
CAPB has become the main reference for purging the
budget of its temporary cyclical components. In particu-
lar, it is used by all major international economic organi-
sations including the IMF and the OECD. The cyclically
adjusted budget balance is also the official indicator in the
¥1∂  where  is the nominal primary budget balance,
the sensitivity of the budget with respect to the cycle as measured by the
capbt pbt ε OGt⋅–= pbt
ε200
output gap . For a detailed discussion of the cyclical-adjustment
method used in the EU fiscal framework see European Commission (2004).
¥2∂ See Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Alesina and
Ardagna (1998).
OGt
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effects of discretionary fiscal policy (1).
Possible shortcomings of using changes in the CAPB and
the Blanchard type of indicator as a measure for discre-
tionary fiscal policy are well known. In addition to discre-
tionary fiscal policy measures they can also reflect one-off
and accounting distortions, autonomous revenue fluctua-
tions and growth surprises (2). In our analysis presented in
Section IV.3 and IV.4 we try to address these measure-
ment issues (i) by choosing sufficiently large changes in
the CAPB and (ii) by using specific variables that may
control for at least some of these other factors, notably
data on one-off measures and apparent tax elasticities (3).
As regards the size and timing of consolidation, we
allow for two different types of consolidation episodes.
The first is characterised by a sharp fiscal adjustment
effort concentrated in one single year. By way of con-
trast, the second type is one in which the fiscal correction
is implemented over a longer period.
Definition 1 — Consolidation: a consolidation is an
improvement of the CAPB of at least 1.5 % of GDP
which is either achieved (i) in one single year or (ii) over
a period of three years where in each single year the
improvement of the CAPB is less than 1.5 % of GDP and
the CAPB does not deteriorate by more than 0.5 % of
GDP compared to the year before.
The relatively high threshold of a 1.5 % of GDP
improvement of the CAB was chosen for two reasons.
First and foremost, because of what was just said above
about the ‘noise’ included in observed changes in the
CAB. Large adjustments are unlikely to result from other
factors than discretionary fiscal policy. Second, it is eas-
ier to discern differences in the composition of fiscal
adjustment if the overall correction is larger.
Episodes satisfying at least one of the two conditions in
Definition 1 are consolidation episodes for the purpose
of our analysis. Episodes of the first type will be referred
to as ‘cold shower’ consolidations, to highlight the rela-
tively strong tightening over a period of one calendar
year. Episodes of the second type will be called ‘gradual
consolidations’. It is important to note that the two defi-
nitions are mutually exclusive but a ‘cold shower’
adjustment could be adjacent to a ‘gradual’ episode.
Moreover, the definition of a ‘gradual’ adjustment for-
mally excludes consolidations of more then 4.5 % of
GDP over three years. Consolidations of this type are
treated as successive ‘cold shower’ episodes.
The reason for discriminating between those two types of
consolidation episodes is straightforward. They can be
taken to represent polar cases. In a ‘cold shower’ adjust-
ment the fiscal correction is concentrated in a short period
of time and may potentially reflect a completely different
economic environment as well as different institutional
arrangements than a gradual consolidation episode.
A stylised presentation of the two episodes is provided in
Graph IV.2.1 and Graph IV.2.2.  
The presentation of a ‘cold shower’ consolidation is sim-
ple. Graph IV.2.1 refers to the case in which the mini-
mum adjustment of 1.5 % of GDP is achieved. The pres-
entation of a ‘gradual’ adjustment is slightly more
involved, as it is consistent with several adjustment pat-
terns over a three year period that gives rise to the
required overall minimum adjustment of 1.5 % of GDP.
The solid line refers to the case in which the adjustment
is distributed evenly over the consolidation period. The
two grey lines delimit the range of adjustment patterns
consistent with the definition.
Most existing studies of fiscal consolidation rely on com-
bined definitions, i.e. definitions that include different
combinations of size and in particular time of fiscal adjust-
ment as in Definition 1 (4). The obvious advantage of
combined definitions is to increase the number of consol-
idation episodes for the purpose of the econometric analy-
sis. 
¥1∂ Initially used as an analytical instrument, the CAB was established as a
key instrument of budgetary surveillance under the SGP in March 2003,
when the Ecofin Council adopted conclusions consistent with the recom-
mendations contained in the November 2002 Commission Communication
‘Strengthening the coordination of budgetary policies’ advocating the use
of underlying budget balances. The role of the CAB was further strength-
ened with the reformed Pact in which both the medium-term budgetary
objectives and the adjustment towards them are expressed in cyclically
adjusted terms. The commonly agreed methodology for estimating poten-
tial output and the output gap, which is one of the main inputs to the CAB
used for EU fiscal surveillance, is explained in detail in Part VI of this
report.
¥2∂ Koen and Van den Noord (2005) examine the distortions arising from one-
off measures and accounting issues. Girouard and Price (2004) highlight
the role of autonomous fluctuation in revenues that are not netted-off when201
adjusting the budget for the effect of the cycle. Larch and Salto (2005)
point to the impact of economic growth surprises. 
¥3∂ The impact of autonomous fluctuations on the assessment of fiscal adjust-
ment is described in Section II.2.1 of this report.
¥4∂ This is the case in Alesina and Perotti (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998)
and von Hagen et al.(2002).
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ing criteria:
Definition 2 — Success: a consolidation in line with
than 0.75 % of GDP in cumulative terms compared to
the level recorded in the last year of the consolidation
period. In other words, at least half of the overall mini-
mum fiscal correction required to qualify as consolida-
Graph IV.2.1:  Stylised fiscal consolidation episode: ‘cold shower’ adjustment
Source: Commission services.
Graph IV.2.2:  Stylised fiscal consolidation episode: ‘gradual’ adjustment
NB: The grey solid lines indicate the maximum variation in the CAPB during the adjustment.
Source: Commission services.
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Definition 1 is successful if the following condition
applies: in the three years after the end of the consoli-
dation episode the CAPB does not deteriorate by more
tion has to be safeguarded three years after. A consoli-
dation is deemed unsuccessful if this condition is not
met.
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pared to previous work. It is not linked to the evolution
of the government debt ratio. This was a deliberate
choice so as to avoid the clear head start of high debt
countries to reduce the debt ratio for a given rate of GDP
growth.
As in any alternative, there is of course a certain degree
of arbitrariness in our definitions of consolidation and
success. However, abstracting from a number of specif-
icities concerning the length and size of fiscal adjust-
ment our definition of consolidation shares one impor-
tant feature with those found in the literature. The focus
is on episodes of tight fiscal policy reflecting a marked
change in the fiscal policy stance. As mentioned before,
this ensures that the improvement in the cyclically
adjusted primary balance is genuinely discretionary and
not due to other factors.
However, the choice of excluding smaller adjustments
comes at a price. It basically, rules out longer periods of
moderate fiscal adjustment. In particular, Definition
1 does not allow for adjustment episodes that satisfy the
formal requirements of the reformed SGP (1). Under the
provisions of the preventive arm of the reformed Pact,
Member States that have not yet reached their country-
specific medium-term budgetary objective are expected
to improve the cyclically adjusted budget balance, net of
one-offs and other temporary measures by 0.5 % of GDP
each year as a benchmark (2). The adjustment effort
should be higher in good times and could be lower in bad
times. A minimum annual adjustment of 0.5 % of GDP
is also required for countries in EDP.
These provisions cannot be directly translated into an
operational definition of fiscal consolidation comparable
to the ones set out above. The criteria for success are
clearly given by the achievement of the MTO, but the
period of adjustment is a function of the starting point
and of the cyclical conditions prevailing along the
adjustment path, which allow for a modulation of the
annual adjustment effort. Moreover, the issue of factors
other than discretionary fiscal policy that ‘pollute’
changes in the cyclically adjusted budget balance is
recurrent in the EU budgetary surveillance framework.
In the light of this, we chose a definition that mimics
some of the key elements of the adjustment required
under the provisions of the SGP:
Definition 3 — SGP adjustment: an SGP-type of adjust-
ment is one in which for at least one year the cyclically
adjusted budget balance improves by 0.5 % of GDP or
more.
Definition 3 is applied to the data for illustrative purposes
only. The main focus of our studies, especially of the
econometric analysis, will be on Definition 1 and Defini-
tion 2. The requirements of the reformed SGP are binding
only for the most recent years of the time period covered
by our data and hence, did not constitute a benchmark for
fiscal adjustment in the past. Nevertheless, it may be
instructive to see how the provisions of the reformed Pact
compare with past adjustment patterns.
2.3. Findings from existing literature
A fairly rich literature has emerged on the determinants
and the economic effects of successful fiscal consolida-
tion. In some cases success and economic effects are
covered at the same time. In this section we review the
results concerning the factors that determine the success
of fiscal consolidation.
2.3.1. Results applicable to industrialised countries 
in general
The first comprehensive empirical analysis of fiscal
adjustments is by Alesina and Perotti (1995). It focuses
on OECD countries and sets the foundations for the by
now familiar notion that the composition of adjustment
is crucial for success. In particular, Alesina and Perotti
(1995) find that successful adjustments are mainly
expenditure based, with a focus on primary current
expenditure. The paper also introduces the analysis of
political factors, where single-party governments were
shown to be more successful in carrying out adjustments
than coalitions. Indications about a possible link
between consolidation, labour market performance and
economic activity are also provided.
Precursor studies include Alesina (1988), and Dorn-
busch (1989), who however focus on individual country
cases (Italy and Ireland respectively), and largely
abstract from any issues of composition. In a similar¥1∂ The ‘old’ Pact did not include detailed requirements for annual fiscal203
vein, the issue of how coalition governments affect the
budget balance has been covered earlier in Grilli et al.
(1991), albeit with a primary focus on debt.
adjustment. Member States were merely expected to achieve a close-to-
balance or in surplus position over the cycle.
¥2∂ Article 5, Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, as amended by Regula-
tion (EC) No 1055/2005.
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solidation in industrialised countries matters for success
has been subject of further research, for instance in Mc
Dermott and Westcott (1996), and in Alesina and Perotti
(1996). Their main results are echoed in the more elaborate
paper by Alesina and Perotti (1997), who find that budget-
ary consolidations which focus on reductions in public sec-
tor wages and employment, and transfer payments, were
generally longer-lasting than those which were centred on
tax hikes and reductions in public investment. The reason
why expenditure-based consolidations are found to be
more durable is that they tackle the very items which gen-
erally exhibit a comparatively steep upward trend. The
authors obtain these results on the basis of a full sample of
20 OECD countries covering the period 1960–94.
A further comprehensive benchmark study of fiscal con-
solidation episodes is by Alesina and Ardagna (1998).
They look into 10 OECD country cases from the early
1960s onwards confirming earlier findings that expendi-
ture-based budgetary consolidations, centred on cuts in
public employment, transfers and government wages,
are generally longer-lasting. In this context they also
highlight the labour market channel of successful fiscal
consolidation, arguing that the ‘right’ composition of
adjustment can produce beneficial effects on the labour
market and finally on economic activity by lowering unit
labour costs. The analysis of fiscal consolidation is deep-
ened by looking at additional economic and political fac-
tors. In particular, in some cases devaluations are found
to be helpful for achieving consolidation. A further inter-
esting result is that fiscally responsible governments are
not found to be necessarily penalised at elections.
Ardagna (2004) examines 17 OECD countries from
1975 to 2002 and focuses on new dimensions of fiscal
adjustment such as the size of the budgetary correction,
the rate of real GDP growth and the monetary policy
stance. She finds that the size of the adjustment is more
important than the composition for the likelihood of suc-
cess. However, the composition of budgetary consolida-
tion is characterised as decisive for a consolidation to
produce expansionary effects.
Apart from the purely fiscal issues, over time increasing
attention has been paid to political factors. An early over-
view of these is presented in Alesina et al. (1998). In gen-
eral, single party governments are identified as more
measures are found to be best implemented during the
period soon after an election, when popular support for the
government is still running at high levels. The role of
political leadership (of the Prime Minister and Finance
Minister in particular) in promoting fiscal consolidation
and the way the necessity of consolidation is communi-
cated to the public is often discerned as relevant too.
The increasing focus on political factors is also reflected
in recent case study work, such as the report commis-
sioned by the Bertelsmann foundation, covering in detail
nine country cases for the period 1992–2005. Building
on a very policy-oriented analysis of various economic
and political issues the report comes up with some orig-
inal, albeit strong proposals of how to set the right incen-
tives for consolidation. These include introducing clear
rules for the use of surpluses and augmenting the refer-
ence values of 3 % and 60 % by further criteria.
As to monetary conditions and exchange rates, they have
also been identified as factors that determine the likeli-
hood of success of fiscal consolidations. Ahrend et al.
(2006) find that on average consolidations are more likely
to be successful if monetary policy is accommodating dur-
ing their early phase, and hence counteracts any contrac-
tionary effects of budgetary tightening. In addition, both
short and long-term interest rates are found to be more
likely to fall if the fiscal consolidation is based on cuts in
current spending rather than on tax increases. This is
explained by the fact that implementing politically sensi-
tive expenditure-side measures demonstrates the commit-
ment of the government to consolidation and hence
enhances the credibility of its budgetary strategy.
Lambertini and Tavares (2005) focus on the question of
how exchange rate policies affected fiscal consolidation
in 20 OECD countries between 1970 and 1999. Apart
from confirming the relevance of composition, size, and
the initial level of public debt they find that exchange
rate depreciations or devaluations, which boost compet-
itiveness, have often preceded successful budgetary con-
solidations. From this they infer that fiscal consolidation
will be harder in the economic and monetary union
(EMU), in which by definition the nominal exchange
rate is not available any more as a policy instrument.
2.3.2. EU-specific results
Empirical work on fiscal consolidations in the EU is less204
effective for achieving fiscal consolidation than coali-
tions, while the political alignment of governments hardly
matters. Potentially painful budgetary consolidation
ample. Zaghini (1999) looks into 14 EU country cases (the
EU-15 excluding Luxembourg) for the period between
1970 and 1998, i.e. preceding the inception of the EMU.
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adjustment for success. In addition, he emphasises that the
length of the fiscal adjustment episodes matters for
achieving lasting consolidation while its size does not.
Von Hagen, Hughes-Hallett and Strauch (2002) examine
fiscal consolidations in 20 OECD countries with a par-
ticular focus on 11 euro area countries for the period
1960–98. Overall they confirm the importance of the
composition (dubbed ‘quality’) of adjustment and find
evidence that the size of consolidation can also be impor-
tant for success. Monetary conditions are not found to
matter. However, they detect a sort of positive external-
ity from fiscal consolidation carried out in other coun-
euro area countries, the authors take a closer look at the
experience over the 1990s, but find only limited evi-
dence that the Maastricht fiscal criteria did contribute to
the fiscal consolidations observed. The importance of
centralisation of the budgetary process for achieving fis-
cal discipline and lasting consolidation is emphasised.
Briotti (2004) uses data for the EU-15 Member States
from 1991 to 2002. She confirms established findings
notably concerning the role of the composition of fiscal
adjustment for success as well as the relevance of initial
macroeconomic and fiscal conditions, where the latter
are measured as the debt-to-GDP ratio. She also finds
evidence indicating that the size of the adjustment is
Box IV.2.1: Main determinants of successful fiscal consolidations: 
a synthetic overview of the evidence from previous empirical studies
Determinants Main findings References
Composition of fiscal 
adjustment
Cuts in expenditure are more effective than tax 
increases in making consolidation successful. 
Reductions in public sector employment and 
wages, and in transfers are found to be particularly 
conducive. Thus far, this result represents ‘conven-
tional wisdom’. More recent studies, focusing on 
country cases, provide evidence that both expendi-
ture and revenue-based consolidation can be suc-
cessful.
Alesina and Perotti (1995), Zaghini (1999), v. Hagen 
et al. (2002), Briotti (2004), Lambertini and Tavares 
(2005), Ahrend et al. (2006) Alesina and Perotti 
(1997), Alesina and Ardagna (1998) Bertelsmann 
Foundation (2006).
Size of fiscal adjustment The size of fiscal adjustment is found to be rele-
vant as it may make a consolidation harder to 
reverse. The result is not robust across alternative 
studies and seems to depend on the definition of 
success.
Ardagna (2004), v. Hagen et al. (2002), Briotti 
(2004), Lambertini and Tavares (2005) Alesina and 
Ardagna (1998) Zaghini (1999).
Initial conditions: 
macroeconomic and fiscal 
conditions
The gravity of initial macroeconomic and fiscal 
conditions plays a role, especially in triggering an 
episode of consolidation. It is also found to influ-
ence the success rate of consolidation.
Ardagna (2004), Zaghini (1999), von Hagen et al. 
(2002), Briotti (2004), Lambertini and Tavares 
(2005), Ahrend et al. (2006) Alesina and Ardagna 
(1998).
Monetary stance A number of studies conclude that the monetary 
policy stance is relevant for success as it may 
accommodate consolidation. This conclusion is not 
corroborated in general.
Ahrend et al. (2006), Bertelsmann Foundation 
(2006) v. Hagen et al. (2002) Ardagna (2004), Lam-
bertini and Tavares (2005).
Exchange rate As for the monetary stance, the exchange rate is 
found to matter as it may accommodate consolida-
tion. In particular, depreciations increase the 
chances of success.
Alesina and Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna 
(1998), Lambertini and Tavares (2005).
Rate of GDP growth The findings concerning economic growth are not 
clear cut. There is evidence that accelerating 
growth benefits the rate of success.
Alesina and Perotti (1995), Bertelsmann Founda-
tion (2006) and Ardagna (2004).
Political factors Single-party governments are generally more 
effective than coalitions, while the political align-
ment hardly matters.
Alesina and Perotti (1995), Bertelsmann Founda-
tion (2006).205
tries in the sense that the likelihood of a budgetary con-
solidation to persist increases if it falls within an
international context of consolidation. As regards the
instrumental for success. Moreover, she concludes that
the implementation of the EU fiscal framework has been
successful in promoting budgetary consolidation among
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dation fatigue set in after its inception in 1999.
2.4. Basic features of successful fiscal 
consolidations in the EU
Our sample covers all 27 Member States of the EU. The
time period depends on the availability of the data and is
not the same for all countries. For the EU-15 countries the
period is generally 1970–2006 (1). Significantly shorter
periods, mostly starting in the mid-1990s, are covered for
the recently acceded Member States. The exact sample
length by country is indicated in Table IV.2.1. 
¥1∂ The EU-15 includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Table IV.2.1
Overview of episodes of fiscal consolidation in the EU
 
Type of consolidation
Cold shower No of years Gradual No of years Total No of years Sample period
BE 1977, 1982, 1984, 1993, 2006 5 1985, 1986, 1987, 1996, 1997, 1998 6 11 1971–2006
BG – – 0 2003–06
CZ 2004 1 – 1 1998–2006
DK 1983, 1984, 1986 3 2003, 2004, 2005 3 6 1971–2006
DE 1982, 1989, 2000 3 1983, 1984, 1985, 1992, 1993, 1994 6 9 1971–2006
EE 2000, 2003 2 – 2 1996–2006
IE 1976,1983, 1988, 2004 4 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 4 8 1971–2006
EL 1974, 1982, 1986, 1987, 1991, 1994,
1996, 2005, 2006
9 – 9 1971–2006
ES 1986, 1992, 1996 3 – 3 1971–2006
FR 1996 1 2004, 2005, 2006 3 4 1971–2006
IT 1976, 1982, 1983, 1991, 1992, 1993,
1997
7 – 7 1971–2006
CY 2000, 2004, 2005 3 – 3 1999–2006
LV 1996, 2000 2 2003, 2004, 2005 3 5 1996–2006
LT 1998, 1999 2 – 2 1996–2006
LU 1983, 1985, 1993, 1997 4 1994, 1995, 1996 3 7 1983–87,
1991–2006
HU 1999, 2003 2 2 1998–2006
MT 1999, 2004, 2005 3 2000, 2001, 2002 3 6 1999–2006
NL 1985, 1991, 1993, 1996, 2005 5 1971, 1972, 1973, 1981, 1982, 1983,
1984
7 12 1971–2006
AT 1984, 1996, 1997, 2001 4 – 4 1971–2006
PL 2005 1 – 1 1996–2006
PT 1977, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1992,
2002, 2006
8 – 8 1971–2006
RO 1997, 1998, 1999 3 – 3 1996–2006
SI 2002 1 – 1 2001–2006
SK 1998, 2001, 2003 3 – 3 1997–2006
FI 1976, 1981, 1984, 1988, 1996, 1998,
2000
7 – 7 1971–2006
SE 1971, 1976, 1983, 1987, 1995, 1996 6 1980, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986,
2003, 2004, 2005
9 15 1971–2006
UK 1974, 1980, 1982, 1996, 1997, 1998, 7 – 7 1971–2006206
2000
Total 99 47 146
P a r t  I V
L e s s o n s  f r o m  s u c c e s s f u l  f i s c a l  c o n s o l i d a t i o n sOverall, our data set contains 634 observations of which
146, close to one quarter, qualify as years of consolida-
tion in line with Definition 1 presented in Section 2.2
above. One third of the 146 years of consolidation were
crowned with success in line with Definition 2.
2.4.1. Features and occurrence 
of fiscal consolidation
Table IV.2.1 summarises some basic information organ-
ised by country and more interestingly by type of consol-
idation. It shows a clear prevalence of the ‘cold shower’
type of adjustment, which accounts for around two thirds
of the total number of years in which fiscal consolida-
tions have taken place. ‘Gradual’ adjustments are signif-
icantly less frequent. In actual fact, when choosing the
definition of ‘gradual’ adjustment we noticed that in
practice the CAPB rarely follows a smooth path. In our
EU sample there are only three episodes in which the
CAPB posts an improvement between zero and 1 % of
GDP over three consecutive years. The vast majority
exceed this range.
Hence, the first point to note is that episodes of fiscal
consolidation in line with Definition 1 are generally not
characterised by steady steps of annual adjustment. They
rather follow a pattern of abrupt and sizeable corrections
of more than 1.5 % of GDP, mostly concentrated in one
single year. Even if part of the variance is probably
imputable to elements that are generally not related to
active discretionary fiscal policy measures such as
autonomous variations in tax elasticities or economic
growth surprises, the degree of variation is important.
The frequency distribution of the change in the CAPB
during years of consolidation displayed in Graph IV.2.3
provides telling evidence.
Close to 70 % of the annual improvements exceed 1.5 %
of GDP; one sixth of the years of consolidation fall in the
range of 3 % of GDP and more. The hefty incidence of
very large improvements in one single year is strongly
influenced by the experience of the new or recently
acceded Member States. With a view to EU accession
these countries implemented at times impressive fiscal
adjustments. Almost 30 % of the consolidation years
recoded for the new Member States gave rise to an
annual improvement of the CAPB of 3 % of GDP or
more.
changed significantly over time (see Graph IV.2.4). In
the 1970s and 1980s there was more diversity in the size
of the distribution; especially large annual improve-
ments were carried out relatively frequently. By contrast,
in the 1990s and 2000s a clear convergence towards
‘medium-sized’ annual improvements has taken place.
More than half of the cases are in the range of 1 to 2 %
of GDP, as compared to slightly less than 30 % in the
two previous decades.
This shift across time most probably reflects the
response to major events in the economic environment.
In the early 1980s, public finances had to be brought in
order in the wake of the two negative oil shocks, during
which many countries had accumulated comparatively
large fiscal imbalances also due to the, at the time still
prevailing, view that governments would be in a position
to spend an economy out of a crisis.
The first half of the 1980s, the period after the second oil
price shock, hosts more than one quarter of the overall
number of years of consolidation identified in our sam-
ple (see Graph IV.2.5). After this first major wave, the
number of consolidations dropped significantly in the
second half of the decade in spite of the fact that only a
small share of the corrections implemented in the first
half had turned out to be successful on the basis of our
definition.   
Against this backdrop, and also in view of the conver-
gence process towards the common currency, which
required Member States to bring the deficit and the debt
in line with the thresholds of the Treaty, fiscal consolida-
tion episodes boomed again in the second half of the
1990s, this time with greater success. More than half of
the years of consolidation gave rise to improvements that
were at least in part safeguarded in the three years after
the end of the period. The occurrence of fiscal consolida-
tions remained invariably high in the first six years of the
2000s, but the success rate dropped significantly. This
drop reflects two factors: one formal, the other more of
substance. First, on the basis of our definition success
can only be established three years after the end of the
consolidation period. Hence, the verdict is still out for
episodes that started in 2004 or later. Second, the first
half of the 2000s was characterised by an economic
slowdown that turned out to be much longer and deeper207
In the EU-15 countries the pattern of annual improve-
ments of the CAPB during consolidation episodes
than expected. In this context, consolidation efforts were
successively eroded by repeated negative growth sur-
prises.
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budget balance (CAPB) during consolidation years
Source: Commission services.
Graph IV.2.4:  Frequency distribution of annual improvement in the cyclically adjusted 
budget balance (CAPB) during consolidation episodes in EU-15
Source: Commission services.
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gether 144 episodes in our EU sample that satisfy Defi-
nition 3, i.e. episodes in which the cyclically adjusted
budget balance improved by 0.5 % of GDP or more for
at least one year. More than half of these SGP-type epi-
sodes gave rise to a headline deficit that was consistent
with a stable or declining debt ratio.
As indicated in Graph IV.2.6, the clear majority of the
‘SGP-type’ of consolidations is limited to one year only.
There are very few episodes in which the improvement
of the CAB is sustained over a number of years in a row.
Such protracted episodes are typically linked to pro-
found adjustment processes generally in the wake of
economic crisis and/or regime shifts in fiscal policy-
making. The more general and intuitive point is that the
length of the ‘SGP-type’ of adjustment correlates with
the size of the initial deficit.
Prominent examples of protracted adjustments are Italy
in the beginning of the 1990s, as well as the UK and
Sweden in the second half of the 1990s. In all three
cases, the protracted improvement of the underlying fis-
cal position came after economic difficulties had signif-
icantly worsened the public finance situation of the
country. In Sweden, the adjustment came after the global
of public finances carried over from the 1980s deterio-
rated further in the wake of a recession and the exchange
rate crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. The exchange
rate crisis coupled with weak economic growth also trig-
gered the fiscal adjustment in the United Kingdom. In
the eve of consolidation the deficit had increased to more
than 10 % of GDP in Italy and Sweden and was above
7 % of GDP in the United Kingdom.
2.4.2. Features of successful fiscal consolidation
Success and failure of fiscal consolidation can be
expected to reflect different public finance conditions
and to take place against the backdrop of different mac-
roeconomic situations. They may also give rise to differ-
ent outcomes in terms of both fiscal variables and key
macroeconomic figures.
Tables IV.2.2 and IV.2.3 provide an overview of the
basic differences between successful and unsuccessful
consolidation in the EU on the basis of three successive
stages in time: the period before, during and after fiscal
consolidation. The period before is the two-year period
preceding the first year of the fiscal adjustment. Simi-
larly, the period after is the two-year period following
the last year of the adjustment. The two tables show
period averages.
Graph IV.2.5:  Frequency distribution of consolidation episodes
Source: Commission services.
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economic recession of the early 1990s had been ampli-
fied by a real estate collapse which in turn gave rise to a
financial crisis. In Italy, the already precarious situation
Starting with the fiscal situation, Table IV.2.2 highlights
a number of interesting regularities that are mostly in
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ahead of successful consolidation episodes are on aver-
age in a worse shape than before unsuccessful episodes,
in terms of both the underlying budget balance and the
debt ratio. This pattern would seem to be consistent with
the general finding that difficult starting positions pro-
vide motivation and incentive for more determined con-
solidation efforts. The debt ratio is generally stabilised
after a successful consolidation and the improvement in
the CAPB between before and after the episode is signif-
icantly bigger. In particular, the improvement achieved
by successful consolidations is on average twice as high
as compared to unsuccessful episodes (1).
The figures in Table IV.2.2 also corroborate the well-
known finding related to the composition of fiscal con-
solidation, namely that successful episodes are more
expenditure and less revenue based than unsuccessful
ones. At the end of a successful fiscal consolidation total
primary expenditures net of cyclical factors are on aver-
age almost 2 % of GDP lower than before the episode,
mainly thanks to restraints on current expenditure. Con-
versely, unsuccessful consolidations largely rely on
higher revenues, while primary expenditure net of cycli-
cal factors is on average increased. Particularly striking
is the evolution of the debt. Its average annual increase
is significantly reduced during successful episodes. The
progress is by far smaller during unsuccessful years of
consolidation, partly due to a high and rising debt-
increasing stock-flow adjustment.
The behaviour of the macroeconomic environment
before, during and after fiscal consolidations in the EU is
portrayed in Table IV.2.3. It includes variables describ-
ing aggregate economic activity, price and cost develop-
ments, labour market characteristics as well as some
monetary variables.
Difficult macroeconomic conditions, together with poor
public finances, seem to be a catalyst for successful con-
solidations. In the period preceding them, cyclical condi-
tions, as measured by the output gap, are on average neg-
ative, and the rate of unemployment is higher as
compared to the situation ahead of unsuccessful consol-
idations.
Graph IV.2.6:  Frequency of at least 0.5 % of GDP improvements of the cyclically adjusted primary 
budget balance (CAPB) over consecutive years
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ This result contrasts with the findings of Alesina and Ardagna (1998).
They do not detect any significant difference between successful and
unsuccessful consolidation as regards the improvement in the CAPB from
the period before, to the period after the consolidation. The likely reason
for the divergence in results is the different set of countries covered.210
The situation is reversed during and after the consolida-
tion. Episodes of successful fiscal consolidation start
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) do not examine recently acceded Member
States of the EU, of which, as mentioned in Section IV.2.4.1 above some
have implemented impressive successful consolidations since the mid-
1990s.
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along with a better macroeconomic performance during
and especially after the adjustment is accomplished com-
pared to unsuccessful episodes. Real GDP growth dips
slightly during both successful and unsuccessful consol-
idation phases but seems to recover more briskly after
successful episodes on the back of a recovery of private
consumption and gross fixed capital formation. Linked
while starting from an essentially neutral position in the
cycle, would on average seem to end with a negative out-
put gap. No major change is observed in the unemploy-
ment rate which remains on average higher at the end of
successful episodes.
The behaviour of financial and monetary variables is
also revealing. Long-term real interest rates tend to
Table IV.2.2
Successful and unsuccessful fiscal consolidations — Fiscal conditions and composition of adjustment
 
Successful Unsuccessful
Before During After Diff. Diff. Before During After Diff. Diff.
(a) (b) (c) (b)-(a) (c)-(a) (a) (b) (c) (b)-(a) (c)-(a)
Debt 65.56 71.76 70.14 6.20 4.58 43.72 46.47 46.15 2.75 2.43
(31.10) (33.54) (33.56) (22.94) (24.03) (22.88)
Change in debt 3.20 1.55 0.62 – 1.64 – 2.58 1.76 1.31 1.04 – 0.46 – 0.72
(4.71) (3.83) (4.88) (3.81) (3.43) (3.61)
Stock-flow adjustment 1.38 1.30 1.50 – 0.09 0.11 2.12 2.90 2.72 0.78 0.60
(3.95) (2.82) (3.25) (2.78) (2.99) (3.51)
Primary balance, cycl. adj. – 1.03 1.47 2.37 2.50 3.40 0.14 2.45 1.75 2.31 1.61
(3.16) (2.84) (2.90) (3.47) (3.27) (3.67)
Total revenue, cycl. adj. 43.01 44.20 44.18 1.18 1.16 42.11 45.19 43.96 3.07 1.84
(8.06) (7.51) (7.57) (9.37) (8.59) (8.74)
Total tax burden 38.72 39.98 39.85 1.26 1.13 37.62 38.72 37.98 1.10 0.36
(6.46) (6.61) (6.80) (5.92) (5.71) (6.34)
Total expenditure, cycl. adj. 49.82 49.02 47.98 – 0.80 – 1.83 45.82 46.86 46.22 1.05 0.40
(8.53) (7.74) (7.84) (8.62) (8.26) (7.40)
Total primary expenditure, 
cycl. adj.
44.11 42.80 41.92 – 1.31 – 2.19 42.04 42.79 42.27 0.75 0.23
(7.43) (6.23) (6.16) (7.74) (7.30) (6.73)
Current expenditure 44.48 44.85 43.72 0.38 – 0.76 40.59 42.31 41.44 1.72 0.84
(8.45) (7.73) (7.66) (8.39) (8.26) (7.45)
Consumption expenditure 21.12 20.88 20.50 – 0.25 – 0.62 18.71 18.98 18.69 0.26 – 0.02
(3.71) (3.33) (3.36) (3.29) (3.21) (3.10)
Transfers 27.11 27.01 26.27 – 0.09 – 0.83 24.63 24.60 24.09 – 0.03 – 0.54
(6.74) (5.66) (5.50) (5.07) (4.81) (5.05)
Wages 12.16 12.03 11.85 – 0.13 – 0.32 11.64 12.06 11.66 0.42 0.02
(2.46) (2.26) (2.19) (3.08) (3.24) (2.99)
Investment expenditure 3.13 2.89 2.73 – 0.24 – 0.40 3.33 3.16 3.03 – 0.17 – 0.30
(0.93) (0.89) (0.85) (1.03) (0.94) (0.85)
Subsidies 1.98 1.87 1.66 – 0.12 – 0.32 2.63 2.55 2.53 – 0.08 – 0.10
(1.09) (1.03) (0.98) (1.24) (1.31) (1.30)
Interest expenditure 5.70 6.22 6.06 0.51 0.36 3.69 4.09 3.98 0.40 0.29
 (3.47) (3.53) (3.57) (2.41) (2.31) (2.26)
NB: All variables refer to general government and are expressed in % of GDP. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Source: Commission services.211
to this, successful episodes also seem to weigh less on
cyclical conditions, which on average remain essentially
unchanged. By contrast, unsuccessful consolidations,
decline with successful consolidations, while they edge
up during and after unsuccessful episode. However, in
terms of level they stay on average below those recorded
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 7after successful consolidations. Successful consolidation
also seems to have an easing effect on inflation, which is
not the case for unsuccessful episodes. As regards
depreciation of the currency. Most likely this is due to
the fact that a very large part of successful consolidations
was carried out after the mid-1990s when most EU coun-
Table IV.2.3
Successful and unsuccessful fiscal consolidations — Macroeconomic performance
Successful Unsuccessful
Before During After Diff. Diff. Before During After Diff. Diff.
(a) (b) (c) (b)-(a) (c)-(a) (a) (b) (c) (b)-(a) (c)-(a)
Output gap (% of GDP) – 0.91 – 0.83 – 0.79 0.09 0.12 0.07 – 1.11 – 0.89 – 1.18 – 0.95
(2.48) (2.02) (1.76) (2.32) (2.31) (2.46)
Unemployment rate 
(% of labour force)
9.72 9.83 10.03 0.11 0.31 6.10 6.59 6.58 0.49 0.48
(3.76) (3.53) (3.81) (3.68) (4.04) (3.48)
Real GDP growth 
(% change)
2.89 2.50 3.26 – 0.39 0.36 2.70 1.92 2.83 – 0.78 0.14
(2.24) (2.40) (2.47) (2.73) (2.50) (2.53)
Private consumption 
(% change)
1.58 2.66 3.08 1.08 1.50 2.67 2.13 1.82 – 0.55 – 0.86
(7.94) (2.30) (2.49) (2.77) (2.69) (6.90)
Gross fixed capital 
formation (% change)
– 0.88 – 0.85 0.62 0.03 1.50 0.10 – 1.98 – 0.47 – 2.08 – 0.57
(8.20) (5.68) (6.68) (6.70) (6.69) (7.64)
Export (% change) 7.10 5.44 7.71 – 1.65 0.61 5.60 7.38 7.04 1.78 1.44
(5.87) (7.80) (7.08) (8.53) (6.65) (7.36)
Real effective exchange 
rates (% change)
0.37 1.02 – 0.44 0.65 – 0.81 – 0.43 – 0.11 0.00 0.32 0.44
(5.72) (7.02) (5.86) (6.56) (6.16) (4.80)
Real long-term interest 
rates (%)
5.05 4.19 4.35 – 0.86 – 0.70 2.37 2.69 3.15 0.32 0.78
(2.99) (2.97) (2.93) (3.80) (3.64) (2.68)
Inflation (% change) 7.11 5.12 4.53 – 2.00 – 2.58 8.94 8.04 7.27 – 0.90 – 1.67
(5.90) (4.68) (4.40) (7.00) (7.11) (7.08)
Trade balance (% of GDP) – 1.20 – 0.36 0.04 0.84 1.24 – 1.98 0.33 – 0.20 2.31 1.78
(5.14) (5.11) (5.08) (6.72) (6.97) (6.45)
Real unit labour costs 
(% change)
– 0.78 0.16 – 0.76 0.94 0.02 – 0.04 – 0.42 – 0.37 – 0.38 – 0.33
(4.69) (5.40) (6.27) (7.31) (7.06) (6.78)
Nominal wage (% change) 7.84 7.89 6.32 – 2.20 – 1.52 9.34 8.24 7.50 – 1.10 – 2.82
(8.20) (6.92) (6.49) (11.85) (10.21) (10.77)
Gross saving, private sector 
(% of GDP)
21.80 21.44 20.76 – 0.37 – 1.04 21.52 20.21 20.47 – 1.30 – 1.04
(4.71) (4.42) (4.99) (4.72) (4.56) (4.89)
Net national saving 
(% of GDP)
6.06 6.55 7.13 0.49 1.07 9.79 9.70 9.15 – 0.09 – 0.64
(4.49) (3.86) (4.14) (6.94) (6.03) (6.01)
NB: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Real effective exchange rates are measured as performance relative to the rest of 20 industrial countries; double export
weights. Unit labour cost and nominal wages are in the manufacturing sector.
Source: Commission services.212
exchange rates, our sample does not corroborate the
findings highlighted in a number of existing works
namely that successful consolidation are helped by a
tries were already converging towards the EMU and
tried to keep the exchange rate within the limits required
by the Treaty.
3. The determinants of fiscal consolidation
3.1. Introduction
This chapter takes a closer look at the features of fiscal
consolidation in the EU. Following up on the purely
descriptive analysis of the previous section, the aim is to
explore in detail regularities for a number of dimensions,
notably the start of a consolidation episode and the type
of fiscal adjustment, i.e. ‘gradual’ versus ‘cold shower’.
The list of determinants considered in our work is broader
and more comprehensive compared to existing studies. On
top of the traditional factors such as the macroeconomic
and fiscal conditions prevailing ahead of the consolidation
episode, we also explore the role played by fiscal govern-
ance and structural reforms. The conjecture linked to both,
fiscal governance and structural reforms, is that their
occurrence and quality should have a positive impact on
the probability of triggering fiscal consolidation.
The analysis of a broader set of determinants of fiscal
consolidation compared to the existing literature relies
on data sets of which some were made available only
recently. This is especially the case for indicators of fis-
cal governance and expenditure reforms. A detailed
description of the data sets, including coverage of coun-
tries and time period is provided in Box IV.3.1 below.
Two additional innovations compared to the literature
refer to the composition of fiscal adjustment. First, on
top of the typical distinction between revenue and
expenditure-based fiscal adjustment we use data on ‘fis-
cal gimmickry’ i.e. one-off measures and/or measures
that move budgetary items ‘below the line’. The a priori
is that successful fiscal consolidation should rely less on
‘fiscal gimmickry’ than consolidation that are not suc-
cessful. Second, we examine expenditure data based on
the classification of functions of government (COFOG).
This allows us to better identify the areas in which con-
solidations are taking or not taking place.
light statistically significant differences across distinct
groups. Specifically, it will help us to sketch a typical
profile of years of consolidation versus ‘normal’ times,
of ‘gradual’ versus ‘cold shower’ consolidations and
finally, of successful versus unsuccessful consolida-
tions. The limitation of the mean comparison is that only
one factor, i.e. only one variable, is considered at a time.
With a view to controlling for a range of potential deter-
minants we also use regression analysis. It explores the
likelihood of starting a fiscal consolidation and the like-
lihood of engaging in a particular type of consolidation.
3.2. How do episodes of consolidation 
in the EU compare to ‘normal’ times 
and what triggers them?
The primary purpose of fiscal consolidation consists in
correcting existing imbalances in public finances.
Accordingly, episodes of fiscal consolidation should be
characterised by at least two basic elements: the need for
adjustment and the adjustment itself.
3.2.1. The typical profile of fiscal consolidation
Table IV.3.1 displays the results of a comparison of
means between years of fiscal consolidation and years in
which no consolidation has taken place.
In line with expectations and with the descriptive analy-
sis reported in Section IV.2 the initial conditions of years
of fiscal consolidation are characterised by economic
and fiscal hardship. As regards the fiscal situation, both
the headline deficit and government debt are on average
measurably higher than in ‘normal’ times.
The difference in the headline deficit before consolida-
tions and in ‘normal’ times reflects the combination of
two factors: a worse underlying budgetary position and a
less favourable economic cycle. At the eve of fiscal con-213
In terms of methodology our analysis essentially relies
on two techniques: mean comparison and regression
analysis. The first is a simple and intuitive way to high-
solidations the CAPB has on average dwindled to a mod-
est surplus of 0.3 % of GDP, as compared to a more com-
fortable level of around 1.5 % of GDP in ‘normal’ times.
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Fiscal consolidation in normal times — Mean comparisons
Consolidation No 
consolidation   
Mean value Mean value t-/q-value p-value
Initial macroeconomic and fiscal conditions
Output gap (t–1) % of GDP – 0.52 – 0.64 1.91 0.06
Real GDP growth (t–1) % change 2.58 3.06 1.84 0.07
Inflation (t–1) % change 6.57 7.15 0.62 0.53
Real long–term interest rate (t–1) % 3.48 2.98 – 1.46 0.15
Unemployment rate (t–1) % of labour force 7.59 7.37 – 0.54 0.59
Debt (t–1) % of GDP 55.51 50.17 – 1.81 0.07
Budget balance (t–1) % of GDP – 4.69 – 2.64 5.06 0.00
Actual minus debt stabilising deficit (t–1) % of GDP 0.53 – 0.87 – 3.13 0.00
Primary balance, cycl. adj. (t–1) % of GDP 0.27 1.45 3.53 0.00
Size and composition of fiscal adjustment (% of GDP, change)
Net lending 1.57 – 0.49 – 12.48 0.00
Primary balance, cycl. adj. 2.01 – 0.58 – 18.76 0.00
Total revenue, cycl. adj. 1.18 0.05 – 7.06 0.00
Total expenditure, cycl. adj.  – 0.61 0.57 6.07 0.00
Interest expenditure  0.14 – 0.29 – 3.14 0.00
Consumption expenditure  – 0.10 0.14 2.82 0.01
Wages  – 0.05 0.08 2.53 0.01
Social transfers other than in kind  – 0.02 0.11 1.72 0.09
Social transfers in kind  0.01 0.10 1.62 0.11
Subsidies  – 0.28 – 0.23 0.13 0.90
Investment expenditure  – 0.18 0.01 5.25 0.00
Stock-flow adjustments  0.40 – 0.19 – 2.06 0.04
‘Fiscal gimmickry’ 0.32 0.40 0.63 0.53
Classification of functions of government — COFOG (% of GDP, change)
Defence – 0.04 – 0.06 – 0.27 0.79
Economic affairs – 0.46 0.12 2.89 0.00
Housing and community – 0.16 – 0.01 2.18 0.03
Health 0.06 0.13 1.08 0.28
Education 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.88
Social protection 0.09 0.06 – 0.34 0.73
Public order and safety 0.01 0.01 – 0.10 0.92
General public services – 0.16 – 0.22 – 0.47 0.64
Fiscal governance 
Fiscal rules (index, time average) (1) 0.03 0.08 0.34 0.74
Expenditure rules (index, time average) (1) 0.27 0.12 – 1.03 0.31
Budget procedures (2) – 0.03 – 0.02 0.03 0.98
Fiscal council (dummy) 0.34 0.38 0.30 0.59
Contract versus delegation country (dummy) (3) 0.66 0.56 2.08 0.15
Structural reforms (dummies) (4)
Pension reform  (RDBF) 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.60
Reform of  employment protection legislation (RDBF) 0.20 0.17 0.25 0.62
Reform of stricter unemployment benefits (RDBF) 0.50 0.35 4.09 0.04
Labour market reform (IMF, 2004) 0.27 0.25 0.15 0.70
Product market reform (IMF, 2004) 0.36 0.30 0.97 0.32
Expenditure reforms 0.33 0.21 6.41 0.01
Ambitious expenditure reforms (5) 0.25 0.12 11.28 0.00214
Strengthening the Minister for Finance  0.10 0.04 6.23 0.01
Fiscal contracts 0.09 0.06 1.02 0.31
(Continued on the next page)
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Fiscal council 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.95
Improved parliamentary control over budget 0.07 0.01 12.46 0.00
Multi-year budget planning  0.14 0.05 12.76 0.00
Expenditure ceilings 0.12 0.05 6.98 0.01
Deficit/surplus rule 0.07 0.02 9.12 0.00
Pension reform  0.09 0.02 9.34 0.00
Labour market reform  0.19 0.08 12.45 0.00
Tax reform/cuts  0.17 0.09 6.53 0.01
Wage-setting reform  0.04 0.02 1.01 0.31
 Wage moderation 0.06 0.05 0.29 0.59
NB: (1) Index of coverage and strength of rule (see Box IV.3.1).
(2) Index of quality of budget procedures (see Box IV.3.1). 
(3) The dummy takes the value 1 for contract States. The classification is based on von Hagen et al. (2001, 2002, 2005) and Yläoutinen (2004). 
(4) See Box IV.3.1 for a detailed description of the variables.
(5) Combinations of ambitious expenditure reforms and structural reforms . For dummies the mean values  for the two groups are compared with a chi-square-test, and
the value given in the table is the q-value. For the other variables a t-test is used, and the value given is the t-value. The corresponding p-value is given to both tests. 
Source: Commission services.
Box IV.3.1: Indicators of determinants of fiscal consolidation
Fiscal governance
• Fiscal rules (coverage and strength): index summarising, for each Member State, the information on what part of general
government finances is covered by numerical rules for the deficit and the debt (measured as the share of government
expenditure of the general government sub-sector to which the rule applies in total general government expenditure). All
numerical rules are aggregated. In case of overlap (same government subsector covered by several rules), different
weights are applied. Secondly the strength of each fiscal rule is calculated taking into account five criteria: the statutory
base of the rule; whether there is an independent monitoring; the nature of the institution responsible for enforcement;
the existence of pre-defined enforcement mechanisms; and media visibility. The fiscal rule index is calculated by mul-
tiplying the share of government finances covered by the rule with the index of the strength of the rule. Country cover-
age: EU-25. Time period: 1990–2005.
Source: Commission services, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs.
• Expenditure rules (coverage and strength): index, constructed following exactly the same methodology as for fiscal rules
but limited to expenditure rules, thus combining the measurement of the share of government finances covered by
expenditure rules, with that of the strength of those rules. Country coverage: EU-25. Time period: 1990–2005. 
Source: Commission services, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs.
• Budgetary procedures: a synthetic index taking into account the features of the national budget procedures. The index is
aggregated from six sub-indexes covering the following dimensions: Budget transparency, multiannual planning hori-
zon, centralisation of the budget process, top-down budgeting, prudent economic assumptions and reserves and perform-
ance budgeting. The index is calculated by finding the average of the standardised (average 0, standard deviation 1)
scores on the sub-index. The score on each sub-index is derived from the unweighted average score on from four to eight
questions concerning that particular dimension. The construction of the indicator is further explained in Section II.3.
Note to that description that fiscal rules are not included in the index used for this purpose, since the fiscal rule index is
used separately. Data source: OECD/World Bank budget practices and procedures database (2003). Country coverage:
18 EU Member States. Time period: 2003.
Source: Commission services, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs.
Structural reforms
• Expenditure reforms: based on information provided in Hauptmeier et al. (2006) the index was computed by the Commis-
sion services using self-constructed dummies indicating ambitious or timid expenditure reforms as well as combinations of
expenditure reforms and other types of reforms measures. Country coverage: 21 OECD countries. Time period: 1960–2007.
Source: Hauptmeier et al. (2006) and Commission services.215
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GDP growth, higher interest rates and somewhat higher
unemployment, which taken together put additional
weight on the budget balance and heighten the need for
adjustment.
During episodes of fiscal consolidation the CAPB
improves on average by 2 % of GDP per year, whereby
more than half is achieved thanks to higher revenues. In
‘normal’ times the CAPB deteriorates by around 0.6 %
of GDP almost exclusively on the back of expenditure
increases; final consumption expenditure including
wages and transfers other than in kind (i.e. mainly pen-
sions) are the main drivers.
Interestingly, there is no statistically significant differ-
ence in the recourse to ‘fiscal gimmickry’. Using the data
set of Koen and Van den Noord (2005), which covers the
10 year period 1993–2003, the incidence of temporary
deficit-reducing measures of on average 0.3 % of GDP
in years of fiscal consolidation is actually slightly lower
than in ‘normal’ years.
A breakdown of expenditure in terms of the classifica-
tion of functions of government (COFOG), which so far
has not been considered in the literature, reveals some
noteworthy patterns (1). The mean comparison in Table
IV.3.1 shows that the brunt of expenditure cuts during
years of consolidation is essentially borne by two cate-
gories: expenditure for economic affairs and expenditure
COFOG categories. This is especially true for expendi-
ture on education, health and social protection, which
incidentally continue to increase in per cent of GDP dur-
ing consolidations, as they do during ‘normal’ times.
In the EU average, expenditure for economic affairs
amounts to about one 10th of total expenditure. In terms
of composition the largest items are subsidies, gross
fixed capital formation (mostly basic infrastructure such
as roads and bridges), capital transfers and intermediate
consumption which together amount to three quarter of
the total. Subsidies are generally more difficult to cut, as
evidenced by the fact that in our sample the annual
change in the overall national accounts aggregate is on
average the same in years of consolidation and ‘normal’
times and normally rather small. The political economy
aspect is relatively evident, as subsidies generally go to
relatively strong and well-defined constituencies. Hence,
savings under the functional heading economic affairs
are more likely to come from fixed capital formation and
non-wage consumption expenditure.
The contribution to fiscal consolidation from expendi-
ture on housing and community amenities is somewhat
Box IV.3.1 (continued)
• Labour market reform: labour market index consisting of the unweighted average of indicators of employment restric-
tion, unemployment benefit replacement rate and benefit duration. The index is normalised in such a way to be between
0 and 1 and to increase as labour market restrictions are reduced. Original data source: Nickell and Nunziata (2001),
Labour Market Institutions Database and data used in OECD (2003), World Economic Outlook, April, Ch. IV. Country
coverage: EU-14 except Greece. Time period: 1970–98. 
Source: IMF (2004).
• Product market reform: index measuring entry barriers, public ownership, market structure, vertical integration and price
controls in public utilities and transport services. The index is normalised in such a way to be between 0 and 1 and to
increase as product market restrictions are reduced. Original data source: Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). Country cov-
erage: EU-14 except Greece. Time period: 1975–98. 
Source: IMF (2004).
• Reforms of public pension systems, employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits: data indicating the
years in which reforms of the three types were approved by parliament and the major characteristics of the reforms.
Country coverage: EU-14. Time period: 1985–2005.
Source: Fondazione Rodolfo de Benedetti (FRDB).
¥1∂ COFOG data are available from 1995 onward only. The two-digit classifi-
cation of functions of government (COFOG) comprises 10 divisions: gen-
eral public services; defence; public order and safety; economic affairs;
environmental protections; housing and community amenities; health; rec-
reation, culture and religion; education; social protection. For details see
the Internet site of the United Nations Statistics Division. Of the 10 catego-216
for housing and community amenities. There are no sta-
tistically significant differences between years of con-
solidation and ‘normal’ times in the changes of the other
ries we do not consider environmental protection and recreation, culture
and religion, because in the EU average they represent only around 2 % of
total expenditure. For details see: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/
regcst.asp?Cl=4&Lg=1 
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ties carried out by local authorities such as water supply,
street lighting, and housing development. A possible
explanation for the significant decline of this category
during years of consolidation is that sales of real estate,
which are a typical example of so-called one-off opera-
tions, are recorded under this heading (1).
Episodes of fiscal consolidation may or may not be cou-
pled to other economic policy measures notably struc-
tural reforms. A priori there could be trade-offs as well
as complementarities. The trade-offs would reflect the
fact that some reforms have a direct budgetary cost. By
the same token, reforms and consolidation could also be
considered to be complementary on the grounds that
some reforms release weight from the expenditure side
of the budget, such as a reform of social transfers. A
comprehensive discussion of the issue was provided in
Deroose and Turrini (2005) and European Commission
(2005a). The analysis was based on indicators for labour
and product market reforms used in IMF (2004) and pen-
sion reform indicators reporting the year of adoption and
the main characteristics of the reform. At the time, some
evidence was found that consolidations do not preclude
structural reforms. More specifically, structural reforms
do not happen less frequently in years of fiscal consoli-
dation.
The present study broadens the view on the link between
structural reforms and fiscal consolidation by taking into
account new data on expenditure reforms enacted in
21 OECD countries over the period 1960–2007, where the
last two years represent forecasts. The data refer to Haupt-
meier et al. (2006) (2). Depending on the degree of effort,
expenditure reforms are divided into two categories:
‘ambitious’ and ‘timid’ expenditure reforms. Ambitious
reforms are identified as episodes in which the primary
spending ratio is reduced by at least 5 % of GDP over
seven years. Timid reforms are episodes in which the
reduction is less than 5 % of GDP, again over a seven-
year period. Clearly, such definitions are potentially over-
lapping with our definition of consolidation with one big
exception; they refer to expenditures only and, hence,
depending on what happens on the revenue side may more
or less intersect with fiscal consolidation as measured by
the improvement of the primary budget balance.
However, what makes the data set interesting is that
ambitious reforms are further divided into several sub-
categories depending on whether they were accompa-
nied by structural reforms. This gave us the possibility to
construct indicators that take the value one in case an
ambitious expenditure reform went hand in hand with
other specific policy measures such as changes in the
institutional arrangements concerning fiscal policymak-
ing or structural reforms of the labour market (3).
The results of a mean comparison for the indicators of
expenditure reforms are also reported in Table IV.3.1.
As expected expenditure reforms are enacted more fre-
quently during years of fiscal consolidation, indicating
that they are generally not offset by contemporaneous
tax cuts. The difference is even more significant for
‘ambitious’ expenditure reforms. Among the comple-
mentary measures that accompany ‘ambitious’ reforms
only three types do not seem to be particularly linked to
consolidation episodes, namely the introduction of fiscal
contracts as well as wage-setting reforms or measures
aimed at achieving wage moderation.
3.2.2. The likelihood to start a fiscal consolidation
A final set of elements that may potentially shape fiscal
consolidations and which have not been studied so far, are
fiscal rules, institutions and budgetary procedures, i.e. ele-
ments of fiscal governance. A comprehensive database
covering features of fiscal governance has been built by the
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of
the European Commission over the past few years. It
includes all EU Member States and covers the period
1990–2005. The most developed section of the database is
on fiscal rules. It formed the basis of the analysis presented
in European Commission (2006a) and in Ayuso et al.
(2006). The indicators of fiscal rules are relatively com-
plex. They are constructed in such a way as to capture not
only the existence of rules, but also its strength and the
fraction of general government finances covered by the
rule. Similarly, the indicators of budgetary procedures
encompass a number of dimensions such as transparency,
level of centralisation and prudence. A brief description of
the database and its content is in Box IV.3.1 (4).
A priori, the presence and quality of fiscal rules, institu-
tions and budgetary procedures should not be a discrim-217
¥1∂ For a detailed discussion of one-off and other temporary measures see
European Commission (2006a).
¥2∂ We thank Ludger Schuknecht for making the data available to the Com-
mission services.
¥3∂ A detailed description of the data set is provided in Box IV.3.1. 
¥4∂ A detailed description of the database of fiscal rules is provided in Euro-
pean Commission (2000) and European Commission (2002).
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mal’ times. Unless they are put in place during fiscal
corrections, as gauged by the indicators of Hauptmeier et
al. (2006), they rather describe a state of the world that
does not necessarily change with fiscal performance.
However, rules, institutions and procedures are likely to
help trigger and carry through consolidations whenever
the fiscal performance deteriorates as compared to coun-
tries or years in which such arrangements are not present.
This assumption is supported by the results of probit
regressions on panel data that explore the link between
the probability to start a fiscal consolidation and a
number of potential determinants (see Table IV.3.2). In
addition to a baseline specification, which includes the
initial headline deficit and the cyclical stance, the probit
regressions were run by groups of thematic variables
notably, fiscal governance, political factors and struc-
tural reforms (1). The obvious gain vis-à-vis a simple
mean comparison is that regressions permit control for a
number of variables simultaneously.
As regards fiscal governance, the likelihood of starting a
fiscal consolidation increases with the coverage and the
strength of numerical fiscal rules and with the quality of
budgetary procedures. Not all indicators are significant,
most probably due to multi-collinearity. For instance, the
summary indicator of budgetary procedures turns highly
significant if the indicators of fiscal rules are not
included in the regression indicating that countries with
a high score on fiscal rules also rank high in terms of
budgetary procedures.
The probit regressions also reveal a number of other fac-
tors that act as catalyst for fiscal consolidation. The
‘usual suspects’ identified in previous studies are clearly
the initial level of the deficit and the cyclical stance.
Large deficits and unfavourable cyclical conditions sig-
nificantly increase the likelihood of fiscal adjustment.
This result is robust across alternative specifications of
the probit regression and corroborates the patterns
brought to light by our descriptive analysis and the mean
comparison. It is also in line with the political economy
¥1∂ The approach of running probit regressions sequentially for a baseline
specification plus separate groups of variables is dictated by the need to
have a well-behaved maximum likelihood solution.
Table IV.3.2
Probability of starting a fiscal consolidation
Explanatory variables Estimated 
coefficient p-value No of obs.
Baseline
Initial conditions
Budget balance % of GDP – 3.84 0.00 466
 Output gap (t–1) % of GDP 2.32 0.02 466
Political factors
Elections (t–1), dummy 1.41 0.16 417
Size of majority in parliament 0.48 0.63 417
Fiscal governance (1)
Fiscal rules (average), index 0.83 0.41 230
Expenditure rules (average), index 1.47 0.14 230
Budgetary procedures, index 2.09 0.04 213
Structural reforms (1)
Pensions (RDBF), dummy – 0.66 0.51 216
Employment protection legislation (RDBF), dummy – 0.11 0.91 216
Unemployment benefits (RDBF), dummy 2.26 0.02 216
Labour market (IMF, 2004), dummy 1.90 0.06 258
Product market (IMF, 2004), dummy – 0.33 0.75 258
NB: (1) See Box IV.3.1 for detailed description of the indicators. Estimation method: probit regression on panel data. On top of the baseline specification, regressions
were run sequentially by adding variables. Estimated coefficients represent the marginal contribution of the explanatory variable (measured at sample mean) to the218
probabiliy of starting a fiscal consolidation enacting a gradual rather than a 'cold shower' adjustment. All equations include country-specific constants, whose coef-
ficient, significant in most cases, is not reported.
Source: Commission services.
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things generally have to get bad to induce policy
action (1). Our results are less clear cut as regards the role
played by the economic cycle as measured by the output
gap. The sign of the estimated coefficient conflicts with
the general expectation that economic hardship may act
as a catalyst for consolidation. It actually suggests that
corrections are more likely to be launched when the out-
put gap is positive. This result needs to be qualified in at
least two respects. First, the sign of the estimated coeffi-
cient changes and turns out in line with expectations if
the economic cycle of the year in which the consolida-
tion starts is used. Second, output gap estimates availa-
ble in real time are typically revised as additional data
become available, meaning that the ex post output gap
used in our regression analysis or similar studies may not
necessarily reflect the assessment of the cycle at the
moment the consolidations are undertaken. Finally, the
indications from the mean comparison suggest that a
series of other indicators, which are much less prone to
revisions, such as real growth, unemployment rate and
real interest rate are all less favourable ahead of consol-
idations than in ‘normal’ times. Turning to structural
reforms, it was already mentioned before that they may
both conflict with and foster fiscal consolidation depend-
ing on whether they imply direct budgetary costs or sav-
ings. Our regression analysis provides some evidence
that specific structural reforms can indeed increase the
probability to begin fiscal adjustment. In particular, the
approval by parliament of reforms that reduce the gener-
osity of unemployment benefits turns out to be an impor-
tant and statistically significant factor for prompting fis-
cal consolidation. A similar result is obtained for the
more general indicator of labour market reforms of the
IMF (2004). The causality implied by these result is not
clear cut. It could simply signal that consolidations tend
to go along with changes in some expenditure categories,
in particular unemployment benefits. It could also mean
that reforms in general are a good predictor of the gen-
eral willingness of fiscal policymakers to bring in order
public finances. The evidence for the second conjecture
is mixed. The approval of reforms that loosen employ-
ment protection legislation as measured by the indicators
of the Fondazione Rodolfo de Benedetti (FRDB) (see
Box IV.3.1) have a small positive effect on the kick-off
probability yet the link is not significant at conventional
levels. The same holds for the summary indicators of
product market reforms constructed by the IMF (2004).
The estimated impact of pension reforms, as measured
by the indicators of the Fondazione Rodolfo de Bene-
detti (FRDB) is also not statistically significant. The
negative sign would tend to suggest, that after control-
ling for the initial level of the headline deficit and for ini-
tial cyclical conditions the approval of pension reforms
tends to diminish the likelihood of fiscal consolidation
being started. However, this result cannot be attributed
to a potentially negative short-term budgetary impact of
pension reforms. The pension reform indicator used in
our regression refers to the approval and not the imple-
mentation of the reform. Hence, to the extent that the full
implementation of reforms takes time there should be no
conflict between costs of systemic pension reforms and
fiscal adjustment effort. In addition, most of the pension
reforms included in the data set used for our regressions
are rather incremental in nature, i.e. they impact on a part
of an existing system instead of overhauling it com-
pletely. The estimated negative impact of pension
reforms on the chances to start a fiscal consolidation is
more likely to reflect political economy elements. In par-
ticular, it is preferable to stagger major fiscal policy
measures rather than to overburden the electorate that
must support the reforms.
The evidence concerning the role of political factors as
measured by the occurrence of parliamentary elections
and the strength of the ruling coalition in parliament is in
line with expectation but weak. In theory, the likelihood
of fiscal consolidations should increase immediately
after parliamentary elections, i.e. at the beginning of a
new political term, as well as with the strength of the
political backing of the government in parliament. The
estimated impact of both variables after controlling for
the initial size of the headline deficit and cyclical condi-
tions has the expected sign but their statistical signifi-
cance is relatively weak especially as regards the size of
the majority of the ruling coalition in parliament.
3.3. What explains the difference between 
‘cold shower’ and ‘gradual’ 
consolidations?
In Section IV.4 below, when discussing the determinants
of success it will be shown that, based on our empirical
analysis, the type of consolidation, i.e. ‘cold shower’
versus ‘gradual’, does not significantly affect the proba-219
bility of success. Nevertheless, separate probit regres-
sions on the determinants of gradual adjustments reveal
a number of insightful patterns which will be briefly¥1∂ See Drazen (2000) for an overview of the literature.
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reported in Table IV.3.3.
As a first important point, the likelihood of engaging in
a ‘gradual’ rather than a ‘cold shower’ type of adjust-
ment significantly increases if the adjustment comes
closely after an earlier episode of consolidation, specifi-
cally within a period of three years. This result is quite
intuitive suggesting that in terms of political feasibility
there is the tendency not to overburden the electorate and
the economy with a close sequence of large and short-
lived episodes of fiscal corrections.
Similarly, the probability of a ‘gradual’ adjustment
increases with the gravity of the initial cyclical condi-
tions as measured by the output gap. This link is to be
judged against the background of the potentially or per-
ceived restrictive effects of fiscal consolidation. If the
prevailing economic conditions are already difficult the
decision to implement a fiscal consolidation is more
likely to translate in a gradual adjustment plan than into
a ‘cold shower’ therapy so as to spread out the possible
weight on economic activity and to make it more palata-
ble to the electorate (1).
A third interesting result refers to the composition of the
expenditure restraints. Fiscal consolidations that rely
strongly on a reduction of government wages are more
likely to be of the gradual type. The explanation for this
should be relatively straightforward. Fiscal policymak-
ers will generally face the resistance of public servants,
¥1∂ The gravity of the fiscal situation as measured by the difference between
the actual and the debt stabilising deficit seems to reduce the probability of
a gradual adjustment suggesting that fiscally bad times are catalysts of
harsher corrections.
Table IV.3.3
Probability of a gradual fiscal consolidation
Explanatory variables Estimated 
coefficient p-value No of obs.
Baseline 
Initial conditions
Actual minus debt stabilising deficit (t–1) % of GDP – 1.10 0.27 124
Output gap (t–1) % of GDP – 1.10 0.27 124
Consolidation in three preceding years (dummy) 4.39 0.00 124
Composition of adjustment (change, % of GDP)
 Cyclically adjusted primary expenditure 3.65 0.00 124
Government wage bill – 2.34 0.02 124
Government investment expenditure 2.97 0.00 124
Government final consumption expenditure – 1.09 0.28 124
Subsidies – 2.19 0.03 124
Transfers other than in kind – 1.84 0.07 124
Transfers in kind – 1.65 0.10 124
Political factors
Elections (t–1), dummy 0.08 0.94 116
Size of majority in parliament – 0.76 0.45 116
Fiscal governance (1)
Fiscal rules (time average), index 0.21 0.83 50
Expenditure rules (time average), index 1.20 0.23 50
Budgetary procedures, index – 0.78 0.44 50
Structural reforms (1)
Expenditure reforms, dummy 0.18 0.85 102
Ambitious expenditure reforms, dummy 0.36 0.72 102
NB: (1) See Box IV.3.1 for detailed description of the indicators. Estimation method: probit regression on panel data. On top of the baseline specification, regressions
were run sequentially by adding variables. Coefficients represent marginal contribution of the explanatory variable (measured at sample mean) to the probabiliy of220
enacting a gradual rather than a 'cold shower' adjustment. All equations include country-specific constants, whose coefficent, significant in most cases, is not
reported.
Source: Commission services.
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interest group, to abrupt and large reductions in the sal-
ary or number of employees. A similar reasoning applies
to cuts in subsidies or transfers other than in kind (i.e.
mostly pensions). The estimated coefficients of these
two expenditure categories are also positive and statisti-
cally significant signalling that large savings are more
likely to be achieved in the context of a ‘gradual’ fiscal
adjustment.
The political economy dimensions underlying these
results are well known and have been extensively
explored in the literature under the heading of vested inter-
ests. Strong policy measures, in our specific case expend-
iture cuts, that affect well-defined or powerful constituen-
cies will encounter fiercer opposition as opposed to
measures that concern a broader and heterogeneous
group. As a corollary of this, it will generally be more dif-
ficult to implement them via a ‘cold shower’ approach. A
gradual approach increases the political feasibility.
By contrast, large cuts in expenditure items that do not
relate to well-defined constituencies, typically invest-
ment expenditure, are more likely to be implemented
during ‘cold shower’ episodes. The estimated coefficient
relating to government investment expenditure in the
respective probit regression reported in Table IV.3.3 has
the correct (positive) sign and is highly significant.
Hence, after controlling for initial conditions and the
overall contribution of primary expenditure cutbacks of
investment expenditure are more characteristic for short
and sharp consolidation episodes.
The role of political factors, fiscal governance and struc-
tural reforms, seems to be limited to the start and success
of fiscal consolidation. The estimated coefficients of fis-
cal rules and structural reforms have mostly a positive
sign, suggesting that structural reforms and better gov-
ernance give rise to a more measured pace of fiscal con-
solidation. However, the results are not statistically sig-
nificant.221
4. The determinants of success
4.1. Introduction
In the previous section attention was focused on the ele-
ments that trigger fiscal consolidation and that determine the
type of adjustment. We now turn to the question of what
makes fiscal consolidation successful and, if not, which
budgetary components are responsible for the slippage.
In our sample, roughly one out of three consolidation
episodes turns out to be successful on the basis of our
definition, i.e. half of the minimum improvement of the
CAPB of 1.5 % of GDP is safeguarded three years after
the end of the consolidation. The success rate is slightly
higher for ‘cold shower’ episodes than for ‘gradual’ con-
solidations. However, the difference does not turn out to
be statistically significant.
The analysis of success is analogous to the one of the pre-
vious section. We first start by comparing the episodes of
successful and unsuccessful fiscal consolidations identi-
fied in our sample for a number of macroeconomic and
fiscal variables. This gives us a first overview of the char-
acteristics of success. After that we proceed to a more
detailed and advanced analysis of the factors that are con-
ducive to improve the probability of success.
Also in line with the previous section we screen a list of
potential determinants that is significantly broader com-
pared to that found in the literature. In particular, we exam-
ine the role played by fiscal governance, including budget-
ary procedures, and structural reforms in improving or
deteriorating the chances of success. The expectations are
that a fiscal consolidation is more likely to be successful if it
is carried out in the framework of strong and effective fiscal
governance and/or it is accompanied by structural reforms.
4.2. The typical profile of successful 
consolidations
idations that do not produce a lasting correction of the
underlying deficit. As shown in Table IV.4.1, the output
gap is somewhat more negative, real interest rates are sig-
nificantly higher and a significantly higher percentage of
the labour force is unemployed as compared to unsuccess-
ful episodes. Similarly, the initial level of the headline def-
icit and the debt ratio are also considerably higher. This,
together with the findings related to the elements that trig-
ger fiscal consolidation confirms that the gravity of the
initial economic and fiscal conditions plays a dual role. It
increases the likelihood of prompting a fiscal consolida-
tion episode and seems to have an effect on the resolve
and efficacy of the fiscal adjustment.
The difference in terms of the overall size of the budget-
ary correction is measurable yet not statistically signifi-
cant. The annual average improvement of the CAPB dur-
ing successful episodes is 2.3 % of GDP, as opposed to
1.9 % of GDP in years of unsuccessful episodes. A much
more important and familiar difference concerns the
composition of the budgetary adjustment. Successful
consolidations are significantly less revenue and signifi-
cantly more expenditure based than unsuccessful epi-
sodes. The average annual reduction in total primary
expenditure net of cyclical factors enacted during suc-
cessful episodes is more than 1.2 % of GDP, five times
higher than during unsuccessful episodes. A relatively
large part of the expenditure restraint weighs on final
consumption expenditure including wages, followed by
cuts on investment, transfers and subsidies. All this is
broadly in line with the findings of previous studies, con-
firming that the durability of fiscal consolidation is
linked with the ability to control expenditure.
Contrary to our expectations the recourse to ‘fiscal gim-
mickry’ does not seem to be a typical attribute of unsuc-
cessful fiscal consolidations. Although not statistically
significant, the annual average incidence of such meas-222
Successful consolidations are on average started under
more difficult economic and fiscal conditions than consol-
ures expressed in per cent of GDP was actually some-
what higher during adjustments that produced a lasting
correction. However, this result needs to be interpreted
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Noord (2005) is one of the most comprehensive invento-
ries of its kind, it is still not exhaustive. For instance, it
does not capture the effect of temporary expenditure
freezes, which contribute to a fiscal correction in a given
year and give rise to a rebound in following year. It also
excludes measures with an impact of less than 0.1 % of
GDP.
Table IV.4.1
Episodes of fiscal consolidation — Mean comparisons
Successful Unsuccessful   
Mean value Mean value t-/q-value p-value
Initial macroeconomic and fiscal conditions
Output gap (t–1) % of GDP – 0.65 – 0.32 0.74 0.46
Real GDP growth (t–1) % change 2.71 2.38 – 0.73 0.47
Inflation (t–1) % change 5.91 7.92 1.72 0.09
Real long–term interest rate (t–1) % 4.92 2.79 – 3.40 0.00
Unemployment rate (t–1) % of labour force 9.52 6.26 – 4.64 0.00
Debt (t–1) % of GDP 70.21 46.55 – 4.36 0.00
Budget balance (t–1) % of GDP – 7.16 – 3.42 5.13 0.00
Actual minus debt stabilising deficit (t–1) % of GDP 1.88 – 0.52 – 2.95 0.00
Primary balance, cycl. adj. (t–1) % of GDP – 0.78 0.97 2.72 0.01
Size and composition of fiscal adjustment (% of GDP, change)
Net lending 1.92 1.28 – 2.07 0.04
Primary balance, cycl. adj. 2.25 1.92 – 1.13 0.26
Total revenue, cycl. adj. 0.90 1.40 1.68 0.10
Total expenditure, cycl. adj.  – 1.10 – 0.22 2.33 0.02
Interest expenditure  0.24 0.13 – 1.01 0.32
Consumption expenditure  – 0.17 0.08 1.67 0.10
Wages  – 0.06 – 0.01 0.52 0.60
Social transfers other than in kind  – 0.13 0.10 1.74 0.08
Social transfers in kind  0.01 0.07 0.61 0.54
Subsidies  – 0.05 0.01 1.06 0.29
Investment expenditure  – 0.16 – 0.22 – 0.91 0.36
Stock-flow adjustment 0.14 0.64 0.85 0.40
 'Fiscal gimmickry' 0.40 0.23 – 1.11 0.28
Classification of functions of government — COFOG (% of GDP, change)
Defence – 0.02 – 0.01 0.12 0.90
Economic affairs – 0.43 – 0.11 1.50 0.14
Housing and community – 0.29 – 0.03 1.08 0.29
Health 0.07 0.02 – 0.47 0.64
Education 0.00 0.04 0.67 0.51
Social protection 0.02 0.19 1.05 0.30
Public order and safety 0.01 0.02 0.43 0.67
General public services – 0.08 – 0.42 – 1.59 0.12
Fiscal governance 
Fiscal rules (index) (1) 0.48 – 0.34 – 3.23 0.00
Expenditure rules (index) (1) 0.14 0.40 0.81 0.42
Budget procedures (2) 0.17 – 0.36 – 1.62 0.11
Fiscal council (dummy) 0.46 0.17 4.93 0.03
Contract versus delegation country (dummy) (3) 0.63 0.65 0.04 0.84
Structural reforms (dummies) (4)223
Pension reform  (RDBF) 0.31 0.14 2.21 0.14
Reform of  employment protection legislation (RDBF) 0.25 0.14 1.04 0.31
(Continued on the next page)
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ful and unsuccessful years of consolidation gives rise to a
clear cut picture. Both dimensions considered in our work,
that is fiscal rules and budgetary procedures make a differ-
ence. Their presence and quality turn out to be an impor-
tant characteristic of success. An interesting detail and
exception in relation to aspects of fiscal governance con-
cerns the widely used classification introduced by Haller-
berg and von Hagen (1999) between the delegation and
the contract states. Delegation States entrust decision-
making and enforcement power to the Minister for
Finance, who has a strong capacity to implement the
budget, including taking corrective measures. In contract
States fiscal policy is based on pre-commitments among
the parties of the ruling coalition. As a renegotiation of the
commitment may be costly, in the event the implementa-
tion of the budget gets off track, contract solutions are
thought to be less apt to effectively deal with the correc-
tion of fiscal imbalances (see Strauch et al., 2004). This
conjecture is not confirmed by our EU sample. Contract
and delegation governments are equally distributed across
success and non-success of fiscal consolidation.
The prima facie evidence in relation to structural reforms
correction of the deficit. This result is relatively robust
across the three different sets of indicators of structural
reforms used for our work and described in Box IV.3.1,
notably the IMF indicators for labour and product market
reforms, the indicators on pension reforms and specific
types of labour market reforms provided by the Rodolfo
de Benedetti Foundation (RDBF) and the indicators
related to expenditure reforms of Hauptmeier et al. (2006).
Two exceptions are worth mentioning. First, reforms that
loosen the rigidity of employment protection legislation
do not seem to be a particularly recurrent element of suc-
cessful fiscal consolidation, most probably because they
produce no direct impact on the budget. A more complex
explanation for the weak link could be that employment
protection legislation is generally thought to produce
ambiguous effects on unemployment in the short run (see
for instance Jackman et al., 1990). Hence, it would not
necessarily contribute to the success of fiscal consolida-
tion indirectly via the channel of economic activity. Sec-
ond, there is no across-the-board evidence that successful
consolidations are more frequently linked to the ambitious
expenditure reforms recorded and documented by Haupt-
meier et al. (2006). Only reforms coupled with some spe-
cific additional policy measures seem to be of importance,
Table IV.4.1 (continued)
Reform of stricter unemployment benefits (RDBF) 0.63 0.32 4.91 0.03
Labour market reform (IMF, 2004) 0.47 0.11 13.18 0.00
Product market reform (IMF, 2004) 0.56 0.19 11.23 0.00
Expenditure reforms 0.49 0.29 3.86 0.05
Ambitious expenditure reforms (5) 0.30 0.25 0.21 0.64
Strengthening the Minister for Finance  0.10 0.12 0.10 0.75
Fiscal contracts 0.08 0.11 0.19 0.66
Fiscal council 0.06 0.03 0.65 0.42
Improved parliamentary control over budget 0.00 0.14 7.25 0.01
Multi-year budget planning  0.10 0.20 1.92 0.17
Expenditure ceilings 0.08 0.17 1.79 0.18
Deficit/surplus rule 0.02 0.12 3.96 0.05
Pension reform  0.04 0.14 2.97 0.08
Labour market reform  0.20 0.23 0.09 0.77
Tax reform/cuts  0.14 0.23 1.30 0.26
Wage-setting reform  0.10 0.00 7.04 0.01
Wage moderation 0.04 0.09 1.09 0.30
NB: (1) Index of coverage and strength of rule (see Box IV.3.1).
(2) Index of quality of budget procedures (see Box IV.3.1).
(3) The dummy takes the value 1 for contract states. The classification is based on Von Hagen et al. (2001, 2002, 2005) and Yläoutinen (2004).
(4) See Box IV.3.1 for a detailed description of variables.
(5) Combinations of ambitious expenditure reforms and structural reforms. For dummies the mean values  for the two groups are compared with a chi-square-test, and
the value given in the table is the q-value. For the other variables a t-test is used, and the value given is the t-value. The corresponding p-value is given to both tests.
Source: Commission services224
is encouraging. The occurrence of reforms is significantly
higher during periods of fiscal consolidation that are
crowned by success than those that do not lead to a lasting
notably improved parliamentary control, the introduction
of fiscal rules over the budget and wage setting reforms.
The first two measures fall under the heading of fiscal
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before.
The bearing of wage-setting reforms for the success of
fiscal consolidation is somewhat more intricate yet con-
sistent with findings in the literature. Two different
channels can be distinguished. The first channel pro-
duces a direct impact on the budget as a general shift
towards wage moderation can be expected to spill over
to the government wage bill. The second channel is more
indirect and falls under the category of non-Keynesian
effects of fiscal consolidation. Alesina and Perotti
(1996) were among the first to argue that expenditure-
based consolidations, especially those that include cuts
of government wages, would contribute to wage moder-
ation and in turn spur aggregate economic activity which
finally would produce a positive feedback on public
finances. We will qualify this conclusion somewhat for
our EU sample later on.
4.3. The likelihood of success
With a view to exploring possible interactions among the
determinants of success, we move on to regression analy-
sis. As in Section IV.3 we consider groups of economic,
fiscal and institutional variables while controlling for
some basic determinates. The results are shown in Table
IV.4.2. The baseline specification of the probit regres-
sions includes variables gauging the initial economic and
fiscal conditions as well as the size and the composition of
the fiscal adjustment. Except for the initial level of the out-
put gap, all variables have the expected sign.
Initial conditions and the size of adjustment
To start with, the gravity of the initial fiscal conditions
measured either as the initial level of the headline deficit
or the initial level of the debt ratio is a statistically signif-
icant determinant of success. The worse the public finance
situation the higher the probability of implementing a last-
ing fiscal correction. The gravity of initial conditions
seems to heighten the awareness that significant policy
measures are required to change the status quo.
Size and composition
However, the channel through which the degree of aware-
ness increases the chances of success is not necessarily the
size of the fiscal adjustment. The estimated coefficient of
and the likelihood of success are not clear cut. The results
would also seem to depend on the specific definition of
success used in the empirical analysis. The definition used
in our analysis is based on a fixed deterioration of the
CAPB compared to the last year of the adjustment. As
long as this criterion is met there is no difference between
very large adjustments and smaller ones. Our definition
may even penalise very large adjustments which, while
not meeting the condition of Definition 2, give rise to a
larger net improvement of the CAPB.
In a number of other studies, on top of a deficit criterion
the stabilisation of the debt ratio is used as complemen-
tary condition for success. In that case success is corre-
lated with the initial debt level; i.e. the larger the fiscal
correction the higher the likelihood to stabilise the debt.
What appears to make the difference for success is the
composition of the fiscal adjustment, as measured by the
size of the change in cyclically adjusted primary expendi-
ture. In particular, the likelihood of success significantly
increases with savings in primary expenditure net of cycli-
cal factors. To control for the role of investment expendi-
ture we also added the change in government gross fixed
capital formation on top of our baseline specification of
the probit regression. The corresponding result indicates
that reliance on investment expenditure significantly
reduces the chances of success because cuts in investment
expenditure are more likely to be reversed over time.
At first glance, the findings emerging from our EU sample
about the composition of the adjustment are essentially in
line with the standard result reported in the literature: the
likelihood of success increases with the savings on current
primary expenditure and decreases with cuts in investment
expenditure. However, a closer look reveals a somewhat
more differentiated picture. Two separate issues can be
highlighted. The first refers to the relative importance of
primary expenditure cuts in explaining the success of con-
solidation; the second concerns the role of individual com-
ponents of current primary expenditure.
As regards the overall composition of adjustment the
standard result in the literature according to which
expenditure-based consolidations stand a bigger chance
to be lasting is confirmed for the entire sample period but
does not hold for the 1990s and beyond. A separate pro-225
the change of the CAPB is not statistically significant and
does not have the expected sign. The findings in the liter-
ature concerning the link between the size of adjustment
bit regression for this subperiod shows that savings in
primary expenditure have a positive impact on the prob-
ability of success but the evidence is weak. The esti-
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pared to the regression for the period as a whole.
This result is quite important as it points to a possible
shift in the recipe for success over time. The conven-
tional wisdom about the importance of expenditure-
based consolidations seems to have lost some of its bear-
ing. One potential explanation could be that there has
been a convergence in the composition of adjustment. If
successful and unsuccessful consolidations increasingly
relied on a similar mix of expenditure and revenue cuts,
composition would no longer be a discriminatory ele-
ment. This conjecture is only partially confirmed by the
data. As regards cuts in primary expenditure net of cycli-
cal factors the difference between successful and unsuc-
cessful consolidations narrowed somewhat in the 1990s
and beyond. In the latter period, the average annual
reduction of expenditure net of cyclical factors achieved
during years of unsuccessful consolidation almost dou-
bled as compared to the entire period, when the overall
size of the adjustment in terms of the primary budget bal-
ance remained broadly unchanged. This slight shift
towards stronger expenditure cuts during unsuccessful
episodes was not attained by reducing investment
expenditure, i.e. the category that is generally thought to
be easier to restrain in the short term with the risk of
bouncing back afterwards.
The average annual decline in investment expenditure
during consolidation episodes was actually slightly
lower in the 1990s and beyond. Overall, while narrowing
the difference in the composition between successful and
unsuccessful consolidations remained significant. Con-
sequently, there must have been other factors at play
affecting the likelihood for success.
One important element in this context is certainly the
experience ahead of the inception of the economic and
monetary union (EMU), when a number of EU Member
States made relatively large efforts to qualify for the
euro. In several cases those efforts involved both a sig-
nificant increase in government revenues and significant
savings on the expenditure side. What made the differ-
ence between success and failure was the ability to safe-
guard the corrections over time, independently of the
composition of the adjustment. As will be shown below,
structural reforms and numerical fiscal rules seem to
play an important role in this respect.
tiveness of recipes which based on conventional wisdom
is generally not crowned by success. This conclusion is
corroborated by some of the country cases presented in
the annex to this chapter. For instance, consolidation epi-
sodes in Italy and Spain in the 1990s are telling examples
of fiscal corrections that yielded significant results while
following at first glance non-standard strategies. In the
case of Italy, the heavy reliance on higher revenues was
accompanied by measures aimed at capping existing
expenditure trends. Such measures did not translate into
measurable expenditure savings in per cent of GDP but
calmed expenditure dynamics. In the case of Spain, the
sustainability of revenue based consolidations was prob-
ably helped by the fact that the overall tax burden was
comparatively low. A common feature of both cases is
that fiscal consolidations were accompanied by the
strengthening of fiscal governance and the implementa-
tion of structural reforms.
The government wage bill
The second qualification vis-à-vis the literature concerns
the common finding that successful consolidations are
those that focus on cutting social security and, in partic-
ular, government wages. Our analysis weakens the con-
clusion on government wages. In our sample, there is no
specific item in current primary expenditure that on top
of the aggregate stands out as particularly instrumental
for the likelihood of success. The prevailing pattern
seems to be one of across-the-board savings in current
primary expenditures. All components seem to be mov-
ing into the same direction during episodes of fiscal con-
solidations with total current transfers showing the lar-
gest average annual decline followed by non-wage
consumption expenditure (see Table IV.4.2). The gov-
ernment wage bill does not play a particularly prominent
role in our EU sample of successful consolidations.
One possible explanation for this result as compared to
the literature is the selection of countries. Existing stud-
ies largely focus attention on OECD economies
i.e. including a number of non-EU countries, notably the
USA, Canada and Australia where cuts in government
wages during episodes of fiscal consolidation may have
been particularly important. This is partly confirmed by
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) who provide country-spe-
cific information on a number of consolidation episodes
in the OECD. Other possible explanations for the weak
link between cuts in wages and success in our EU sample226
The exceptional circumstances linked to the run-up to
the euro also seem to have had an impact on the effec-
are: (i) wage cuts are likely to be implemented in a grad-
ual way and hence do not produce their full effect in
three years after the end of the consolidation period;
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compensatory measures like tax cuts in the short run.
The weak link between cuts in the government wage
bill and the likelihood of success does not necessarily
mean that fiscal consolidations in the EU did not fully
exploit the potentially beneficial effects of wage mod-
solidation may foster wage moderation. The first chan-
nel consists in constraining the increase in government
wages directly. To the extent that the government sec-
tor acted as the leader in the national wage bargaining
process, the control of government wages would spill
over to the economy as a whole and in turn sustain eco-
nomic activity. In practice, however, there seem to be
Table IV.4.2
Probability of a successful fiscal consolidation
Explanatory variables Estimated 
coefficient p-value No of obs.
Baseline
Initial conditions
Actual minus debt stabilising deficit (t–1) % of GDP 1.84 0.07 110
Output gap (t–1) % of GDP 0.95 0.34 110
Size and compensation of adjustment (change, % of GDP)
Cyclically adjusted primary balance – 0.15 0.88 110
Cyclically adjusted primary expenditure – 2.54 0.01 110
Government wage bill 1.16 0.25 110
Government investment expenditure 2.04 0.04 110
Government final consumption – 0.24 0.81 110
Subsidies – 0.57 0.57 110
Transfers other than in kind – 0.65 0.52 110
Transfers in kind 1.10 0.27 110
Other fiscal factors
Gradual consolidation, dummy – 0.43 0.67 110
Tax elasticities – 0.48 0.63 110
Political factors
Elections (t–1), dummy 1.07 0.28 107
Size of majority in parliament – 0.54 0.59 107
Herfindahl index – 0.60 0.55 107
Fiscal governance (1)
Fiscal rules (average), index 3.98 0.00 52
Expenditure rules (average), index – 0.97 0.33 52
Budgetary procedures, index 1.82 0.07 44
Structural reforms (1)
Pensions (RDBF), dummy 1.23 0.22 54
Employment protection legislation (RDBF), dummy 0.54 0.59 54
Unemployment benefits (RDBF), dummy 2.14 0.03 54
Labour market (IMF, 2004), dummy 3.51 0.00 77
Product market (IMF, 2004), dummy 2.59 0.01 77
Expenditure reforms, dummy 1.91 0.06 93
Ambitious expenditure reforms, dummy – 1.33 0.18 93
Wage setting, dummy predicts success perfectly 88
Wage moderation, dummy – 0.93 0.35 93
NB: (1) See Box IV.3.1 for a detailed description of the indicators. Estimation method: probit regression on panel data. Starting from the baseline specification addi-
tional variables where added individually in turn. Coefficients represent marginal contribution of the explanatory variable (measured at sample mean) to the proba-
biliy of successful consolidation. All equations include country-specific constants, whose coefficient, significant in most cases, is not reported.
Source: Commission services227
eration, including the expansionary effects that wage
moderation may have on economic growth. There are at
least two different channels through which fiscal con-
no clear examples of EU countries were the govern-
ment sector can be taken to set the agenda in national
wage bargaining.
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through which fiscal consolidation impacts on wage
developments, which in turn contribute to the success of
a fiscal correction via stronger economic growth, is the
one suggested by Alesina and Perotti (1996). In the
framework of a country’s wage setting mechanism wage
claims will generally be more moderate if fiscal consol-
idation does not affect after-tax wages in the economy as
a whole. This will typically be the case for expenditure
as compared to revenue-based fiscal corrections. Hence,
the right composition of adjustment can induce wage
moderation in the economy as a whole, including the
government sector. Moreover, wage moderation is con-
ducive to sustained economic growth which will feed
back to the government sector via revenues (1).
Other fiscal factors
In addition to the size and the composition of the fiscal
adjustment, we have examined two other fiscal factors:
the type of adjustment and the behaviour of tax elastici-
ties. Whereas there is no clear conjecture about the role
played by the type of adjustment, the expectations linked
to tax elasticities is the following. Empirically, the tax
elasticity with respect to GDP, i.e. the relative change of
total current taxes with respect to the relative change of
nominal GDP, can be subject to significant autonomous
fluctuations. Such fluctuations are due to changes in the
composition of aggregate demand or changes in the pri-
mary distribution of income towards more or less tax
rich components. For instance, private consumption
expenditure is markedly more tax rich than exports or
investment expenditure, and compensations of employ-
ees are generally more tax rich than gross operating sur-
plus. In case a fiscal consolidation relied on a temporary
increase in tax elasticities the chances for success should
be negatively affected, as revenues would at some point
move back to ‘normal’ levels. This conjuncture is only
partially confirmed by our regression analysis. The esti-
mated coefficient of the variable controlling for autono-
mous fluctuations in the tax elasticity has the expected
negative sign, yet is not statistically significant.
There is also no statistically significant link between the
likelihood of success and the type of fiscal adjustment.
Hence, the choice between ‘cold shower’ and a more
‘gradual’ approach does not systematically affect the
odds. There are however interesting differences between
the two types of adjustments in terms of initial conditions
and composition, which are discussed in Section IV.3.3.
Political factors
Among the elements that do not systematically influence
the likelihood of success are also the two political factors
considered in our work: the beginning of a political term
and the size of the majority of the ruling coalition in par-
liament. They are conducive for prompting a fiscal con-
solidation, as indicated in Section IV.3 but play no sta-
tistically significant role in determining the outcome of
the adjustment. Although one may have assumed that
governments backed by a strong majority in parliament
may stand a greater chance to implement more effective
fiscal corrections, the relationship between the size of a
majority and its political strength are not necessarily lin-
ear. A large majority may reflect a coalition of ideologi-
cally not homogenous parties. However, even the Her-
findahl index of concentration does not turn out to be
statistically significant (2).
Fiscal governance
The more interesting and certainly novel finding of our
analysis refers to the link between success and fiscal
governance. Our regression results clearly show that,
after controlling for initial conditions as well as for the
size and the composition of the fiscal adjustment, the
presence, coverage and strength of numerical fiscal rules
and budgetary procedures are conducive to the success
of consolidation. Somewhat surprisingly the link
between success and fiscal governance is weak when
considering expenditure rules only. The estimated coef-
ficient is not statistically significant and has the wrong
sign. One possible reading of this result could be that
expenditure rules may impose an excessive focus on
expenditure thereby affecting investment expenditure
which by experience is likely to rebound. By contrast,
deficit and debt rules provide leeway to combine
expenditure cuts with some revenue increases. On the
other hand, the weaker role of expenditure rules in
explaining the success of consolidation could simply
reflect the fact that in practice they are generally limited
to central government whereas deficit and debt rules
have a larger coverage of general government public
finances.228
¥1∂ For a discussion of the link between wages, employment and economic
activity see for instance Blanchard and Wolfers (1999) and Mourre (2004).
¥2∂ The Herfindahl index measures the degree of concentration in parliament
with respect to the number of political parties. It takes a large value when the
number of parties is low and lower values if the number of parties is high.
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fiscal adjustment is likely to work via at least two differ-
ent channels. First, comprehensive and strong fiscal
rules favour discipline-oriented budgets. They provide
incentives to design adjustment measures that stand a
higher chance to be effective and lasting, not least in
view of the possible costs associated with the risk of run-
ning afoul of the rules. Second, well-designed budgetary
procedures favour good planning, a balanced composi-
tion and an effective implementation of consolidation
measures as opposed to a situation in which measures are
drawn up over a short period of time, in an uncoordi-
nated way and potentially based on not very prudent
assumptions.
Structural reforms
The last group of potential determinants of success
examined in our regression analysis is structural
reforms. Ex ante it could be argued that reforms improve
the chances of success as they should typically result in
durable changes in the way public money is spent. For
instance, labour market reform or pension reforms trans-
lating into a reduction of the level of the benefits should
ceteris paribus produce direct and lasting effects on
expenditure. In addition, some structural reforms can
also be expected to have a positive impact on economic
growth and hence support the success of consolidation
via the denominator of the deficit ratio. Clearly, the ulti-
mate effect of structural reforms on both the budget and
economic activity inter alia depend on their specific
design. Especially, in the case of labour market reform
one should probably make a distinction between those
that impact on active versus passive labour market poli-
cies.
A positive link between the probability of success and
structural reforms is confirmed for our sample. A first
interesting and clear point emerging from the analysis is
that the likelihood of success is significantly increased
when consolidation is linked to or falls in years in which
labour and/or product market reforms as measured by
the indicators used in IMF (2004) are enacted.
The results are somewhat more differentiated, yet gener-
ally positive, with respect to expenditure reforms as
defined by Hauptmeier et al. (2006). Overall, expendi-
ture reforms appear to be conducive to the success of fis-
seven years, suggesting that very large expenditure
restraints are less likely to be sustainable (1).
One way to make fiscal consolidations coupled with
ambitious expenditure reforms successful is to combine
them with wage-setting reforms. Based on the probit
regressions such a constellation is actually a guarantee
for success: all expenditure reforms that went along with
a reform of the wage-setting mechanisms gave rise to
successful fiscal consolidation. While this result needs to
be interpreted with caution because of the rather low
number of cases (overall there are only five cases in
point) it relates to the findings in the existing literature
about the importance of the labour market channel
emphasised by Alesina and Perotti (1996) and confirmed
by Alesina and Ardagna (1998). Notably, elements that
impact on the wage formation in the economy as a whole
are conducive to successful fiscal consolidation. This
finding relates to the more general insight of economics
according to which wage moderation is beneficial for
employment creation, overall economic activity and
finally fiscal performance: a given level of government
expenditure is easier to sustain if economic activity
increases.
4.4. Why do consolidations fail?
In this section we take a brief look at the consolidation
episodes which according to our definition did not end
with success. The focus will be on the different budget-
ary items that rebounded in the three years following the
end of the consolidation episode leading or contributing
to an overall deterioration of the CAPB of more than
0.75 % of GDP. In case of successive ‘cold shower’ or
‘gradual’ consolidations we considered the three years
following the last episode. The corresponding results are
summarised in Table IV.4.3.
The messages emerging from this exercise are relatively
clear. Unsuccessful episodes of fiscal consolidation fail
because of two reasons: (i) they do not manage to pre-
serve the sizeable increases in government revenues on
which the fiscal adjustment was built; and (ii) they do not
manage to control government expenditure in the first
place.
¥1∂ The negative sign can also reflect our specific definition of success. The229
cal consolidation. A negative coefficient is estimated for
ambitious expenditure reforms i.e. reforms that reduce
primary expenditure by more than 5 % of GDP over
threshold for success versus non-success is expressed in absolute terms
and is not linked to the overall size of adjustment. Hence, a very large
adjustment of say 5 % of GDP is judged to be unsuccessful even if the net
correction three years after the end of the consolidation is 2.5 % of GDP. 
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tion episode, revenues net of cyclical factors decline on
average by 0.6 % of GDP in cumulative terms, eroding
almost half of the increase attained during the consolida-
tion phase. However, what weighs more are expenditure
dynamics. Adjusted for the cycle, primary expenditures
increase on average by close to 2 % of GDP in the three
years following the end of the adjustment. This drift is
not due to one specific expenditure item; it rather reflects
a general problem in controlling expenditures as a
whole. In relative terms the strongest slippages concern
social transfers other than in kind (i.e. mostly pensions)
and non-wage government consumption.
Overall, this is a rather clear indication that consolida-
tion measures did not attempt to tackle existing expend-
iture trends, which continue irrespective of the sizeable
increase in revenues. As time goes on the revenue hikes
tend to be reversed or turn out to be short-lived unveiling
again the underlying need to restrain expenditure.
Additional insight into the ‘anatomy of failure’ can be
gained by analysing the expenditure dynamics in terms
of the COFOG classification. This shortens considerably
the sample to 1995–2006 but still provides some useful
information. As indicated in the lower part of
Table IV.4.3, there are essentially two expenditure cate-
gories that rebound in the aftermath of unsuccessful fis-
cal adjustments, namely health and social protection.
Incidentally, these two COFOG headings include the
expenditure items which will principally bear or do
already bear the budgetary impact of ageing population.
A better control of them will be increasingly important
in the future. Alternatively, a better control or restraint of
expenditure of other functions of government is required
to compensate for the increasing weight of social protec-
tion and health.
Table IV.4.3
Backtracking of unsuccessful fiscal consolidations: 
cumulative change of revenue and expenditure items 
in the three years after the end of an unsucessful fiscal 
consolidation
Economic classification
Cumulative 
change in % 
of GDP
Number 
of observations
Total revenue – 0.46 34
Total expenditure 1.71 34
Cyclically adjusted revenue – 0.59 33
Cyclically adjusted primary 
expenditure 
1.92 33
Final consumption 0.35 29
Wages 0.19 34
Subsidies 0.00 34
Transfers other than in kind 0.69 29
Transfers in kind 0.35 28
Investment expenditure 0.17 34
Classification of function of government
General public service – 0.60 10
Defence – 0.18 10
Public order and safety – 0.11 10
Economic affairs – 0.14 10
Housing – 0.13 10
Health 0.38 10
Education – 0.04 10
Social protection 0.18 10
Source: Commission services.230
5. Conclusions
Our empirical analysis of successful fiscal consolida-
tions in the EU highlights a number of important lessons.
Some match up with the findings in the existing litera-
ture; others are new or somewhat different from ‘con-
ventional wisdom’.
The lessons consistent with previous findings refer to the
fiscal and macroeconomic conditions under which suc-
cessful consolidations are generally started as well as to
the overall composition of the fiscal correction as such.
In particular, the likelihood of success increases if initial
conditions are difficult: the deficit and the debt ratio are
generally higher. Episodes of successful consolidation
are on average also characterised by more difficult eco-
nomic conditions compared to consolidations that do not
result in a lasting correction. 
As regards the composition of successful fiscal consoli-
dation the EU experience over the whole sample period
1970–2006 confirms that fiscal corrections involving
cuts in current primary expenditure are more likely to
produce a lasting effect than those relying on higher rev-
enues or on large cuts in government investment. How-
ever, the validity of this by now familiar notion is some-
what weakened for consolidation episodes enacted since
the beginning of the 1990s. The composition of adjust-
ment per se seems to have lost some of its influence in
determining the success of fiscal consolidation.
A number of possible factors may explain this finding.
Firstly, the observed shift in the composition of fiscal
consolidation since the beginning of 1990s may reflect a
general trend towards smaller governments. Starting
from a relatively large size of government in the 1980s,
many EU Member States have embarked on a path that
has measurably reduced the weight of the public sector
in the economy. Along this path the leeway for further
Secondly, in the 1990s and beyond there was a general
increase in the expenditure content of fiscal consolida-
tion also among unsuccessful episodes. While successful
consolidations continued to rely significantly more on
expenditure restraints the difference vis-à-vis unsuccess-
ful correction narrowed to some extent and hence lost
some of its discriminatory power.
Thirdly, the motivation and resolve to participate in the
common currency has induced Member States to imple-
ment comparatively large consolidation packages that
did not necessarily follow the conventional recipe for
success. Cuts in primary expenditure still played a role
but were complemented by additional measures and fac-
tors that proved to be sustainable over time. Improve-
ments in fiscal governance and structural reforms are
prominent candidates of such additional factors.
On the basis of our empirical analysis the quality of fis-
cal governance turns out to be conducive to the success
of fiscal consolidation. After controlling for initial con-
ditions and the composition of adjustment the probabil-
ity to produce a lasting correction is increased when pub-
lic finances are covered by numerical fiscal rules and/or
effective budgetary procedures. The link between the
quality of fiscal governance and the chances of success
of fiscal consolidation is likely to be complex and needs
to be examined in more detail. The main point is cer-
tainly that effective fiscal governance fosters discipline-
oriented budgets as well as an effective implementation
of budgetary plans including fiscal corrections.
On top of fiscal governance, the chances of achieving a
lasting fiscal correction also increase significantly if
consolidation efforts are complemented by or go hand-
in-hand with structural reforms. This result points to
potential complementarities between the Stability and
Growth Pact and the Lisbon process for growth and jobs.231
expenditure cuts is gradually reduced unless they are
embedded in a structural overhaul of specific functions
of government.
Apart from pension reforms, for which the statistical evi-
dence is weak, measures that aim at improving the func-
tioning of labour and product markets turn out to be
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which structural reforms help fiscal consolidation are
twofold: directly by capping or flattening existing
expenditure trends and indirectly by spurring economic
activity. Clearly, the ultimate effect of structural reforms
on both the budget and economic activity inter alia
depend on their specific design. Especially, in the case of
labour market reform one should probably make a dis-
tinction between those that impact on active versus pas-
sive labour market policies.
A second notable qualification of received wisdom
emerging from our analysis relates to the more detailed
composition of expenditure cuts. According to the pre-
vailing view significant cuts in the government wage bill
are taken to be an instrumental ingredient to the recipe
for success, also because they are thought to contribute
to wage moderation, which in turn is expected to trigger
non-Keynesian effects by promoting investment and
economic activity. Our analysis indicates that in the EU
direct cuts in government wages or employment play a
comparatively minor role in explaining the success of
fiscal consolidation. The main contributors to savings in
primary expenditure during successful consolidation are
transfers and non-wage government consumption.
This conclusion does not diminish the importance of
wage moderation as such. While further work is needed
to explore in detail the precise link between the determi-
nants of successful fiscal consolidation and wage devel-
opments our analysis supports the conclusion that wage
moderation in the economy as a whole is conducive to
success.
Firstly, and linked to the role played by structural
reforms outlined before, the likelihood of success
increases significantly in our EU sample if fiscal consol-
idations are coupled with reform measures geared
towards improving the functioning of the labour market,
especially the wage setting mechanism. The effect is
likely to operate through two separate channels: (i) indi-
rectly via the expansionary impact of wage moderation
on economic activity, which in turn benefits public
finances and (ii) directly via lower government wage
increases as wage moderation in the private sectors spills
over to the government sector.
Secondly, expenditure versus revenue based consolida-
tions can also be conducive to wage moderation in the
economy as a whole as they do not reduce after-tax
wages. Consolidations that heavily rely on revenue
increases reduce after tax wages and may trigger higher
wage claims by trade unions, with a potentially negative
feedback on economic activity and hence lower govern-
ment revenues.
On the whole, our results give rise to the following con-
clusions. The established recipe for success character-
ised by significant cuts in primary government expendi-
ture is not outdated. It was particularly effective in the
1970s and 1980s and was still used in the 1990s. On top
of it, the menu of options has widened. Especially in the
1990s, the composition of adjustment in terms of pri-
mary expenditure cuts lost some of their discriminatory
power between success and failure. Successful consoli-
dation still remained more expenditure and less revenue-
based than unsuccessful episodes. However, the differ-
ences narrowed. As a result, other factors have become
more decisive such as fiscal governance and structural
reforms. They turn out to be instrumental in safeguard-
ing the fiscal correction over time.232
A. Annex: Country cases
A.1. Introduction
This annex presents four country cases: Spain, Italy, the
Netherlands and Hungary. The aim is to highlight some
of the basic features and (ir)regularities of successful
versus unsuccessful consolidation examined in the main
body of Part IV by means of ‘real life’ examples. The
selection of countries does not reflect any judgement
about the specific experience; it was rather driven by the
intention to illustrate a number of particularly interesting
aspects that are common to many episodes across a
number of countries but which we thought were particu-
larly evocative and representative in terms of both the
macroeconomic background and the specific recipes of
fiscal adjustments.
Spain exemplifies fiscal consolidation episodes that
were carried out successfully against the backdrop of
rapid economic convergence. Italy represents a case of a
mature industrialised country, which has undergone a
series of adjustment episodes with a varying degree of
success. The Netherlands stands for a small open econ-
omy at the core of the EU integration process which for
some time has been relying on a number of supportive
elements of fiscal governance and budgetary procedures.
Hungary is a new Member State in which fiscal policy is
embedded in a still ongoing transition and convergence
process.
A.2. Spain
Spain underwent three ‘cold shower’ consolidations: in
1986, 1992 and 1996. All turned out successful in line
with our Definition 1. We focus on the two episodes of
the 1990s for reasons of data availability and the fact that
the 1986 consolidation may have largely been shaped by
the Spanish EU accession. The fiscal consolidation of
1992 was mainly revenue-based, whereas the 1996 epi-
sode mainly relied on expenditure cuts. The success rate
of fiscal consolidation benefited from fiscal rules, bind-
ing agreements between the different levels of govern-
ment as well as from an effective budgetary process.
Moreover, fiscal consolidation in the 1990s was accom-
As regards fiscal governance, some legal and institu-
tional changes aiming at higher budgetary discipline and
prudence were introduced in the 1990s. These include
strengthening the position of the Minister for Economy
and Finance, the creation of a State bureau of public
expenditure and budget and the extension of a monthly
expenditure control to the social security. Fiscal rules
adopted in 1990 include spending limits on State
expenditure. Fiscal constraints agreed with the lower
levels of government in the financial agreement 1992–96
were renewed in 1997. Political coordination between
the different levels of government has been supported by
the existence of the ‘National committee of local admin-
istration’, which was established by law in 1985 and the
Court of Auditors already set up in 1978.
The 1992 consolidation was mainly revenue based and
was enacted when macroeconomic circumstances were
still positive but deteriorating. Consolidation efforts were
suspended in 1993 as Spain was hit by a very deep reces-
sion. The nominal deficit peaked at 6.6 % of GDP in 1993.
Nevertheless, the fiscal stance was only slightly expan-
sionary in 1993, and tightened again as soon as economic
growth gained momentum. The cumulative improvement
of the CAPB amounted to 1.6 % of GDP over the period
1992–95. The overall fiscal adjustment in the early 1990s
was dominated by the ‘cold shower’ consolidation of 1992
which improved the CAPB by 1.7 % of GDP, brought
about by increasing cyclically adjusted revenues by almost
2.5 % of GDP. The revenue increase was due to changes in
the income tax law to reverse the income tax reform of 1991
and due to intensified fight against tax fraud. The sustaina-
bility of tax increases benefited from the comparatively low
tax burden in Spain compared to the EU average. The high
level of other current revenues attained in 1992 and 1993
can largely be explained by one-offs resulting from the
revaluation of foreign assets held by the Bank of Spain. On
the expenditure side, a structural reform of the social secu-
rity system tightened the eligibility to unemployment bene-
fits and sickness transfers. Moreover, government invest-
ment was cut back markedly. Nonetheless, these measures
were more than offset by a large increase in public pensions
and government consumption implying an increase in total
cyclically adjusted expenditure. Furthermore, cyclically233
panied by significant structural reforms geared towards
stimulating the labour market and improving long-term
sustainability.
adjusted expenditure was adversely affected by the sizeable
increase in interest payments after the increase of govern-
ment debt by roughly 12 % of GDP in 1993.
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EMU from the outset backed the expenditure-based fis-
cal consolidation process initiated in the mid-1990s. The
largest improvement of the CAPB of 1.8 % of GDP was
achieved in 1996, hence qualifying as a ‘cold shower’
consolidation. Overall, the CAPB improved by 2.6 % of
GDP in 1994–97, when the economic conditions were
still affected by the consequences of the 1993 recession.
The strong decrease of cyclically adjusted expenditure of
1.2 % of GDP in 1996 was exclusively the result of the
retrenchment of primary expenditure. Expenditure
measures adopted in the course of the consolidation
process encompassed cuts in social benefits other than
social transfer in kind as well as cuts in government con-
sumption and investment.
The cut of government consumption was achieved by a
continued wage freeze combined with a reduction in the
number of employees and the decline in the purchase of
goods and services. Structural reforms reduced expendi-
ture pressures stemming from social benefits, namely
unemployment compensations and temporary disability
payments by tightening eligibility criteria and shifting a
larger part of the initial cost to firms. Government invest-
ment expenditure was cut by introducing new modes to
finance public infrastructure investment such as intro-
ducing private sector participation in 1997. The
improved revenue performance in 1996 was mainly the
result of increases in indirect taxes, namely on tobacco
and alcohol, higher dividends by public enterprises and
the Bank of Spain and the change in the recording of
social contributions yielding a 0.4 % of GDP one-off
intake. In 1997, reforms of the labour market intended to
stimulate employment growth translated into higher
direct tax revenues.
A.3. Italy
Italy underwent seven consolidation periods in 1970–
2006 (1976, 1982, 1983, 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1997).
According to our Definition 1 all of them were ‘cold
shower’ consolidation and, except for the episodes in
1983 and 1997, all of them were successful. The most
impressive adjustments were enacted in the 1990s, after
the deficit and the debt ratio had reached 11.4 % of GDP
and 95 % of GDP respectively. The CAPB improved by
more than 10 % of GDP over the period 1990–97, when
macroeconomic conditions were generally not support-
ive. The fiscal adjustment was almost exclusively reve-
nue based. Nevertheless, the successive consolidations
were comparatively effective in curbing the medium-
term expenditure trends. Fiscal consolidation in the
1990s was helped by a number of structural reforms. As
regards the labour market a key reform was implemented
at the beginning of the decade, which abolished the sys-
tem of automatic wage indexation (scala mobile) and
promoted wage moderation (concertazione 1993).
Graph IV.A.1:  Spain: composition of fiscal consolidation
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ond half of the 1990s aimed at increasing the flexibility
of wage contracts. The parametric pension reform of
1992 was estimated to have cancelled about one quarter
of net pension liabilities, while the 1995 pension reform
introduced a gradual shift towards a first pillar notional
defined contribution system. Progress was also made in
liberalising product and capital markets.
In terms of fiscal governance, the 1990s were character-
ised by a slow process of regional decentralisation,
where increased tax autonomy of lower levels of govern-
ment was traded off against cuts in transfer payments
and the devolvement of duties to local governments
(Bassanini laws and enacting legislation 1997–98).
However, local financial autonomy remained very lim-
ited and, in 1997, its increase was temporarily sus-
pended, as administrative constraints on local govern-
ment cash flows and mandatory limits for transfers from
the State to local authorities were introduced to meet the
Maastricht target. Only in 1999 an Internal Stability Pact
was introduced to foster budgetary coordination between
the different levels of government. On top of the Internal
Stability Pact a number of fiscal rules have been intro-
duced among which two expenditure rules and two
budget balance rules covering all levels of government.
Over the successive ‘cold shower’ consolidations of
1991–93 the CAPB improved by roughly 6 % of GDP
via large increases in revenues and in the face of increas-
ing expenditures. Despite a significant cyclical deterio-
ration, direct taxes increased by 1.8 % of GDP due to a
change in personal income tax brackets, a limitation of
compensation for fiscal drag and a new levy on firms’
net assets. Indirect tax revenues grew by 1.3 % of GDP
partly as the result of revisions in the VAT rates and a
new municipal tax on buildings. Furthermore, one-off
measures heavily supported the consolidation effort,
yielding more than 2 % of GDP in 1992–93. Cyclically
adjusted expenditure increased by 3.3 % of GDP in
1991–93, mainly due to a 2.6 % of GDP increase in
interest expenditure. Primary expenditure growth was
curbed by a cumulative cut in government investment of
0.6 % of GDP over the consolidation years, and also by
a wage freeze in the public sector combined with more
stringent hiring limits. More structural expenditure
retrenchments including the 1992 pension reform did not
immediately restrain social benefits other than social
transfers in kind which continued to grow by a cumula-
tive 1.6 % of GDP in 1991–93.
The consolidation efforts were temporarily interrupted
in 1994, when, after the end of the recession, which
spanned from the second quarter of 1992 to the third
quarter of 1993, budgetary policy aimed at supporting
the economic recovery. Fiscal consolidation resumed in
1995 and peaked in 1997 to guarantee Italy’s participa-
tion in the EMU. The reduction of the headline deficit by
Graph IV.A.2:  Italy: composition of fiscal consolidation
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lower interest expenditure and an improvement of the
CAPB. However, the impressive reduction in interest
payments of 2 % of GDP in part resulted from a reclas-
sification of expenditure for interest payment on postal
savings. The tightening of the fiscal stance of 2.1 % of
GDP was brought about by increasing cyclically
adjusted revenues, while cyclically adjusted primary
expenditure was broadly stabilised. On the revenue side,
substantial use was made of temporary measures, which
amounted to more than 1.5 % of GDP and mainly con-
sisted of one-off taxes (such as the tassa per l’Europa a
progressive one-year surcharge on the income tax rates).
On the expenditure side, capital expenditure was curbed,
essentially through cuts in capital transfers by 0.3 % of
GDP. However, primary current expenditure raised as
savings in intermediate consumption by 0.1 % were
more than offset by increases in other expenditure items,
in particular in social benefits, which increased by 0.6 %
of GDP.
A.4. The Netherlands
The Netherlands underwent two episodes of ‘gradual’
consolidation in the early 1970s and early 1980s and five
‘cold shower’ consolidations in 1985, 1991, 1993, 1996
and 2005. Apart from a mixed track record in the 1970s
and 1980s, the episodes since 1991 produced a lasting
correction of public finances. In the 1990s, consolida-
tions did not follow a specific template; the composition
varied from mainly revenue to mainly expenditure-
based. Mix-strategies were also tried. One strong point
in the Dutch experience is fiscal governance. Firstly,
Dutch fiscal policy has benefited from the Netherlands
Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), the classic
example of a strong fiscal council, founded in 1945,
which provides independent forecasts and analysis for
the preparation and the execution of the budget. Sec-
ondly, the Netherlands has high quality budgetary proce-
dures which are conducive to fiscal performance. The
role of the CPB and the budgetary procedures in general
are clearly reflected in the indicators of national budget-
ary procedures (see Section II.5). Moreover, in the 1990s
consolidation benefited from an important reform of the
social benefit system. Furthermore, active labour market
programmes were designed to decrease long-term unem-
ployment via training and a wage moderation agreement
between the social partners were introduced.
increasing cyclically adjusted revenues. Part of the reve-
nue increase was temporary as it was due to the decision
to bring forward the deadline for the payment of direct
taxes. On the expenditure side, several measures to
reduce structural long-term unemployment were intro-
duced and the growing trend in housing subsidies was
reversed.
In 1993, the improvement of the CAPB of 2.5 % of GDP
was again almost entirely achieved by an increase in
cyclically adjusted revenues. Most of this revenue
increase stemmed from higher social security contribu-
tions and one-off windfalls due to the reorganisation and
computerisation of the tax department.
In a bid to participate in Stage III of the EMU the Dutch
authorities implemented a significant expenditure-based
consolidation in 1996, which improved the CAPB by
1.8 % of GDP. The marked reduction of cyclically
adjusted expenditures of 2 % of GDP inter alia reflected
the effects of the introduction of a medium-term budget-
ary framework including public expenditure growth ceil-
ings in 1994, which reduced expenditure by 5 % of GDP
compared to 1993. Social benefits other than social
transfers in kind were curbed as a result of a number of
reform measures: reform of disability assistance (1993),
reform of sick leave (fully privatised in 1996), reform of
unemployment, and social assistance schemes tightening
eligibility criteria. A 1 % of GDP restraint of govern-
ment consumption was achieved by a reduction of gov-
ernment employees and moderate wage increases. On
the revenue side, 1996 was the first year to post a slight
increase in cyclically adjusted revenues, after a cumula-
tive decrease of 5.6 % of GDP between 1993 and 1996.
Tax shortfalls, caused by higher tax deductions (mort-
gage interest, company saving plans) and the growing
number of self-employed who benefited from the lower
corporate tax rates, were partly compensated by an eco-
tax on electricity and natural gas consumption. Further-
more, exceptionally strong natural gas revenues and a
one-off payment stemming from Court decision regard-
ing natural gas receipts amounting to 0.4 % of GDP con-
tributed to the increase of the cyclically adjusted revenue
ratio (1).
After three consecutive years of fiscal loosening and
unfavourable growth conditions the Dutch deficit
breached the 3 % of GDP threshold of the Treaty in236
The fiscal retrenchment in 1991 improved the CAPB by
an impressive 3.1 % of GDP, almost exclusively by ¥1∂ See Koen, V. and van den Noord, P. (2005).
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ment started mixed consolidation strategy in 2004. The
CAPB was reduced by 2.7 % of GDP over 2004 and
2005, whereby only 2005 classifies as a ‘cold shower’
consolidation. The 2004 consolidation package included
a reduction in the government workforce together with a
wage freeze, and structural expenditure cuts in the
healthcare sector. Structural revenue measures com-
prised a higher health insurance premium. A series of
one-off measures yielded 0.2 % of GDP. The 2005
budget encompassed a structural rise in social contribu-
tions, and tax base broadening measures as well as the
obligation for two independent public sector agencies to
pay corporate taxes. Expenditure was curbed by keeping
a lid on public wages and by restraining outlays for
social benefits other than social transfers in kind. Fur-
thermore, tax revenues temporarily increased by 0.2 %
of GDP as corporate tax receipts relating to 2006 were
brought forward to 2005.
A.5. Hungary
Hungary underwent two ‘cold shower’ consolidations in
1999 and in 2003, which according to our Definition 1
turned out unsuccessfully. Both episodes were mainly
expenditure based with sizeable cuts in government
even stronger fiscal expansion. Overall, the CAPB dete-
riorated by more than 10 % of GDP in 1998–2006.
As regards fiscal governance, the State Audit Office,
which is the highest financial monitoring institution of
the State, was created in 1989. However, as this institu-
tion is not actively participating in the budgetary process
its support to fiscal consolidation has been limited. Audit
rules and rules governing tax enforcement were modi-
fied and strengthened in 2003. Nevertheless, so far this
has not visibly improved the effectiveness of fiscal con-
solidation.
After the election year 1998, Hungary carried out an
expenditure-based fiscal consolidation against the back-
ground of a widening negative output gap. The consoli-
dation measures improved the CAPB by an overall
3.7 % of GDP in 1999 and 2000, whereby only 1999
classifies as a ‘cold shower’ consolidation. While cycli-
cally adjusted revenues remained broadly unchanged in
per cent of GDP compared to 1998, cyclically adjusted
expenditures declined by 2.7 % of GDP in each of the
two years. However, in 2000, this was primarily the
result of reduced interest payments. Government con-
sumption growth was restrained by reducing the number
of government employees, which was matched by large
Graph IV.A.3:  The Netherlands: composition of fiscal consolidation
Sources: OECD and Commission services.
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investment. Hungarian fiscal policy was extremely vola-
tile in 1998–2006 due to pronounced political cycles.
Every episode of fiscal tightening was followed by an
wage increases and higher spending on goods and serv-
ices. The spending categories that declined substantially
were interest payments, government investment and
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included a number of structural tax measures designed to
permanently reduce the fiscal burden such as the intro-
duction of a more generous child allowance and the
reduction of the number of tax brackets from six to three.
Cuts in social security contributions for employers were
only partially compensated by increases in the contribu-
tions paid by individuals. One-off measures included the
sale of government assets and 50 % of the revenues from
a 15-year mobile telephone licence.
In 2001, after the end of the consolidation, the CAPB dete-
riorated by 2â % of GDP reflecting discretionary spend-
ing measures and unforeseen expenditure surprises, nota-
bly in social benefits other than social transfers in kind.
The loosening continued in 2002, in the context of the last
phase of the electoral cycle, with the CABP deteriorating
by 5.5 % of GDP. This deterioration was partly due to
debt transfers and other one-off operations. The other part
can be attributed to the continued high increases of public
sector wages and social benefit spending as well as a rev-
enue loss due to the exemption of old-age pension from
the calculation of taxable income.
The expenditure-based consolidation in 2003 reduced
the CAPB by 1.7 % of GDP, qualifying as a ‘cold
shower’ consolidation. Fiscal consolidation initially
continued in 2004, but was completely abandoned in
view of upcoming elections and despite improving mac-
roeconomic conditions. In 2003, cyclically adjusted
expenditures were cut by more than 2 % of GDP; more
than two thirds were cuts in government investment
(1.4 % of GDP). The remaining adjustment was
achieved by structural cuts in housing subsidies and
changes in the unemployment benefit entitlements,
while government consumption increased considerably
due to high public sector wage increases. Deficit increas-
ing one-off measures included compensation payments
for unpaid child benefits ordered by a court decision
(0.2 % of GDP). Revenue measures in 2003 were
intended to make the fiscal environment for businesses
easier and to promote lifelong learning and new technol-
ogies via tax benefits. The change of VAT rates for some
items increased indirect tax revenues, which helped to
limit the decrease of cyclically adjusted revenues to
0.4 % of GDP. Consolidation efforts were sustained in
2004, when the CAPB was improved by 0.7 % of GDP.
But fiscal policy was loosened again in 2005 on the back
of expenditure increases as well as revenue shortfalls
reflecting permanent tax cuts and increasing social ben-
efit other than social transfers in kind expenditure
(mainly increases in pension expenditure) respectively.
Graph IV.A.4:  Hungary: composition of fiscal consolidation
Sources: OECD and Commission services.
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Part V
Member State developments

1. Belgium
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government recorded a budget sur-
plus of 0.2 % of GDP, as compared with a balanced
budget targeted in the December 2005 update of the sta-
bility programme. Public finances benefited from the
higher-than-anticipated economic growth, in particular
through indirect tax revenue. Direct taxes (excluding the
impact of one-off measures) turned out to be lower than
anticipated, mainly because the budgetary impact of the
final stage of the 2001 personal income tax reform seems
to have been underestimated by about 0.3 % of GDP,
which was only identified in the second half of 2006.
The unfavourable developments in direct tax revenue
were compensated by the better-than-anticipated pro-
ceeds from sales of real estate and by stepping up a one-
off measure to advance the collection of corporate taxes.
As a result, the total impact of one-off measures turned
out to be well above 0.8 % of GDP. Government
expenditure remained reasonably on track. The debt-to-
GDP ratio in 2006, which includes the debt assumed
from the railway company SNCB/NMBS (see footnote 6
to Table V.1.1), was 89.1 %.
The 2007 budget was presented in October 2006 and
approved by parliament on 21 December. It targets a
nominal surplus of 0.3 % of GDP (confirmed in the
December 2006 update of the stability programme) and
some initiatives to further reduce the tax burden on
labour (around 0.1 % of GDP) (1). New measures that
include fiscal revenues include: a new fiscal framework
for tax-exempt corporate reserves (a tax shelter for cor-
porate profits), higher excise duties on alcohol and
tobacco, and new initiatives to fight tax fraud. The initial
budget also included a new tax on packing material (with
an initial expected revenue of 0.1 % of GDP in 2007),
but it turned out to be difficult to implement and its
expected revenue was downsized considerably during
the March 2007 budget control exercise. A number of
smaller measures to bring down the tax burden on labour
reduced government revenue by around 0.1 % of GDP.
The budget also foresees a series of new one-off meas-
ures (â % of GDP), including a takeover of pension
obligations and the sale of real estate. Some changes in
the timing of social contributions on holiday allowances
also have a temporary positive effect on government rev-
enue. The government expenditure ratio-to-GDP is
planned to diminish slightly. In particular, for 2007,
regions and communities have agreed to refrain from
spending additional transfers assigned to them by the
federal government (about 0.1 % of GDP), while public
investment by local authorities is expected to return to its
trend level after a marked investment boom in the run-up
to the 2006 local elections (a pattern frequently observed
in the past). The Commission services’ 2007 spring fore-
cast foresees a small deficit of 0.1 % of GDP, but the dif-
ference with the official government target can be
largely explained by the fact that, based on the usual no-
policy-change assumption, the Commission services did
not take into account some of the planned one-off meas-
ures (about 0.3 % of GDP) because they were not yet
sufficiently specified at the time of the forecast (2).
According to the Commission services’ 2007 spring
forecast, the structural primary balance is expected to
stabilise at around 3.8 % of GDP in 2007. Therefore the
fiscal stance can be considered to be broadly neutral.
As for 2008, on a no-policy-change basis, a slight dete-
rioration of the budget balance to a deficit of around
0.2 % of GDP is forecast, mainly due to the expiry of
the one-off measures for 2007 that are retained in the
forecast, which is only partially compensated by a
reduction of interest expenditure. This compares with241
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm 
¥2∂ In particular, the forecast did not include the impact of the take-over of
pension obligations, as well as about half of the planned real estate sales. 
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 7a 0.5 % of GDP surplus targeted in the most recent
update of the stability programme. Like the Commis-
sion services’ forecast, the programme assumes a fur-
ther reduction of the debt burden (about 0.2 % of
GDP), but it does not explain what measures will be
taken to replace the expired one-off measures included
in the 2007 budget. After 2008 the stability programme
foresees a further build-up of surpluses up to 0.9 % of
GDP in 2010, mainly based on decreasing interest
expenditure.
The debt-to-GDP ratio is forecast to remain on a down-
ward path, falling from 89.1 % in 2006 to 82.6 % in
2008, which is only slightly higher than foreseen in the
stability programme. By 2010, the stability programme
foresees a debt ratio below 75 %. 
Table V.1.1
Budgetary developments 2005–10, Belgium (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008   
General government balance – 2.3 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.2   
— Total revenues 49.9 49.3 48.5 48.2   
  Of which: — current taxes 30.3 30.0 29.6 29.5   
— social contributions 16.1 15.9 15.8 15.8   
— Total expenditure 52.2 49.1 48.7 48.5   
  Of which: — collective consumption 8.8 8.7 8.7 8.7   
 — social transfers in kind 14.1 13.9 13.9 14.0   
 — social transfers other than in kind 16.0 15.7 15.7 15.7   
 — interest expenditure 4.2 4.1 3.9 3.8   
 — gross fixed capital formation 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7   
Primary balance 2.0 4.3 3.8 3.5   
Tax burden 45.5 45.1 44.5 44.4   
One-off and other temporary measures – 2.0 0.8 0.2 0.0   
Structural balance (3) 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.1   
Structural primary balance 4.5 3.7 3.8 3.9   
Government gross debt 93.2 89.1 85.6 82.6   
pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.1 3.1 2.3 2.2   
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
General government balance (6)  – 2.3* 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Primary balance 1.9 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.2
One-off and other temporary measures n.a. 0.6 0.4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Structural balance (3) (5) n.a. – 0.4 0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Government gross debt (6) 93.2* 89.4* 85.6* 82.1* 78.3* 74.3*
pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.2 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.2
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
(6) The deficit and debt figures in the 2005 programme are those notified by Belgium. In October 2006 Eurostat amended the data notified by Belgium as they were
found not to be in accordance with ESA95 rules, specifically, in relation to the assumption by government (FIF/FSI — Fonds de l’infrastructure ferroviaire/Fonds
voor spoorweginfrastructuur) of 2.5 % of GDP of the debt of the railway company SNCB/NMBS in 2005 (see Eurostat News Release No 139/2006). According to
ESA95 rules, the impact on the 2005 government deficit is of the same amount; the impact on government debt in 2005 amounts to 1.7 % of GDP, taking into
account a partial reimbursement occurred in that year. Data for 2005 marked with an asterisk are as amended by Eurostat. Debt data marked with an asterisk for
years 2006 to 2010 have been ’mechanically’ adjusted by the Commission services to comply with ESA95. This adjustment of debt figures is based on the techni-
cal assumption that the stock of FIF/FSI’s debts remains unchanged. In December 2006 the Belgian Government challenged Eurostat’s amendment of the Belgian
data before the European Court of First Instance.
Sources: Commission services and  December 2006 update of the stability programme of Belgium.242
P a r t  V
M e m b e r  S t a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  B e l g i u mTable V.1.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Belgium
 Revenue measures (1)  Expenditure measures (2)
• Take-over of pension funds (0.2 % of GDP) • Agreement with regions and communities not to spend 
the additional transfers they receive from the federal level in 2007 
(– 0.1 % of GDP)                                                                                                                                                                                                             
•  Measures to reduce taxes and social contributions on labour 
(– 0.1 % of GDP)
• Real estate sales (– 0.2 % of GDP)
• New tax regime for corporate tax exempt reserves (0.1 % of GDP)
• Increased excise duties on tobacco (0.1 % of GDP)
• New measures to fight fiscal fraud (0.1 % of GDP)
• Advancing social contributions on holiday allowances 
(0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and Chambre de Répresentants de Belgique, Budget des recettes et dépenses pour l’année 2007: Exposé Général.243
2. Bulgaria
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government surplus in Bulgaria
was 3.3 % of GDP. This is considerably better than the
balanced budget originally planned in the December
2005 pre-accession economic programme and in the
2006 budget law. The better-than-expected outcome is
due to both higher revenues and lower expenditures.
Higher-than-anticipated revenue growth was the result
of stronger economic activity, improved tax collection
and cautious initial tax projections. Despite a reduction
in social contributions of 6 percentage points, the reve-
nue-to-GDP ratio came out 0.7 percentage point
stronger than originally expected. The better budgetary
outcome is, however, also due to substantial expendi-
ture restraint in 2006. The expenditure-to-GDP ratio
was reduced by 2â percentage points compared to ori-
ginal plans and by almost 3 percentage points com-
pared to the 2005 outcome. This reflects higher-than-
expected growth of nominal GDP but also a reduction
in the growth of nominal expenditure, in particular cur-
rent expenditure compared to initial plans. Thus, cur-
rent expenditure decreased by more than 3 percentage
points compared to 2005, while at the same time gov-
ernment gross fixed capital formation increased by 0.3
percentage point. General government gross debt
reached 22.8 % of GDP, down from 29.2 % of GDP in
2005.
The 2007 budget law, which was adopted by parliament
on 19 December 2006, envisages a general government
surplus of 0.8 % of GDP. However, a separate provi-
sion in the budget law specifies that 10 % of primary
expenditures will not be released for spending if the
current account deficit widens further in 2007. This
provision would be binding until a general government
surplus of 2 % of GDP is achieved. Bulgaria’s first con-
GDP would effectively be aimed at (1). On the revenue
side, the 2007 budget foresees a cut in the corporate
income tax rate and an increase in the tax-exempted
income under the personal income tax. However, on the
basis of improved tax collection, an increase in some
excise duties and higher EU transfers, the budget envis-
ages a slight increase in the revenue-to-GDP ratio. The
budget also projects an increase in the expenditure-to-
GDP ratio by 2.8 percentage points, reflecting Bul-
garia’s contribution to the EU budget and an increase in
subsidies and other current expenditures. In order to
achieve the 2 % of GDP surplus, the increase in
expenditure would be limited to around 1â % of GDP,
with the additional savings coming mainly from other
current expenditure. The Commission services’ spring
2007 forecast is broadly in line with the projections in
the convergence programme. However, the forecast
expects that revenue losses linked to tax cuts and the re-
allocation of part of the VAT revenues to the EU
budget will not be fully compensated, while at the same
time the increase in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio will
probably turn out more moderate. The fiscal stance in
2007 will be strongly expansionary as the structural
surplus is estimated to decrease by more than 1 percent-
age point of GDP. In 2008 and 2009, the budgetary tar-
gets in the convergence programme imply a broadly
neutral fiscal stance.
Based on a no-policy-change scenario, the Commission
services’ spring 2007 forecast expects the general gov-
ernment surplus to remain at 2 % of GDP in 2008. Tak-
ing into account a further increase in capital expendi-
ture, the convergence programme projects the general
government surplus to decline to 1.5 % of GDP in
2008, down from 2 % in 2007, and to remain at that
level in 2009. A relatively tax-rich composition of
growth in 2008 could, however, imply an increase in244
vergence programme which was submitted in January
2007 confirmed the target of a budget surplus of 0.8 %
of GDP but underscored that a higher surplus of 2 % of
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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planned expenditure increases.
On account of general government surpluses and strong
nominal GDP growth, the Commission services’ spring
2007 forecast projects government gross debt to
decrease to 20.9 % of GDP in 2007 and 19 % of GDP
in 2008. This is broadly in line with the projections in
the convergence programme with minor differences
due to stronger economic activity and a stronger out-
come for debt reduction in 2006. The convergence pro-
gramme expects a further decrease in the debt-to-GDP
ratio by over 1 percentage point in 2009. The projected
debt reduction in 2008 and 2009 takes into account debt
increasing stock-flow adjustments due to an accumula-
tion of financial assets in both years. 
Estimating the budgetary impact 
of accession
Following its accession to the EU on 1 January 2007,
Bulgaria will benefit from considerable transfers of EU
funds under the EU’s structural and cohesion policy, the
common agricultural policy (CAP) and a number of
other policy regimes (e.g. on research or education and
training). These EU transfers can play an important role
in promoting economic growth and convergence. How-
ever, a number of studies on the accession of 10 Member
States in 2004 argued that while becoming net recipients
of EU transfers, these countries could face substantial
pressure on their public finances as a result of accession.
Following the methodology used in Hallet and Keere-
man (2005) to assess these claims for the Member States
Table V.2.1
Budgetary developments 2005–09, Bulgaria (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance 1.9 3.3 2.0 2.0  
— Total revenues 41.4 39.9 39.3 39.6  
  Of which: — current taxes 24.6 24.9 24.2 24.4  
 — social contributions 10.3 8.8 8.7 8.7  
— Total expenditure 39.5 36.6 37.3 37.6  
  Of which: — collective consumption 9.8 9.4 9.2 9.1  
 — social transfers in kind 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.8  
 — social transfers other than in kind 11.9 11.5 11.5 11.5  
 — interest expenditure 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.1  
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.5  
Primary balance 3.4 4.6 3.1 3.0  
Tax burden 34.1 33.7 33.0 33.2  
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) 1.3 2.8 1.6 1.8  
Structural primary balance 2.9 4.1 2.8 2.9  
Government gross debt 29.2 22.8 20.9 19.0  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.2  
Convergence programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance 2.4 3.2 0.8 1.5 1.5
Primary balance 3.9 4.6 2.2 2.8 2.7
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) 2.1 3.2 1.0 1.9 2.0
Government gross debt 29.8 25.3 22.7 22.3 21.1
pm Real GDP growth (%) 5.5 5.9 5.9 6.2 6.1
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.245
(4) Submitted in January 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Bulgaria.
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impact of accession for Bulgaria in 2007.
Financial transfers between Bulgaria and the EU
2007–13: EU funds pre-allocated to Bulgaria under the
financial perspective 2007–13 amount to more than EUR
12.5 billion in total (see Table V.2.3). These figures refer
to so-called appropriations for commitments which rep-
resent the maximum amount of EU funds that can be
committed in a given year. For 2007, these pre-allocated
funds represent around 4 % of Bulgarian GDP.
The main EU funds which are pre-allocated to Bulgaria
are as follows: (i) under the budget heading ‘Sustainable
growth’ and in line with the Protocol to Bulgaria’s Treaty
of Accession, EUR 70 million (in 2004 prices) is assigned
annually until 2009 for the decommissioning of the
Kozloduj nuclear power plant. In addition, Bulgaria has
also been assigned an overall envelope of EUR 6.8 billion
(in current prices) for the period 2007–13 under the EU’s
Structural and Cohesion Funds; (ii) an overall amount of
around EUR 2.7 billion has been pre-allocated for rural
development and fisheries for 2007–13. As in the case of
the Member States that joined in 2004, direct payments to
farmers will be gradually phased in, starting with amounts
equal to 25 % of the EU-15 Member States level in
2007 (1); (iii) in the first three years after accession Bul-
garia will benefit from compensations under the Schengen
and cash-flow facility foreseen in the Protocol to the
Treaty of Accession (2).
In addition, Bulgaria will also benefit from EU funds
spent within the framework of various internal policies.
However, these funds are not pre-allocated to specific
countries but are project-based. These additional funds
are therefore not taken into consideration here.
Since 1 January 2007, Bulgaria also has to contribute to
the EU budget, through ‘traditional own resources’
(agricultural levies and custom duties), value added
based own resources, gross national income-based
resources and the UK rebate. In 2007, the Bulgarian
contribution (3) is expected to amount to EUR 230 mil-
lion (0.85 % of GDP). This amount excludes the tradi-
tional own resources which cannot be attributed to indi-
vidual countries as they are levied at the EU external
border.
Budgetary impact in 2007: Bulgaria will be a net recip-
ient of EU funds over the period 2007–13. However, the
impact on the general government budget can differ
from the impact on the country as a whole for a number
of reasons.
Firstly, the impact on the budget will depend on the
actual disbursement of funds and not on their commit-
ment. In particular in the case of Structural and Cohesion
Funds, disbursements depend on the implementation of
projects and will occur only over time. Especially in the
first year of accession, both commitments and disburse-
ments can only start after the approval of all operational
Table V.2.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Bulgaria
 Revenue measures (1)  Expenditure measures (2)
• Reduction of corporate income tax rate from 15 % to 10 % 
(– â % of GDP )
• Indexation of pensions by 8.5 % from 1 July 2007
• Increase in the tax-free income under the personal income tax 
(– ä % of GDP) 
 
• Increase in excise rates on certain fuels and introduction of excise 
duties on coke, coal and electricity (+ ä % of GDP)
 
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and convergence programme of Bulgaria.246
¥1∂ This procedure is specified in Council Regulation (EC) No 2011/2006 and
also applies to Bulgaria
¥2∂ As published in OJ L 157, 21.6.2005.
¥3∂ Further details on each Member State’s contribution to the EU budget can
be found at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2007_VOL1/EN/nmc-
grseq42960935830-3/index.html
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to be limited in 2007. In the following analysis, it is
assumed that only 20 % of the commitments in 2007 will
actually be disbursed. However, in addition to disburse-
ments under the new financial framework, Bulgaria will
also still receive disbursements for commitments made
under the pre-accession instruments (Phare, Sapard,
ISPA), which are also taken into account here. Secondly,
differences can also arise because part of the transfers
from the EU will go to beneficiaries outside general gov-
ernment. These transfers are therefore recorded outside
general government and have no impact on the budget.
This concerns mainly direct payments under the com-
mon agricultural policy, but also part of the funds trans-
ferred under the Structural and Cohesion Funds and
through pre-accession financial assistance. Thirdly, in
cases where general government is the final beneficiary
(typically transfers under the Structural and Cohesion
Funds and pre-accession assistance) EU funds are usu-
ally linked to the financing of certain projects. Hence,
assuming strict additionality, they affect both the reve-
nue and expenditure side of the general government
budget, but are in principle neutral in terms of the budget
balance.
The only transfers that have a direct impact on the budget
balance are therefore on the one hand Bulgaria’s contri-
bution to the EU, through a re-allocation of part of the
VAT revenue to the EU and through transfers, and on the
other hand the compensation payments received under
the Schengen and cash-flow facility. The direct budget-
ary impact of EU accession in 2007 would indeed be
negative and amount to around 0.43 % of GDP.
In analysing the budgetary impact of EU transfers, cer-
tain indirect effects should, however, also be taken into
account. To the extent that EU transfers are not subject
to a strict additionality rule, they can at least partly sub-
stitute previously national expenditure. This is the case
in particular for direct payments under the CAP which
can in principle replace national subsidies. While a strict
additionality rule exists for structural fund transfers, this
is not the case for the Cohesion Fund. Moreover, addi-
tionality rules for pre-accession aid refer to the project
level and are therefore difficult to verify. Hence, sub-
stantial savings can in principle be realised through an
appropriate restructuring of the expenditure side of the
budget and a partial substitution of previously national
expenditures. This potential for additional savings is
captured in Table V.2.4 under the heading ‘substitution’,
assuming that all possibilities for substituting national
expenditures are used.
On the other hand, co-financing requirements as they
exist under both Structural and Cohesion Funds can
imply a need to mobilise additional budgetary resources.
This can in principle be avoided, if the projects to be
financed under the Structural and Cohesion Funds were
fully aligned with national spending priorities. In prac-
tice this may, however, be difficult to realise. Therefore,
in Table V.2.4 the standard maximum co-financing rates
under the different funds (15 % for the Cohesion and
Structural Funds in the case of Bulgaria, 25 % in the case
of the Rural Development and Fisheries Funds) were
applied to estimate additional expenditure needs due to
co-financing.
Table V.2.3
EU budget allocations to Bulgaria 2007–13 (current prices)
Euro 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total
1. Sustainable growth
Decommissioning of Kozloduj 74.28 75.77 77.29 — — — — 227.34
Structural and Cohesion Funds            514.44 737.40 991.81 1 044.07 1 116.08 1 188.43 1 260.63 6 852.86
3. Natural resources -
Rural development                                                                 244.06 337.14 437.34 399.10 398.06 397.70 395.70 2 609.10
Fisheries 5.82 8.52 11.60 12.22 13.08 13.95 14.82 80.01
CAP direct payments (1) 200.38 240.52 281.15 321.38 401.62 481.96 562.31 2 489.33
4. Compensations 129.26 62.72 62.19 — — — — 254.16
Total 1 168.24 1 462.07 1 861.38 1 776.77 1 928.84 2 082.04 2 233.46 12 512.79247
(1) CAP: Common agricultural policy.
Source: Commission services.
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co-financing and a partial substitution of previous
national expenditures, Table V.2.4 shows that the overall
budgetary impact of transfers between Bulgaria and the
EU would be positive and could amount to more than
1 % of GDP in 2007.
Table V.2.4
Budgetary effect of transfers between the EU and Bulgaria in 2007 (% of GDP)
EU transfers Impact on general government budget
Allocations Estimated disbursements
Direct impact
(1)
Indirect impact
(2)
0verall
(1)+(2)
Revenue Expenditure Balance Substitution Co-financing Balance
Pre-accession funds (a) 0.00 1.23 1.02 1.02 0.00 1.02 – 0.34 0.68
Sustainable growth      
Decommissioning of 
Kozloduj NPP
0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.00   
Structural and Cohesion 
Funds (b)
1.86 0.37 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.10 – 0.05 0.05
Natural resources      
Rural Development 
and Fisheries Fund (c)                               
0.90 0.18 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.04 – 0.01 0.03
CAP direct payments (d) 0.72 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.72
Compensations 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.47
     
Contribution to EU budget (c)      
VAT-based own resource  – 0.15 – 0.15   – 0.15
GNI-based own resource, 
UK rebate
   0.74 – 0.74   – 0.74
TOTAL 4.22 3.24 1.94 2.37 – 0.43 1.88 – 0.40 1.05
(a) The pre-accession funds include Phare, ISPA and Sapard. It is assumed that general government is the final beneficiary of 100 % of ISPA, 80 % of Phare and 50 %
of Sapard Funds; there is no strict additionality attached and the maximum co-financing rate is 25 % for all three programmes. 
(b) Assuming an absorption rate of 20 % in 2007 and that the government is the final beneficiary of 80 % of the total transfers. Only the Cohesion Fund (expected to
represent approximately one third of total Structural and Cohesion Fund transfers) is not subject to a strict additionality requirement. The co-financing rate is 15 %
for Structural and Cohesion Funds.
(c) Assuming an absorption rate of 20 % in 2007 and that the government is the final beneficiary of 20 % of the total transfers. Transfers are not subject to a strict addi-
tionality requirement. The maximum co-financing rate is 25 % for both funds.
(d) The national ceiling for direct payments under the CAP is fully used and all funds are disbursed in 2007. Payments are transferred to final beneficiaries outside gen-
eral government. CAP direct payments can substitute previously national subsidies.
Source: Commission services.248
3. The Czech Republic
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government deficit was 2.9 % of
GDP, compared with a deficit target of 3.8 % of GDP set
out in the November 2005 update of the convergence pro-
gramme (1). Higher-than-projected growth and lower-
than-budgeted expenditures contributed to the better-than-
expected outturn. As in 2005, lower-than-budgeted
expenditures reflected the possibility given to government
departments to carry over unspent budgetary allocations,
rather than intentional and sustainable spending cuts.
Unspent budgetary allocations amounted to about ä % of
GDP, accumulating to over 2 % of GDP since 2004. Pub-
lic debt in 2006 reached about 30â % of GDP.
The budget for 2007 was approved by parliament on
13 December 2006, targeting a deficit of 4 % of GDP.
On the expenditure side the budget includes an increase
in social spending of about 1.1 % of GDP and an
increase in research and development expenditure of
about 0.1 % of GDP. On the revenue side, there are no
major changes. The increase in budgetary expenditures
is projected to be higher than the increase in nominal
GDP, leading to a rise in the expenditure ratio of about
half a percentage point. The 2007 budget exceeds the
medium-term expenditure ceilings set by the Czech
authorities. The deficit target of 4 % of GDP for 2007 in
the March 2007 convergence programme exceeds the
target of 3.3 % of GDP of the November 2005 conver-
gence programme. The increase in the target is due to the
expansionary budget of 2007 and is broadly in line with
the Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast for a def-
icit of 3.9 % of GDP for 2007. This forecast is based on
the assumption that the reserve fund of unspent budget-
ary allocations will remain constant in 2007, unlike in
2006. Fiscal policy is expected to be expansionary in
2007 as the structural primary balance is estimated to
deteriorate by 1ä % of GDP.
The Commission services’ forecasts for 2008 a deficit of
3.6 % of GDP, based on a no-policy change assumption.
The structural primary balance is estimated to improve in
2008 by some ä % of GDP. The envisaged deficit for
2008 set in the March 2007 convergence programme is
3â % of GDP while the new government has announced
a package of as yet unapproved measures intended to
bring about a stronger reduction in the deficit for 2008. In
2009, the convergence programme envisages the general
government deficit to be reduced to 3.2 % of GDP.
The general government debt ratio is projected by the
Commission services to slightly increase in 2007 and
2008 to about 31 % of GDP. 
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm 249
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Budgetary developments 2005–09, Czech Republic (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance – 3.5 – 2.9 – 3.9 – 3.6  
— Total 
revenues
40.4 39.5 39.2 39.4  
  Of which: — current taxes 20.8 19.8 19.7 19.9  
 — social contributions 15.1 15.0 14.7 14.5  
— Total expenditure 44.0 42.5 43.1 43.0  
  Of which: — collective consumption 11.2 10.8 10.9 10.7  
 — social transfers in kind 11.0 10.6 10.7 10.5  
 — social transfers other than in kind 11.5 11.4 11.1 10.7  
 — interest expenditure 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0  
 — gross fixed capital formation 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.3  
Primary balance – 2.4 – 1.8 – 2.8 – 2.6  
Tax burden 36.4 35.4 35.0 34.9  
One-off and other temporary measures – 1.1 – 0.2 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) – 2.0 – 2.8 – 4.1 – 3.8  
Structural primary balance – 0.9 – 1.7 – 3.0 – 2.8  
Government gross debt 30.4 30.4 30.6 30.9  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 6.1 6.1 4.9 4.9  
Convergence programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 3.6 – 3.5 – 4.0 – 3.5 – 3.2
Primary balance 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.0 1.6
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 3.4 – 3.9 – 4.4 – 3.9 – 3.5
Government gross debt 30.4 30.6 30.5 31.3 32.2
pm Real GDP growth (%) 6.1 6.0 4.9 4.8 4.8
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in March 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and March 2007 update of the convergence programme of the Czech Republic.
Table V.3.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Czech Republic
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
 • Increase in social transfers  (1.1 % of GDP)
 • Increase in R & D expenditures (0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and March 2007 update of the convergence programme of the Czech Republic.250
4. Denmark
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government recorded a surplus of
4.2 % of GDP (1). This was markedly higher than the sur-
plus of 2.1 % of GDP projected in the November 2005
convergence programme. It marks the continuation of rel-
atively sizeable surpluses in recent years, which in partic-
ular are due to healthy economic growth. Together with
increasing employment and a persistent fall in unemploy-
ment to historically low levels, this has implied higher tax
revenue and lower expenditure due to a fall in transfer
payments. However, the higher-than-estimated surpluses
are also due to certain windfall revenues. Notably, high
energy prices have resulted in strong tax revenue from oil
and gas activities in the North Sea and favourable devel-
opments in financial markets in the second half of 2006
implied stronger than estimated revenue from the taxation
of pension funds. Against the background of the high sur-
plus, the government debt ratio was reduced further to just
above 30 % of GDP in 2006.
The central government budget for 2007 was approved by
parliament on 13 December 2006. The budget was pre-
sented against the backdrop of the tax freeze introduced in
2001. Consequently, no taxes or fees were raised. Overall,
the budget did not contain any quantitatively significant
revenue measures. On 18 April 2007, however, the gov-
ernment presented an agreement to lower the corporate
tax rate by 3 percentage points to 25 %, with effect from
2007. The Danish corporate tax rate was thereby brought
in line with the current average tax rate in EU. On the
expenditure side, the budget confirmed the upward revi-
sion of the target for annual real growth of public con-
sumption from â to 1 %, which was agreed in the context
of the ‘Agreement on wealth and welfare and investments
in the future’ of June 2006. The new expenditure meas-
ures were limited and focused on initiatives in response to
the challenges of globalisations, e.g. the setting-up of a
globalisation fund, and on health and welfare. According
to the most recent update of the convergence programme,
which was submitted to the Commission in November
2006, a general government surplus of 2.8 % of GDP is
projected for 2007 (2). This is 1 percentage point lower
than the estimated surplus in the Commission services’
spring 2007 forecast. The difference is mainly due to the
fact that the governments estimate does not take into
account the higher-than-expected surplus for 2006. It is
also due to a rather cautious macroeconomic scenario in
the convergence programme. As measured by the change
in the structural primary balance, the fiscal stance appears
to be mildly expansionary in 2007.
For 2008, the Commission services’ spring 2007 fore-
cast projects a surplus of 3ã % of GDP, similar to the
projection for 2007. This forecast is based on a no-pol-
icy-change assumption and, hence, only takes into
account measures’ for which at least draft laws exist. The
Commission services’ projection is markedly higher
than the expected surplus of 2.5 % of GDP presented in
the most recent update of the convergence programme.
This is mainly due to a markedly cautious macroeco-
nomic scenario in the programme beyond 2007, which is
based on a technical assumption of a closing output gap
by 2010. However, the assumption of a gradual fall in the
oil price over the programme period until 2010 also
plays a role. On the basis of these assumptions, the pro-
gramme forecasts the surplus to be reduced further to
1.8 % of GDP and 1.2 % of GDP in 2009 and 2010,
respectively.
¥1∂ The government accounts of Denmark now include the pension reform251
costs, as the transitory period on the sectoral classification of pension
schemes expired. The funded second-pillar pension scheme is now classi-
fied in the corporate sector, rather than in government. Targets in conver-
gence programmes were adapted so that data are comparable.
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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the debt ratio is expected to continue to fall. According to
the Commission services’ spring forecast the debt ratio is
expected to reach 25 % of GDP in 2007 and 20 % of GDP
in 2008. Considering the somewhat higher surpluses pro-
jected by the Commission services, this is a slightly more
rapid reduction of the debt ratio than outlined in the latest
update of the convergence programme. 
Table V.4.1
Budgetary developments 2005–10, Denmark (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008   
General government balance 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.6   
— Total revenues 57.2 55.1 53.8 53.1   
  Of which: — current taxes 48.9 47.3 46.2 45.8   
 — social contributions 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9   
— Total expenditure 52.6 50.9 50.1 49.6  
  Of which: — collective consumption 7.7 7.7 7.5 7.4   
 — social transfers in kind 18.1 17.9 17.8 17.7  
 — social transfers other than in kind 16.2 15.3 15.4 15.2   
 — interest expenditure 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2  
 — gross fixed capital formation 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.5   
Primary balance 6.5 5.8 5.0 4.7  
Tax burden 50.3 48.7 48.6 48.1   
One-off and other temporary measures 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0  
Structural balance (3) 4.7 3.7 3.4 3.9   
Structural primary balance 6.5 5.2 4.7 5.0   
Government gross debt 36.3 30.2 25.0 20.0   
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.1 3.2 2.3 2.0   
Convergence programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
General government balance 4.0 3.1 2.8 2.5 1.8 1.2
Primary balance 5.8 4.7 4.3 3.4 2.5 1.8
One-off and other temporary measures 0.3 0.3 0.3    
Structural balance (3) (5) 3.5 2.2 1.9 2.7 2.6 2.7
Government gross debt 36.2 29.8 25.8 22.7 20.5 19.0
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.6 2.7 2.0 0.7 0.7 0.6
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and November 2006 convergence programme of Denmark.
Table V.4.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Denmark
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Lower corporate tax rate (– 0.3 % of GDP) •  Globalisation (0.1 % of GDP)
 • Welfare reform (0.1 % of GDP)252
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services, 2007 budget law and the Danish Ministry of Finance.
5. Germany
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government deficit amounted to
1.7 % of GDP, against the target of 3.3 % of GDP set in
the February 2006 update of the stability programme.
About half of this unexpected improvement in the govern-
ment balance is due to cyclical factors (real GDP actually
grew by 2.7 % compared with the update’s projection at
1.4 %). The principal contribution to the better structural
outturn comes from the revenue side. Direct taxes, espe-
cially those related to profits, yielded substantially
stronger revenues than economic developments would
have suggested. As a result, the tax ratio increased by
more than â percentage point in 2006 compared with
2005. This is not the result of recent discretionary tax pol-
icy measures. Rather, it was partly driven by payments of
tax arrears and early payments of direct taxes, to some
extent the counterpart of the relatively low direct tax ratio
of the recent past. General government expenditure has
been kept under firm control in 2006, growing only by
0.6 % and thus slightly less than targeted. Government
debt amounted to 67.9 % of GDP at the end of 2006.
In 2007, the increase in the standard VAT rate from 16 %
to 19 % is expected to boost general government revenue
by about 1 % of GDP. The pension contribution rate was
raised from 19.5 % to 19.9 % and public health insurers
are projected to increase contribution rates on average by
â percentage point. On the other hand, the unemploy-
ment insurance contribution rate has been reduced from
6.5 % to 4.2 %, so that the overall social contributions as
a percentage of GDP will decline. The German authori-
ties projected the deficit to amount to 1.6 % of GDP in
the updated stability programme of November 2006 (1).
In view of the improving macroeconomic situation and
the lower-than-expected 2006 deficit, the deficit projec-
tion was revised to 1.2 % of GDP in the April 2007
notification for the excessive deficit procedure. The
Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast, with a sig-
nificantly more favourable macroeconomic scenario,
projects the deficit ratio to decline to 0.6 % of GDP.
With the structural deficit estimated to narrow by ã per-
centage point, the fiscal stance would be restrictive.
Under the assumption of unchanged policies, including
social contribution rates, the general government deficit
is projected by the Commission services to decline fur-
ther to 0.3 % of GDP in 2008, albeit almost entirely due
to persistent favourable cyclical conditions. Continuing
consolidation effects of measures already in force will be
more than offset by the budgetary impact from the
planned reform of company taxation, for which the gov-
ernment presented a draft law in March 2007, amounting
to more than 0.3 % of GDP in the initial year. While the
update of the stability programme did not imply an
improvement in the structural balance in 2008, its
premises of a less favourable macroeconomic outlook
and the higher projected deficits in the preceding years
resulted in a deficit projection at 1â % of GDP in 2008,
falling to â % of GDP by 2010.
With GDP growth expected to remain buoyant, the Com-
mission services’ spring 2007 forecast projects the debt
ratio to decline to 63.6 % of GDP by 2008. This decline
is steeper than projected in the updated stability pro-
gramme of November 2006, which foresees a debt ratio
at 66â % of GDP for 2008.
National budgetary coordination
On 5 June 2007, the Council decided that Germany had
corrected its excessive deficit in 2006. The general gov-
ernment deficit had been above the 3 % of GDP refer-
ence value since 2002. In last year’s edition of this253
report, the existing mechanisms of national budgetary
coordination in Germany were discussed and it was
argued that some of the difficulties in implementing
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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budgetary procedures are institutionalised (1). The focus
was on the expenditure coordination mechanism
between the federal level and the State level (all Länder
combined), which was set up in July 2002, when an
amendment to the Law on Budgetary Principles (Haush-
altsgrundsätzegesetz, HGrG) entered into force in order
to implement, at the national level, the commitments
made by Germany in the context of the Stability and
Growth Pact. At the time, this meant a balanced general
government budget by 2004.
In the 2002 Fiscal Planning Council (Finanzplanung-
srat, FPLR), the levels of government agreed to imple-
ment the law as follows. In 2003 and 2004, the federal
level was to reduce expenditure by â % on average per
year (in nominal terms), the Länder were to limit joint
expenditure growth to 1 % on average per year. The
agreement was renewed on 16 June 2004, relaxing the
expenditure target for the federal level: its annual
expenditure growth should not exceed 1 % on average in
2005 and 2006. The target for the Länder level remained
unchanged.
The agreement neither details data requirements for
monitoring, nor are progress reports published. Table
V.5.3 shows compliance with the targets of the second
agreement, which elapsed in 2006. The federal level and¥1∂ See European Commission (2006a).
Table V.5.1
Budgetary developments 2005–10, Germany (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008   
General government balance – 3.2 – 1.7 – 0.6 – 0.3   
— Total revenues 43.5 44.0 43.7 43.4   
  Of which: — current taxes 10.2 10.8 10.9 10.8   
 — social contributions 17.7 17.4 16.5 16.4   
— Total expenditure 46.8 45.7 44.3 43.7   
  Of which: — collective consumption 7.7 7.5 7.2 7.1   
 — social transfers in kind 11.0 11.0 10.9 10.8   
 — social transfers other than in kind 19.2 18.6 17.7 17.3   
 — interest expenditure 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8   
 — gross fixed capital formation 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5   
Primary balance – 0.5 1.1 2.2 2.5   
Tax burden 39.1 39.8 39.7 39.5   
One-off and other temporary measures 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0   
Structural balance (3) – 2.4 – 1.5 – 0.8 – 0.7   
Structural primary balance 0.4 1.3 2.0 2.0   
Government gross debt 67.9 67.9 65.4 63.6   
pm Real GDP growth (%) 0.9 2.7 2.5 2.4   
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
General government balance – 3.2 – 2.1 – 1 â – 1 â – 1.0 –  â
Primary balance – 0.5 – 1 â 1.0 1.0 1 â 2.0
One-off and other temporary measures 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 2.7 – 2.0 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.0 – 0.6
Government gross debt 67.9 67.9 67.0 66.5 65.5 64.5
pm Real GDP growth (%) 0.9 2.3 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.7
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.254
(4) Submitted in November 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and  November 2006 update of the stability programme of Germany.
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schemes are controlled by the federal budget through
legislation. Likewise, the Länder and the local level are
combined, since local governments are under fiscal
supervision by the respective Land. Transfers to other
subsectors of government are netted out, so that only the
direct expenditures (unmittelbare Ausgaben) are consid-
ered. Summing direct expenditures over subsectors
yields total consolidated expenditure of general govern-
ment. In order to be consistent with the Stability and
Growth Pact, data are in national accounts.
Table V.5.3 shows that the first expenditure agreement
for the years 2003 and 2004 had been respected by the
Länder but not by the federal level (1). This agreement
was made before the excessive deficit procedure was ini-
tiated. Its underlying aim was to bring the general gov-
ernment account into balance by 2004. With hindsight,
however, the expenditure agreement taken in 2002
would not have been strict enough to enable Germany to
correct the excessive deficit over the period of this agree-
ment, i.e. by 2004. Given actual revenue developments,
if the agreement had been overall just respected, the gen-
eral government deficit would have amounted to 3.4 %
of GDP instead of the actual 3.7 % of GDP in 2004. Tak-
ing the actual performance of the Länder as given, whose
budgetary execution was even tighter than required by
the agreement, and if the federal level had just met its tar-
get, the general government deficit would have
amounted to 3.1 % of GDP in 2004. Certainly, actual
revenue developments over this period reflect unex-
pected growth shortfalls; however, the agreement was
not revised when they became apparent. By contrast, the
second agreement of June 2004 was respected by both
levels of government, and budgetary execution was even
tighter than required therein.
What can explain the different performance over the two
consecutive agreements? Expenditure growth at the fed-
eral level (including the social security systems)
amounted to 0.5 % on average during the first agree-
ment. Social benefits contributed 0.6 percentage points
to expenditure growth, current transfers (outside German
Government) 0.2 percentage point and intermediate con-
sumption 0.1 percentage point. Conversely, gross invest-
ment and the public wage bill remained stable, and
expenditure growth was dampened by subsidies and
interest expenditure; the latter reflected falling interest
rates. At the Länder and local level, social benefits even
contributed 0.7 percentage point, but this was countered
especially by investment (– 0.6 percentage points) and
also investment grants (– 0.3 percentage points). The
contribution of intermediate consumption and public
wages was mildly positive.
During the second agreement, social benefits contrib-
uted only 0.4 percentage points to average expenditure
growth at the federal level, while intermediate con-
sumption now contributed 0.3 percentage points. The
remaining components, including public wages,
remained almost stable. At the Länder level, the contri-
bution of social benefits to expenditure growth was
Table V.5.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Germany
 Revenue measures (1)  Expenditure measures (2)
•  VAT and insurance tax (from 16 % to 19 %)  (up to 1% of GDP) • Discretionary restraint in labour market expenditure 
(0.1–0.2 % of GDP)
• Social contributions (in total: – 0.4 % of GDP) • Healthcare reform 2007 (negligible)
— unemployment insurance (6.5 % to 4.2 %)   
— pension system (19.5 % to 19.9 %)   
— public healthcare (14.2 % to 14.7 % on average)   
• Reduction of tax allowances (0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and various draft laws.255
0.4 percentage points, while that of intermediate con-
sumption soared to 0.6 percentage points and interest
payments to 0.3 percentage points. This was countered
¥1∂ Differences from the table in last year’s edition of this report are due to
data revisions.
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points), investment and investment grants.
Overall, this analysis confirms the broad picture that
expenditure restraint in Germany relied particularly on
reducing investment and the cost of public administra-
tion. The latter involved both modest public sector wage
agreements (reflecting wage moderation in the private
sector) and a substantial reduction in staff levels (on
average over 2 % per year between 2002 and 2005).
Other consolidation efforts are somewhat hidden behind
these figures. For example a public healthcare reform
dampened expenditure growth considerably in 2004 by
contributing one half to the federal expenditure restraint
(but healthcare spending returned to previous growth
rates thereafter) and the strong improvement in the
labour market in 2006 helped containing expenditure of
social security.
Moreover, the composition of expenditures between
subsectors of government is quite different. While the
Länder and local governments account for about 70 % of
total public investment and even 77 % of the public sec-
tor wage bill, the federal level controls directly 85 % of
social expenditure. Even so, social benefits at the Länder
level consist mostly of pensions for civil servants and
basic social aid. This implies that the federal expenditure
is far more exposed to cyclical fluctuations.
Overall, the results of the expenditure agreement
between levels of government give a mixed picture.
Even though the Länder levels performed better than
planned in the first agreement, in 2004 the federal level
was not able to reverse enough its high expenditure
growth of the preceding year, some of which was due to
worsening cyclical conditions. By the same token, the
federal level benefited towards the end of the second
agreement from improving cyclical conditions, while the
Länder levels began rising especially consumption.
The agreement was renewed in the FPLR meeting of
29 June 2006. Nominal expenditure growth should not
exceed 1 % per year on average in the years 2007 to 2010.
Despite the remarkable expenditure restraint between
2002 and 2006, the agreement has not fully achieved the
intended results in its first implementation until 2004. It
is unknown whether the soft sanctioning device (a rec-
ommendation by the Fiscal Planning Council) has been
applied at the time. Moreover, the targets are not well-
defined in terms of statistics.
Finally, it is not clear whether, for the remaining years,
the existence of this agreement was the reason why its
expenditure targets have been respected. Its non-binding
nature makes the agreement a softer device for budget-
ary control at subsectors of government than the consti-
tutional requirement that net borrowing should not
exceed gross investment (excluding investment grants
received) in cash terms for each budgetary authority.
Between 1991 and 2006, almost 30 % of all budgets (the
federal and each of the 16 Länder) violated this con-
straint ex post (1). The definition of gross investment for
this budgetary rule is wider than in national accounts and
invites to some accounting creativity. Moreover, the rule
¥1∂ See Kitterer and Groneck (2006) for the years 1991–2005; Statistisches
Bundesamt (2007) for 2006.
Table V.5.3
Agreements on expenditure growth for subsectors of government in %
2002
% of total 
expenditure
2003
(1)
2004
(2)
Target
average 
(1),(2)
Result
average 
(1),(2)
2005
(3)
2006
(4)
Target
average 
(3),(4)
Result
average 
(3),(4)
Federal government and  
social security
63.1 2.2 – 1.2 – 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.2 1.0 0.7
Länder and local 
governments
36.9 0.8 – 0.2 1.0 0.3 0.2 1.3 1.0 0.7
General government (1) 100.0 1.7 – 0.8 (0.06) 0.4 0.9 0.6 (1.0) 0.7256
(1) The agreement does not contain a target for general government. Numbers in parentheses are implicit.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office, Commission services’ calculations.
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from the equilibrium of the total economy’), which is not
made operational in numerical terms.
In March 2007, a joint commission of federal and State
representatives began work on the modernisation of fis-
cal relations between federal and Länder levels (Föder-
alismuskommission II). The aim is, among other things,
to strengthen the fiscal accountability of each budgetary
authority. Particular attention will be given to: (i) estab-
lishing an early-warning system, by developing criteria
for government borrowing and instruments for enforce-
ment, taking into account structural differences between
the Länder, and by using a common system of accounts;
(ii) ways to resolve acute budgetary crises at sublevels of
government. Results are expected for early 2009.257
6. Estonia
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, public finances were considerably better than
originally budgeted. The general government surplus
reached 3.8 % of GDP, against the projection of 0.1 % of
GDP in the December 2005 update of the convergence
programme. The main reasons behind this outturn were
higher-than-expected tax revenues due to exceptionally
buoyant economic activity. At the same time expenditure
plans of some times, in particular public investment, were
not fully implemented and carried over to 2007. Efficiency
of tax collection has also improved in recent years, coupled
with measures implemented by the government to stimu-
late declaration of income. In September 2006 the govern-
ment adopted a supplementary budget to allocate higher-
than-expected revenues of 2.5 % of GDP, of which one
third was placed in the pension insurance reserve and the
remaining part mainly directed towards additional invest-
ment. The government debt ratio continued to decline and
stood at 4.1 % of GDP as of end-2006.
The State budget for 2007 was adopted by the govern-
ment in September 2006 and by the parliament in
December. The budget, restricted to central govern-
ment and social security funds, set a precedent com-
pared to the previous practice of targeting nominal bal-
ance by projecting an overall surplus of 0.5 % of GDP.
This compares with the general government surpluses
of 1.2 % of GDP in the November 2006 update of the
convergence programme and of 1.9 % of GDP in the
spring 2007 forecast of the Ministry of Finance (1).
Such adjustment repeats the practice of recent years,
according to which cautiously set targets are subse-
quently considerably overachieved.
For 2007 the Commission services’ spring 2007 fore-
cast projects a general government surplus of 3.7 % of
GDP. The more optimistic projection compared with
the official view results from the expectation of con-
tinued strong and domestic demand led economic
growth and a sizeable overachievement of fiscal tar-
gets in recent years. Robust domestic demand associ-
ated with attractive credit conditions, rising wages
and disposable income of households, should contrib-
ute to higher-than-budgeted inflows of taxes, as is
already evident from healthy tax receipts during the
first months of 2007.
The main measures foreseen by the 2007 budget
include on the revenue side further reduction of the
income tax rate, which is the same for both individuals
and corporations, by one percentage point to 22 %, an
increase in the personal income tax-free threshold for
families with children, and on the other hand a rise in
the social tax minimum contribution basis and an
increase in VAT applied to heating and certain medical
equipment. On the expenditures side, the main changes
include increase in pensions and family allowances, as
well as investments in the field of public order and
safety, inter alia to comply with the Schengen technical
requirements. On the basis of the Commission services’
spring 2007 forecast, the fiscal stance as measured by
the change in the structural primary balance appears
broadly neutral.
For 2008, the Commission services’ spring 2007 fore-
cast, which is based on the customary no-policy-change
assumption, projects a general government surplus of
3.5 % of GDP, while the medium-term budgetary strat-
egy of Estonia, embodied in the 2006 update of the con-
vergence programme, foresees the general government
surplus to be 1.3 % of GDP in 2008 and to grow to
about 1â % of GDP thereafter. The income tax rate
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the258
will continue to decline by one percentage point yearly
and reach 20 % in 2009.
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm 
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will continue to decline further. Following repayment of
Eurobonds amounting to 0.7 % of GDP, it is projected
that the general government debt will fall below 3 % of
GDP in 2007. The net financial position of the general
government is already positive, as the government has
accumulated substantial financial assets amounting to
13 % of GDP as of end-2006. 
Table V.6.1
Budgetary developments 2005–10, Estonia (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008   
General government balance 2.3 3.8 3.7 3.5   
— Total revenues 35.5 37.0 36.2 35.9   
  Of which: — current taxes 20.2 20.7 20.8 20.8   
 — social contributions 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2   
— Total expenditure 33.2 33.2 32.4 32.4   
  Of which: — collective consumption 7.9 7.7 7.7 7.6   
 — social transfers in kind 9.5 9.1 8.6 8.4   
 — social transfers other than in kind 9.2 9.0 9.1 9.1   
 — interest expenditure 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1   
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.2 3.6 3.8 4.0   
Primary balance 2.5 3.9 3.8 3.6   
Tax burden 30.9 31.3 31.2 31.1   
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   
Structural balance (3) 2.4 3.3 3.5 3.8   
Structural primary balance 2.6 3.4 3.6 3.9   
Government gross debt 4.4 4.1 2.7 2.3   
pm Real GDP growth (%) 10.5 11.4 8.7 8.2   
Convergence programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
General government balance 2.3 2.6 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.5
Primary balance 2.5 2.8 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.6
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) 2.2 1.4 0.4 1.2 1.7 1.7
Government gross debt 4.5 3.7 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9
pm Real GDP growth (%) 10.5 11.0 8.3 7.7 7.6 7.5
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and December 2006 update of the convergence programme of Estonia.259
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Main measures in the budget for 2007, Estonia
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Personal and corporate income tax: reduction of income tax rate 
from 23 % to 22 % (– 0.34 % of GDP)
• Increase in pensions (0.88 % of GDP)
• Personal income tax: basic exemption is applicable starting from 
second child, previously from third child (– 0.15 % of GDP)
• Increase in parental and family benefits, in particular increase in 
child allowances to EEK 900 starting from third child 
(0.06 % of GDP)
• VAT: standard 18 % rate applied to heating from 1.7.2007, 
previously 5 % (0.07 % of GDP)
• Issuance of biometric travel documents and investments in the 
field of public order and safety (0.08 % of GDP)
• VAT: standard 18 % rate applied to certain medical equipment 
from 1.1.2007, previously 5 % (0.03 % of GDP)
• Social tax: increase in social tax minimum contribution basis from 
EEK1 400 to EEK 2 000 (0.11 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and December 2006 update of the convergence programme of Estonia and Estonian Ministry of Finance.260
7. Ireland
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government balance is estimated to
have posted a surplus of 2.9 % of GDP. This compares
with a deficit target of 0.6 % of GDP set in the December
2005 update of the stability programme (1). Starting from
a 0.8 % of GDP higher surplus in 2005 than expected,
the significantly better-than-projected outturn in 2006 is
essentially due to the revenues. The increase in the total
revenue ratio by almost 1â percentage points of GDP
between 2005 and 2006 is attributable to tax receipts
arising from a more tax-rich growth. It reflects in partic-
ular the high levels of activity and valuations in the hous-
ing market boosting related tax receipts (capital gains
and stamp duties), but also higher output growth having
a similar effect on corporation and personal income
taxes. Overall expenditure was slightly below target, in
particular as lower-than-budgeted cash social transfers
more than offset higher than expected ‘other’ expendi-
ture. Government debt was at 24.9 % of GDP in 2006,
which is around 3 percentage points less than budgeted.
The budget for 2007 was presented on 6 December 2006,
together with the updated stability programme for 2006–
09. On the revenue side, the main measures include a
more generous personal income tax regime and a less
onerous VAT for small businesses. One measure worthy
of note, even if its total budgeted cost is not large, is a
slight increase in mortgage relief, particularly for first-
time buyers. On the expenditure side, the budget fore-
sees further increases in social welfare payments and
other social transfers, additional funds for elderly and
disabled care and increased capital expenditure as part of
the new medium-term public investment programme
‘National development plan 2007–13’. Built on a still
positive outlook for the Irish economy, although with
some easing due to the property market, the 2007 budget
targeted a general government surplus of 1.2 % of GDP.
The target was later revised to 1.1 % of GDP, mainly on
account of an upward revision of expenditure commit-
ments at central government level and a worsening in the
forecast balances of the social insurance fund. For 2007,
the Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast projects
a somewhat better outcome, a surplus of 1.5 % of GDP,
taking account of the recent record of much better-than-
expected budgetary outturns (2). Given the projected
worsening of the general government balance in 2007,
the deterioration in the structural balance by over 1 % of
GDP points to an expansionary fiscal stance (3).
In view of the non-indexed nature of the tax and social
benefit systems, the no-policy-change assumption for
2008 is made operational, in the absence of new
announced measures, by freezing average nominal tax
rates and adjusting social transfer payments by the fore-
cast CPI inflation rate (with a small top-up). On these
assumptions, the Commission services’ spring 2007 fore-
cast projects a surplus shrinking further to 1 % of GDP,
only marginally better than the target in the December
2006 stability programme update. For 2009, the pro-
gramme projects a further decline in the surplus to 0.6 %
of GDP. Overall, the public finances are expected to
remain strong over the forecast period. However, some of
the macroeconomic risks (notably related to develop-
ments in the housing sector), if realised, have the potential
to weigh negatively on the Irish public finances (4).
The government debt ratio is projected to decrease fur-
ther in 2007 and 2008 to less than 22 % of GDP. The
¥2∂ The forecast of the general government deficit of Ireland for 2006, as
stated in the April 2006 fiscal notification.
¥3∂ Cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and other temporary measures.
¥4∂ While robust growth of the Irish economy is expected to continue, the
Commission services spring 2007 forecast points also to some risks in the261
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
years ahead. On the external side, recent competitiveness pressures expose
the economy’s sensitivity to changes in the global economic environment.
On the domestic side, the extended residential construction boom and
accelerating house prices are noteworthy risks over the medium term.
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of the accumulation of non-general government assets in
the National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF), estab-
lished in 2001 to pre-fund future pension liabilities.  
Table V.7.1
Budgetary developments 2005–09, Ireland (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance 1.0 2.9 1.5 1.0  
— Total 
revenues
35.5 36.9 36.6 36.4  
  Of which: — current taxes 25.8 27.1 27.0 27.0  
 — social contributions 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2  
— Total expenditure 34.4 34.1 35.1 35.5  
  Of which: — collective consumption 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6  
 — social transfers in kind 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.5  
 — social transfers other than in kind 8.7 8.2 8.9 8.9  
 — interest expenditure 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0  
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.3  
Primary balance 2.0 3.9 2.5 2.0  
Tax burden 30.8 32.2 32.1 32.1  
One-off and other temporary measures 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) 0.8 3.0 1.8 1.6  
Structural primary balance 1.9 4.0 2.9 2.6  
Government gross debt 27.4 24.9 23.0 21.7  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 5.5 6.0 5.0 4.0  
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance 1.1 2.3 1.2 0.9 0.6
Primary balance 2.1 3.3 2.3 1.8 1.6
One-off and other temporary measures 0.3 – 0.1 — — —
Structural balance (3) (5) 1.0 2.9 1.8 1.8 1.6
Government gross debt 27.4 25.1 23.0 22.4 21.9
pm Real GDP growth (%) 5.5 5.4 5.3 4.6 4.1
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources:  Commission services and December 2006 update of the Irish stability programme.262
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Main measures in the budget for 2007, Ireland
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• For personal incomes, more generous tax-exempt thresholds, 
widening of standard rate tax bands  and a reduction of the 
higher rate (– 0.7 % of GDP)
• Increased social welfare weekly rates (0.6 % of GDP) and child and 
family benefits (0.1 % of GDP)
• Less onerous VAT regime, with changes oriented towards small 
businesses and mainly of a one-off cash-flow nature
(– 0.1 % of GDP)
• Additional funds for elderly and disabled care (0.2 % of GDP)
• Mortgage interest relief (less than – 0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and Irish Department of Finance, budget 2007.263
8. Greece
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the government deficit was 2.6 % of GDP (1), in
line with the target projected in the previous update of
the stability programme in December 2005 (2). The 2006
deficit figure includes 0.6 % of GDP temporary revenues
(deferred payments by banks in exchange of the assump-
tion by social security of pension commitments). With-
out one-off revenues the 2006 deficit would have been
3.2 % of GDP. The outcome is identical to the estimation
in the December 2006 updated stability programme. The
debt-to-GDP ratio is moving downwards slowly, from
an average of almost 110 % over the period 2001–05 to
around 104â % in 2006.
The 2007 budget was adopted by the Greek Parliament
on 22 December 2006. According to the budget law, the
official objective for 2007 is a deficit of 2.4 % of GDP.
On the revenue side, the budget envisages a reform in
personal-income taxation and a further rise in excise
taxes on fuel, while intensifying the fight against tax
evasion. On the expenditure side, the annual growth of
primary expenditures is projected to fall short of that of
nominal GDP and, along with a further reduction in
interest payments, should lead to a decline in the expen-
ditures ratio. The reduction will be supported by a slower
growth in the total public wage bill (approximately 25 %
of total primary expenditure), which according to the
budget will not exceed 6 % in nominal terms. Significant
cutbacks in intermediate consumption (mainly adminis-
trative cost and procurement) and public investment are
also planned.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2007
forecast, the general government deficit is projected to
be 2.4 % of GDP in 2004. This includes additional
expenditure-saving measures of a permanent nature
amounting to around ä % of GDP as well as additional
one-off revenues of the same amount, both announced
by the Minister for Finance on the cut-off date of the
forecast. Without one-off revenues, the Commission
services deficit forecast for 2007 would be 2.9 % of
GDP. This is above the objective of 2.4 % of GDP set in
the December 2006 updated stability programme, which
did not include the additional consolidation measures
announced by the Greek authorities in April this year. In
particular, the impact of the announced measures is pro-
jected to be offset by (i) a more cautious growth assump-
tion in the Commission services’ spring forecast and
(ii) the fact that the permanent measures included in the
stability programme would, in Commission services
view, be insufficient to fully compensate for the decline
in one-off revenues from 0.6 % of GDP in 2006 (exclud-
ing those announced in April) to ä % of GDP in 2007.
In 2007, total revenues are projected to decline by less
than ä percentage point, as higher indirect taxes are
likely to only partly compensate reductions in revenues
from takeovers of pension funds, and direct tax revenues
are to decline in view of the personal income tax cuts. In
parallel, expenditure is projected to fall by around â %
of GDP, mainly driven by lower interest expenditure,
public consumption and gross fixed capital formation,
and only partly offset by social transfers’ increases.
Overall, the structural balance, i.e. the cyclically
adjusted balance net of one-off and other temporary
measures is estimated to improve by around ä % of
GDP in 2007. Based on a no-policy-change assumption,
the projection for 2008 is a deficit of around 2ã % of
GDP. This compares with the target set in the December
2006 updated stability programme of Greece of 1.8 % of
¥1∂ GDP in this document refers to the old GDP series provided by the Greek
authorities as an annex to the EDP notification of April 2007. The
‘revised’ GDP data reported by the Greek authorities in October 2006,
which would lead to an upward revision of nominal GDP by around 26 %264
GDP for 2008 and 1.2 % of GDP for 2009.per year since 2000, are still subject to examination by Eurostat.
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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a general government debt-to-GDP ratio at just below
101 % in 2007, which is close to the target shown in the
December 2006 updated stability programme. Increas-
ing primary surpluses, lower debt-increasing stock-flow
adjustments, privatisations, and sustained nominal GDP
growth all contribute to a further reduction of the debt-
to-GDP ratio in 2008, at just below 98 %. According to
the December 2006 updated stability programme, the
debt-to GDP-ratio is foreseen at 91ä % in 2009.   
Table V.8.1
Budgetary developments 2005–09, Greece (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance – 5.5 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.7  
— Total 
revenues
41.6 43.2 43.0 42.5  
  Of which: — current taxes 9.2 8.7 8.6 8.6  
 — social contributions 14.4 14.9 14.9 14.6  
— Total expenditure 47.1 45.8 45.5 45.2  
  Of which: — collective consumption 9.6 9.3 10.4 10.4  
 — social transfers in kind 6.4 6.2 4.7 4.7  
 — social transfers other than in kind 17.6 17.7 18.1 18.1  
 — interest expenditure 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.2  
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5  
Primary balance – 0.6 2.0 2.0 1.5  
Tax burden 36.6 36.7 36.8 36.5  
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.0  
Structural balance (3) – 6.1 – 3.9 – 3.6 – 3.4  
Structural primary balance – 1.2 0.7 0.8 0.8  
Government gross debt 107.5 104.6 100.9 97.6  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.7 4.3 3.7 3.7  
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 5.2 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 1.8 – 1.2
Primary balance – 0.4 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.9
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 5.6 – 3.4 – 2.7 – 2.2 – 1.6
Government gross debt 107.5 104.1 100.1 95.9 91.3
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.7 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.1
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and December 2006 update of the stability programme of Greece.265
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 7Table V.8.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Greece
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Increases in excise taxes on fuel and tobacco, VAT on transfers of 
new constructions and tax duty imposed on mobile connection 
bills (ä % of GDP)
• Cutbacks in intermediary government expenditure, through the 
improvement of fiscal audits and controls — Establishment of a 
DG for fiscal audits within the Ministry of Economics and Finance 
• Income tax reform, decrease in personal income tax ratios
(– 0.1 % of GDP)
• Further cutbacks of public spending by EUR 430 million 
(– 0.2 % of GDP) (3)
• Temporary revenues from takeovers of private banks’ pension 
funds (0.3 % of GDP) (3)
 
• Temporary revenues from sale of public real estate 
and the extension of licences of casinos (0.2 % of GDP) (3)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
(3) Measures publicly announced by the Minister for Economy and Finance in April 2007.
Sources: Commission services and 2007 budget law.266
9. Spain
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government balance recorded a sur-
plus of 1.8 % of GDP. This compares with a surplus of
0.2 % of GDP projected in the 2006 budget law and a sur-
plus of 0.9 % of GDP in the December 2005 stability pro-
gramme (1). The higher-than-planned surplus is explained
by stronger-than-expected revenues, accounting for 1 %
of GDP, while expenditures turned out as planned. Specif-
ically, corporate tax revenues grew by 14.5 % on the year
before and income taxes grew by 14.8 %. By levels of
government, the central government posted a surplus of
0.8 % of GDP, regional governments registered a bal-
anced budget and local authorities a deficit of 0.2 % of
GDP. Social security achieved a surplus of 1.2 % of GDP.
Government gross debt amounted to 39.9 % of GDP in
2006, down from 43.2 % of GDP in 2005.
In 2007, the budget law adopted by the government on
28 December 2006 projected a surplus of 0.7 % of GDP.
However, the December 2006 update of the stability pro-
gramme forecasts a surplus of 1 % of GDP. The Com-
mission services’ spring 2007 forecast projects a surplus
of 1.4 % of GDP. According to the 2007 budget law,
central government revenues are projected to increase by
10â % in nominal terms. Direct taxes are expected to
increase by 16.6 %, indirect taxes by 12 % and social
contributions by 6.7 %. On the expenditure side, the pro-
jected increase is 7.8 %.
The economic policy objectives of the central govern-
ment are twofold: (i) Enhance productivity by increasing
spending on R & D education and infrastructure. Specif-
ically, in 2006 the R & D budget (excluding military
items) is projected to grow by 33 %, in line with the
objective of attaining 2 % of GDP in 2010. Also in 2006,
allocations for education are forecast to grow by 26 %,
(amounting to 0.2 % of GDP), mainly reflecting the
increase in students’ grants. Infrastructure investment is
planned to increase by 9â % in line with the strategic
plan of infrastructure and transports (PEIT); (ii) enhance
social protection by improving pensions and increasing
its reserve fund and starting the implementation of the
dependency policy. Specifically, the allocated budget for
pensions will grow by 8 % in nominal terms. Addition-
ally, the expenditure allocated for long-term care in 2007
is 0.04 % of GDP. The reserve fund of pensions, created
at the end of the 1990s to guarantee the future payment
of pensions, will increase by 0.6 % of GDP.
In 2008, the December 2006 update of the stability pro-
gramme targets a general government surplus of 0.9 %
of GDP. This projection is lower than the 2007 Commis-
sion services’ spring forecast, in which, under a no-pol-
icy-change assumption, the general government balance
is expected to achieve a surplus of 1.2 % of GDP. This
latter projection takes into account the impact in 2008 of
the direct tax reform and the higher surplus projected for
2007. In 2009, according to the December 2006 stability
programme, the general government surplus is projected
at 0.9 % of GDP.
Concerning government debt, the stability programme
foresees a gradual decline towards 34 % of GDP in 2008.
This is broadly in line with the projections in the Com-
mission services’ spring 2007 forecast. 
Developments in tax revenues
Since the mid-1990s, the dynamic performance of the
Spanish economy went along with strong government
revenue flows. The apparent elasticity of total taxes to
GDP, i.e. the relative changes of taxes over the relative
change of nominal GDP, was consistently above the267
‘normal’ level which is estimated to be close to one. The
composition of economic growth is part of the explana-
tion. Graph V.9.1 suggests that private consumption,
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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Budgetary developments 2005–10, Spain (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008   
General government balance 1.1 1.8 1.4 1.2   
— Total revenues 39.3 40.3 39.7 39.7   
  Of which: — current taxes 23.0 24.0 23.9 24.1   
 — social contributions 13.0 13.0 12.9 12.8   
— Total expenditure 38.2 38.4 38.3 38.5   
  Of which: — collective consumption 7.5 7.5 7.7 7.7   
 — social transfers in kind 10.5 10.4 10.4 10.5   
 — social transfers other than in kind 11.6 11.6 11.8 11.8   
 — interest expenditure 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5   
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.6 3.9 3.6 3.7   
Primary balance 2.9 3.4 3.0 2.7   
Tax burden 35.6 36.5 36.7 36.9   
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   
Structural balance (3) 1.6 2.3 1.8 1.7   
Structural primary balance 3.4 3.9 3.4 3.2   
Government gross debt 43.2 39.9 37.0 34.6   
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.5 3.9 3.7 3.4   
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  
General government balance 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.9  
Primary balance 2.9 3.0 2.5 2.3 2.2  
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) (5) 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.6  
Government gross debt 43.1 39.7 36.6 34.3 32.2  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.5 3.8 3.4 3.3 3.3
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and December 2006 update of the stability programme of Spain.
Table V.9.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Spain
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Reform on direct taxes (– 0.4 % of GDP) • Increase in R & D spending (0.15 % of GDP)
 • Increase in investment in infrastructure (0.1 % of GDP)
 • Increase in social benefits (pensions) (0.6 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Source: Commission services.268
investment in dwellings and corporate profits were the
main drivers of the ‘boom’ of indirect and corporate tax
revenues over the last decade. By contrast, while discre-
tionary measures were predominant drivers of tax reve-
nues in the 1980s, they are assessed to have played a
rather secondary role at the present time.
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M e m b e r  S t a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  S p a i nIn 1995–2006, total current taxes have been growing at
8â % per year in nominal, 1 percentage point faster than
nominal GDP terms (see Table V.9.3) (1). As a result, the
tax burden went up by 4 percentage points of GDP and
the gap vis-à-vis the euro area significantly narrowed. In
the mid-1990s, the Spanish tax burden was 8 percentage
points of GDP lower than that of the euro area.
When a longer-term perspective is taken, the current
buoyancy of tax revenues in Spain looks less excep-
tional. The average apparent elasticity of total taxes to
GDP of 1ä over the last 10 years does not differ signifi-
cantly from the average recorded over the last 35 years.
Moreover, when compared with previous expansions of
the Spanish economy, especially that of the 1980s, cur-
rent developments might appear relatively modest. Spe-
cifically, between 1970 and 2006 tax revenues have been
growing in nominal terms at an annual average rate of
14â %, more than 2 percentage points faster than nomi-
nal GDP. As a consequence, the tax burden has increased
from 18 % of GDP in 1970 to 36â % in 2006.
However, there is a notable difference between the past
10 years and the last quarter of the 20th century. The
increase of the tax burden, especially between the mid-
1970s and the early 1990s, is closely linked to the mod-
ernisation of the Spanish fiscal system. This process
included the reform of direct taxes in 1977, which raised
substantially direct tax rates during the 1980s, as well as
the introduction of the VAT in 1986 coinciding with the
accession of Spain to the EU. No comparable institu-
tional developments explain the recent buoyancy of tax
revenue.
Indirect taxes: In 1995–2006 indirect taxes have been
growing at an average annual rate of 9â % as compared
to 7â % of nominal GDP. Today indirect taxes account
for 12ä % of GDP, up from 10 % of GDP in 1995. Using
private consumption plus an estimate of transactions of
new dwellings as tax base, the implicit tax rate has
declined marginally from 15â % in 1995 to 15 % in 2006.
Indirect tax revenues have posted an apparent elasticity to
GDP of on average 1ä. No substantial legislative changes
affecting VAT were implemented in 1995–2006.
VAT related to housing is estimated to have grown by
19 % per year since 1995. As a result, it accounted for 7 %
of total indirect tax revenues or 1 % of GDP in 2006,
which corresponds to an average elasticity to GDP of 2.7.
This reflects not only the increasing share of investment
Graph V.9.1:  Developments in selected tax bases 1970–2006
Source: Commission services.
50
55
60
65
70
75
1970
%
 o
f G
D
P
5
10
15
20
25
30
%
 o
f G
D
P
Net operating surplus Compensation of employees and self-employed
Households’ gross disposable income 
Private consumption and investment in dwellings 
200620032000199719941991198819851982197919761973269
in dwellings in real GDP but also the boom of housing
prices, which have been growing annually by around
three times the GDP deflator. As no legislative changes
¥1∂ Current taxes include direct and indirect taxes as well as social contribu-
tions.
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ing VAT on new houses, it is not surprising that the
implicit tax rate remained essentially unchanged and the
elasticity to the base is close to unity (1). Consequently,
the bulk of the increase in revenues from VAT on hous-
ing would be explained by the increase in the tax base.
Concerning VAT other than on housing, in 1995–2006
revenues expanded at an annual average rate close to
10 %, which has resulted in a tax elasticity-to-GDP of
1.3. In parallel, the implicit tax rate has increased from
7â % in 1995 to 9ä % in 2006 (2). The apparent elastic-
ity to the base is therefore comparable to that to GDP and
Graph V.9.2:  Total tax burden: breakdown by types of taxes 1970–2006
Source: Commission services.
Table V.9.3
Tax revenues in Spain, 1995–2006
Current 
taxes Indirect taxes Direct taxes
Social 
contributions
Total VAT on housing Other VAT
Other 
indirect 
taxes
Revenues Annual % change, average 8.6 9.4 19.8 9.1 8.9 8.9 7.5
 % of GDP, average 34.7 11.3 0.5 5.1 5.7 10.4 13.0
Tax bases (1) Annual % change, average 7.4 9.8 22.3 7.0 7.0 7.1 6.3
Elasticity Annual  average to GDP 1.2 1.3 2.7 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.0
 Annual  average to base  1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2
NB: Nominal GDP growth rate 7.4 %
(1) The chosen tax bases are: gross domestic product (tax base for total taxes), private consumption and investment in dwellings (tax base for indirect taxes), investment
in dwellings (tax base for VAT on housing), private consumption (tax base for other VAT and other indirect taxes ), gross value added (tax base for direct tax), com-
pensation of employees and self-employed (tax base for social contributions).
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ Tax revenues are calculated on the basis of the number of new dwellings
built each year multiplied by the market price per square metre and by the
average square metres per dwelling (90).
¥2∂ The proxy of tax base for VAT (other than on housing) is private consump-
tion.
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category seem to respond to income effects, as consump-
tion shifts towards goods with higher VAT rates.
Direct taxes: In 1995–2006, direct taxes have been
growing at an average annual rate close to 9 %. As a
result, they accounted for 11â % of GDP in 2006, up
from 10 % of GDP in 1995. The implicit tax rate has
increased from 11 % in 1995 to 13 % in 2006 (1). The
bulk of the increase has taken place during the last two
years. The apparent tax elasticity to GDP and to the base
is well above unity; 1.2 and 1.3 respectively.
The recent expansion of direct tax revenues is somewhat
surprising, as it has coincided with reforms of personal
income tax in 1999 and 2003, which reduced statutory
tax rates. However, based on available estimates, neither
the changes in the tax base nor discretionary measures
can explain the recorded development in direct tax reve-
nues. These two factors should have had a moderating
effect on revenues from direct taxation of income. Since
tax brackets have not been updated in line with inflation
every year, the dynamism of direct taxes could be
explained by the intrinsic progression of the tax system.
Moreover, the regularisation of immigrants and, last but
not least, extraordinary corporate profits also played a
role.
Social contributions: In 1995–2006, social contributions
have been growing at an annual average rate close to nom-
inal GDP and their share in GDP has remained broadly
unchanged at around 13 %. The implicit tax rate (in per
cent of compensations of employees and self-employed)
has increased from 21 % in 1995 to 24 % in 2006.
During the last 10 years, the labour share in income has
actually declined. However, the negative effect on social
contributions has been compensated by other factors,
such as a substantial broadening of the contribution base
in 2001 and 2002 together with the regularisation of
immigrants in 2005. As regards the regularisation of
immigrants, it increases revenues without changing the
tax base because national accounts already estimate non-
declared jobs that do not contribute to the social security
system.¥1∂ The proxy of tax base for direct taxes is the gross value added (GVA).271
10. France
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
Following a decline to 3.0 % of GDP in 2005, the gen-
eral government deficit was further reduced to 2.5 % in
2006, mainly thanks to higher-than-expected revenues.
One-off revenues totalled 0.3 % of GDP, after 0.6 % of
GDP in 2005. The deficit outturn is 0.4 percentage point
better than the target presented in the January 2006
update of the stability programme and 0.1 percentage
point better than the official forecast of March 2006 (1).
The budgetary outturn benefited from higher-than-
expected inflow of VAT and corporate taxes, which
more than offset the implementation of some tax cuts.
On the expenditure side, the target was respected at the
central government level but some slippages were
recorded for healthcare and local government expendi-
ture so that growth in total public expenditure overshot
its official target. The structural balance, i.e. the balance
net of cyclical and one-offs, improved by 0.9 % of GDP.
After a rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio by nearly 2 percent-
age points in 2005, the government committed itself to
reduce the ratio by 2 % of GDP in 2006. This objective
was achieved.
Based on the assumption that real GDP will grow
between 2 % and 2.5 %, the 2007 budget adopted by the
parliament on 19 December 2006 plans a deficit of 2.5 %
of GDP. The improvement compared to 2005 is pro-
jected to result from expenditure restraints, notably (i) a
reduction of State expenditures by 1 % in real terms after
four years of stabilisation in volume, (ii) a slowdown of
outlays for unemployment benefits in connection with an
improved employment performance, and (iii) a slow-
down of health expenditure resulting from the full effect
of the 2004 healthcare reform and additional measures
incorporated in the 2006 and 2007 budget for the social
security sector (in particular, the ‘pharmaceutical plan’,
the ‘hospital plan’ and continued efforts to control the
cost of medical treatment and fight frauds). On the reve-
nue side, the main measures are an income tax reduction
(0.2 % of GDP), an increase in the employment premium
and lower tax rates on new capital expenditure. The
reduction in the deficit will benefit from one-off reve-
nues of about 0.05 % of GDP (2). The Commission serv-
ices’ spring 2007 forecast projects a government deficit
of 2.4 % of GDP. This is slightly below the 2007 budget
target of 2.5 % of GDP which assumed a 0.2 percentage
point of GDP higher deficit outcome for 2006. If the
carry over from the lower-than-expected deficit in 2006
was applied to the 2007 deficit target, the excess of the
Commission services’ forecast (of 0.1 percentage point
of GDP) would stem from higher expenditures, notably
expenditure by the social security funds and investment
expenditure by local governments. The Commission
services’ forecast implies a structural improvement of
0.3 % of GDP.
In 2008, based on the conventional no-policy-change
assumption, the Commission services’ spring 2007 fore-
cast projects a deficit of 1.9 % of GDP. The official def-
icit target for 2007 set in the 2006 update of the stability
programme is 1.8 % of GDP (or 1.6 % when taking into
account of the favourable base effect from the 2006 out-
turn of the budget deficit). The higher Commission pro-
jection is due to a higher deficit estimate for 2007 by
0.1 % of GDP (negative base effect) and higher expendi-
tures from the State, in particular on the basis of
unchanged policies it is assumed that the rule of a
expenditure reduction of 1 % in volume terms is imple-
mented, while the official scenario is based on a reduc-
tion of expenditure by 1ä % in volume terms, higher
expenditures in the local government sector and higher
expenditures in the social security sector. The 2006272
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
¥2∂ The one-off revenues result from a change in the corporate tax code and
the advanced collection of social contributions on saving plans.
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tinuous reduction in the deficit so that there are no more
deficits in 2010.
The government’s objectives of debt reduction are fore-
cast to be achieved in 2007 with a projected further
reduction in the debt level to 62.9 % of GDP, based on
the full allocation of privatisation receipts to debt reduc-
tion and a better overall management of the debt (notably
of the cash-flow) of the different general government
entities. For 2008, the forecast includes EUR 7.5 billion
of privatisation receipts, i.e. the middle of the range pre-
sented in the latest update of the stability programme,
which would further reduce the debt ratio by 1 percent-
age point of GDP. The 2006 update of the stability pro-
gramme anticipated that the debt-to-GDP ratio would
decline below the 60 % of GDP threshold by 2010. 
The corporate income tax in recent years
In 2006, windfall revenues compared to the official pro-
jections of the finance law for the general government
sector totalled about EUR 12 billion (budgetary account-
ing), i.e. 0.7 % of GDP, of which EUR 10 billion were
concentrated at the central government level.
Corporate tax revenues, which were EUR 6.4 billion
higher than the estimate included in the initial budget bill,
constituted half of the overall windfall. When assessing
the performance of the State budgetary execution in their
Table V.10.1
Main measures in the budget for 2007, France (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008   
General government balance – 3.0 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.9   
— Total revenues 50.7 51.0 50.7 50.8   
  Of which: — current taxes 26.8 27.3 27.1 27.2   
 — social contributions 18.2 18.4 18.3 18.3   
— Total expenditure 53.6 53.5 53.2 52.7   
  Of which: — collective consumption 8.3 8.3 8.2 8.1   
 — social transfers in kind 15.5 15.4 15.3 15.1   
 — social transfers other than in kind 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8   
 — interest expenditure 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5   
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4   
Primary balance – 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.5   
Tax burden 43.8 44.4 44.1 44.1   
One-off and other temporary measures 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0   
Structural balance (3) – 3.2 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 1.5   
Structural primary balance – 0.6 0.2 0.5 1.0   
Government gross debt 66.2 63.9 62.9 61.9   
pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.2 2.0 2.4 2.3   
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
General government balance (6) – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.5 – 1.8 – 0.9 0.0
Primary balance – 0.2 – 0.1 0.1 0.7 1.7 2.5
One-off and other temporary measures 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 3.0 – 2.5 – 2.2 – 1.6 – 0.7 0.2
Government gross debt (6) 66.6 64.6 63.6 62.6 60.7 58.0
pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.2 2.0-2.5 2.0-2.5 2.2 2.2 2.2
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 economic forecasts.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
5273
( ) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and December 2006 update of the stability programme of France.
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two factors: the good performance of French firms and
the December 2006 change in the corporate tax code,
which yielded EUR 1 billion additional revenues (0.05 %
of GDP).
The apparent elasticity, of the corporate tax to GDP, i.e.
the relative change of corporate taxes over the relative
change of GDP, averaged 1.7 in 2000–06 (see Graph
V.10.2), against an ex ante OECD elasticity of 1.6 (1).
The apparent elasticity can be decomposed into the elas-
ticity of the tax base (which is approximated by the gross
operating surplus — GOS) with respect to GDP and the
elasticity of corporate taxes to the tax base.  
Table V.10.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, France
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Income tax reform (– 0.2 % of GDP) • Reduction in the number of civil servants (– 0.03 % of GDP)
• Lower tax rates on new capital expenditure  (– 0.1 % of GDP) • Implementation of the State modernisation audits’ 
recommendations regarding potential savings and productivity 
gains (– 0.05 % of GDP)
• Increase in the employment premium (– 0.05 % of GDP) • Budget bill for social security (– 0.02 % of GDP)
• One-offs: change in the corporate tax code and advance payment 
of taxes on specific saving plans (+ 0.05 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and 2007 budget bill.
¥1∂ The budgetary elasticities used in the EU budgetary surveillance frame-
work are derived from a commonly agreed method developed by the
OECD. For details see http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2005doc.nsf/
43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/
05fabee2d580f005c1257037002d2179/$FILE/JT00187415.PDF 
Graph V.10.1:  Corporate tax (CT) revenues
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In recent years the fluctuations of the apparent elasticity
were comparatively mild. Indeed, the GOS has been sta-
ble at 17 % of GDP over this period.
Over the period 2000–06, the growth rate of the GOS of
French firms has been quite volatile yet not too different
compared to that of nominal GDP. By contrast, the rela-
tion between corporate tax revenues (CT) and the GOS is
not stable. Between 2000 and 2006 the apparent elasticity
of the CT with respect to the GOS was well above the
OECD ex ante elasticity, estimated at 1 (Graph V.10.3). In
2006, the apparent elasticity reached 9.7 after 22.7 in 2005
(partly due to the lack of growth in GOS in that year).
Graph V.10.2:  Apparent elasticity of corporate taxes (CT) with respect to GDP
Sources: INSEE and Commission services.
– 6
– 4
– 2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1997
Apparent elasticity of CT to GDP
OECD ex ante elasticity of CT to GDP
200320022001200019991998
Graph V.10.3:  Apparent elasticity of corporate taxes (CT) to gross operating surplus (GOS)
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apparent elasticity of the GT to GOS. Firstly, the GOS
does not exactly correspond to the tax base of corporate
taxes. The actual tax base, the bénéfice fiscal, is calculated
on the basis of the earnings minus the deductible charges
(which notably include provisions for risks, higher prices,
depreciation, etc.). Secondly, until December 2005 the
corporate tax on profits in year t was paid (in four instal-
ments) in year t (estimated on the basis of profits in year t-
1), with an additional corrective payment in March of year
t+1on the basis of taxable profits in year t. This time dis-
crepancy could arguably distort the link between the GOS
and tax receipts. To correct for this distortion, the lagged
corporate tax revenues elasticity with respect to gross
operating surplus of the preceding year was calculated. It
proved to be as volatile as the un-lagged one and thus una-
ble to explain the high volatility in the tax elasticity (1).
Thirdly, smoothing CT payments over time (depending
on the series of benefits and losses, etc.) also impinges
on the relation between the GOS and CT receipts. There
is a possibility of transferring losses to future exercises,
but also a ‘carry-back system’ which allows firms to
impute losses on past benefits (up to three years before
the occurrence of the losses). In this case, a claim on the
French Treasury materialises, corresponding to past cor-
porate tax payments, which would be reimbursed if not
offset against new corporate tax payments within five
years (2). Fourth, the link between the GOS and the CT
is blurred by discretionary measures.
Graph V.10.5 presents the apparent elasticity corrected
for the effect of discretionary measures using the data in
Table V.10.3. Despite the correction, the volatility of the
apparent elasticity is still strong.
¥1∂ Changes in the tax code in 2005 and 2006, may reduce the lag between the
GOS and CT revenues. Since December 2005, in the case of firms with a
turnover of over EUR 1 billion, the first three instalments of the CT are still
linked to the taxable profits of year t-1, but the fourth one, in December, is
linked to the estimate of the taxable profits in year t and thus brings forward
at least part of the adjustment payment which occurs in March of year t+1.
As this provision was extended in December 2006 to firms with turnover of
over EUR 0.5 billion and will again be extended in 2007, the time distance
between the GOS and the CT payments should be further reduced.
¥2∂ Example 
If the 2006 result is a EUR 100 million profit, the firm should pay a corpo-
rate tax amount of EUR 33.33 million: it could offset its claim on the
Treasury and pay 10 million in cash. On the contrary if the firm continues
to record losses up to 2010, it could ask the French Treasury to reimburse
the EUR 23.3 million claim from 2011.
Million EUR 2002 2003 2004 2005
Taxable profit + 50 + 10 + 30 – 70
‘Carry-back’ of the 2005 EUR 
70 million deficit 
50 10 10
Claim on the French Treasury EUR 70 million *33.33 %  = EUR 23.3 million
Graph V.10.4:  Quarterly profile of corporate tax (CT) payments
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M e m b e r  S t a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  F r a n c eSome important points need to be stressed concerning
the data used. It is extremely difficult to quantify the
effect of some discretionary measures, as estimates are
sometimes drastically revised. For example, an
exceptional tax of 25 % on distributed profits not taxed
at the normal rate was estimated in 2003 to increase CT
revenues by EUR 0.5 billion in 2005, while in 2005 its
estimated impact on CT receipts in that year stood at
about EUR 2 billion.  
It is difficult to disentangle the effect of discretionary
measures from the impact of growth. For example, the
change in the tax code of December 2005 was first
estimated to yield about EUR 0.4 billion; the latest
estimate is now EUR 2.3 billion.
In the corrective budget bill for year t, the French
authorities’ present ex post estimates of discretionary
measures, but only since 2000 such figures have been
presented in a constant manner. Therefore, the histori-
cal series are extremely short. Table V.10.3 shows the
total discretionary measures affecting corporate tax
revenues over the last six years (2006 results are provi-
sional). An important drawback of these data is that
problems of consistency remain in assessing the cumu-
lated impact of a series of measures taken on the same
budgetary items over a number of years. For example,
in Table V.10.3, the amount displayed for 2006 only
takes into account the estimated impact of the Decem-
ber 2006 corporate tax code change (EUR 1 billion) but
does not integrate any estimate of the change in the
code implemented in December 2005, whereas in other
cases the impact of previous years’ measures is taken
into account.  
Graph V.10.5:  Apparent elasticity of corporate taxes (CT) to gross operating surplus (GOS) taking 
into account discretionary measures
Sources: INSEE, projet de loi portant règlement définitif du buget (for the years 2000–06) and Commission services.
Table V.10.3
Impact of discretionary measures
Net effect 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
EUR billion – 1.4 – 1.8 – 1.3 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.4
% of GDP – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Sources: Projet de loi portant règlement définitif du budget (for the years 2000–06) and Commission services’ calculations.
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11. Italy
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government deficit was 4.4 % of
GDP. This compares with a deficit target of 3.5 % of
GDP set in the December 2005 update of the stability
programme (1). The headline deficit was affected by two
exceptional factors, namely a ruling of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) concerning VAT on company
cars, entailing refunds officially estimated at 1.1 % of
GDP (2) and the government decision to cancel the debt
of the railway company related to the high-speed project
resulting in a 0.9 % of GDP increase in the deficit (3).
Excluding one-off and other temporary measures (4), the
2006 deficit was 3ä % of GDP, â percentage point bet-
ter than planned. The increase in revenue net of one-offs
ended up 1â % of GDP higher than projected in Decem-
ber 2005, which more than offset the higher-than-
planned growth of expenditure net of one-offs, amount-
ing to around 1 % of GDP. A mid-year package adopted
in June 2006, officially estimated to have increased rev-
enue and expenditure by around 0.25 and 0.15 % of GDP
respectively, contributed to this result. The windfall rev-
enue seems to be linked to a previous underestimation of
the impact of budgetary provisions as well as to an over-
shooting of VAT receipts, the reasons of which are still
unclear. Concerning expenditure, sizeable slippages in
compensation of employees and healthcare accounted
for around half of the overshooting in 2006. The refunds
of VAT on company cars unduly paid in 2006 also
increased expenditure by more than 0.3 % of GDP. The
2005 update of the stability programme projected a
slight decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio in 2006. By con-
trast, the gross debt ratio increased to 106.8 % of GDP in
2006, up from 106.2 % in 2005, essentially due to the
accumulation of deposits to finance part of the reim-
bursement following the ECJ ruling on VAT.
The 2007 budgetary package is composed of the budget
law proper and a decree law that, among other measures,
compensates for the permanent loss in VAT revenues
linked to the ECJ ruling with higher direct taxes. It also
includes a framework law that lays the basis for the har-
monisation of taxation on households’ income from
financial assets. Parliament passed the decree law on
23 November and approved the budget law on
21 December 2006. However, the adoption of the frame-
work law, which is expected to yield around 0.1 % of
GDP of higher revenue, has been postponed. Redistribu-
tive and growth-oriented measures in the package entail
a budgetary burden of almost 1â % of GDP. Around two
thirds of these amounts are higher expenditures; the rest
are lower revenues, including deductions related to the
regional tax on productive activities (IRAP) aimed at
reducing the labour tax wedge. The negative budgetary
effect of these measures is more than offset by deficit-
reducing measures officially estimated at 2â % of GDP,
mostly, around 1ã percentage points, revenue-based.
The single most important measure, planned to yield
more than ä % of GDP, is the partial diversion of the
accumulation of the severance pay scheme of private
sector employees (TFR) from enterprises to the national
social security institute (INPS). It must be noted that,
while reducing the deficit, this measure does not
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
¥2∂ The ruling entails the refunding of VAT paid between 2003 and September
2006 and lower VAT revenues thereafter. VAT refunds for the years
2003–05 (officially estimated at ã percentage point of GDP) are treated as
one-off, whereas the 2006 refunds (officially estimated at more than 0.3 %
of GDP) are not.
¥3∂ Following a Eurostat decision of 23 May 2005 (see Eurostat news release
No 65/2005), such debt was already booked as government liability. This
means that national accounts recorded a debt from the RFI-TAV (the high-
speed project company) towards government and a debt from government
towards bond holders (‘on-lending’).
¥4∂ One-off and temporary measures increased the 2006 deficit by 1.2 % of
GDP in 2006. On top of the ECJ ruling and the debt cancellation, the fol-278
improve fiscal sustainability, as it implies additional
future expenditure. Additional revenues are supple-
mented by around ã % of GDP expenditure cuts, distrib-
lowing transactions are treated as one-off: sales of real estate (0.1 % of
GDP) and taxes on the revaluation of companies’ assets (0.4 % of GDP).
By contrast, the 2005 update of the stability programme projected deficit-
reducing one-off measures at 0.3 % of GDP in 2006.
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revision to the domestic stability pact, the framework for
local government’ finances, aims to deliver the planned
savings at local level.
The update of the stability programme submitted in
December 2006 targeted a deficit at 2.8 % of GDP in
2007, built on an economic growth forecast of 1.3 % and
assuming the full implementation of the 2007 budget. In
light of the favourable economic and budgetary develop-
ments, a new report published by the Ministry of Econ-
omy and Finance in March 2007 revised the 2007 deficit
target downwards to 2.3 % of GDP, with an economic
growth forecast of 2 %. The Commission services’
spring 2007 forecast projects a deficit of 2.1 % of GDP,
just less than 0.2 percentage point lower than the official
projection. Starting from the positive base following the
2006 budgetary  outturn, this forecast assumes slightly
lower than officially projected interest and capital
expenditure. However, it does not incorporate the full
implementation of some measures in the 2007 budget.
According to the Commission services forecast, the pri-
mary structural balance (i.e. net of cyclical factors and
excluding one-off measures) is projected to improve by
more than 2 % of GDP in 2006–07, implying a restric-
tive fiscal policy stance.
The 2008 deficit forecast of 2.2 % of GDP is based on
the customary no-policy-change assumption and is in
line with the target set in the December 2006 update of
the stability programme. However, given the better-
than-planned budgetary and economic developments,
Table V.11.1
Budgetary developments 2005–11, Italy (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008    
General government balance – 4.2 – 4.4 – 2.1 – 2.2    
— Total revenues 44.0 45.6 46.0 46.1    
  Of which: — current taxes 27.6 29.3 29.2 29.2    
 — social contributions 12.9 13.0 13.5 13.6    
— Total expenditure 48.2 50.1 48.1 48.3    
  Of which: — collective consumption 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.3    
 — social transfers in kind 11.9 11.9 11.7 11.8    
 — social transfers other than 
in kind
17.0 17.1 17.3 17.3    
 — interest expenditure 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8    
 — gross fixed capital formation 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4    
Primary balance 0.3 0.1 2.7 2.5    
Tax burden 40.6 42.3 42.8 42.9    
One-off and other temporary measures 0.6 – 1.2 0.1 0.1    
Structural balance (3) – 3.9 – 2.6 – 1.6 – 1.8    
Structural primary balance 0.7 2.0 3.1 2.9    
Government gross debt 106.2 106.8 105.0 103.1    
pm Real GDP growth (%) 0.1 1.9 1.9 1.7    
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
General government balance – 4.1 – 5.7 – 2.8 – 2.2 – 1.5 – 0.7 0.1
Primary balance 0.7 – 0.9 2.2 2.8 3.4 4.2 5.0
One-off and other temporary measures 0.5 – 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 4.0 – 3.9 – 2.5 – 1.9 – 1.2 – 0.4 0.3
Government gross debt 106.6 107.6 106.9 105.4 103.5 100.7 97.8
pm Real GDP growth (%) 0.0 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.279
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and December 2006 update of the stability programme of Italy.
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adjustment in structural terms, whereas the updated sta-
bility programme foresees an improvement by more than
0.5 % of GDP, as required by the Stability and Growth
Pact. For the subsequent years, the updated stability pro-
gramme plans a further improvement of the government
balance, which is expected to turn into surplus by 2011.
The debt ratio is expected to decline to 105 % of GDP in
2007 and, assuming unchanged policy, to continue
diminishing in 2008, broadly in line with the decline pro-
jected in the latest update of the stability programme.
The latter projects the pace of debt reduction to acceler-
ate over the outer years of the programme, as the targeted
primary surplus continues increasing steadily and in the
absence of any significant debt-increasing operations
recorded below the line.
The diversion of the severance pay scheme 
(TFR) to INPS
The 2007 budget law further modified the scheme govern-
ing severance pay (Trattamento di Fine Rapporto — TFR)
for dependent workers in the private sector. In the previ-
ous scheme, employers were obliged to accumulate each
year about one month’s worth of salary per worker as
book reserves. The amounts thus accumulated were
relationship. The TFR funds accrued a yearly return of
1.5 % plus three quarters of the inflation rate. Given
higher market interest rates and relatively difficult credit
conditions, particularly for small firms, TFR funds typi-
cally represented a source of low-cost and easy financing
for enterprises.
In 2005, legislation enacting the pension reform of 2004
intended to kick-start the privately funded pension pillar,
established that from 1 January 2008 all dependent work-
ers in the private sector could choose to either continue
accumulating the severance pay fund with their employer
or direct future flows to a private pension fund. The 2007
budget law advanced the implementation of the above
provision to 1 January 2007. At the same time, employers
with at least 50 employees have to divert the flows that
employees decide not to transfer to private pension
schemes towards a new scheme set up within the Italian
social security institute INPS. The funds thus accumulated
will continue to yield to employees the same yearly return
of 1.5 % plus ã of the inflation rate that was granted by
the previous scheme and will be eventually paid back to
them as severance pay. The government will use them to
fund specific projects, mainly infrastructure, set out in the
budget law. The concerned employees can communicate
their decision on the destination of their TFR payments
until 30 June 2007; the decision will however concern all
TFR payments as from 1 January 2007. 
Table V.11.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Italy
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•  TFR diversion to INPS (0.4 % of GDP) •  Cuts to central government expenditure (– 0.3 % of GDP)
•  Higher social contributions (0.3 % of GDP) •  Cuts to local government expenditure (– 0.2 % of GDP)
•  Fight of tax evasion/elusion (0.3 % of GDP) •  Transfers to the railways (0.2 % of GDP)
•  Deduction from IRAP tax base (– 0.2 % of GDP) •  Social transfers (0.2 % of GDP)
•  Increase of local and regional taxes (0.2 % of GDP) •  Higher compensation of employees (0.1 % of GDP) 
•  Increase of the tax base of the self-employed and small firms 
(0.2 % of GDP)
•  Peace-keeping operations (0.1 % of GDP)
•  Tax relief for family charges (– 0.1 % of GDP) •  Savings on healthcare expenditure (– 0.1 % of GDP)
•  Annual extension of special tax provisions (– 0.1 % of GDP)   
•  Change personal income break tax (0.1 % of GDP)   
•  Harmonisation of taxation on households’  financial assets 
(0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and  Italy’s Ministry of Economy and Finance.280
returned to workers at the end of the employment relation-
ship or, in exceptional circumstances (like for the pur-
chase of a dwelling or healthcare), during the working
In national account terms, the previous severance pay
scheme TFR managed by firms in the private sector is
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book reserves are recorded as employers’ social contri-
butions, whereas the severance payments to employees
are recorded as social benefits (1).
The creation of the new scheme within INPS foreseen in
the 2007 budget law implies a change in the institutional
sector that manages severance payments, from the cor-
porate sector to the government sector, but does not
affect the accounting classification of the relevant in-
and out-flows. Hence, the new scheme must be consid-
ered as a social security scheme. Flows from employees
(via their firms) to INPS will be recorded as government
revenue (i.e. social contributions) that reduces the defi-
cit, whereas severance payments from the government to
employees will represent public consumption (social
benefits) that increases the deficit.
The government estimates that the net gain stemming
from the TFR diversion, after taking account of contribu-
tions received, benefits paid and also the compensatory
measures in the way of fiscal advantages to firms, will
amount to more than 0.3 % of GDP in 2007. The deficit-
reducing impact is projected to decrease over time. While
in the first years of its operation revenues will largely
exceed the benefits paid, the positive impact on the budget
balance is officially estimated to progressively fade away
over the next eight to nine years, when additional revenues
and expenditure will balance out.
There are considerable uncertainties attached to the esti-
mated impact of this measure on the budget, as it requires
assumptions on decisions of employees that cannot be
easily anticipated. In particular, the government’s estima-
tion hinges on the assumption that more than 60 % of
employees in firms concerned would explicitly refuse the
transfer of their funds to the private pension schemes.
Especially given that employees can opt for the private
pension funds through silent assent, the officially pro-
jected budgetary impact of the measure appears to be at
risk. This is particularly relevant for 2007, when participa-
tion in private pension schemes could be higher than
assumed. The official estimate of the budgetary impact of
the measure also appears to be in conflict with the ongoing
promotion of private pension funds via information cam-
paigns in the media, as a way to help workers preserve
adequacy of their future pensions.
Finally, although the transfer of the TFR flows will imply
an improvement in the fiscal position of the government
for some years to come, the additional revenue stemming
from it does not improve the sustainability of public
finances as it implies additional future expenditure.
¥1∂ The scheme is classified as ‘non-autonomous private funded social insur-
ance schemes’. ‘Non-autonomous’ and ‘funded’ because employers build
up reserves by legal obligation for the exclusive and explicit purpose of
paying severance to their employees remaining, however, within the
employers institutional unit. An analogous scheme for civil servants, man-
aged by the social security unit INPDAP, is also classified as a social secu-
rity scheme, but it is recorded as unfunded in line with ESA95 rules.
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12. Cyprus
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government deficit in Cyprus was
1.5 % of GDP. This is about â percentage point of GDP
better than the target of the convergence programme
submitted in December 2005 (1). Compared with 2005,
the deficit improved by around ã percentage point of
GDP. The better-than-expected outcome was due to
higher tax revenues associated with the buoyant per-
formance of the real estate sector as well as improved tax
administration and collection. This more than compen-
sated the temporary revenues that were initially budg-
eted (ä % of GDP linked to the issuance of deeds for
buildings with minor irregularities) but did not material-
ise. Revenues were also supported by the high-tax con-
tent of growth, which was almost fully based on private
consumption thus leading to higher indirect tax reve-
nues. The general government debt ratio declined to
around 65ä % of GDP in 2006 compared with 69ä % a
year earlier, slightly higher than the 64ã % of GDP pro-
jected in the convergence programme. This difference is
mainly explained by the somewhat more gradual than
planned reduction of deposits held at the Central Bank.
The 2007 budget law, which was approved by parlia-
ment on 21 December 2006 and incorporated in the
December 2006 update of the convergence programme,
targets a nominal general government deficit of 1.6 % of
GDP. The fiscal adjustment is planned to be underpinned
by a decline in the expenditure ratio (about ä percentage
point of GDP) and a marginal increase in the revenue
ratio (0.1 percentage point of GDP). In particular, inter-
est expenditure is projected to fall by ä percentage point
and the reduction in collective consumption would be of
almost â percentage point. These savings are expected
to be offset by an increase in transfers other than in kind
and other current expenditure. The small increase in rev-
enue actually compensates the termination in 2007 of
Cyprus’ receipts of temporary compensating grants from
the EU budget (estimated at slightly below â % of
GDP). The budget also contemplates administrative
improvements and an increase of fees of the Land and
Survey Department, which would enhance tax collection
and revenues. On the expenditure side, the main budget-
ary measures include the maintenance of a ceiling on the
nominal growth rate of current expenditures of 2 % per
year, the continuation of the restrictive recruitment and
wage policy in the general government sector, the limi-
tation of the rate of growth of current transfers (pensions,
allowances and other benefits) to the rate of inflation,
more targeted social benefits, and the reduction of inter-
est expenditure by running down the stock of debt
financed by running down deposits held in the Central
Bank.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2007
forecast, the general government deficit for 2007 is pro-
jected to remain almost unchanged, just below 1â % of
GDP, despite the better-than-anticipated outturn of
2006. This is to account for the announcement of a forth-
coming package of social transfers, amounting to about
ä percentage point of GDP. The primary surplus is pro-
jected to remain at 1.7 % of GDP. The projected
improvement of the structural balance, i.e. the budget
balance net of cyclical factors and one-off and other tem-
porary measures, is expected to be marginal, which
would correspond to a broadly neutral fiscal stance.
In 2008, based on the customary no-policy-change
assumption, the Commission services project a gen-
eral government deficit of 1.4 % of GDP. The 2006
update of the convergence programme targets a deficit282
of ã %of GDP which then gradually declines to an
almost balanced position by the end of the programme
period (2010).
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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the debt-to-GDP ratio to continue its downward path
reaching 61.6 % in 2007, down from 65.3 % in the pre-
vious year, and then decline further to 54.9 % in 2008,
largely driven by the planned reduction of deposits with
the central bank. According to the 2006 update of the
convergence programme, the debt-to-GDP ratio is pro-
jected to decline from 64.7 % in 2006 to 52.5 % in
2008, before gradually improving further and reaching
46.1 % in 2010. The difference between the Commis-
sion services’ forecast and the updated convergence
programme over 2007–08, is mainly explained by dif-
ferent projections of the primary balance and nominal
GDP growth. 
Composition of the fiscal adjustment 
in Cyprus
The general government balance in Cyprus has been in def-
icit since 1998, the first year for which statistical informa-
tion is available. As regards the past six years, two clearly
separate subperiods can be identified. The first is character-
ised by a worsening of the government balance, while the
latter is characterised by fiscal adjustment required by the
Council in relation to the excessive deficit procedure (1).
¥1∂ Council Decision 2005/184/EC, OJ L 62, 9.3.2005 p.19.
Table V.12.1
Budgetary developments 2005–10, Cyprus (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008   
General government balance – 2.3 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.4   
— Total revenues 41.2 42.4 42.6 42.6   
  Of which: — current taxes 26.2 28.7 29.2 29.2  
 — social contributions 8.3 8.0 8.1 8.1   
— Total expenditure 43.6 43.9 44.0 43.9  
  Of which: — collective consumption 10.0 9.9 9.9 9.9   
 — social transfers in kind 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1  
 — social transfers other than in kind 12.7 12.3 12.8 12.8   
 — interest expenditure 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1  
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3   
Primary balance 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.7  
Tax burden 35.6 37.0 37.6 37.6   
One-off and other temporary measures 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) – 2.8 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.1   
Structural primary balance 0.7 2.1 2.1 2.0  
Government gross debt 69.2 65.3 61.5 54.9   
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.9   
Convergence programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
General government balance – 2.3 – 1.9 – 1.6 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 0.1
Primary balance 1.1 1.4 1.4 2.1 2.1 2.2
One-off and other temporary measures (6) 1.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 3.3 – 1.9 – 1.2 – 0.3 0.0 0.3
Government gross debt 69.2 64.7 60.5 52.5 49.0 46.1
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.1
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
(6) The programme reports one-offs and temporary measures to be at 1.3 % of GDP from 2005 and 0.4 % of GDP in 2006, all deficit reducing. These one-off measures
include 0.4 % of GDP in both years accounting for EU funds, which are not considered as one-off measures in our analysis.283
Sources: Commission services and December 2006 update of the convergence programme of Cyprus.
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increased from 2.2 % of GDP to 6.3 % of GDP. This was
the result of a cyclical downturn and a counter-cyclical
expansionary fiscal policy. In the early 2000s, Cyprus,
like the rest of Europe, was exposed to a global eco-
nomic slowdown. Real GDP growth halved from 4.0 %
in 2001 to 2.0 % in 2002 and edged further down to
1.8 % in 2003. However, the worsening of the fiscal con-
ditions went beyond the pure effect of economic activity,
as shown by the cyclically adjusted primary balance,
which deteriorated by 2ã percentage points of GDP dur-
ing this period. Total revenues increased modestly, from
almost 36 % of GDP to slightly more than 38ã % of
GDP, owing mainly to temporary measures of around
ä % of GDP in 2002 and 1ã % in 2003. Net of one-offs,
total revenues increased by only 1 percentage point of
GDP; from just below 36 % of GDP in 2001 to 37 % in
2003, mainly driven by an increase in indirect taxes
partly offset by a decline in direct taxes. This shift in the
composition of tax revenues from direct to indirect taxes
was the result of a comprehensive tax reform, consistent
with the process of harmonisation with the EU acquis.
Social contributions posted only a minor increase of
some ä percentage point of GDP. By contrast, total
expenditure rose by almost 7 percentage points of GDP,
from 38ä % of GDP in 2001 to around 45 % in 2003,
clearly outpacing total revenues. The strongest deteriora-
tion of the budget balance occurred in 2003, a pre-elec-
tion year. Retroactive increases in salaries and wages of
the public sector by around 8 %, coupled with a rise in
thermore, social transfers and subsidies increased by
almost 2 % of GDP in 2003, in order to mitigate the eco-
nomic slowdown and the negative impact of the tax
reform.
The period between 2004 and 2006 was a period of fiscal
retrenchment. Cyprus embarked on a consolidation pro-
gramme aiming at bringing the deficit below the 3 % of
GDP Treaty threshold by 2005. The consolidation pro-
gramme was mainly frontloaded, with the bulk of the
adjustment taking place in 2004 and 2005, when Cyprus
recorded a deficit reduction of 2ä percentage points of
GDP and 1ã percentage points of GDP respectively,
while in 2006 the adjustment was more moderate, by
ã percentage point of GDP. As a result, between 2004
and 2006 the government deficit declined by nearly
4ã % of GDP to 1â % of GDP in 2006. The magnitude
of the fiscal adjustment was reflected in the improve-
ment of the cyclically adjusted primary balance, which
moved from a deficit of 2ã % of GDP in 2004 to a sur-
plus of around 2 % of GDP in 2006. The fiscal adjust-
ment was driven by both revenues and expenditures, but
especially by the former. Over the period 2004–06 total
revenues increased by slightly above 3â percentage
points of GDP while expenditure fell by slightly above
1 percentage point of GDP. Revenues were boosted in
2004 and 2005 by temporary revenues of some 2 per-
centage points of GDP, mainly associated with the tax
amnesty. Net of one-offs, total revenues increased by
around 4ã percentage points of GDP, mainly driven by
Table V.12.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Cyprus
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Administrative and price-policy improvement of Land and Survey 
Department services’ fees (+ 0.5 % of GDP)
• Restrictive employment and wage policy in the general 
government sector (– 0.1 % of GDP)
• Limiting the rate of growth of current transfers (pensions, 
monetary allowances and other benefits) to the rate of inflation
 • Maintaining a ceiling on the rate of growth in both current and 
capital expenditure (excluding wages and salaries and debt-
servicing costs) compared with the previous year
 • The reduction of net interest payments by running down stock of 
debt financed by sinking fund deposits (– 0.3 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and December 2006 update of the convergence programme.284
the cost-of-living-allowance (COLA) payments follow-
ing the increase in indirect taxes, induced an increase of
the government wage bill in the order of 10-11 %. Fur-
direct and indirect taxes. This improvement in revenues
benefited from the broadening of the tax base following
the tax amnesty, and by higher tax compliance of the tax
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designed to enforce better tax compliance, in conjunc-
tion with efforts to improve the efficiency of the public
service’s revenue collecting departments contributed to
higher tax revenues.
On the other hand, total expenditure fell sharply by
more than 2 percentage points of GDP in 2004 when
Cyprus embarked on a strong consolidation path while
cyclical conditions improved; GDP growth shot up to
4.2 % in 2004 from 1.8 % in the previous year. Over the
period 2004–06 expenditure grew by just above 1 % of
GDP. Current primary expenditure plummeted by more
than 2ä % of GDP in 2004 while social transfers and
subsidies retreated slightly by ä % of GDP. However,
capital expenditure inched higher in 2004 by almost
ä % of GDP. Nonetheless, during 2005 and 2006,
while compensation of employees remained at similar
levels as a per cent of GDP and capital expenditure
declined, intermediate consumption and social trans-
fers and subsidies recorded an increase. These in tan-
dem with an increase in other current expenditure led
current primary expenditure to record an increase of
some 3â % of GDP in 2006.
In spite of the adjustment effort implemented so far,
improving the quality and composition of government
expenditure remains a challenge. Fiscal consolidation
until now has been mainly revenue-driven and has often
relied on one-off measures. Expenditure trends have not
been reversed.
The response of fiscal policy in Cyprus to the business
cycle has been asymmetric. The counter-cyclical stance
during the slowdown has created large public deficits and
increased government debt, which have not been fully
corrected during the upside of the cycle. Therefore, a main
challenge for Cyprus in the short run would be to pursue
further consolidation, by restraining current primary
expenditure, so as to create room for fiscal policy to react
to downturns, notably by allowing the automatic stabilis-
ers to operate fully. In this way, fiscal policy could con-
tribute to offset the pervasive effects of international
shocks to which the Cypriot economy is highly exposed.
Table V.12.3
Composition of the fiscal adjustment in Cyprus (% of GDP)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Revenue 35.9 35.9 38.8 38.8 41.2 42.4
Of which one-offs    0.0 0.3 1.8 1.1 0.9 0.0
Tax revenue 24.1 24.5 26.0 24.9 26.2 28.7
Of which:
Direct taxes
11.1 11.2 9.6 8.0 9.3 10.9
Indirect taxes 13.0 13.3 16.4 16.9 16.9 17.8
Social contributions 6.8 6.7 7.0 7.7 8.3 8.0
Other current resources 3.6 3.0 4.0 3.7 4.0 3.4
Expenditure 38.2 40.3 45.1 42.9 43.6 43.9
Final consumption expenditure 17.1 18.2 19.8 17.9 18.1 18.0
Compensation of employees             13.2 13.8 15.6 14.8 14.8 14.8
Transfers in kind, other than in kind and subsidies 18.6 19.5 21.4 21.2 21.5 21.8
Interest expenditure   3.4 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.3
Current primary expenditure 30.4 31.9 35.9 33.6 34.7 37.1
Capital expenditure 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.2 3.6 3.5
General government deficit – 2.2 – 4.4 – 6.3 – 4.1 – 2.3 – 1.5
General government consolidated gross debt 60.7 64.7 69.1 70.3 69.2 65.3
pm:
Real GDP growth rate (% change) 4.0 2.0 1.8 4.2 3.9 3.8
Primary balance 1.1 – 1.2 – 2.9 – 0.8 1.1 1.7285
Cyclically adjusted primary balance 0.1 – 1.8 – 2.7 – 0.5 1.6 2.1
Total tax burden 30.9 31.2 33.1 33.5 35.6 37.0
Source: Commission services.
13. Latvia
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government balance recorded a
surplus of 0.4 % of GDP. This is better than the tar-
geted deficit of 1.5 % of GDP set in the November
2005 update of the convergence programme, despite a
supplementary budget in October 2006 which
increased expenditures by around 1.5 % of GDP. The
better outcome was a result of higher-than-expected
tax revenues, as nominal GDP growth exceeded plans
in the November 2005 update of the convergence pro-
gramme by a remarkable 10 â percentage points, an
excess of 4 â points in real terms and 5 â in the defla-
tor. The efficiency of tax collection has also improved
in recent years. Social security recorded a sizeable
surplus of 2 % of GDP, as the strong growth in nomi-
nal wages and employment in 2006 increased social
contributions by 29 %. General government expendi-
ture grew by 29.6 %, well above initial plans (1). The
debt ratio declined to 10 % of GDP, one of the lowest
in the EU.
The 2007 budget law was adopted by the parliament on
19 December 2006 and targets a deficit of 1.3 % of
GDP in 2007. The target was confirmed in the January
2007 update of the convergence programme (2). The
main measures on the revenue side include the
increase of the tax-free threshold of the personal
income tax and the income tax rebate for dependants.
From 2007, the rate of social contributions channelled
to the second-pillar pension scheme doubled to 4 % of
gross wages and it is scheduled to increase further in
the coming years; this will reduce government revenue
as the second-pillar pension scheme is not classified in
the government sector. The harmonisation of excises
on tobacco and oil products with EU rules will, on the
other hand, bring in significant additional revenues.
Although in 2007 discretionary measures amount to a
net loss of revenue, this is to be counterbalanced by the
positive impact of continuing strong economic growth.
The largest increases on the expenditure side are
directed towards the healthcare and the defence sec-
tors, but public sector wages in general are increased
significantly. High investment in infrastructure,
mainly in road building, will drive up capital expendi-
ture in 2007.
Medium-term fiscal targets were tightened in March
2007 in the context of an anti-inflation plan, including
balanced budgets for the years 2007 and 2008 and sur-
pluses in the following two years (excluding local gov-
ernments, which have had anyhow small surpluses in
2005–06). In addition, the government committed itself
to end the practice of previous years, to spend additional
revenue in the form of supplementary budgets. The
Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast projects a
general government budget surplus of 0.2 % of GDP for
2007. The main reason explaining the difference with the
convergence programme is the better-than-expected def-
icit outturn in 2006 and the projected higher economic
growth in 2007. According to the Commission services’
spring 2007 forecast, the fiscal stance in 2007, as meas-
ured by the change in the structural balance, is estimated
to be broadly neutral.
In 2008, based on a no-policy-change assumption, and
taking into account the policy revisions of March
2007, the Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast
projects the general government balance to remain at
a marginal surplus. This compares with a deficit target
¥1∂ The assessment of developments in specific categories of expenditure, in
2005 and 2006, is somewhat hindered by the rapid increase of ‘other cur-
rent transfers payable’, which apparently include expenditure that should286
of 0.9 % of GDP in the convergence programme of
January 2007. The convergence programme also fore-
sees a deficit of 0.4 % of GDP in 2009, but this target
have been classified elsewhere.
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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March 2007.
The debt-to-GDP ratio is projected in the Commission
services’ spring 2007 forecast to decline to 8.0 % at the
end of 2007 and to 6.7 % at the end of 2008, thanks to
high nominal GDP growth and marginal surpluses. This
is more optimistic than the 10.5 % of GDP for 2007 and
10.6 % of GDP for 2008, presented in the January 2007
update of the convergence programme.  
Table V.13.1
Budgetary developments 2005–09, Latvia (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance – 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1  
— Total revenues 35.2 37.4 37.5 36.5  
  Of which: — current taxes 20.3 21.2 21.2 20.7  
 — social contributions 8.6 8.9 8.6 8.2  
— Total expenditure 35.5 37.0 37.3 36.4  
  Of which: — collective consumption 9.0 8.7 8.6 8.4  
 — social transfers in kind 8.5 8.2 8.1 7.8  
 — social transfers other than in kind 8.4 8.0 7.8 7.6  
 — interest expenditure 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3  
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.3 3.4 3.8 4.2  
Primary balance 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.4  
Tax burden 29.0 30.2 30.1 29.1  
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) – 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4  
Structural primary balance 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.8  
Government gross debt 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.7  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 10.6 11.9 9.6 7.9  
Convergence programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance 0.1 – 0.4 – 1.3 – 0.9 – 0.4
Primary balance 0.7 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.4 0.1
One-off and other temporary measures      
Structural balance (3) (5) 0.1 – 0.9 – 1.7 – 0.8 0.2
Government gross debt 12.1 10.7 10.5 10.6 9.4
pm Real GDP growth (%) 10.2 11.5 9.0 7.5 7.5
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in January 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and the January 2007 update of the convergence programme of Latvia.287
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Main measures in the budget for 2007, Latvia
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Increase in the personal income tax-free threshold from LVL 32 per 
month to LVL 50 per month and the setting of income tax rebates 
for dependents at LVL 35 per month (– 0.5 % of GDP)
• Reform of the National Armed Forces and NATO integration 
related requirements (+ 0.6 % of GDP)
• Increase of the statutory minimum wage from LVL 90 per month 
to LVL 120 per month (+ 0.1 % of GDP)
• Modernisation and restructuring of the healthcare system 
(+ 0.5 % of GDP)
• Increase in excise duties on oil and tobacco products 
(+ 0.3 % of GDP)
• Increase of the statutory minimum wage for the public sector 
employees (+ 0.1 % of GDP)
• Reduced VAT rate (5 % instead of 18 %) on natural gas, electricity 
and some other non-commercial services (– 0.1 % of GDP)
• Increased judges’ and prosecutors’ wages (+0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue. Please note that the tax measures of the anti-inflation plan were not yet adopted by the parliament at the time of
the preparation of this document. 
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services, the January 2007 update of the convergence programme of Latvia and the budget for 2007.288
14. Lithuania
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The general government deficit decreased slightly to
0.3 % of GDP in 2006. This compares with a deficit tar-
get of 1.4 % of GDP in the December 2005 update of the
convergence programme. Carrying-over from a better-
than-projected outturn in 2005, the more favourable out-
come results from a good budgetary performance at all
levels of general government, which are estimated to
have recorded higher-than-planned revenues while
expenditure plans, including the supplementary budget
in July 2006, were broadly achieved. This was possible
due to stronger economic activity, employment, faster
wage growth and improvement in tax collection. Against
the background of higher revenue collection in the first
half of 2006, the supplementary budget in July 2006
allocated additional spending of about 0.5 % of the GDP.
The government debt ratio decreased slightly in 2006 to
18.2 % of GDP, thanks to strong growth and receipts
from privatisation.
The budget for 2007 was approved by the parliament on
7 December 2006. The general government deficit tar-
get confirmed in the most recent update of the conver-
gence programme is 0.9 % of GDP (1). The budget did
not contain significant tax changes, apart from already
planned tax reductions in accordance with the tax pol-
icy provisions of the Government action programme
for 2004–08, in particular the reduction in personal
income tax revenues resulting from the tax cut in July
2006 and a planned decrease of one percentage point in
the so-called ‘social tax’ from the beginning of 2007.
This temporary tax was introduced in January 2006 and
is a de facto increase in the corporate tax rate by 4 per-
centage points; it will be abolished in 2008. The costs
of the pension reform (establishing second-pillar pen-
sion schemes outside the general government) which
started in 2004 are estimated to account for 0.8 % of
GDP in 2007. The revenues are expected to benefit
from increases in excise duties on tobacco introduced
in March 2007 and from improved tax administration
and an expansion of the real estate tax base. On the
expenditure side, the budget includes an increase in
capital expenditure growth largely related to public
investment co-financed by the EU. The growth rate of
current expenditure is also planned to rise, mainly
driven by an intended significant increase in social
transfers other than in kind (e.g. pensions and child
benefits), salary increases for public sector employees
and higher subsidies to farmers.
The official projection for 2007 compares with an esti-
mated deficit in the Commission services’ spring 2007
forecast of 0.4 % of GDP. The main reason explaining
the difference is the better-than-expected deficit outturn
in 2006, which was not anticipated by the authorities
when presenting the programme. If the better outcome is
carried over to 2007 and the budget is strictly imple-
mented, the deficit is likely to be lower than planned.
This is backed by a public commitment to disciplinary
and responsible management of public finances
expressed by the parliamentary parties and the govern-
ment by signing an agreement on fiscal responsibility.
The Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast expects
the fiscal stance to be mildly restrictive in 2007, when
the primary structural deficit, i.e. the primary deficit net
of cyclical and one-off and other temporary measures, is
estimated to decline by 0.3 percentage point.
The Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast foresees
the general government deficit in 2008 to worsen to 1 %
of GDP. The forecast is based on the no-policy change
assumption and includes the impact of the tax reform,
namely a planned decrease of the personal income tax289
rate from 27 % to 24 % taking effect in January 2008.
The main reason for the deterioration is explained by the
negative impact of the tax reform, together with increas-
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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of the convergence programme foresees the deficit to
improve to 0.5 % of GDP in 2008 and to achieve a bal-
anced budget in 2009.
The Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast expects
the general government debt ratio to remain low at about
19-20 % of GDP in 2007–08. The authorities foresee the
debt ratio to decrease in 2009. 
Table V.14.1
Budgetary developments 2005–09, Lithuania (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance (3) – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 1.0  
— Total revenues 33.1 33.3 34.4 34.9  
  Of which: — current taxes 20.3 20.9 21.4 21.8  
 — social contributions 8.6 8.8 9.2 9.1  
— Total expenditure 33.6 33.6 34.8 36.0  
  Of which: — collective consumption 7.1 7.0 6.7 6.5  
 — social transfers in kind 9.6 10.3 10.8 11.1  
 — social transfers other than in kind 9.0 8.6 8.5 8.6  
 — interest expenditure 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.8  
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.5 4.2 5.1 6.0  
Primary balance 0.3 0.2 0.2 – 0.3  
Tax burden 28.9 29.3 30.3 30.5  
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (4) – 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 1.0  
Structural primary balance – 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 – 0.2  
Government gross debt 18.6 18.2 18.6 19.9  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 7.6 7.5 7.3 6.3  
Convergence programme (5) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 0.5 – 1.2 – 0.9 – 0.5 0.0
Primary balance 0.3 – 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.8
One-off and other temporary measures      
Structural balance (4) (6) – 1.0 – 1.8 – 1.3 – 0.5 0.5
Government gross debt 18.7 18.4 19.2 19.0 17.7
pm Real GDP growth (%) 7.6 7.8 6.3 5.3 4.5
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) The costs of the ongoing pension reform are included in the deficit. The costs are estimated at 0.8 % of GDP per year in the period 2007–09.
(4) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(5) Submitted in December 2006.
(6) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. There are no one-off and other temporary measures taken from the pro-
gramme.
Sources: Commission services and the December 2006 update of the convergence programme of Lithuania.290
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Main measures in the budget for 2007, Lithuania
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Pension reform (– 0.8 % of GDP) • Increased public investment (0.5 % of GDP)
• Personal income tax cut implemented in July 2006  
(– 0.8 % of GDP)
• Higher social transfers other than in kind (0.7 % of GDP)
• Improved tax administration (0.4 % of GDP) • Increased support for agriculture (0.1 % of GDP)
• Social tax (0.5 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services, the 2007 budget and the December 2006 update of the convergence programme of Lithuania.291
15. Luxembourg
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government balance improved fur-
ther to reach a surplus of 0.1 % of GDP, after a deficit of
0.3 % of GDP in 2005. While very modest compared to
the record surpluses registered in 2000 and 2001 (about
6 % of GDP in both years), the general government bal-
ance was much better than planned in the November
2005 update of the stability programme, when the deficit
was projected to decline to 1.8 % of GDP in 2006 after
reaching a peak of 2.3 % in 2005. The improvement
actually recorded in 2006 was broadly of the same mag-
nitude as that projected by the programme (0.4 percent-
age point of GDP instead of 0.5) but starting from a
much more favourable 2005 outcome. Moreover, real
GDP growth (6.2 % according to the latest estimates)
was significantly stronger than projected in the 2005 and
2006 programmes (4.4 % and 5.5 % respectively). 
The 2007 budget was adopted by the parliament on
22 December 2006. It includes a series of adjustment
measures agreed in April 2006 between the government
and the business and labour organisations in order to
cope with the deterioration in public finances and to rein-
force the competitiveness of the economy. These meas-
ures mainly consist of increases in several contributions
and taxes and a temporary (up to 2009) suspension of the
normal indexation of wages and social benefits on con-
sumer prices, which has been replaced by an indexation
at predetermined dates. The budget for 2007, as well as
the 2006 update of the stability programme, projected
the deficit to improve from an estimated 1.7 % of GDP
in 2006 (revised to 1.5 % in the programme) to 0.9 % in
2007 (1). However, as already stated, the general govern-
ment actually recorded a 0.1 % of GDP surplus in 2006.
Starting from these much more favourable outcomes, the
Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast projects the
general government balance to keep improving to a
0.4 % of GDP surplus in 2007. This would imply a
broadly neutral fiscal stance in 2007, with the structural
primary surplus slightly rising from 0.6 % of GDP in
2006 to 0.8 %.
Under a no-policy-change assumption, implying in par-
ticular that the adjustment measures decided in the
spring of 2006 will continue to be carried out as planned
despite the better-than-expected outcome recorded in
2006, the Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast
projects the general government balance to further
improve in 2008 to a surplus of about 0.6 % of GDP.
This compares to a deficit of 0.4 % of GDP presented in
the most recent update of the stability programme start-
ing from a much less optimistic projection for 2007.
However, the improvement in the general government
balance projected for 2008 by the Commission services,
forecast (0.2 percentage point of GDP) is more limited
than that in the programme (0.5 percentage point of
GDP) because the latter projects a larger relative decline
in expenditure than the forecast (1.2 percentage points of
GDP instead of 1.0) and a smaller decrease in revenues
(0.6 percentage point of GDP compared to 0.8). The sta-
bility programme projects a further improvement of the
general government balance in 2009 to a surplus of
0.1 % of GDP.
The government gross debt is one of the lowest in the EU
and has been on a slightly decreasing trend in the last
decade, in spite of the emergence of budget deficits.
However, it rose from 6.1 % of GDP in 2005 to 6.8 % in
2006 because several loans related to road and railway
infrastructure projects were issued during those years for
a total of about 1 % of GDP. It is projected to resume292
slightly declining in per cent of GDP in 2007 and 2008
thanks to the improvement in the general government
balance and to strong real and nominal GDP growth. 
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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Budgetary developments 2005–09, Luxembourg (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance – 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6  
— Total revenues 42.6 40.5 39.4 38.6  
  Of which: — current taxes 27.4 25.8 25.2 24.8  
 — social contributions 11.7 11.0 10.7 10.4  
— Total expenditure 42.8 40.4 39.0 38.0  
  Of which: — collective consumption 6.7 6.1 5.9 5.7  
 — social transfers in kind 10.2 9.7 9.4 9.3  
 — social transfers other than in kind 14.9 14.0 13.4 13.0  
 — interest expenditure 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1  
 — gross fixed capital formation 4.7 4.1 3.9 3.8  
Primary balance – 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8  
Tax burden 38.6 36.3 35.4 34.7  
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.8  
Structural primary balance 1.2 0.6 0.8 1.0  
Government gross debt 6.1 6.8 6.7 6.0  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.0 6.2 5.0 4.7  
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 1.0 – 1.5 – 0.9 – 0.4 0.1
Primary balance – 0.8 – 1.3 – 0.8 – 0.2 0.3
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 0.2 – 1.3 – 0.5 – 0.1 0.9
Government gross debt 6.1 7.5 8.2 8.5 8.5
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.0 5.5 4.0 5.0 4.0
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and the November 2006 update of the stability programme of Luxembourg.
Table V.15.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Luxembourg
 
Revenue measures (1)  Expenditure measures (2)
• Increase of the dependency insurance contribution: 
+ 0.2 % of GDP
• Reduction of ‘current operating expenditure’: – 0.1 % of GDP
• Reduction of the withholding tax rate: – 0.4 % of GDP • Hiring freeze by central government: less than – 0.1 % of GDP
• Increase in the tax on motor vehicles: + 0.1 % of GDP • Freeze of government’s wages in real terms: – 0.1 % of GDP 
• Suspension of indexations: – 0.3 % of GDP
• Other measures in the field of social security: – 0.2 % of GDP
• Reduction in central government investment: – 0.5 % of GDP
• Reduction in spending by Employment Fund: less than – 0.05 % of 
GDP
• Increase in public research expenditure, in line with the NRP: 
+ 0.3 % of GDP293
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure. 
Sources: Commission services, 2007 budget, 2006 stability programme and Statec, Note de conjoncture No 2006/1, pp. 24–27.
16. Hungary
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government deficit reached 9.2 % of
GDP. It was substantially higher than the original deficit
target of 6.1 % of GDP set in the December 2005 update
of the convergence programme, despite the implementa-
tion of a fiscal retrenchment package in the second half
of the year, reducing the deficit in 2006 by around 2 %
of GDP (1). The overshoot took place almost entirely on
the expenditure side, mainly due to operational costs of
central budgetary institutions (collective consumption
expenditure), pension and healthcare expenditure and
local government investment. Interest expenditure was
also higher than budgeted by 0.3 % of GDP, due to the
higher debt level and a substantial increase in market
rates by over 100 basis points. It also reflects the inclu-
sion of motorway investment inside the general govern-
ment (around 1 % of GDP) after Eurostat clarified that
this could not be recorded as an off-budget operation.
The corrective measures (the ‘new equilibrium’ pack-
age) adopted during the summer were broadly evenly
distributed between the expenditure and revenue-side of
the budget. Due to the very high deficit, the debt-to-GDP
ratio increased significantly in 2006 to 66 % from
61.7 % in 2005. This increase was mitigated somewhat
by privatisation revenues of around 1ä % of GDP.
The 2007 budget adopted by parliament on 21 Decem-
ber 2006 sets a general government deficit target of 6.8 %
of GDP, in line with the envisaged adjustment path of the
December 2006 convergence programme (2). On the reve-
nue side, the budget confirmed the tax increases and the
introduction of co-payments for healthcare services of the
consolidation package which had not yet been implemented
at the time. Measures on the expenditure side largely consist
of freezes in operational and wage expenditure of the public
administration and nominal cuts in universal price subsidies
and public investment expenditures. Since October 2006 a
series of structural reform steps were taken mainly in the
areas of public administration, healthcare, and price subsi-
dies, which have increased the credibility of the expenditure
savings planned in 2007. The budget also introduces a new
control mechanism to enhance line ministries’ respect of
expenditure ceilings and increases the level of budgetary
reserves by 0.3 % of GDP as a safeguard for unforeseen
slippages. The Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast
projects a deficit of 6.8 % of GDP for 2007 in line with the
official target. The structural primary balance is estimated
to improve by 3â % of GDP in 2007, indicating a strongly
restrictive stance of fiscal policy.
For 2008, the Commission services forecast, on the basis
of a no-policy-change assumption, a deficit of 4.9 % of
GDP against the official target of 4.3 % of GDP. The
forecast does not take into account future measures that
the Hungarian Government may decide to take in the
course of 2007 and that were announced in broad terms
in the most recent convergence programme update.
These future measures include the possible introduction
of the central real estate tax or further structural reform
steps (most notably, the revamping of the disability and
also the regular pension systems and the transition from
a single insurer to a multi-insurer health system). Fur-
thermore, the forecast assumes that not all the planned
freezes of wages and operational expenditures are fully
sustained in 2008, also in view of the past negative expe-
rience with similar measures. For 2009, the convergence
programme update plans a further reduction in the deficit
to 3.2 % of GDP. In 2010, a reduction in the deficit to
2.7 % of GDP is foreseen.
The Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast projects¥1∂ All budgetary targets and projections in the text include the burden of the294
the debt-to-GDP ratio to continue to moderately increase
throughout the forecast horizon: to 67.1 % in 2007 and
to 68.1 % in 2008. According to the most recent update
pension reform.
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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debt ratio is expected to further increase from 67.5 % of
GDP in 2006 to 71.3 % of GDP in 2008 and start
decreasing again in 2009. However, the latter does not
take into account the better-than expected public finance
outcomes in 2006. 
Table V.16.1
Budgetary developments 2005–10, Hungary (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008   
General government balance – 7.8 – 9.2 – 6.8 – 4.9   
— Total revenues 42.2 43.7 44.0 44.1   
  Of which: — current taxes 24.5 24.5 25.2 25.2   
 — social contributions 12.6 12.8 12.9 12.7   
— Total expenditure 50.0 52.9 50.9 49.0   
  Of which: — collective consumption 9.9 9.9 9.7 8.9   
 — social transfers in kind 12.6 12.6 11.7 11.1   
 — social transfers other than in kind 14.5 15.1 15.2 15.2   
 — interest expenditure 4.1 3.9 4.1 3.9   
 — gross fixed capital formation 4.0 4.5 3.6 3.3   
Primary balance – 3.7 – 5.3 – 2.7 – 1.0   
Tax burden 37.4 37.6 38.4 38.2   
One-off and other temporary measures 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.9 – 0.1   
Structural balance (3) – 8.4 – 9.4 – 6.1 – 4.6   
Structural primary balance – 4.3 – 5.5 – 1.9 – 0.7   
Government gross debt 61.7 66.0 67.1 68.1   
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.2 3.9 2.4 2.6   
Convergence programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
General government balance – 7.8 – 10.1 – 6.8 – 4.3 – 3.2 – 2.7
Primary balance – 3.7 – 6.2 – 2.4 0.0 0.9 1.1
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 – 0.7 – 1.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 8.0 – 9.8 – 5.6 – 3.7 – 3.0 – 2.9
Government gross debt 61.7 67.5 70.1 71.3 69.3 67.5
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.2 4.0 2.2 2.6 4.2 4.3
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and the December 2006 update of the convergence programme of Hungary.295
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Main measures in the budget for 2007, Hungary
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Increase of the lower tax bracket by HUF 150 000 (– 0.1 % of GDP) • 0.9 percentage point of GDP decrease in public investment 
expenditures 
• Introduction of the minimum expected profit tax for corporations 
(0.2 % of GDP) (3)
• Freezing the public wage bill at the end 2006 level and cuts in 
operational expenditures of public administration 
(– 0.6 % of GDP)
• Introduction of a 4 % ’separate tax’ for personal incomes 
(0.1 % of GDP)
• Cuts in universal pharmaceutical and gas price subsidies 
(– 0.5 % of GDP)
• Increase in the rate of employees’ healthcare contribution from 
6 % to 7 % (0.2 % of GDP)
• Increased subsidies (+ 0.2 % of GDP) and capital injections 
(+ 0.4 % of GDP) to the national railway company in the context 
of a restructuring plan
• Introduction of co-payments in healthcare services (0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue (including tax increases adopted already in July 2006 but effective from 1 January 2007).
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
(3) The Constitutional Court annuled the tax on 27 February 2007.
Sources: Commission services, State Audit Office, December 2006 update of the convergence programme of Hungary.296
17. Malta
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government deficit turned out at 2.6 %
of GDP, marginally better than the official target of 2.7 %
of GDP set out in the January 2006 update of the conver-
gence programme. The slightly lower-than-planned deficit
ratio is largely attributable to a higher-than-expected nom-
inal GDP. Both total revenues and total expenditures were
lower than projected in the January 2006 update of the con-
vergence programme. Relative to GDP, general govern-
ment debt stood at 66.5 % in 2006, significantly lower than
the target of 70.8 % of GDP set out in the January 2006
update of the convergence programme.
The budget for 2007 was approved by the parliament on
17 November 2006 and targets a budget deficit of 2.3 %
of GDP. The budget includes a revenue increasing meas-
ure consisting of a new licensing system for gaming
machines as well as a revenue decreasing measure related
to a review of the personal income tax regime. Other
measures with a marginal overall impact on revenue
include a reduction in social contributions for certain cat-
egories of part-time employment, tax deductions for par-
ents utilising the services of childcare facilities and a
reduction in the airport tax. The main expenditure increas-
ing measures include a grant to low-income households
aimed at alleviating the cost of energy and an increase in
certain social benefits. It is noted, however, that other
ongoing measures, namely a tighter control on the public
sector wage bill and social payments, are expected to con-
tribute to a reduction in the deficit ratio in 2007 to 2.3 %
of GDP. This was confirmed in the 2006 update of the
convergence programme (1). The 2007 budget also
announced the securitisation of certain government prop-
erty (estimated at around 1 percentage point of GDP) to
finance payments for expropriated land.
The forecast for the 2007 deficit ratio was subsequently
improved to 1.9 % of GDP in the April 2007 fiscal notifi-
cation. The lower deficit ratio in the April 2007 notification
is primarily due to advance receipts in relation to a one-off
operation related to sale of land amounting to 0.4 % of
GDP, originally booked in 2006. The transaction was,
however, completed in 2007 and appropriately booked as
a deficit-reducing operation in that year. According to the
Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast, the general
government deficit is projected at 2.1 % of GDP in 2007.
This slightly more cautious projection stems from lower
social contributions, which are forecast to move in line
with the increase in compensation of employees. The
Commission services’ forecast implies a broadly neutral
fiscal stance in 2007, as the structural deficit, i.e. the gen-
eral government deficit net of cyclical and one-off and
other temporary measures, is estimated to decline only
marginally from 2.7 % of GDP in 2006 to 2.6 % in 2007.
Based on the customary no-policy-change assumption, the
Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast projects the gen-
eral government deficit decline to 1.6 % of GDP in 2008.
The significant improvement is primarily due to lower pub-
lic investment linked with the completion of a large health-
care facility. According to the December 2006 update of the
convergence programme, the general government deficit for
2008 is anticipated to decline to 0.9 % of GDP. For 2009, the
most recent update of the convergence programme foresees
a broadly balanced budget in nominal terms.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2007 fore-
cast, general government debt is expected to continue the
downward path which started in 2005. For 2007, the debt-
to-GDP ratio is forecast at slightly below 66 %. This com-
pares with 66.7 % of GDP in the latest update of the con-
vergence programme, which was revised downwards to
66 % of GDP in the April 2007 fiscal notification. For
2008, the general government debt is projected to fall fur-
ther to 64.3 % of GDP, according to the Commission serv-297
ices’ spring 2007 forecast. The 2006 updated convergence
programme foresees a further decline in the debt ratio, to
63.2 % of GDP in 2008 and to 59.4 % in 2009.  
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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Budgetary developments 2005–10, Malta (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance – 3.1 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 1.6  
— Total revenues 42.9 42.7 42.2 41.9  
  Of which: — current taxes 26.6 27.8 28.0 28.0  
 — social contributions 8.6 8.0 8.0 7.8  
— Total expenditure 46.0 45.2 44.3 43.4  
  Of which: — collective consumption 9.6 9.7 9.4 9.2  
 — social transfers in kind 11.5 11.4 11.0 10.7  
 — social transfers other than in kind 13.0 13.0 12.7 12.7  
 — interest expenditure 3.8 3.7 3.3 3.3  
 — gross fixed capital formation 5.3 4.6 5.2 4.0  
Primary balance 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.8  
Tax burden 34.5 34.9 35.2 35.0  
One-off and other temporary measures 1.7 0.7 0.6 0.0  
Structural balance (3) – 3.8 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 1.6  
Structural primary balance 0.0 1.0 0.8 1.7  
Government gross debt 72.4 66.5 65.9 64.3  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.8  
Convergence programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 3.2 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 0.9 0.1
Primary balance 0.8 1.1 1.1 2.5 3.2
One-off and other temporary measures 1.6 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Structural balance (3) (5) – 3.8 – 2.9 – 2.0 – 1.0 – 0.4
Government gross debt 74.2 68.3 66.7 63.2 59.4
pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.2 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.1
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and the December 2006 update of the convergence programme of Malta.
Table V.17.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Malta
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Income tax reform (– 0.5 % of GDP) • Restraint in public services wages (3) (– 0.7 % of GDP)
• Gaming machines’ licenses (0.2 % of GDP) • Control of benefit fraud (3) (– 0.2 % of GDP)
• Revision in social contribution rates (– 0.05 % of GDP)   
• Reduction in airport tax (– 0.02 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
(3) On-going measure, not specific to 2007 budget.
Sources: Commission services, 2006 updated convergence programme and budget for 2007.298
18. The Netherlands
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government balance improved to a
surplus of 0.6 % of GDP, up from a deficit of 0.3 % of
GDP in 2005. The official target, as contained in the
December 2005 update of the stability programme, was a
deficit of 1.5 % of GDP. The main reason for the better
outcome are tax receipts which turned out around 2 % of
GDP higher than targeted, reflecting inter alia higher-than-
expected growth (by â a percentage point). Furthermore,
unexpectedly high revenue from gas sales (around 0.3 %
of GDP) and a 0.3 % of GDP better-than-expected deficit
of the lower levels of government worked to improve the
overall balance. Social contributions, on the other hand,
were 0.4 % of GDP lower than planned. The debt-to-GDP
ratio declined from 52.7 % in 2005 to 48.7 % in 2006, in
part because of debt-reducing stock-flow operations
amounting to 1.2 % of GDP. These operations reflect both
the sale of financial assets and a correction of higher-than-
needed borrowing that took place in 2005.
The budget for 2007 adopted on 5 October 2006 targets
a general government surplus of 0.2 % of GDP in 2007,
which was confirmed in the November 2006 update of
the stability programme (1). The budget includes corpo-
rate and income tax breaks and a reduction of unemploy-
ment premiums following the strong decline in regis-
tered unemployment in 2006. Table V.18.2 specifies the
main measures. In the spring note on budgetary imple-
mentation 2007 (2), the Dutch Government lowered their
target for the general government balance for this year to
a deficit of 0.7 % of GDP. The main factors behind the
worsened target are expenditure overruns of around
0.4 % of GDP and a reduction in estimated gas receipts
of around 0.5 % of GDP. Furthermore, the recent agree-
ment on the upcoming constitutional reform of the Neth-
erlands Antilles included a takeover of debt, which wors-
ens the nominal government balance in 2007 by 0.1 % of
GDP. Finally, the new government modified the disabil-
ity scheme, leading to further expenditure of around
0.1 % of GDP annually from 2007 onwards.
On the other hand, total receipts from taxes and social
contributions are expected to come out 0.2 % of GDP
higher than anticipated in the budget.
In the Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast, the
general government balance is also foreseen to come out
at a deficit of 0.7 % of GDP, although the composition is
slightly different. More specifically, on the one hand the
revenues from mineral gas sales are expected to be higher
by around ä % of GDP in the Commission services’
spring forecast as a result of higher assumed oil prices. On
the other hand, social benefits are foreseen to come out
ä % of GDP higher. In structural terms, the government
balance is estimated to deteriorate by 1â % of GDP,
implying a clearly procyclical fiscal stance in 2007 at a
time of strong economic growth.
On a no-policy-change basis, the Commission services’
spring 2007 forecast projects the nominal budgetary bal-
ance to improve again by 0.7 % of GDP in 2008 and to
reach a balanced budget. The improvement compared
with 2007 is in part explained by an expected increase in
gas receipts resulting from the assumed rise in oil prices
towards the end of the forecast horizon. Furthermore, the
elasticity of social premiums with respect to compensa-
tions of employees is expected to return to its long-term
value and no further debt takeovers are foreseen for 2008.
The no-policy-change assumption implies that the planned
measures of the new government, as set out in the new gov-
ernment’s programme, are not taken on board in the fore-
cast. If all the measures that are planned for 2008 were299
implemented, this would further improve the government
balance by around 0.4 % of GDP in 2008. The most recent
update of the stability programme targeted a surplus of
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
¥2∂ Sent to parliament on 29 May 2007.
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 70.3 % of GDP, hence only a 0.1 % of GDP improvement
in the nominal government balance. This is explained by
the fact that the target was based on GDP growth of only
1ã % instead of 2.6 % in the Commission services’ spring
2007 forecast. For 2009, the stability programme update
targets a surplus of 0.9 % of GDP. This reflects falling
interest expenditures and the reduction of the Dutch contri-
butions to the EU own resources by 0.5 % of GDP. 
Tax revenues in the Netherlands
Tax receipts and social premiums as a share of total gov-
ernment revenues have been relatively stable in the past
decade and a half, at around 85 % (Graph V.18.1).
The relative shares of the major tax categories do not
show large shifts over the time horizon, although one
development can be inferred from the graph: the share of
the main components of direct taxes (i.e. taxes on per-
sonal and corporate income) has fallen from 32 % of
total government revenues in 1995 to around 26 % in
2006. In the same period, the share of taxes on produc-
tion and imports, or indirect taxes, has increased from
22 % to 28 % of total government income.
Although the shares of total receipts from taxes and
social contributions to government revenues have been
relatively stable over a protracted period, the overall
elasticity of tax receipts with respect to GDP shows sig-
nificant fluctuations from one year to another. Graph
V.18.2 shows that the apparent elasticity of total tax rev-
enues and social premiums to GDP fluctuates in an inter-
val of 0.5 and 2 with an average of 1.1, very close to the
OECD estimate of 1.0. It also shows that in recent years,
Table V.18.1
Budgetary developments 2005–09, the Netherlands (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance – 0.3 0.6 – 0.7 0.0  
— Total revenues 45.2 47.2 46.3 46.3  
  Of which: — current taxes 24.2 24.7 24.8 25.1  
 — social contributions 14.1 15.3 15.0 14.9  
— Total expenditure 45.4 46.6 47.0 46.2  
  Of which: — collective consumption 10.6 10.3 10.4 10.5  
 — social transfers in kind 13.5 15.0 15.0 14.9  
 — social transfers other than in kind 11.1 11.2 10.9 10.6  
 — interest expenditure 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0  
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.2  
Primary balance 2.1 2.9 1.5 2.1  
Tax burden 38.2 39.7 39.5 39.7  
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) 0.7 1.1 – 0.4 0.1  
Structural primary balance 3.1 3.4 1.7 2.1  
Government gross debt 52.7 48.7 47.7 45.9  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.5 2.9 2.8 2.6  
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.9
Primary balance 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.9
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
Structural balance (3) (5) 0.8 0.4 – 0.1 0.0 0.4
Government gross debt 52.7 50.2 47.9 46.3 44.2
pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.5 3.5 3.0 1.7 1.7
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.300
(4) Submitted in November 2006
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and the November 2006 update of the stability programme of the Netherlands.
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ant.
Part of the fluctuations in tax elasticities can be traced
back to tax policy. Changes in tax policy may take any
form from adjusting the tax rate, changing the scope of
the tax base or adjusting the speed of tax collection.
mated by constructing corrected elasticities that use ex
ante estimates of the impact of tax measures on
revenues (1). Graph V.18.2 also depicts the corrected elas-
ticity, which fluctuates around a mean of 0.9. Total
receipts of taxes and social premiums should clearly not
be considered buoyant in 2005 and 2006, after adjustment.
Table V.18.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, the Netherlands
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Increase in healthcare premiums (0.2 % of GDP) • Measures to improve security (0.1 % of GDP)
• Reduction of income tax rates (– 0.1 % of GDP) • Reduction of environmental fees, integration and asylum, 
education (combined 0.1 % of GDP)
• Reduction of unemployment premiums (– 0.1 % of GDP) • Increase in child allowance, tax breaks for households’ childcare 
costs, increased running costs of social benefit administration
• Overhaul of corporate tax system (– 0.1 % of GDP)            
• Increases in several tax breaks (– 0.1 % of GDP) 
(combined 0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources:  Commission services and 2007 budget.
Graph V.18.1:  Breakdown of total government revenue into its main categories
Source: Statistic Netherlands.
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Although the effects of policy measures on tax revenues
are difficult to disentangle from the variations that result
from normal economic fluctuations, it can be approxi-
¥1∂ To this end, the ex ante estimates in the budget of the respective years were
used.
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 7The increasing relative share of indirect tax receipts in
total tax receipts can be inferred from Graph V.18.3 as for
most years the apparent elasticity exceeds the standard
value of 1 by a significant margin (1). In fact, it averages
at 1.4 over the period shown. This strongly resembles the
elasticity with respect to private consumption expendi-
review, environmental taxes were introduced and steadily
raised and the highest VAT rate was increased from
17.5 to 19 %. Adjusted for these policy measures, the tax
Graph V.18.2:  Elasticity of total tax revenues to GDP
Source: Commission services.
Graph V.18.3:  Elasticity of indirect taxes to GDP
Source: Statistic Netherlands.
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¥1∂ Budgetary elasticities used in the EU fiscal surveillance framework are302
ture, which averages 1.5. The persisting high elasticity of
indirect taxes reflects a deliberate strategy of shifting
direct taxation to indirect taxation. In the time frame under
estimated on the basis of a commonly agreed methodology developed by
the OECD. For details see http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2005doc.nsf/
43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/
05fabee2d580f005c1257037002d2179/$FILE/JT00187415.PDF 
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GDP shows significantly less volatility and averages 1.0.
Although most taxes on production and imports can be
expected to move with private consumption expenditure
and GDP, some taxes have a base that is not directly
linked to these variables. The share of these taxes in total
indirect taxes increased from 7â % in 1995 to 10 % in
2005. Examples include taxes on assets and the real
estate transaction tax. The most volatile of these is the
real estate transfer tax. It is levied on transfers of existing
dwellings and offices from one owner to another. During
the period under review, the tariff levied remained
unchanged at 6 % of the tax base, which is the total value
of transferred real estate, both private and corporate.
Despite the fixed tariff, the share of this tax in total indi-
rect taxes has more than doubled from 3 % in 1990 to
6â % in 2005, which can be explained by a rapidly
increasing tax base.
Over the whole period under review, the average trans-
action price for private real estate sales tripled and the
annual number of real estate transactions increased by
two thirds. As a result, the tax base grew significantly
faster than private consumption expenditure, the typical
tax base for taxes on production and imports
(Graph V.18.4).
Receipts from direct taxes in the Netherlands have been
more volatile than those of indirect taxes. The policy-
adjusted wage and income tax receipts fluctuated
between – 1 and + 2 and have averaged 0.8 over the
period 1995–2006, significantly below the OECD refer-
ence value of 1.7 (Graph V.18.5). Corporate tax receipts
have been even more volatile. The policy-adjusted elas-
ticity of corporate taxes with respect to GDP fluctuated
between – 5.7 and + 6.9 in the period 1995–2006 and
averaged 1.2. This figure compares with an ex ante
OECD elasticity of 1.5. The single most important cause
for the high volatility of corporate taxes is that compa-
nies have the possibility to compensate profits with
losses incurred in previous years. Graph V.18.5 shows
that tax elasticities are especially volatile around the
time of strong changes in the economic cycle and are rel-
atively stable at times of economic stability. In light of
this experience, the strong corporate elasticity in 2004
and 2005 may be expected to return to normal, a move-
ment that appears to have already started in 2006.
Graph V.18.4:  Development of two tax bases for indirect taxes
Sources: Kadaster and Statistic Netherlands.
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Source: Commission services.
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19. Austria
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government recorded a deficit
amounting to 1.1 % of GDP. This is a markedly better
outcome than the deficit of 1.7 % % of GDP that was
projected in the 2005 update of the stability
programme. (1) The improvement in public finances is
largely the result of a significantly more-robust-than-
anticipated economic growth, which was accompanied
by a notable pickup in tax revenues. The favourable out-
turn concerns in particular higher-than-expected receipts
from corporate taxes and indirect taxes, which led also to
a rise in the revenue ratio by 1 % of GDP. The overall
fall in the deficit was dampened, however, by the fact
that expenditures also rose faster than expected, albeit at
a lower pace than revenues. The government debt ratio
fell to 62.2 % of GDP. This too is better than expected,
in parallel with the lower-than-anticipated deficit.
The federal budgets for 2007 and 2008 were tabled
jointly by the new government at the end of March 2006.
The adoption of the budgets by parliament took place on
3 May 2007. The budget for 2007 targets a general gov-
ernment deficit of 0.9 % of GDP. Regarding expendi-
tures, the government gives priority to R & D, education
and social affairs. Higher spending on social affairs com-
prises an increase in minimum pensions in 2007. More-
over, expenditure on military aircraft will burden the
budget by 0.2 % of GDP.
At the same time, savings on the wage bill and discretion-
ary expenditure ease the budget by 0.1 percentage point in
2007. As regards revenues, excises on fuel will be
increased in mid-2007 (+ 0.3 cent per litre on diesel and
+0.5 cent per litre on petrol with an impact in the 2007
accounts of 0.1 % of GDP). Already in 2006, the govern-
ment enacted several measures to lower the tax burden on
small and medium-sized enterprises by EUR 190 million,
(around 0.1 % of GDP) with an impact on the 2007
accounts. Moreover, the phasing-out of the investment
subsidy and of the indexation of discretionary expenditure
will ease the budget by 0.1 percentage point in 2007.
Moreover, pension and labour market reforms, as well as
the favourable macroeconomic outlook are expected to
lead to significant savings.
The official deficit projection of 0.9 % of GDP is fully in
line with the projection in the Commission services’
spring 2007 forecast. Expenditure and revenue develop-
ments are only insignificantly more moderate in the Com-
mission services’ projections compared with the budget.
In spite of the better-than-expected starting position in
2006 and an upward revision of economic growth for
2007 by ä percentage point compared with the previous
update of the stability programme, the planned deficit is
even 0.1 percentage point higher than projected one year
ago. On this basis, the Commission services estimate a
tiny deterioration of the structural balance in 2007 by
0.1 percentage point of GDP. This implies a broadly neu-
tral fiscal stance and contrasts with the originally targeted
structural improvement of ã percentage point in the sta-
bility programme of November 2005 
For 2008, the Commission services’ forecast projects a
deficit of 0.8 % of GDP, practically unchanged from 2007
in nominal and structural terms. This estimate is based on
the measures decided for the 2008 budget and against the
background of a slight softening in economic growth.
Both revenues and expenditures continue their downward
trend in per cent of GDP, but continue to rise in absolute
terms. The projected deficit is slightly higher than that in
the latest update of the stability programme, even though
the growth assumptions of the Commission services are
slightly more optimistic than those of the national author-305
ities. This is explained by a somewhat more cautious
assessment by the Commission services of expected tax
revenue. For 2009, the stability programme foresees an
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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centage point narrowing the deficit to 0.2 % of GDP.
On the basis of buoyant economic growth and nominal
deficits of around 1 % of GDP, the debt ratio is expected
to decline further form 62.2 % of GDP in 2006 to 60.6 %
of GDP in 2007, dipping below the 60 % of GDP refer-
ence value in 2008. As there are no concrete plans, this
projection does not include any significant privatisation
receipts. 
Table V.19.1
Budgetary developments 2005–10, Austria (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008   
General government balance – 1.6 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.8   
— Total 
revenues
48.2 48.0 47.4 47.1   
  Of which: — current taxes 12.9 13.2 13.1 13.1   
 — social contributions 16.1 16.0 15.8 15.7   
— Total expenditure 49.8 49.1 48.3 47.9   
  Of which: — collective consumption 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.9   
 — social transfers in kind 11.2 11.2 10.9 10.8   
 — social transfers other than in kind 18.6 18.3 18.0 17.8   
 — interest expenditure 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.6   
 — gross fixed capital formation 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0   
Primary balance 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.7   
Tax burden 42.2 42.0 41.5 41.2   
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0   
Structural balance (3) – 1.1 – 1.0 – 1.1 – 1.2   
Structural primary balance 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4   
Government gross debt 63.5 62.2 60.6 59.2   
pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.0 3.1 2.9 2.5   
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
General government balance – 1.6 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.7 – 0.2 0.4
Primary balance 1.3 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.6 3.1
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.1 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.7 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.4
Government gross debt 63.5 62.2 61.2 59.9 58.5 56.8
pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.0 3.1 2.7 2.3 2.5 2.6
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in March 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and the March 2007 update of the stability programme of Austria.306
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Main measures in the budget for 2007, Austria
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Increase of the petroleum tax (0.1 % of GDP) • Military aircraft (0.2 % of GDP)
 • R & D, education, universities (0.1 % of GDP)
 • Social protection (0.1 % of GDP)
 • SME package (0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and Austrian stability programme.307
20. Poland
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government deficit was 3.9 % of
GDP, compared with the official target of 4.6 % of GDP
in the January 2006 update of the convergence pro-
gramme (1). This was possible thanks to a much lower-
than-projected central government deficit by around
0.6 % of GDP and a higher-than-anticipated surplus of
social security sub-sector by around 0.4 % of GDP. In
contrast, the finances of local government slipped into a
deficit of about 0.4 % of GDP, whereas the programme
projected a balance. The better-than-expected outturn
mainly results from an incomplete execution of expend-
iture plans, much better than expected tax-rich growth
and lower unemployment allowances to be paid out
thanks to the strongly improved situation in the labour
market. The debt ratio, at 47.8 % of GDP, also turned out
lower than expected (51.2 % of GDP).
The Polish Government tabled the draft 2007 budget on
27 September and parliament adopted it on 15 December
2006. Excise duty hikes are the main revenue-increasing
measures (0.2 % of GDP). However, they are more than
offset by an extraordinary indexation of personal income
tax brackets (compensating for the lack of indexation
since 2001) and tax-deductible costs, as well as pro-fam-
ily tax relief (together 0.3 % of GDP). The 2007 budget
sets a general government deficit target of 3.7 % of GDP,
compared to 3.4 % of GDP in the November 2006
update of the convergence programme, which relies on a
more favourable growth scenario (2). According to the
Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast, the deficit
should reach 3.4 % of GDP in 2007. On the one hand, a
fast and tax-rich real GDP growth exceeding 6 % is
expected, fuelled also by public investment expansion of
almost 18 % in real terms. On the other hand, social con-
tribution cuts have been brought forward compared to
what was foreseen in the 2006 update of the convergence
programme and they will not be offset by additional def-
icit-decreasing measures. However, these tax reductions
will be offset by still-high growth of compensations of
employees thanks to fast rising wages and employment
and smaller incentives to stay in the underground econ-
omy. Besides, as a consequence of social contribution
cuts, there will be larger personal income tax revenues,
thanks to higher taxable income, and a slower increase in
expenditure on gross wages in the public sector. The fis-
cal stance in 2007, as measured by the change in the
structural primary balance, is broadly neutral.
The Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast, based
on the no-policy-change assumption, indicates that the
general government deficit will improve to 3.3 % of
GDP in 2008. If the reorganisation of the public admin-
istration starts in 2008, as intended by the government,
the outturn may be better than forecast. On the other
hand, if the costly annual indexation of pensions and
social benefits, linked to wage growth, is restored, the
general government balance can turn out worse. The
November 2006 update of the convergence programme
sets deficit targets of 3.1 % of GDP for 2008 and 2.9 %
of GDP for 2009.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2007
forecast, the debt ratio is expected to increase by approx-
imately one percentage point to around 49 % of GDP
between 2006 and 2008. 
Revenue uncertainty: tax bases 
and elasticities in Poland in 1992–2005¥1∂ The government accounts of Poland now include the pension reform costs,
as the transitory period on the sectoral classification of pension schemes
expired. The funded second-pillar pension scheme is now classified in the308
Understanding the relationship between tax revenues
and different GDP components is important for projec-
tions of government revenues. Volatile tax elasticities
corporate sector, instead of government.
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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Budgetary developments 2005–09, Poland (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance – 4.3 – 3.9 – 3.4 – 3.3  
— Total revenues 39.0 39.4 39.0 38.0  
  Of which: — current taxes 20.6 21.4 21.7 22.0  
 — social contributions 12.3 12.2 11.6 10.4  
— Total expenditure 43.4 43.3 42.4 41.4  
  Of which: — collective consumption 8.0 7.9 7.6 7.3  
 — social transfers in kind 10.1 10.1 9.6 9.2  
 — social transfers other than in kind 15.7 15.4 14.7 14.4  
 — interest expenditure 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.6  
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.4 4.1 4.6 4.7  
Primary balance – 1.5 – 1.5 – 0.9 – 0.8  
Tax burden 32.8 33.5 33.7 32.7  
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) – 4.2 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 3.3  
Structural primary balance – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.0 – 0.7  
Government gross debt 47.1 47.8 48.4 49.1  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.6 6.1 6.1 5.5  
Convergence programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 2.5 – 1.9 – 1.4 – 1.0 – 0.6
Primary balance 0.1 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.7
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 2.3 – 1.9 – 1.4 – 1.0 – 0.7
Government gross debt 41.9 42.0 42.1 41.4 40.6
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.5 5.4 5.1 5.1 5.6
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and December 2006 update of the convergence programme of Poland.
Table V.20.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Poland
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Reintroduction of the indexation of personal income tax brackets 
and tax-deductible cost plus pro-family tax reliefs (0.3 % of GDP)
• Increases of salaries for medical personnel (0.4 % of GDP)
• Excise duty hikes for fuels and cigarettes (0.2 % of GDP) • Increased military expenditure (0.1 % of GDP)
 • Increased salaries of teachers (0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and budget for 2007.309
make budgetary planning more difficult. However, the
policymakers themselves can be responsible for high
volatility, if many changes in tax regulations are contin-
uously introduced. Such instability can be costly for
enterprises because, firstly, it involves additional costs to
learn the changes in tax codes and, secondly, economic
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longer optimal in a new setting. Nevertheless, the eco-
nomic transition in east European countries, such as
Poland, required numerous changes in tax policy during
a trial-and-error process of finding an optimal tax system
for a newly established market economy. On the other
hand, the more advanced the transition, the more stabil-
ity in a tax system could be expected. In Poland, this is
not yet the case.
Until 1998, the ex post (empirical) tax elasticities in
Poland were relatively stable and close to the ex ante
(theoretical) elasticities estimated by the OECD (1). The
theoretical elasticities for the largest aggregates are the
following: 1.0 for taxes on production and imports (rela-
tive to private consumption) as well as for social contri-
butions (relative to compensation of employees) and 1.1
for taxes on income and wealth (relative to GDP).
Since 1999, one can observe much higher volatility
(Graph V.20.1) even if outliers (1999 and 2002) are
ignored. This volatility is mainly the result of tax
regulations which have been changed continuously in
Poland (2). Before focusing on tax code changes, it is
worthwhile mentioning that the lower volatility of tax
elasticities in the 1990s compared to the 2000s, may also
result to some extent from much higher inflation in the
earlier period, which had a smoothing effect on both tax
base and revenues.
The revenue uncertainty in Poland is illustrated by the
larger volatility in revenue growth (Graph V.20.1.),
compared to the instability in the tax base
(Graph V.20.2.). Graphs V.20.1 and V.20.2 present real
growth rates of tax revenues and bases in order to avoid
that the picture be blurred by the very high inflation in
Poland at the beginning of the economic transition and
the ensuing disinflation.
Even after elimination of the revenue outliers (years
1992 and 1999 for direct taxes and social contributions;
¥1∂ See Girouard and André (2005).
¥2∂ See Schratzenstaller (2005).
Table V.20.3
Volatility of tax elasticities in Poland
Standard deviation 1992–98 2000, 2001, 2003–05
Taxes on production and imports 0.3 0.9
Current taxes on income and wealth 0.4 1.2
Social contributions 0.1 0.6
Source: Commission services.
Graph V.20.1:  Tax elasticities in Poland
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revenue growth in both categories is higher than the vol-
atility of the corresponding tax base growth; for social
contributions and the associated tax base, wages, the vol-
atility is similar. It needs to be remembered that the tax
bases presented are only proxies for actual tax bases
resulting from the tax code.
In the next section the focus is on tax revenues and
changes in the tax code. Afterwards, the question is
asked whether there is a systematic link between the
growth rate of tax bases and the level of tax elasticities,
which could point at income progressivity or growth
composition having an influence on revenue.
Tax revenues and changes in the tax code
As far as direct taxes are concerned, the main measures
undertaken since 1995 in personal income taxation (PIT)
concentrate on closing tax loopholes and exemptions. To
counterbalance the loss in tax revenue due to the decline
in PIT progressivity, the tax base has been broadened by
abolishing a number of tax deductions and by including
fringe benefits and benefits in kind in taxable income (1).
The statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rate was kept
at 40 % until 1995. In the period 1997–2003, it was
reduced by about 2 percentage points annually on aver-
age. In 2004, the CIT rate has been cut from 27 % to
19 %. In the same year, the PIT regime has been
extended with an option for small entrepreneurs to have
their income taxed at a flat rate of 19 % at the price of
foregoing tax deductions. These CIT and PIT reforms
concerning large and small businesses may be partly
responsible for increased elasticity of direct tax revenues
in the most recent years through the closing of loopholes
and tax deductions as well as less tax avoidance and eva-
sion under much lower tax rates.
The large symmetric blips in the elasticities of direct
taxes and social contributions in 1999 and 2002 appear
to be the result of changes in rules concerning social con-
tributions. It should be noted that social contributions are
deductible from the PIT base. In 1999, a set of different
individual social contributions replaced enterprise-level
contributions. This was an element of the pension reform
which implied the creation of individual pension fund
accounts and was intended to increase long-term sav-
ings. In 2002, there was a reduction in the rates of social
contributions, though not as fundamental as the increase
in 1999, which resulted in higher taxable personal
income and higher PIT revenue. ¥1∂ See European Commission (2006a), p. 176.
Graph V.20.2:  Tax revenues in Poland
Source: Commission services.
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The concept of elasticity implies that one expects a sta-
ble linear relation between changes in tax revenue and
changes in the tax base, i.e. the dynamism of the tax
bases do not influence the elasticity. This can be tested:
the correlation between tax bases and the elasticities
should be close to zero in the long term. Alternatively,
there could be some non-linearities in the reaction of tax
revenues to changes in tax bases, e.g. tax revenues may
resulting from a common external factor such as infla-
tion, real rather than nominal growth rates are scruti-
nised. The data do not reveal strong correlations between
the elasticities and real changes in the corresponding tax
bases. The strongest correlation can be observed
between real private consumption growth and the elas-
ticity for indirect taxes: 0.50 (significant at 7 %). It
implies that, at higher private consumption growth, indi-
rect tax revenue may increase less than proportionally to
the theoretical or average elasticity. This phenomenon
may be the result of composition effects. Notably, the
households’ purchases of construction materials used for
building or renovation of houses and apartments are
taxed at lower rates, given a number of tax allowances
and deductions. These allowances were exploited more
when income growth (also reflected in consumption
growth) was highest.
To conclude, one observes that the volatility of tax elastic-
ities has increased since 1999 compared to the preceding
period. The fluctuations in tax elasticities result mainly
from a number of reforms. Modifications in the system of
social contributions introduced together with the pension
reform, personal income tax rearrangements and corpo-
rate income tax cuts were the main tax measures in Poland
in the recent years. In addition, composition effects played
Graph V.20.3:  Tax bases in Poland
Source: Commission services.
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Table V.20.4
Volatility of tax revenues and tax bases in Poland
 % real change Years Standard deviation (percentage points)
Taxes on production and imports 1993–2005 6.5
Current taxes on income and 
wealth
1993–98, 
2000–05
5.8
Social contributions 1993–98, 
2000–05
3.8
Private consumption 1992–2005 2.3
Nominal GDP 1992–2005 1.8
Compensation of employees 1993–2005 4.0
Source: Commission services.312
rise progressively faster when tax bases expand at a
higher growth rate. To eliminate spurious correlation
a role together with specificities of the tax systems such as
tax allowances for construction goods.
21. Portugal
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government deficit was 3.9 % of
GDP. This compares with a target of 4.6 % of GDP set
in the December 2005 update of the stability programme.
The better-than-expected outturn was mainly due to
higher-than-budgeted current revenue and lower-than-
planned capital spending. In 2006, government debt
declined to 64.7 % of GDP, below the target of 68.7 %
of GDP, thanks to a downward revision of the 2005 debt
ratio (1), the lower-than-expected deficit in 2006 and the
impact of the stock-flow adjustment.
The budget for 2007 was adopted on 30 November 2006.
It targets a general government deficit of 3.7 % of GDP,
confirmed in the December 2006 stability programme
update (2). However, in early May, in the report on budg-
etary policy guidelines, the deficit target was revised to
3.3 % of GDP, following the better-than-expected out-
come in 2006. The 2007 budget plans the deficit reduction
to be mainly driven by a containment of government con-
sumption, notably compensation of employees. In partic-
ular, important contributions to the expenditure retrench-
ment are planned to come from measures adopted in
recent years, notably restraint on public employment and
wages. At the same time, social transfers are expected to
grow somewhat more moderately than in previous years
reflecting changes in old-age pension rules, especially for
civil servants, and curbs on early retirement for private-
sector workers. However, in line with the plans
announced in 2005, higher means-tested benefits for eld-
erly citizens are foreseen to be extended. The latter meas-
ure will work in the opposite direction of the expiry of the
progressive increase of the minimum old-age pension
towards the minimum wage, which took place until 2006.
Lower expenditure for medication is expected. Additional
contributions to fiscal consolidation are planned to come
from higher tax revenue thanks to increases in taxes on
petrol and tobacco products and in social contributions, as
well as a further lowering in tax allowances for pension
income, and further improvements in revenue collection.
However, such an increase in the tax burden will be
largely offset by a decline in EU capital transfers, so that
the total revenue-to-GDP ratio will remain unchanged
from 2006. The Commission services’ spring 2007 fore-
cast projects a deficit of 3â % of GDP, with the small dif-
ference vis-à-vis the new deficit target arising essentially
from a slightly more conservative assessment of govern-
ment expenditure growth (3). In 2007, the fiscal stance, as
measured by the change in the structural primary balance,
i.e. the budget primary balance net of one-off and other
temporary measures, is estimated to be mildly restrictive.
Under the customary no-policy-change assumption, the
Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast projects the
general government deficit to fall below 3ä % of GDP
in 2008. The improvement reflects the lagged effects of
the abovementioned measures adopted to contain central
government employment and old-age pension expendi-
ture. The government deficit target for 2008 presented in
the December 2006 update of the stability programme is
2.6 % of GDP, with the improvement compared with
2007 being based on further spending restraint. In the
report on budgetary policy guidelines of May 2007, the
deficit target for 2008 was revised to 2.4 % of GDP. The
difference between the new official target and the Com-
mission services’ spring 2007 forecast is mainly due to
¥1∂ Most of the downward revision in the debt ratio in 2005 was due to of the
upward revision in the GDP level by about 2â %, explained by methodo-
logical changes as well as by the incorporation of new data, and a lower-
than-planned debt-increasing stock-flow adjustment by about ã percent- ¥3∂ Additionally, unlike the budget, the Commission services forecast assumes313
age point of GDP.
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
that all planned capital injections in hospitals in 2007 and 2008 will be
recorded as capital transfers, rather than as transactions in equity, thus
impacting the government expenditure and deficit levels (see Eurostat
news release 55/2007).
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have not yet been fully detailed and predicts lower GDP
growth. Beyond 2008, the December 2006 stability pro-
gramme projects the general government deficit to reach
1.5 % of GDP in 2009 and 0.4 % of GDP in 2010 on the
back of further expenditure retrenchments and of gradu-
ally increasing GDP growth.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2007
forecasts, the government debt ratio will reach 65.4 % of
GDP at the end of 2007 and 65.8 % of GDP at the end of
2008, on the back of still high deficits and subdued nom-
inal GDP growth. 
The December 2006 update of the stability programme
projects the debt ratio to peak at 68 % of GDP in 2007 and
to start declining thereafter, hovering at 62 % of GDP in
2010, thanks to the return to primary surpluses, the accel-
eration of nominal GDP and privatisation proceeds. The
better-than-expected deficit outturn in 2006, and the sub-
sequent downward revision of the fiscal targets in May
2007, resulted in a revision of the projections of the debt
ratio to 65.1 % of GDP in 2007 and 64.5 % of GDP in
2008. The differences between the new path and the Com-
mission services’ forecast are therefore limited and
mainly due to higher deficits and lower GDP growth in
2008 in the Commission services’ forecast.
Evolution of tax revenues
In Portugal, an increase of tax revenues and social con-
tributions in excess of GDP has been the rule over most
of the past 10 years. The tax burden has increased from
almost 32 % of GDP in 1995 to around 35â % of GDP
Table V.21.1
Budgetary developments 2005–10, Portugal (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008   
General government balance – 6.1 – 3.9 – 3.5 – 3.2   
— Total revenues 41.4 42.2 42.3 42.3   
  Of which: — current taxes 23.5 24.3 24.5 24.6   
 — social contributions 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.4   
— Total expenditure 47.5 46.1 45.8 45.5   
  Of which:        
 — final government consumption 21.2 20.5 20.1 19.8   
 — social transfers other than in kind 14.8 15.1 15.2 15.1   
  — interest expenditure 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0   
  — gross fixed capital formation 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.2   
Primary balance – 3.4 – 1.1 – 0.6 – 0.2   
Tax burden 34.9 35.6 36.0 36.0   
One-off and other temporary measures – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0   
Structural balance (3) – 5.0 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.6   
Structural primary balance – 2.4 – 0.1 0.2 0.3   
Government gross debt 63.6 64.7 65.4 65.8   
pm Real GDP growth (%) 0.5 1.3 1.8 2.0   
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
General government balance – 6.0 – 4.6 – 3.7 – 2.6 – 1.5 – 0.4
Primary balance – 3.3 – 1.7 – 0.7 0.4 1.5 2.5
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 4.9 – 3.4 – 2.6 – 1.8 – 1.3 – 0.5
Government gross debt 64.0 67.4 68.0 67.3 65.2 62.2
pm Real GDP growth (%) 0.4 1.4 1.8 2.4 3.0 3.0
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
3314
( ) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and the December 2006 update of the stability programme of Portugal.
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varied over time owing to different factors. Graph
V.21.1 below shows the evolution of tax revenue with
respect to GDP, including a variant that controls for one-
off fiscal revenues in some years (1). It shows that as a
share of GDP taxes started to decline only in 2001 at the
same time, in 2002 and 2003, one-off measures were
crucial to avoid a further decline in the tax burden.
Graph V.21.1 shows the evolution of the apparent elas-
ticity of total taxes with respect to GDP; i.e. the relative
change of taxes over the relative change of nominal
GDP, against the backdrop of GDP and household’s con-
sumption growth rates, yielding the following observa-
tions. First, in the second half of the 1990s, the elasticity
of the total tax burden picked up in 1999 and has since
behaved quite procyclically. Accordingly, between 2001
and 2003, tax revenues showed very little resilience to
the deceleration in economic activity with the underlying
tax revenue growing below GDP. Finally, as from 2004,
tax revenue has been growing well in excess of a sub-
dued GDP, hence yielding rising revenue ratios.
Over the past decade, all major tax categories have
increased their GDP shares. In particular, indirect taxes
Table V.21.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Portugal
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•  Increase in excise taxes on petrol and tobacco products 
(almost +0.1 % of GDP each)
• Savings on medication co-payments and clinical material 
purchases (– 0.1 % of GDP)
• Increase in the social contributions to be paid by civil servants for 
their healthcare subsystem (almost + 0.1 % of GDP) 
• Freeze of nominal transfers to local governments from central 
government
 • Cut or freezes in expenditure plans of most ministries
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services, 2007 budget and December 2006 update of the stability programme of Portugal.
¥1∂ One-off measures that directly impacted on tax revenue: two tax amnesties
undertaken in 2002 and 2003; a sale of tax and social contributions arrears
in 2003 (0.9 %, 0.1 % and 1.3 % of GDP, respectively). In the rest of this
section, tax revenue data exclude those one-off measures. Imputed social
contributions are also excluded.
Graph V.21.1:  Tax burden in Portugal (annual change)
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adding some 2â percentage points since 1995, represent-
ing about 15â % of GDP in 2006. A similar pattern was
observed for actual social contributions, which increased
by almost 2 percentage points during the same period.
Direct taxes (both corporate and personal income taxes),
which went up by less than â % of GDP, have had a more
uneven behaviour over time, increasing until 2000–01,
declining until 2003 and rebounding afterwards to some
9 % of GDP in 2006. Nonetheless, the different tax cate-
gories have shown rather different reactions to GDP, nota-
bly with direct taxes responding sharply to economic fluc-
tuations, in particular in the slowdown to the 2003
recession.
Different forces are behind the evolution of tax revenues,
in particular macroeconomic developments, as well as
discretionary fiscal policy measures. In an attempt to
identify the importance of the different drivers, Graph
V.21.4 disentangles some of the main factors behind the
changing tax burden in the current decade (1).
In particular, the difference between the apparent elastic-
ity of tax revenue and the long-term average or ex ante
elasticity is separated into three components (2). The first
is the direct impact of the main changes in the major tax
categories implemented since 2001; essentially hikes in
the VAT standard rate and a series of cuts in the standard
corporate tax rate (3). The second term is the composi-
tion component, which captures the effect of the aggre-
gate demand composition, notably the strength of differ-
ent tax bases, such as household consumption or
compensation of employees, relative to GDP. The third
component indicates the elasticity elements as well as
other discretionary elements (4).
After taking those factors into account, Graph V.21.4
suggests that part of the evolution of the tax revenue is
not explained by changes in nominal tax rates or the
composition of economic growth. In particular, it seems
that in 2001–03 additional factors played a role in drag-
ging down tax revenue more than the pace of economic
¥1∂ Also (actual) social contributions related to pensions of civil servants were
excluded in Graph V.21.4 as they are also registered on the expenditure
side, thus being neutral on the government balance. Compensation of
employees has been netted out from social contributions.
¥2∂ The ex ante elasticity is calculated on the basis of a commonly agreed
method developed by the OECD. For details see http://www.olis.oecd.org/
olis/2005doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/
05fabee2d580f005c1257037002d2179/$FILE/JT00187415.PDF 
¥3∂ The changes included are: the increases in the standard VAT rate from
17 % to 19 % in mid-2002 and then to 21 % in mid-2005; and the cuts on
corporate taxes (IRC), which decreased gradually from 34 % in 2000 to
25 % at the beginning of 2004.
¥4∂ For details on the calculation of the composition effect, check economic
assessment of the stability programme of Portugal (update of December
2006) (Annex 5). http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/
publication3843_en.pdf 
Graph V.21.2:  Tax elasticities and the GDP growth pattern
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ing fiscal imbalances.
The reverse appears to have happened since 2004, with
revenues growing above fundamentals and more than
warranted by changes in tax rates, despite a subdued
pace of economic activity (1).
A number of additional factors may have played a role
in the recently observed pattern of tax revenue: a pleth-
ora of changes in less important tax categories that are
not accounted for here (e.g., excises on oil and tobacco
products, taxes on real estate sales and property tax);
various changes in tax benefits and credits; variations
in the time patterns of tax reimbursement and advanced
payments; lagged effects of economic activity on tax
inflows (particularly relevant for direct taxes); changes
in consumption patterns over the cycle as well as
changes in income distribution. At the same time,
improved tax compliance and tax collection, particu-
larly on corporate taxes, VAT, and, more recently,
social contributions, may have also played a role in that
evolution. The recent increases have been consistent
with improvements in the work of the Portuguese tax
administration, namely at the level of improving data
management, including information exchange between
tax and social contributions administrations or the
introduction of automatic systems for clearing tax pay-
ments or checking tax declarations.
Graph V.21.3:  Behaviour of different tax categories
Source: Commission services.
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¥1∂ Changes in employment composition in recent years, with an increase in the
share of paid employment and the mirroring decline in self-employment
(which is at some 25 % of the employed population) may ceteris paribus be
leading to an higher importance of the composition effect and consequently
to a lower importance of the residual component presented in Figure V.21.4.317
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Sources: Commission services and CGA annual reports.
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22. Romania
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government deficit was 1.9 % of
GDP, compared to a target of 0.7 % of GDP in the
December 2005 pre-accession programme. The 2006
budget targeted a deficit of 0.5 % of GDP, according to
domestic concepts which are different from those of the
European system of accounts (ESA). The target was
revised upwards several times during the year to 2.5 %
of GDP (domestic concepts) partly due to higher
expenditure allocated for investment projects and not-
withstanding higher revenue from stronger economic
growth. Despite an accumulated surplus of 1.2 % of
GDP during the 11 months to November, spending of
about 3 % of GDP in December turned the budget bal-
ance for the whole year into a deficit of 1.7 % of GDP in
terms of domestic budgetary accounting. Lower-than-
budgeted capital expenditure caused by delays in imple-
menting investment projects reduced the deficit,
although part of the unspent funds were shifted to current
spending notably wages, purchases of goods and serv-
ices and social transfers. On the revenue side, direct tax
revenues were higher than budgeted due to stronger-
than-expected growth, better tax collection and an
increase in formal employment. VAT revenue made also
a positive contribution as a result of higher private con-
sumption and improved tax collection. The government
gross debt ratio was 12.4 % of GDP at the end of 2006
compared to 15.1 % of GDP foreseen in the December
2005 pre-accession economic programme.
The 2007 budget approved by the Romanian Parliament on
19 December 2006 targets a general government deficit of
2.8 % of GDP in domestic accounting methodology. This
was translated in the January 2007 convergence pro-
gramme into a deficit of 2.7 % of GDP in ESA terms (1).
Nevertheless, in the April 2007 fiscal notification, the
a broadening of the VAT and direct tax bases. On the
expenditure side, a substantial increase in public invest-
ment is foreseen, while social benefits and purchases of
goods and services are also set to increase as a share of
GDP. According to the Commission services’ spring 2007
forecast, the general government deficit is projected to
reach 3.2 % of GDP. This deficit is in line with the April
2007 fiscal notification. On the expenditure side, a relaxed
policy is expected notably with respect to the capital
expenditure as well as collective consumption and social
transfers. On the revenue side, the Commission services’
spring 2007 forecast is less favourable than the one put for-
ward by the authorities in the January 2007 convergence
programme, notably with respect to indirect taxes. Moreo-
ver, it includes a negative impact of the property fund
scheme for compensation of citizens for the non-return of
confiscated property and an increase in public wages
which was not captured by the adopted 2007 budget. The
fiscal stance in 2007 is expansionary as the structural pri-
mary balance will deteriorate by 1.4 % of GDP.
Based on the no-policy-change assumption, the Com-
mission services’ spring 2007 forecast expects the gen-
eral government deficit to remain stable at 3.2 % of GDP
in 2008, against the background of a lower, but still
robust economic growth. This projection includes a
budgetary cost of the pension reform (the introduction of
a second-pillar funded pension scheme) of 0.2 % of
GDP. The January 2007 convergence programme targets
a general government deficit of 2.6 % of GDP in 2008
and a significant tightening to 2.0 % of GDP in 2009.
The Commission services project the debt-to-GDP ratio to
increase by 0.7 percentage point between 2006 and 2008,
reaching just above 13 % in 2008. The increase of the ratio
is due to higher primary deficits partly offset by the posi-
tive effect of strong nominal GDP growth.319
Romanian authorities reported a planned deficit for 2007
of 3.2 % of GDP in ESA terms. On the revenue side, the
2007 budget relies on an increase of revenue mainly due to
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm 
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and the EU budget
EU funds play a key role in promoting economic devel-
opment. With a GDP per capita measured on the basis of
purchasing power standards (PPS) of around 35 % of the
EU-15 average, the EU funds provide a major opportu-
nity for Romania to accelerate the catching-up process.
On the other hand, as EU member, Romania will also
contribute to the EU budget. The following paragraphs
give a broad overview of the flows of EU funds to and
from Romania, their order of magnitude and the
expected budgetary implications.
Financial perspective 2007–13: the total amount of EU
funds is fixed in a multiannual programming framework,
which sets out the maximum commitment appropria-
tions that can be put into the EU budget each year. For
the period 2007–13, these amounts are fixed in the
‘financial perspective 2007–13’. The main EU funds
which are pre-allocated to Romania are the following (1).
• In the policy area of competitiveness and cohesion,
Romania has been assigned a total envelope of EUR
19.7 billion between 2007 and 2013. They are allo-
cated under the EU Structural Funds.
¥1∂ Selected parts of the EU budget are geographically pre-allocated to Mem-
ber States, i.e. where they are not absorbed by a specific Member State,
they cannot be re-directed to another country or purpose. In addition,
Member States can also benefit from budget lines in areas such as educa-
tion and consumer protection, which are allocated on project basis. The
present analysis only takes into account the pre-allocated funds, which rep-
resent more than 90 % of the funds flowing to Romania.
Table V.22.1
Budgetary developments 2005–09, Romania (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance – 1.4 – 1.9 – 3.2 – 3.2  
— Total revenues 32.4 30.1 30.4 31.0  
  Of which: — current taxes 18.2 17.4 17.4 17.7  
 — social contributions 10.5 10.2 10.0 9.8  
— Total expenditure 33.7 32.0 33.6 34.2  
  Of which: — collective consumption 9.0 9.0 9.4 9.6  
 — social transfers in kind 9.0 9.1 8.7 8.5  
 — social transfers other than in kind 8.9 8.2 8.6 8.8  
 — interest expenditure 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8  
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.8 2.9 3.8 4.1  
Primary balance – 0.3 – 1.1 – 2.5 – 2.5  
Tax burden 27.9 26.8 26.6 26.6  
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) – 1.2 – 2.2 – 3.5 – 3.3  
Structural primary balance – 0.1 – 1.4 – 2.8 – 2.5  
Government gross debt 15.8 12.4 12.8 13.1  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.1 7.7 6.7 6.3  
Convergence programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 1.5 – 2.3 – 2.7 – 2.6 – 2.0
Primary balance – 0.4 – 1.2 – 1.6 – 1.5 – 1.0
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 1.7 – 2.9 – 3.4 – 3.3 – 2.4
Government gross debt 15.9 12.8 13.5 12.6 11.7
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.1 8.0 6.5 6.3 5.9
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
3320
( ) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in January 2007.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and the January 2007 update of the convergence programme of Romania.
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for rural development, fisheries and direct aid to
farmers. For Romania, an amount of EUR 8.0 billion
has been pre-allocated for rural development, which
is channelled through the European Agricultural Fund
for Rural Development (EAFRD). EUR 0.1 billion
has been pre-allocated through the European Fisher-
ies Fund (EFF). The direct aid to farmers will follow
a 10-year phasing-in period, starting with amounts
equal to 25 % of the EU-15 Member States in 2007,
progressively increasing towards 100 % by 2017 (1).
• Finally, Romania will benefit from compensations,
foreseen in the Accession Protocol to ensure that
new Member States retain a positive budgetary bal-
ance during the first years of accession. They are
fixed at EUR 0.6 billion between 2007 and 2009 and
disbursed through the Schengen and cash flow facil-
ities (2).
In 2007, the amounts allocated to Romania represent
about 2.4 % of GDP; this is expected to increase to 4.8 %
of GDP in 2013.
Contributions to the EU budget: starting from 1 January
2007, Romania contributes to the EU budget, which is
based on the ‘traditional own resources’ (agricultural
levies and custom duties), value added tax receipts, gross
national income and the UK rebate. In 2007, the Roma-
nian contribution amounts to EUR 0.9 billion (i.e. 0.8 %
of GDP) (3). This amount excludes the traditional own
resources, which cannot be attributed to individual coun-
tries as they are levied at the EU external border.
Table V.22.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Romania
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Increased VAT tax base (+ 1 % of GDP) • Increased public investment (+ 3.6 % of GDP)
• Personal income tax-related measures (+ 0.5 % of GDP) • Higher social benefits (+ 0.4 % of GDP)
• Customs duties (– 0.4 % of GDP) • Lower subsidies (– 0.9 % of GDP)
• Lower social contributions (– 0.3 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services, 2007 budget and the January 2007 update of the convergence programme of Romania.
Table V.22.3
EU transfers available to Romania 2007–13 (% of GDP, 2007 prices)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1. Competitiveness and cohesion           1.13 1.59 2.10 2.47 2.61 2.75 2.89 
2. Natural resources
Rural development                                                                0.63 0.85 1.07 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.93 
Fisheries 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
CAP direct payments (1) 0.37 0.44 0.51 0.57 0.69 0.82 0.94 
3. Compensations 0.26 0.12 0.12 
Total EU funds 2.41 3.02 3.82 4.05 4.30 4.54 4.78 
(1)  CAP: common agricultural policy.
Source: Commission services.321
¥1∂ This procedure is specified in Council Regulation (EC) No 2011/2006 of
19 December 2006 and applies to Bulgaria and Romania (OJ L 384,
29.12.2006).
¥2∂ OJ L 157, 21.6.2005.
¥3∂ Further details on each Member State’s contribution to the EU budget can
be found at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2007_VOL1/EN/nmc-
grseq42960935830-3/index.html
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 7On balance, Romania is a net beneficiary of EU trans-
fers, as are all Member States which joined since 2004.
This is consistent with their relatively higher needs to
catch up with the other EU economies. In 2007, the GDP
per capita (PPS) in the recently acceded new Member
States varies between 34 % of the EU-15 (Bulgaria) and
82 % (Cyprus), while the net transfers from the EU
budget range from 0.3 % of GDP (Cyprus) and 1.7 %
(Hungary) (1). 
Assessing the budgetary impact 
of EU transfers
Although recently acceded Member States benefit from
considerable inflows of EU funds, it is often claimed that
the EU financial framework represents a drag on the
national fiscal balance because of the co-financing rules,
the additionality requirements and the national contribu-
tions to the EU budget (2). Measuring the impact of EU
transfers on the budget balance requires the following
elements to be taken into account.
• The European system of accounts (ESA 95) requires
the ‘recording of financial flows when accrued’, i.e.
when the expenditure of each particular project
takes place. This is opposed to the cash basis,
whereby revenue and expenditure are registered
when actually paid. In practical terms, ESA 95
requires expenditure financed by the EU budget and
the corresponding revenue from the EU budget to be
booked simultaneously, even if the refund comes
with a delay or in advance.
• Experience has shown that in the short run, Member
States face constraints in absorbing the EU funds
¥1∂ Calculated as the sum of the Structural Funds, rural development and com-
pensations, less national contributions to the EU budget. ¥2∂ For an overview of this debate, see Hallet and Keereman (2005).
Table V.22.4
Impact of EU transfers on the fiscal balance of Romania in 2007 (%)
EU transfers Impact on fiscal balance
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Pre-accession funds (a)  0.87 0.69 0.69 0.00 0.69 – 0.23 0.46 
Competitiveness 
and cohesion (b)
1.13 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.06 – 0.03 0.03 
Natural resources      
Rural development 
and fisheries (c)                                                              
0.64 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 – 0.01 0.02 
CAP direct payments (d) 0.37 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37  0.37 
Compensations 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26   0.26 
Contribution to EU budget   0.76 – 0.76   – 0.76 
Total 2.41 1.86 1.15 1.66 – 0.50 1.15 – 0.27 0.37 
(a) The pre-accession funds include the Phare, ISPA and Sapard programmes. The government is the final user of 80 % of Phare, 100 % of ISPA and 50 % of Sapard
funds; all funds substitute national expenditure; national co-financing of 25 % for all pre-accession funds. 
(b) Absorption rate of 20 %; the government is the final user of 80 % of the total transfers; only the Cohesion Fund (assumed to represent about one third of total
disbursements) substitutes national expenditure; national co-financing of 15 %.
(c) Absorption rate of 20 %; the government is the final user of 20 % of the total transfers; all funds substitute national expenditure; national co-financing of 20 %.322
(d) All committed CAP funds are disbursed; all funds are directly transferred to the final beneficiaries (i.e. zero direct impact on revenues and expenditures); all funds
substitute national expenditure; no national co-financing.
Source: Commission services.
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trative capacity to design and implement projects, to
provide national co-financing and to draft the
required project documentation. While this is less
relevant to the common agricultural policy funds,
which are direct payments to farmers, the absorption
rate has proved to be a critical parameter for the
Structural Funds. Where disbursements are lower
than commitments, the Commission spending rules
allow the funds to be carried-over to the next year,
although some restrictions apply (1). Drawing on
earlier experience in Romania, the average absorp-
tion rate of pre-accession funds during 2005–06 has
been low at 25 %. As a reference, the 10 Member
States which joined the EU in 2004 have shown an
average absorption rate of Structural Funds by
around 47 %.
• Thirdly, ESA 95 rules only require the recording of
funds where the government is the final beneficiary.
Hence, as the CAP related transfers are directly paid
to farmers, they appear neither as revenue nor as
expenditure in the fiscal balance.
Apart from the ESA 95 rules and the actual absorption
rate, the following indirect effects on the budget also
need to be accounted for:
Most EU funding rules require additionality, i.e. that
they should lead to new projects, on top of what the gov-
ernment would have spent in the absence of external
funding. Exceptions are the Cohesion Fund and the CAP
direct payments, the transfers of which are allowed to
replace national spending. Pre-accession aid, as well as
rural development and the Fisheries Fund, are subject to
the additionality requirement, though this is imple-
mented as a soft condition at project level, which is dif-
ficult to verify. This implies that they may lead to
expenditure reductions in other budget lines.
Finally, most EU funds require national co-financing
varying between 10 % and 25 % of the total project cost.
This is applicable to all EU transfers, except for the CAP
direct payments. The direct fiscal impact of co-financing
is limited to the share of the funds destined to the gov-
ernment as a final user. Moreover, as co-financing is not
subject to the additionality requirement, the related
funds may be taken from other national budget lines, i.e.
their net effect on public finances may be zero. However,
given the short-term ‘rigidity’ of national budget lines,
the impact assessment assumes that national co-financ-
ing is additional.
When applying the above rules on the Romanian budget
for 2007 and assuming that all remaining pre-accession
funds will be spent, the EU transfers increase both the
revenue and expenditure level by 1.15 % and 1.66 %
respectively, resulting into a direct negative budgetary
impact of -0.5 % of GDP (see Table V.22.4). However,
when also taking into account the indirect fiscal effects,
resulting from the partial substitution of previous
national expenditure by EU transfers, the overall net
effect becomes largely positive. If the assumption is
made that national co-financing cannot be retrieved from
existing budget lines, because of rigidities, the net budg-
etary impact is still positive, representing about 0.4 % of
GDP in 2007.
¥1∂ For Structural Funds, the maximum carryover period is n+3 years for com-
mitments until 2010, subsequently reduced to n+2 years, thereafter.323
23. Slovenia
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government deficit was 1.4 % of
GDP, compared with a deficit target of 1.7 % of GDP set
in the convergence programme submitted in December
2005 (1). The better-than-expected result is essentially
due to a positive base effect from 2005, when the deficit
was 0.2 % of GDP lower than initially expected. In addi-
tion, in 2006 both revenues and expenditures were less
dynamic than planned in 2005 with the expenditure
share decreasing by 0.1 percentage point more than the
revenue share.
The government gross debt-to-GDP ratio declined by
0.5 percentage point in 2006 compared to the previous
year, to 27.8 %, whereas the 2005 update of the conver-
gence programme projected a 0.6 percentage point
increase. All the three potential contributors to the
change in the debt ratio, namely primary balance, snow-
ball effect and stock-flow adjustment, were more favour-
able than planned.
Within the framework of the existing budgetary proce-
dure of simultaneously adopting budgets for two consec-
utive years, the original 2007 budget was adopted in
December 2005. The government presented the supple-
mentary 2007 budget to parliament in October 2006,
together with the one for 2008. The parliament adopted
the 2007 budget law and the accompanying budget
implementation act together with the 2008 budget on
20 November 2006.
On the revenue side, the 2007 budget includes changes to
personal income and corporate taxation. The new personal
income tax, coming into effect as of 1 January 2007,
decreases the degree of progression by reducing the
number of tax brackets from five to three and by capping
the top tax rate at 41 % as compared to previously 50 %.
Similarly, the new corporate income tax regime lowers the
tax rate from 25 % to 23 % in 2007, followed by a 1 per-
centage point cut each year to reach 20 % by 2010, while
abolishing tax exemptions related to non-R & D invest-
ment. Moreover, in the framework of a gradual elimina-
tion of the payroll tax paid by employees by 2009, its rate
is trimmed by 40 % in 2007.
On the expenditure side, cost-saving measures related to
the ongoing streamlining of government purchases have
been included. Restrictive employment and wage poli-
cies in the public sector are planned to continue. Further
savings are expected from the reform of unemployment
and other social benefits, specifically by increasing con-
ditionality and streamlining the indexation mechanism,
and aiming at containing the rise of social transfers.
However, the deficit-reducing effect of these measures
will be partly offset by the decision to index pensions to
wages, as well as by additional expenditure linked to the
spending commitments related to EU and NATO mem-
bership (e.g. Schengen, top-up payments related to the
farming sector, defence). Despite a major investment in
the railway infrastructure the nominal rate of growth of
government gross fixed capital formation is planned to
decline significantly in 2007, after the 17 % increase
recorded in 2006.
The stability programme submitted in December 2006
set the deficit target for 2007 at 1.5 % of GDP. This is in
line with the Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
The projected cuts in expenditure are expected to be
almost entirely offset by the reduction in the revenue-to-
GDP ratio linked to the extensive tax reforms. The final
impact of the tax reform is, however, uncertain and could
result in lower or higher revenue compared to official
projections, thus affecting the final outcome. The pri-324
mary structural balance is estimated to worsen to – 0.3 %
of GDP in 2007 from a balanced position in 2006, thus
indicating a mildly expansionary fiscal stance.
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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Commission services forecast the government deficit
ratio to remain at 1.5 % of GDP in 2008, with the deficit-
increasing effect of the tax cuts offsetting the planned
expenditure reduction. This is slightly below the 1.6 %
of GDP targeted in the stability programme. The stability
programme targets a decline in the deficit in 2009, when
it should reach 1.0 % of GDP thanks to expenditure cuts.
According to the Commission services’ forecast, the
general government debt is expected to remain broadly
stable below 30 % of GDP in 2007 and 2008. 
Table V.23.1
Budgetary developments 2005–09, Slovenia (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.5  
— Total revenues 45.6 44.8 43.9 42.9  
  Of which: — current taxes 25.2 24.9 24.2 23.6  
 — social contributions 15.1 14.9 14.7 14.6  
— Total expenditure 47.0 46.3 45.4 44.4  
  Of which: — collective consumption 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.7  
 — social transfers in kind 11.8 11.4 11.3 11.3  
 — social transfers other than in kind 16.3 16.0 15.6 15.4  
 — interest expenditure 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4  
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.0  
Primary balance 0.2 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1  
Tax burden 40.2 39.8 39.0 38.2  
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.7 – 1.7  
Structural primary balance 0.6 0.0 – 0.3 – 0.3  
Government gross debt 28.4 27.8 27.5 27.2  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.0 5.2 4.3 4.0  
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 1.4 – 1.6 – 1.5 – 1.6 – 1.0
Primary balance 0.4 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.3 0.3
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 0.8 – 1.4 – 1.4 – 1.6 – 1.1
Government gross debt 28.0 28.5 28.2 28.3 27.7
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.0 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.1
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and the December 2006 update of the stability programme of Slovenia.325
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Main measures in the budget for 2007, Slovenia
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
•  Lowering the payroll tax rate by 40 % (– 0.4 % of  GDP) •  Restrictive employment policy (– 0.2 % of GDP)
•  The new personal income tax (– 0.5 % of GDP) •  Indexation of pensions to wages (0.1 % of GDP)
•  The new corporate income tax (– 0.3 % of GDP) •  Improvement of public procurement (– 0.1 % of GDP)
•  Harmonisation of excise duties with the acquis  (0.1 % of GDP) •  Streamlining of indexation of social transfers (– 0.4 % of GDP)
•  Railway investment (0.4 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and the December 2006 update of the stability programme of Slovenia.326
24. Slovakia
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government deficit amounted to
3.4 % of GDP which was 0.8 percentage point below the
target set in the December 2005 update of the Slovak
convergence programme (1). The increases in excise
taxes on cigarettes and alcohol at the beginning of 2006
induced consumers and enterprises to bring the pur-
chases of these products forward to the end of 2005,
which was not foreseen in the 2006 budget and had a
negative impact on indirect tax revenues in 2006 of
around ä % of GDP. Stronger-than-expected GDP and
employment growth, nevertheless, ensured that overall
tax revenues were higher than anticipated in the 2006
budget. The positive development on the revenue side
was, however, partly offset by some unplanned increases
in public expenditure mitigated by the fact that a lower-
than-expected absorption of EU funds eased demands on
public expenditure through co-financing. The unex-
pected net borrowing at the local government level of
some ä % of GDP contributed to the overall general
government deficit. The debt ratio decreased by almost
4 percentage points to 30.7 % of GDP in 2006 thanks
mainly to a reduction in liquidity (deposits) by the
agency responsible for managing government debt
(ARDAL).
The budget for 2007, which the parliament approved on
12 December 2006, targets a general government deficit
of 2.9 % of GDP. The government decided to decrease
expenditure in the areas of justice and interior affairs, as
well as the transfer to the Academy of Sciences while
keeping increases in expenditure on education and social
affairs below nominal GDP growth, in order to attain a
deficit below the 3 % of GDP threshold. On the other
hand, the budget foresees a temporary increase in health
spending amounting to some 0.1 % of GDP. The tax code
simplified in 2004 has also been slightly modified by a re-
introduction of a lower VAT rate (10 %) on pharmaceuti-
cal and medical products, and by decreasing the level of
tax-free income for higher income groups. The Commis-
sion services’ spring 2007 forecast indicates that, given
the strong growth prospects, the 2007 deficit target of
2.9 % of GDP can be reached. The fiscal stance in 2007,
as measured by the change in the structural primary bal-
ance, is estimated to be broadly neutral.
Based on no-policy-change assumption, the 2008 general
government balance is expected to remain broadly
unchanged. Degressive decreases of the tax-free level of
personal income introduced in the 2007 budget should
have a positive impact of only 0.05 % of GDP on tax rev-
enues in 2008. Hence, some further measures will have to
be adopted in order to meet the 2008 deficit target of 2.4 %
of GDP set in the most recent update of the convergence
programme, which foresees the general government defi-
cit to decline further to 1.9 % of GDP by 2009.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2007
forecast the debt ratio is expected to decline slightly to
below 30 % of GDP in 2007 and 2008.
The potential impact of more binding 
nominal expenditure ceilings on fiscal 
consolidation
In the recommendation to Slovakia of 5 July 2004 under
Article 104(7) of the Treaty, the Council invited the Slo-
vak authorities ‘to strengthen the binding character of
the three-year budgetary framework by introducing
detailed medium-term expenditure ceilings to be
adopted by parliament’ (2). In addition, the Council rec-
ommended ‘to accelerate the fiscal adjustment if the327
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm 
¥2∂ The text of the recommendation is available at: http://register.consil-
ium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st11/st11221.en04.pdf
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than expected in the convergence programme of May
2004, in particular by dedicating any higher-than-budg-
eted revenues primarily to faster deficit reduction’.
This invitation, although repeated in every subsequent
Council opinion on the updates of the convergence pro-
gramme, has not been followed so far. Given that real
GDP growth in Slovakia has been much stronger in the
last years than expected in 2004 (on average 6.6 % in
2004–06 compared to a forecast of on average 4.5 % pro-
duced in May 2004), the question arises of whether more
binding medium-term nominal expenditure ceilings
would have led to better budgetary outcomes than eventu-
ally achieved.
According to the May 2004 convergence programme,
nominal GDP was expected to amount to some SKK
1 291 billion, 1 384 billion and 1 496 billion in 2004,
2005 and 2006 respectively. In reality, nominal GDP
was on average 7 % higher than initially forecast.
Thanks to stronger-than-anticipated GDP growth, gener-
al government revenues (in absolute terms) also exceed-
ed projections.
As a result, the government was able to both increase
expenditure and achieve lower-than-planned deficits.
The actual deficit outcomes were 2.4 % of GDP, 2.8 %
of GDP and 3.4 % of GDP in 2004, 2005 and 2006
respectively, against targets of around 4 % of GDP for
each of the three years.
Table V.24.1
Budgetary developments 2005–09, Slovakia (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance – 2.8 – 3.4 – 2.9 – 2.8  
— Total revenues 35.2 33.9 33.1 32.8  
  Of which: — current taxes 18.6 17.4 17.1 17.1  
 — social contributions 12.9 12.1 11.8 11.6  
— Total 
expenditure
38.1 37.3 36.0 35.6  
  Of which: — collective consumption 10.9 11.5 11.0 10.8  
 — social transfers in kind 7.6 7.7 7.4 7.3  
 — social transfers other than in kind 12.5 12.0 11.5 11.2  
 — interest expenditure 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3  
 — gross fixed capital formation 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2  
Primary balance – 1.3 – 2.0 – 1.5 – 1.5  
Tax burden 31.8 29.8 29.2 29.0  
One-off and other temporary measures – 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) – 1.2 – 3.3 – 3.4 – 3.3  
Structural primary balance 0.4 – 1.9 – 2.0 – 2.0  
Government gross debt 34.5 30.7 29.7 29.4  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 6.0 8.3 8.5 6.5  
Convergence programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance – 3.1 – 3.7 – 2.9 – 2.4 – 1.9
Primary balance – 1.4 – 1.9 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.2
One-off and other temporary measures – 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) – 1.6 – 3.5 – 3.2 – 2.9 – 2.5
Government gross debt 34.5 33.1 31.8 31.0 29.7
pm Real GDP growth (%) 6.1 6.6 7.1 5.5 5.1
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
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( ) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and the December 2006 update of the convergence programme of Slovakia.
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been established on the basis of the figures in the May
2004 convergence programme, more ambitious deficit
outcomes could ceteris paribus have been reached
(1.8 % of GDP, 2.3 % of GDP and 1.8 % of GDP in
2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively) (1). Moreover, both
interest and capital expenditure in the years 2004–06
ended below the levels foreseen in the May 2004 conver-
gence programme. The higher-than-foreseen expendi-
ture path was thus solely induced by unplanned increases
in primary current expenditure. Therefore, if a nominal
expenditure ceiling had been enforced for primary cur-
rent expenditure only (again with the figures of the May
2004 convergence programme), even lower deficits
could have been achieved (0.7 % of GDP, 1.0 % of GDP
and – 0.1 % of GDP in 2004, 2005 and 2006 respec-
tively).
Concerning 2007, using the revenue projections of the
Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast, a binding
nominal ceiling for overall expenditure established
according to the May 2004 convergence programme
would imply a balanced budget target for 2007. Further-
more, a nominal expenditure ceiling for primary current
expenditure would lead to a surplus of 1.5 % of GDP in
2007. However, the general government deficit,
although below the 3 % of GDP reference value of the
Treaty, is expected to be higher than planned in the May
2004 convergence programme despite tax revenues and
social security contributions which are forecast to be
almost 12 % higher than originally assumed.
Finally, one could have taken into account that expendi-
ture ceilings should ideally have been adjusted for devi-
ations from plans that equally affect both sides of the
budget and thus cancel out, such as lower-than-foreseen
inflows of EU funds. Assuming that lower-than-planned
other revenues in 2004–06 are entirely caused by the
lower-than-expected absorption of EU funds, the ceiling
for overall expenditure should thus have been lowered
equivalently. In this case, deficits outcomes of 1.8 % of
GDP, 1.1 % of GDP and 1.6 % of GDP would have been
achieved in 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively.
Table V.24.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Slovakia
 Revenue measures (1)  Expenditure measures (2)
• Lower VAT on pharmaceutical and medical products 
(– 0.16 % of GDP)
• Savings in health expenditure due to lower VAT (– 0.13 % of GDP)
• Changes of consumption taxes  (0.05 % of GDP) • Extra health expenditure (0.12 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services and the Ministry of Finance.
¥1∂ Price developments diverged in both directions from the levels expected
by the programme. GDP deflator increased by 6 %, 2.4 % and 2.7 % in the
years 2004–06 compared to 3.7 %, 2.7 % and 3 % forecast for these years
in May 2004.
Table V.24.3
General government deficits with May 2004 
convergence programme ceilings
May 2004 CP ceiling for: 2004 2005 2006 2007 (*)
Overall expenditure 1.8 2.3 1.8 0.0
Current primary expenditure 0.7 1.0 – 0.1 – 1.5
Overall expenditure adjusted for 
lower absorption of EU funds
1.8 1.1 1.6 – 0.4
(*) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
Source: Commission services calculations.329
P u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  i n  E M U
2 0 0 7Table V.24.4
Comparision of general government revenue and expenditure projections and outcomes
May 2004 convergence 
programme (1) Outcome and projections
Difference between outcome and 
May 2004 convergence 
programme
2004 2005 2006 2007 2004 2005 2006 2007 (2) 2004 2005 2006 2007 (1)
Nominal GDP 1 291.3 1 383.6 1 495.9 1 602.6 1 355.3 1 471.1 1 636.3 1 834.1 64.0 87.5 140.4 231.5
General government total 
revenue (billion SKK)
482.9 524.4 552.0 586.6 511.2 543.9 581.7 635.2 28.3 19.5 29.7 48.7
Taxes and social contributions 
(bn SKK)
400.3 426.1 448.8 474.4 429.4 464.0 482.6 529.5 29.1 37.8 33.8 55.1
Other revenue (billion SKK) 82.6 98.2 103.2 112.2 81.8 79.9 99.1 105.7 – 0.8 – 18.3 – 4.1 – 6.5
General government total 
expenditure (billion SKK)
535.9 578.3 611.8 634.6 543.8 585.6 637.1 688.2 7.9 7.2 25.2 53.6
Current expenditure (billion 
SKK)
485.5 518.9 549.0 570.5 505.3 529.1 587.4 633.6 19.8 10.3 38.4 63.1
Current primary expenditure 
(billion SKK)
452.0 480.1 508.6 528.9 475.7 506.5 564.9 609.0 23.7 26.4 56.3 80.1
Interest expenditure 
(billion SKK)
33.6 38.7 40.4 41.7 29.6 22.6 22.5 24.6 – 3.9 – 16.1 – 17.8 – 17.1
Capital expenditure (billion SKK) 50.4 58.1 62.8 64.1 38.5 56.4 49.6 54.6 – 11.8 – 1.7 – 13.2 – 9.5
General government deficit 
(billion SKK)
51.7 54.0 58.3 48.1 32.6 41.7 55.4 53.0 – 19.1 – 12.3 – 2.9 4.9
General government deficit 
(% of GDP)
4.0 3.9 3.9 3.0 2.4 2.8 3.4 2.9 – 1.6 – 1.1 – 0.5 – 0.1
(1) Differences between sum and the total of individual items due to rounding.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
Sources: May 2004 convergence programme, Commission services’ calculations.330
25. Finland
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The general government surplus reached 3.9 % of GDP
in 2006, which is 2 ä percentage points higher than the
official target of 1.6 % set in the update of the stability
programme of November 2005 (1). The difference origi-
nates mainly from the central government finances
which recorded a stronger fiscal balance on the back of
strong tax and non-tax revenues combined with expend-
iture restraint and from the social security sector. The
debt ratio declined to 39.3 % of GDP in 2006.
The 2007 budget was adopted in December 2006. The
main focus of the budget is on employment measures,
including various targeted tax incentives and new
expenditure programmes, totalling EUR 100 million
(0.06 % of GDP). The largest measures are cuts to the
personal income tax worth 0.3 % of GDP, which is the
final stage of a larger multi-year package. While the
budget aimed for a general government surplus of 2.7 %
of GDP in 2007, as confirmed in the November 2006
update of the stability programme, this target is outdated.
The higher-than-planned surplus in 2006 will carry over
to the following years, raising the surplus outlook by
about one percentage point. The latest forecast by the
Ministry of Finance of 27 March 2007 already includes
the carryover effect and foresees a surplus of 3.6 % of
GDP. Similarly, the Commission services’ spring 2007
forecast expects the general government surplus to reach
3.7 % of GDP in 2007. The fiscal stance will be broadly
neutral in 2007, with the structural balance essentially
unchanged from 2006.
The Commission services’ spring forecast indicates that
under a no-policy-change assumption, the general gov-
ernment surplus remains broadly unchanged at 3.6 % of
GDP in 2008. While the new government, which took
office in April 2007, has announced in its coalition pro-
gramme various expenditure and revenue measures with
a total direct cost of about EUR 3.1 billion (1.7 % of
2008 GDP). The exact timing of the measures over the
next four years is presently not known. Therefore, their
impact is not included in the Commission services’ fore-
cast, even though the surplus would be affected in the
following years by the interplay of the direct cost of the
measures and their potentially surplus-increasing effect
arising from increased economic dynamism and employ-
ment. The stability programme target for 2008 is out-
dated as it does not include the carryover from 2006, but
would remain broadly unchanged from the previous year
under a no-policy-change assumption. Beyond 2008, the
stability programme expects the surplus to remain stable
in 2009, but to edge down by 0.3 percentage point in
2010, signalling the effects of ageing population.
Based on the Commission services’ spring 2007 fore-
cast, the debt ratio will be on a steadily declining trend,
reaching close to 35 % of GDP by 2008. As presented in
the stability programme, the debt ratio would stay on a
downward path in 2009–10. The decline in the debt ratio
that would result from significant primary surpluses is
tempered by a debt-increasing stock-flow adjustment
reflecting accumulation of financial assets by social
security.
The economic programme 
of the new government
The economic strategy of the new government, which
took office following the general elections of March
2007, focuses on increasing employment through new
active labour market measures, tax measures, improving
work incentives by reforming some social benefit
schemes, promoting entrepreneurship and innovation.331
Similar to the previous coalition programme, a target of
creating 80 000 to 100 000 jobs over the next four years
is set. The government assumes that the gains to public
¥1∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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activity could offset the net direct costs of the measures.
The programme aims to maintain the presently achieved
surplus of 1 % of GDP on the central government level
by the end of the four-year legislative term, with the
objective of securing the long-term sustainability of pub-
lic finances. The coalition programme also reiterates the
adherence to the initiatives presented in the stability pro-
gramme of November 2006, which were primarily
geared towards supporting the sustainability of public
finances. Assuming a surplus of 2 % of GDP in social
security and a balance in local government finances
(based on stability programme data, which does not
include the carryover from 2006), the 1 % of GDP cen-
tral government surplus target would mechanically
translate into a surplus of roughly 3 % of GDP at the gen-
eral government level in 2010–11. This would be even
higher than the surplus of 2â % of GDP projected in the
autumn 2006 stability programme update.
The total cost of the new expenditure is estimated at
EUR 1.3 billion (0.7 % of 2008 GDP), mainly targeted at
social initiatives, education and R & D. Total tax reduc-
tions in net terms amount to EUR 1.8 billion (1 % of
2008 GDP). The tax measures aim to support employ-
ment, small businesses and entrepreneurship, and
increasing equitability of living standards. The measures
with the largest budgetary impact are a reduction of the
personal income tax by EUR 1.1 billion (0.6 % of 2008
GDP) and the planned 5 percentage-point reduction of
Table V.25.1
Budgetary developments 2005–10, Finland (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008   
General government balance 2.7 3.9 3.7 3.6   
— Total revenues 53.0 52.3 51.3 50.9   
  Of which: — current taxes 31.4 30.7 30.3 30.2   
 — social contributions 12.2 12.3 12.2 12.2   
— Total 
expenditure
50.3 48.5 47.7 47.3  
  Of which: — collective consumption 7.6 7.2 7.1 7.0   
 — social transfers in kind 14.6 14.2 14.1 14.1  
 — social transfers other than in kind 16.5 15.9 15.7 15.6   
 — interest expenditure 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3  
 — gross fixed capital formation 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7   
Primary balance 4.2 5.3 5.1 4.9  
Tax burden 44.1 43.6 43.1 43.0   
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.6   
Structural primary balance 5.1 5.1 4.9 5.0   
Government gross debt 41.4 39.1 37.0 35.2   
pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.9 5.5 3.1 2.7   
Stability programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
General government balance 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.4
Primary balance 3.9 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.1 3.7
One-off and other temporary measures 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8
Government gross debt 41.3 39.1 37.7 36.2 35.0 33.7
pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.9 4.5 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.1
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
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( ) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in November 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and the November 2006 update of the stability programme of Finland.
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or 0.25 % of 2008 GDP). Environmental taxes will be
raised by EUR 300 million (0.15 % of 2008 GDP).
The exact timing of the revenue and expenditure meas-
ures over the next four years is not specified in the coa-
lition agreement. It will most probably be specified in
the government medium-term expenditure ceilings
framework, expected to be negotiated by the end of May
2007. According to the coalition programme, the design
and operation of the expenditure ceilings framework will
be maintained broadly in the same form as under the pre-
vious government, but with some modifications to
increase the flexibility of expenditure planning.
Table V.25.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Finland
 Revenue measures (1)  Expenditure measures (2)
•  Income tax cuts (– 0.3 % of GDP) • Comprehensive employment package combining tax and 
expenditure measures (0.06 % of GDP)
• A 2 % inflation adjustment of the income tax brackets 
(– 0.1 % of GDP)
• Increase in development cooperation spending (0.04 % of GDP)
• Reduction in electricity tax on industry and greenhouse cultivation 
(– 0.04 % of GDP)
• Increase in spending on health and social welfare projects 
(0.04 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources:  Commission services and 2007 budget review.333
26. Sweden
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
In 2006, the general government recorded a surplus of
2.2 % of GDP (1). This was significantly better than the
small deficit of 0.1 % of GDP targeted in the conver-
gence programme of November 2005 (2). The better-
than-expected general government balance is notably
due to a marked pick-up in economic growth in 2006,
and stronger-than-anticipated inflows of tax revenue.
More positive developments in the labour market and a
considerable fall in unemployment in the later part of the
year also contributed to reducing expenditure. Owing to
the surplus, the government debt ratio was further
reduced to 46.9 % of GDP in 2006.
Following the general election and the change in gov-
ernment in the autumn 2006, the budget proposal was
presented in October and the 2007 budget law was
approved by parliament on 21 December 2006. The
budget built on the proposals presented by the old gov-
ernment, but also introduced additional measures
aimed primarily at increasing demand and supply of
labour. On the revenue side, it notably introduces a
considerable reduction of labour income taxes, which
are partly financed by a combination of revenue and
expenditure measures. These measures include in par-
ticular a reduction of active labour market policies,
higher unemployment contributions for employees and
a cut in unemployment benefits. In the context of the
spring budget law, which was presented in April 2007,
the government announced some further measures that
mainly have an effect on the revenue side. In particular,
wealth taxation is to be fully abolished retroactively
with effect from 1 January 2007. According to the mac-
roeconomic scenario underpinning the spring budget
law, the government forecasts a general budget surplus
of 2.3 % of GDP for 2007. This is fully in line with the
Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast. It implies
a significant upward revision as compared to the esti-
mated surplus of 1.3 % of GDP presented in the most
recent update of the convergence programme. As in
2006, the upward revision of the surplus is notably due
to higher expected economic growth and to a much
stronger performance of the labour market than previ-
ously foreseen, which translates into both higher reve-
nue and lower expenditure. The projected surplus
respects the redefined national objective of a 1 % of
GDP surplus over a cycle of seven years, i.e. the aver-
age of the expected budget balance for the present year
and the three coming years as well as the outcome of
the three preceding years. Actually, it would imply an
overshooting of the objective as the currently estimated
average balance is 2 % of GDP. As measured by the
change in the structural primary balance, the fiscal
stance in the Commission services’ spring 2007 fore-
cast is mildly expansionary. It should be noted, how-
ever, that this weakening of the structural budgetary
position is linked to the reforms introduced as part of
the policy package presented by the new government.
For 2008, the Commission services’ forecast projects a
surplus of 2.4 % of GDP, slightly higher than for 2007.
This forecast is based on a no-policy-change assumption
and, hence, does not take into account announced meas-
ures that have not been sufficiently detailed. The Com-
mission services’ forecast is significantly higher than the
surplus of 1.6 % of GDP in the most recent update of the
convergence programme, which was based on a weaker
macroeconomic scenario, but is broadly in line with the
forecast underlying the spring budget law. For 2009, the
¥1∂ The government accounts of Sweden include the pension reform costs, as
the transitory period on the sectoral classification of pension schemes
expired in April 2007. The funded second-pillar pension scheme is now
classified in the corporate sector, rather than in government. The targets in334
convergence programme foresees an improvement in the
general budget balance by 0.4 percentage points to 2 %
of GDP.
convergence programmes were adapted so that data are comparable.
¥2∂ The programme, as well as its assessment by the Commission and the
Council, can be found at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/
sg_pact_fiscal_policy/Fiscal_policy528_en.htm
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surpluses, the government debt ratio is projected to be
further reduced. According to the Commission serv-
ices’ spring forecast, the debt ratio is expected to
decline to 42.1 % of GDP in 2007 and 37.7 % of GDP
in 2008. This reduction is underpinned by privatisation
plans that are estimated to yield roughly 2 % of GDP
per year.  
Table V.26.1
Budgetary developments 2005–09, Sweden (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008  
General government balance 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.4  
— Total revenues 58.4 57.5 55.2 54.9  
  Of which: — current taxes 37.2 37.0 35.1 35.2  
 — social contributions 13.9 13.2 13.1 13.0  
— Total expenditure 56.3 55.3 53.0 52.5  
  Of which: — collective consumption 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3  
 — social transfers in kind 19.4 19.2 19.1 19.0  
 — social transfers other than in kind 17.5 16.7 15.5 15.3  
 — interest expenditure 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.7  
 — gross fixed capital formation 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.2  
Primary balance 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.1  
Tax burden 50.7 49.9 48.2 48.1  
One-off and other temporary measures 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (3) 2.1 2.2 1.8 1.9  
Structural primary balance 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.6  
Government gross debt 52.2 46.9 42.1 37.7  
pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.9 4.4 3.8 3.3  
Convergence programme (4) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
General government balance 2.0 2.0 1.3 1.6 2.0
Primary balance 3.6 3.6 3.0 3.1 3.5
One-off and other temporary measures 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (5) 2.0 2.0 1.1 1.4 1.9
Government gross debt 50.9 47.0 42.0 37.9 33.5
pm Real GDP growth (%) 2.7 4.0 3.3 3.1 2.7
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast.
(3) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(4) Submitted in December 2006.
(5) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources:  Commission services and the December 2006 update of the convergence programme of Sweden.
Table V.26.2
Main measures in the budget for 2007, Sweden
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Taxation of labour income (– 1.3 % of GDP) • Labour market measures (– 0.5 % of GDP)
• Unemployment insurance (0.35 % of GDP) • Education (– 0.1 % of GDP)
• Taxation of property and wealth (– 0.35 % of GDP)335
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
Sources: Commission services, 2007 budget bill and 2007 spring budget bill.
27. United Kingdom
Recent developments and medium-term 
prospects
The preliminary outturn for the general government bal-
ance in the 2006/07 financial year is a deficit of 2.7 % of
GDP (1). This would be 0.1 percentage point less than the
deficit projected in the 2005 update of the convergence
programme submitted on 14 December 2005. Lower-
than-expected revenues and an overshoot in current
expenditure were compensated for by reduced capital
spending. The deficit in 2006/07 also includes a capital
transfer in relation to the cancellation of debt owed by
developing countries amounting to 0.1 % of GDP. The
preliminary outturn represents an improvement from the
2005/06 deficit of 2.9 % of GDP, on account of strong
revenue growth resulting in an increase in the revenue
ratio of 0.4 percentage point. The general government
debt ratio is estimated to have risen slightly to around
42â % of GDP at the end of the 2006/07 financial year.
The 2007 budget, presented on 21 March 2007, includes
important tax reforms. The changes in the tax regime,
however, will only take effect from financial year 2008/
09 and should have a practically neutral influence on the
profile of the general government deficit over the
medium term. The 2007 budget followed the publication
of the pre-budget report on 6 December 2006, which had
introduced measures that will increase revenues by ä %
of GDP from the 2007/08 financial year. The tax reforms
announced in the 2007 budget include a 2 percentage
point reduction in both the basic rate of personal income
tax and in the main corporate tax rate, largely compen-
sated for by the abolition of the 10 % starting rate of
income tax and a reduction of capital allowances against
corporation tax. As regards expenditure, the 2007 budget
sets overall spending limits for the three years 2008/09
to 2010/11, but the departmental expenditure limits will
be determined in the comprehensive spending review.
Current expenditure growth will be restrained below
estimated trend growth, while net investment will be
kept constant as a percentage of GDP.
The 2007 budget forecasts a deficit for 2007/08 of 2.6 %
of GDP, up from 2.3 % in the 2006 convergence pro-
gramme. An uncompensated downward revision in
expected receipts from North Sea activity led the gov-
ernment to reduce its revenue projections by 0.2 % of
GDP for both 2007–08 and 2008–09. Forecast expendi-
ture was also increased by about 0.1 % of GDP, in part
reflecting an upward revision in the cost of tax credits
and interest payments. The Commission services’ spring
2007 forecast projects a deficit of 2.6 % of GDP in 2007/
08. General government revenue, boosted by strong
growth, fiscal drag and also high corporate profits, is
expected to rise by 0.3 percentage point of GDP, slightly
less than in the budget projections. However, the higher
revenues will be partly offset by an increase in the
expenditure-to-GDP ratio of 0.2 percentage point. Over-
all, the fiscal stance is estimated to be mildly restrictive
in 2007/08. With output growth close to potential, the
small negative output gap is expected to remain
unchanged in 2007 and to increase marginally in 2008,
such that that the improvement in the nominal balance is
expected to translate into an almost equivalent drop in
the structural balance. As a result, a reduction in the
structural balance is forecast from 2.6 % of GDP in 2006
to 2.5 % of GDP in 2007 (2).
For 2008/09, under a no-policy-change assumption, the
Commission services forecast a modest reduction of the
deficit to 2.4 % of GDP. This is 0.5 percentage point
higher than the projected deficit in the 2006 update of the
¥2∂ The output gap is calculated on a calendar year basis, and thus it is not pos-
sible to have an estimate of the structural balances on a financial year basis
that is strictly based on the commonly agreed methodology. However, tak-336
¥1∂ The financial year runs from April to March.
ing into account the milder improvement in the nominal balance in 2006/
07 and 2007/08 and the output growth profile for the financial years, the
structural balance is estimated to have dropped from 3.0 % of GDP in
2005/06 to 2.6 % in 2006/07 and 2.5 % in 2007/08.
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over from the higher deficit forecast in the preceding
year 2006/07, but it also reflects slower revenue growth
for 2008/09 in the Commission services’ forecast.
Beyond 2008/09, the 2007 budget projects a continued
reduction of the deficit to 1.8 % of GDP by 2010/11. In
line with the convergence programme, the envisaged
consolidation is entirely driven by a reduction in the
expenditure-to-GDP ratio, on account of tighter growth
in current expenditure. Meanwhile, revenue and capital
expenditure are both expected to increase at the same
rate of GDP.
According to the Commission services’ spring 2007
forecast, the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to rise to
about 44 % at the end of 2008/09. The UK authorities
also project public sector net debt, taking into account
holdings of financial assets. According to the 2007
budget, public sector net debt is projected to reach
38.8 % in 2009–10. Since the government’s ‘sustainable
investment rule’ is interpreted as requiring public sector
net debt to remain below 40 %, the latter ceiling could
become binding should there be any slippages to the
forecast consolidation.
Developments in the implicit tax rates 
and in the apparent elasticities
Since the early 1990s the total tax burden has seen an
increase of about 2 percentage points of GDP (1). Under-
lying the trend increase, however, were two periods of a
lower tax burden in the mid-1990s and at the beginning
of the current decade, followed by a significant increase
over the last three years.
The increase in the tax burden is mainly attributable to an
increase in social contributions which in 2002 jumped by
about 1 percentage point of GDP following a discretion-
ary policy change, and, to a lesser extent, by a slight
increase in indirect taxation. After adjusting for policy-
induced changes, these two categories remained rela-
tively stable. By contrast, although the share of direct
taxes in GDP in financial year 2005/06, at 17 % of GDP,
was broadly equal to its level in the beginning of the
1990s, it fluctuated significantly throughout the period.
Tax reforms partly explain developments in the major
tax categories. In 1991, the VAT rate was increased by
2.5 percentage points, to 17.5 %. The main rate of
income tax was reduced and a lower starting rate was
introduced in the late 1990s. In 1997 and 1998, the main
corporate tax rate was reduced by 3 percentage points,
whereas the rate of social contributions was increased by
1 percentage point in 2002.
Changes in the apparent elasticity of taxes and social
contributions to GDP (i.e. the relative change of tax and
social contributions over the relative change of nominal
GDP) reflect developments in the implicit tax rates rela-
tive to the respective taxable bases, as well as the com-
position of GDP growth (2). During the period from
1989/90 to 2005/06, the apparent elasticity of total taxes
to GDP was on average equal to one. However, the elas-
ticity has been unstable over the period, falling to below
one (total taxes change less that proportionally to GDP)
at the beginning of the 1990s and between 2002 and
2003. In recent years, the apparent elasticity to GDP has
increased significantly, reaching about 1.5 in 2005.
The variations in the apparent elasticity of total taxes to
GDP are not entirely explained by discretionary meas-
ures. The income and expenditure composition of GDP
has not undergone major shifts, although over the period
there has been a tendency for stronger growth in more
tax-rich areas. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the
share of private consumption in GDP has increased
slightly, rising by about 4 percentage points to its peak of
66 % of GDP in 2001/02, before falling back slightly to
64 % subsequently. Meanwhile, the share of investment
has dropped slightly.
Underlying the slight, but steady, increase in the implicit
VAT rate are successive hicks in the respective elastic-
ity, which, nevertheless, averaged around unity over the
period under consideration. The increase in the apparent
elasticity in 1991/92 reflects the increase in the headline
VAT rate, which increased the VAT-to-GDP ratio by
about 1 percentage point. Since then the implicit tax rate
has shown a slight upward trend, with the apparent elas-
ticity moving significantly above unity on three other
occasions. It is likely that the anti-avoidance measures
adopted by the government since 2002 may have just337
¥1∂ The tax burden is defined as the ratio of direct taxes, indirect taxes (includ-
ing those paid to the EU budget) and social contributions over GDP.
¥2∂ The proxies of tax bases used for estimating implicit rates are: private con-
sumption expenditure for VAT, compensation to employees for personal
income tax and social contributions, and gross operating surplus for corpo-
ration tax.
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fraud.
Reforms in personal income taxation do not fully explain
the variations in the implicit tax rate. The fiscal drag (i.e.
the increase in tax revenue due to the fact that taxpayers
move to higher income brackets) was allowed to operate
during the period, as tax brackets and allowances rose in
line with prices rather then earnings. Fiscal drag is esti-
mated to add slightly over 0.1 percentage point to the
suggesting that compositional changes within the tax
base could explain developments since the late 1990s. In
particular, developments in the share of compensation of
employees do not merely reflect the labour force growth.
Shifts in the income distribution, with income growing
faster at the top of the income scale where the marginal
tax rate is highest, can help explain the peaks of the
implicit rates and elasticities in 1998/99 and 1999/00 and
more recently in 2005/06.
Table V.27.1
Budgetary developments 2005/06–2010/11, United Kingdom (% of GDP) (1)
Outturn and forecast (2) 2005 2006 2007 2008   
General government balance (3) – 3.1 (– 2.9) – 2.8 (– 2.7) – 2.6 (– 2.6) – 2.4 (– 2.4)   
— Total revenues 40.7 (41.2) 41.4 (41.6) 41.6 (41.9) 41.9 (42.1)   
  Of which : — current taxes 28.9 29.7 29.9 30.2   
 — social contributions 8.4 8.2 8.2 8.3   
— Total expenditure 43.7 (44.1) 44.1 (44.3) 44.2 (44.5) 44.3 (44.5)  
  Of which : — collective consumption 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.2   
 — social transfers in kind 13.3 13.6 13.7 13.7  
 — social transfers other than in kind 13.0 12.8 12.7 12.7   
 — interest expenditure 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1  
 — gross fixed capital formation 0.6 1.8 2.0 2.3   
Primary balance – 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.2  
Tax burden 37.2 38.0 38.2 38.5   
One-off and other temporary measures 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Structural balance (4) – 3.2 – 2.6 – 2.5 – 2.1   
Structural primary balance – 1.1 – 0.6 – 0.4 0.0   
Government gross debt 42.2 (41.8) 43.5 (42.5) 44.0 (43.3) 44.5 (43.9)   
pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.9 2.8 2.8 2.5   
Convergence programme (5) 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11
General government balance – 2.9 – 2.8 – 2.3 – 1.9 – 1.7 – 1.6
Primary balance – 0.8 – 0.6 – 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.5
One-off and other temporary measures 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Structural balance (3) (6) – 3.0 – 2.5 – 2.1 – 1.7 – 1.5 – 1.4
Government gross debt 42.7 43.7 44.1 44.2 44.2 44.0
pm Real GDP growth (%) 1.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.5
(1) Interest expenditure, total expenditure and balances include swaps in line with the definitions used in the excessive deficit procedure.
(2) Commission services’ spring 2007 forecast. Figures in parentheses are on a financial year basis (so that the figure in the 2005 column refers to the 2005/06 financial
year). The UK financial year begins in April; the excessive deficit procedure applies to the United Kingdom on a financial year basis. Outturns for deficit and debt
in 2006/07 are based on preliminary data.
(3) Actual general government balance data reported here apply the Eurostat definition of 14 July 2000 on the allocation of UMTS receipts. The UK has generally not
applied this decision in domestic publication of its deficit data, which results in the deficit on a Eurostat basis being up to 0.1 percentage points of GDP per annum
higher than reported in the UK national accounts from 2001/02 onwards. 
(4) Cyclically adjusted balance excluding one-off and other temporary measures.
(5) Submitted in December 2006.
(6) Commission services’ calculations on the basis of the information in the programme. One-off and other temporary measures taken from the programme.
Sources: Commission services and the December 2006 update of the convergence programme of the United Kingdom.338
income tax-to-GDP ratio per annum, compensating the
fall in the main tax rates. Fluctuations in the tax base also
seem to be correlated with the variations in the tax rates,
Overall, the implicit rate of social contributions, calcu-
lated on the basis of compensation to employees, was
broadly stable at around 12â % between 1990/91 and
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04, following the increase in the headline contribution
rates paid by both employers and employees in April
2003. The share of compensation to employees in GDP
was stable at around 55 %. On the other hand, the appar-
ent elasticity of social contributions to the tax base was
less stable, but largely reflected government reforms to
2003/04 and 2005/06 by raising the earnings’ thresholds
with those for income tax and by abolishing the cap on
contributions.
Corporation taxes are a relatively important element of
UK public finances, accounting on average for 10 % of
total revenue over the period examined, compared to
Table V.27.2
Main measures in the 2006 pre-budget report and the 2007 budget, United Kingdom
Revenue measures (1) Expenditure measures (2)
• Increase in air passenger duty (0.1% of GDP) • Established overall spending limits for 2008/09 to 2010/11 
(growth of 2 % per year in real terms) (3)
• Reduction in basic personal income tax rate  (– 0.5 % of GDP)   
• Removal of 10% personal income tax starting rate 
(+ 0.5 % of GDP)
  
• Reduction in main corporation tax rate (– 0.1 % of GDP)   
• Reduction in capital allowances deductible from firms’ profits 
(+ 0.1 % of GDP)
(1) Estimated impact on general government revenue.
(2) Estimated impact on general government expenditure.
(3) The spending limits do not change the expenditure baseline set out in the convergence programme, as the latter had already provided for the reduction in expendi-
ture growth.
Sources: Commission services, December 2006 update of the convergence programme of the United Kingdom and 2007 budget.
Graph V.27.1:  Developments in ratio of taxes to GDP
Source: Commission services.
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the social security system. These reforms contributed to
an increase in the elasticity of social security revenues to
compensation to employees to above unity between
8 % in Italy and around 6 % in France and Germany.
Intakes from corporation tax are relatively volatile, and
seem to explain most of the variation in the apparent
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Source: Commission services.
Graph V.27.3:  Personal income tax
Source: Commission services.
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elasticity of aggregate tax revenues to GDP. The implicit
tax rate for corporation tax saw a marked drop in the
early 1990s and after 2001, when the elasticity turned
negative (meaning that tax revenues moved in a different
direction from the tax base), followed by significant
increases in the late 1990s and in the three years between
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M e m b e r  S t a t e  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  U n i t e d  K i n g d o mGraph V.27.4:  Social security contributions
Source: Commission services.
Graph V.27.5:  Corporation tax
Source: Commission services.
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Average elasticity: 0.9
Standard deviation: 4.9341
2003/04 and 2005/06. Most of the discretionary meas-
ures adopted since the early 1990s tended to decrease the
statutory tax rate and do not fully capture the swings in
the implicit tax rate. It is likely that cyclical movements
in corporate profitability have a greater impact on the
implicit tax rate when compared to policy changes.
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also seems to suggest a relevant role for the financial sec-
tor. A surge in the apparent elasticity coincided with the
stock market boom of the late 1990s. On the other hand,
the elasticity turned negative after the burst of the bubble
in 2001, but normalised from 2004 as financial markets
reported large gains. The steady increase in the share of
taxes paid by the financial sector, to about a quarter of
total corporate taxes in 2004/05, suggests that factors
such as equity prices and mergers and acquisition activ-
ity will become increasingly important determinants of
government revenue performance. The increase in cor-
porate tax revenues in 2004–06 was further boosted by
significant rise in oil prices that contributed to a doubling
of profitability for companies operating on the UK con-
tinental shelf.342
Part VI
Resources

1. Common methodology for calculating 
potential output — Overview of key 
features and recent modifications
1.1. Introduction
The assessment of fiscal performance under the provi-
sions of the reformed Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
focuses attention on the budget balance net of cyclical
factors and one-off and other temporary measures. One
crucial input to the calculation of the cyclically adjusted
budget balance is the output gap, measured as the dis-
tance between actual output and potential output.
The measure of the output gap used by the Commission
services in the EU budgetary surveillance framework is
based on potential output estimates derived from a pro-
duction function model. The methodology was devel-
oped in the output gap working group (OGWG) of the
Economic Policy Committee and was officially adopted
by the Ecofin Council on 12 July 2002 replacing the
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter as a reference method when
evaluating stability and convergence programmes.
While keeping its main features unaltered, the com-
monly agreed method has gradually evolved over time in
response to both the availability of additional data and to
a number of technical improvements. This section pro-
vides a description of the production function method
and highlights the main stages of its evolution.
1.2. Basic features of the method
Unlike purely statistical methods such as the HP-filter or
the Baxter-King filter, which rely on technical assump-
tions on the time series properties of trends and their cor-
relation with the cycle, the production function approach
to economic theory. The disadvantage is that it requires
assumptions on the functional form of the production
technology, returns to scale, trend technical progress and
the representative utilisation of production factors. As
shown in the diagram below, with a production function,
potential GDP can be represented by a combination of
factor inputs, multiplied with the technological level or
total factor productivity (TFP).
In more formal terms, with a production function, GDP (Y)
is represented by a combination of factor inputs — labour
(L) and the capital stock (K), corrected for the degree of
excess capacity  and adjusted for the level of effi-
ciency . In many empirical applications, a Cobb-
Douglas specification is chosen for the functional form of
the production function. This greatly simplifies estimation
and exposition. Thus potential GDP is given by:
(VI.1.1)
where total factor productivity, as conventionally
defined, is set equal to:
(VI.1.2)
this summarises both the degree of utilisation of factor
inputs as well as their technological level. Factor inputs
are measured in physical units. An ideal physical meas-
ure for labour is hours worked which we use as our
UL UK,( )
EL EK,( )
Y ULLEL( )
α
UKKEK( )
1 α–
L
α
K
α
TFP⋅= =
TFP EL
α
EK
1 α–( ) UL
α
UK
1 α–( )=345
makes assumptions based on economic theory. This lat-
ter approach focuses on the supply potential of an econ-
omy and has the advantage of giving a more direct link
labour input. For capital we use a comprehensive meas-
ure which includes spending on structures and equip-
ment by both the private and government sectors.
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production function; the most important ones are the
assumption of constant returns to scale and a factor
price elasticity which is equal to one. The main advan-
tage of these assumptions is simplicity. However these
assumptions seem broadly consistent with empirical
evidence at the macro level. The unit elasticity
assumption is consistent with the relative constancy of
nominal factor shares. Also, there is little empirical
evidence of substantial increasing/decreasing returns
to scale (see, e.g. Burnside et al. (1995) for economet-
ric evidence).
The output elasticities of labour and capital are repre-
sented by  and  respectively. Under the
assumption of constant returns to scale and perfect com-
petition, these elasticities can be estimated from the
wage share in GDP. The same Cobb-Douglas specifica-
tion is assumed for all countries, with the mean wage
share for the EU-15 over the period 1960–2003 being
used as the estimate for the output elasticity of labour,
which gives a value of 0.63 for  for all Member States
and, by definition, 0.37 for the output elasticity of capi-
tal. While the output elasticity for labour may deviate
somewhat from the imposed mean coefficient in the case
α 1 α–( )
α
Box VI.1.1: Cobb-Douglas production function scheme
P o t e n t i a l  o u t p u t
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Measuring potential  output  using 
a  produc tion func tion approach346
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not seriously bias the potential output results.
To summarise, in moving from actual to potential output
it is necessary to define clearly what one means by
potential factor use and by the trend (i.e. normal) level of
efficiency of factor inputs.
Capital: with respect to capital this task of defining
potential factor use is straightforward since the maxi-
mum potential output contribution of capital is given by
the full utilisation of the existing capital stock in an econ-
omy. Since the capital stock is an indicator of overall
capacity there is no justification to smooth this series in
the production function approach. In addition, the uns-
moothed series is relatively stable for the EU and the
USA since although investment is very volatile; the con-
tribution of capital to growth is quite constant since net
investment in any given year is only a tiny fraction of the
capital stock figures. In terms of the measurement of the
capital stock, the perpetual inventory method is used
which makes an initial assumption regarding the size of
the capital-output ratio (1).
Labour: initially, labour force survey data were used for
the labour input. Eurostat and the OECD subsequently
agreed that the national accounts are the preferred source
for labour input data. As a results, the production func-
tion approach now uses the national accounts data for the
labour input variables i.e. for hours worked and employ-
ment.
The definition of the contribution of labour input to
potential output is more involved since it is more diffi-
cult to assess the ‘normal’ degree of utilisation of this
factor of production. Labour input is defined in terms of
hours. Determining the trend of labour input involves
several steps. In defining the trend input we start from a
maximum possible level, namely the population of
working age. We obtain the trend labour force by
mechanically de-trending (using an HP filter) the partici-
pation rate. In a next step we calculate trend unemploy-
ment to be consistent with stable, non accelerating,
(wage) inflation (NAIRU/NAWRU) (2). Finally we
obtain trend hours worked (potential labour supply) by
multiplying trend employment with the trend of average
hours worked. One of the big advantages of this
approach is that it generates a potential employment
series which is relatively stable whilst at the same time
also providing for year-to-year changes to the series to
be closely linked to long-run demographic and labour
market developments in areas such as the working age
population, trend participation rates and structural unem-
ployment.
Trend efficiency: within the production function frame-
work, potential output refers to the level of output which
can be produced with a ‘normal’ level of efficiency of
factor inputs, with this trend efficiency level being meas-
ured as the HP filtered Solow Residual.
Normalising the full utilisation of factor inputs
( ) as one, potential output can be represented as
follows:
(VI.1.3)
where the superscripts P and T denote potential and
trend levels respectively.
1.3. Recent modifications 
to the methodology
Following the decisions taken at both the May 2004
Ecofin Council and the June 2005 meeting of the Eco-
nomic Policy Committee, the most important recent
changes regarding the operation of the production func-
tion (PF) methodology are as follows.
1.3.1. Country derogations for ‘old’ Member States
The PF methodology is now applicable to all 15 of the
‘old’ Member States. Following the resolution of the
outstanding country specific issues pertaining to Ger-
many, Spain and Austria, all of the 15 countries now
accept the use of the PF approach as the reference
method for the assessment of the stability and conver-
gence programmes. The HP filter approach will only be
used as a ‘back-up’ method.
¥2∂ The observed unemployment rate (Ut) is decomposed into a trend (Tt) anda cyclical component (Ct): . The trend component is simplymodelled as a random walk with drift . The drift term
follows a random walk . The cyclical component is
Ut Tt vCt+=
Tt μt Tt 1– vt+ +=
μt μt 1– at+=
UL UK,
Y
P
L
P
EL
T( )α KEK
T( )1 α–=347
¥1∂ In the perpetual inventory model, the capital stock is calculated as the sum
of gross fixed capital formation of previous years that is not fully depreci-
ated.
obtained via a Philips curve relationship where
X is a vector of explanatory variables including terms of trade, productivity
and the wage share. The unobserved components Tt and Ct the parametersare estimated with the Kalman filter.
πt
wΔ α βX γCt ut+ + +=
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Member States
Due essentially to a number of serious statistical prob-
lems associated with the availability of only short time
series for the new Member States, a modified PF frame-
work had to be developed for these countries. As long as
these statistical problems persist, the HP filter and the PF
method are used in parallel.
A common starting date of 1995 was imposed for all
12 countries since too many transitional issues were
biasing the pre-1995 data. The main modifications to the
methodology, relative to that which applies to the EU-15
countries, include: (i) a simpler NAIRU methodology
based on wage elasticities (1). It was not possible to use
the more sophisticated Kalman Filter based approach
applied to the ‘old’ Member States; (ii) trend TFP is esti-
mated using a moving average based, stochastic trend,
approach (as opposed to the random walk model used for
the EU-15 countries); and (iii) the capital stock is esti-
mated using a capital-output ratio which is fixed in the
base year of 1995.
1.3.3. Improvement of NAWRU estimates
Following requests from a number of delegates in the
OGWG of the EPC, additional work was undertaken in
2004 (i) to address the issue of whether it was appropri-
ate to constrain the unemployment gap to have a mean of
zero over the sample period; (ii) to better capture the spe-
cificity of the European labour market and (iii) to help
desk officers and the Member States to more easily inter-
pret changes in the NAWRU/NAIRU estimates. In more
concrete terms, it was agreed to remove the zero sample
mean restriction; to include the wage share in the
NAWRU estimation model as an additional explanatory
variable.
1.3.4. Estimation of trend total factor productivity 
(TFP)
Trend TFP is obtained as the HP filter of the Solow
residual. In order to overcome the well known end-point
bias of the HP filter, TFP is extended into the future
using statistical models. At the September 2004 meeting
of the OGWG of the Economic Policy Committee it was
agreed to replace a deterministic method with a stochas-
tic trend approach so as to reduce the mean reverting ten-
dency of the trend TFP estimates (2). In addition, in the
context of ongoing research by the Commission services
to isolate the best method for extracting the cyclicality
from trend TFP, the OGWG of the Economic Policy
Committee discussed a paper which experimented with
using capacity utilisation indicators.
1.3.5. Introduction of hours worked
Total hours worked is the preferred measure of labour
input in the national accounts but its measurement has
proved challenging due to the growing importance of
service activities, self-employed jobs and the emergence
of a range of new, often irregular, working patterns. Due
to these measurement issues, its use in the PF methodol-
ogy was delayed until the Commission services’ autumn
2005 forecast since there was an absence of data sets of
sufficient quality for a large number of the Member
States. While the ESA95 data transmission programme
provides for the provision of hours worked series, not all
EU countries have, as yet, officially provided the data.
Eurostat (in close cooperation with the OECD) have
however constructed data for total hours worked for
most of those countries which were not yet in a position
to provide it. Following the agreement of the Economic
Policy Committee in June 2005 and the resolution of all
the outstanding country-specific data issues over the
summer months, the hours worked series for the respec-
tive countries were successfully introduced in the Com-
mission services’ autumn 2005 forecasting exercise. In
addition, given the associated joint OECD/Eurostat deci-
sion to use the national accounts (as opposed to the
labour force survey) as the preferred source of labour
input data, the method has been modified to take both the
employment and hours worked input variables from this
single source.
1.4. Technical specification of the model
This section summarises in a synthetic way the structure
of the commonly agreed PF method used in the EU
budgetary surveillance framework.
¥2∂ It should be stressed that the present move from a deterministic to a sto-
chastic I(1) process for the calculation of trend TFP in the EU-15 countries
does not change the results for the vast majority of Member States in any348
¥1∂ The approach used is based on the following equation:
where ulc denotes unit labour
costs, w wages per employee, pr productivity, U the rate of unemployment
and T its unobserved trend component.
Δ2ulc Δ2w Δ2pr– β Ut Tt–( ) vt+= =
meaningful way since mean reversion is a feature of both models. How-
ever, a move from an I(1) to an I(2) stochastic model could produce signif-
icant changes in terms of trend TFP, with the trend for the most recent past
playing a much greater role.
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POPW — (population of working age)
PARTS — (smoothed participation rate)
NAIRU — (structural unemployment)
IYPOT — (investment to potential GDP ratio)
SRHP — (HP filtered Solow residual)
HOURST — (trend, average hours worked)
Endogenous variables
LP — (potential employment)
I — (investment)
K — (capital stock)
YPOT — (potential output)
YGAP — (output gap)
Potential labour input
LP=(POPW*PARTS*(1-NAIRU)) *HOURST
Investment and capital
I=IYPOT*YPOT
K=I-(1-dep)*K(-1)
Potential output
YPOT=K0.35 * LPOT0.65 * SRHP
Output gap
YGAP = (Y/YPOT-1)349
2. Glossary
Automatic stabilisers Features of the tax and spending
regime which react automatically to the economic cycle
and reduce its fluctuations. As a result, the budget bal-
ance tends to improve in years of high growth, and dete-
riorate during economic slowdowns.
Broad economic policy guidelines (BEPGs) Annual
guidelines for the economic and budgetary policies of
the Member States. They are prepared by the Commis-
sion and adopted by the Council of Ministers responsible
for Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin).
Budget balance The balance between total public
expenditure and revenue in a specific year, with a posi-
tive balance indicating a surplus and a negative balance
indicating a deficit. For the monitoring of Member State
budgetary positions, the EU uses general government
aggregates. See also structural budget balance, primary
budget balance, and primary structural balance.
Budgetary rules Rules and procedures through which
policymakers decide on the size and the allocation of
public expenditure as well as on its financing through
taxation and borrowing.
Budgetary sensitivity The variation in the budget bal-
ance in percentage of GDP brought about by a change in
the output gap. In the EU, it is estimated to be 0.5 on
average.
Candidate countries Countries that wish to accede to
the EU. Besides the accession countries, they include
Croatia and Turkey.
Close-to-balance requirement A requirement con-
tained in the ‘old’ Stability and Growth Pact, according
to which Member States should, over the medium term,
achieve an overall budget balance close to balance or in
Code of conduct Policy document endorsed by the
Ecofin Council of 11 October 2005 setting down the
specifications on the implementation of the Stability and
Growth Pact and the format and content of the stability
and convergence programmes.
Convergence programmes Medium-term budgetary
and monetary strategies presented by Member States that
have not yet adopted the euro. They are updated annu-
ally, according to the provisions of the Stability and
Growth Pact. Prior to the third phase of EMU, conver-
gence programmes were issued on a voluntary basis and
used by the Commission in its assessment of the progress
made in preparing for the euro. See also stability pro-
grammes.
Crowding-out effects Offsetting effects on output due
to changes in interest rates and exchange rates triggered
by a loosening or tightening of fiscal policy.
Cyclical component of budget balance That part of the
change in the budget balance that follows automatically
from the cyclical conditions of the economy, due to the
reaction of public revenue and expenditure to changes in
the output gap. See automatic stabilisers, tax smoothing
and structural budget balance.
Cyclically adjusted budget balance See structural
budget balance.
Defined-benefit pension scheme A traditional pension
scheme that defines a benefit, i.e. a pension, for an
employee upon that employee’s retirement is a defined
benefit plan.
Defined-contribution pension scheme A scheme pro-
viding for an individual account for each participant, and350
surplus; was replaced by country-specific medium-term
budgetary objectives in the reformed Stability and
Growth Pact.
for benefits based solely on the amount contributed to
the account, plus or minus income, gains, expenses and
losses allocated to the account.
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economy on the demand side (e.g. changes in private
consumption or exports) or on the supply side (e.g.
changes in commodity prices or technological innova-
tions). They can impact on the economy either on a tem-
porary or permanent basis.
Dependency ratio A measure of the ratio of people who
receive government transfers, especially pensions, rela-
tive to those who are available to provide the revenue to
pay for those transfers.
Direct taxes Taxes that are levied directly on personal or
corporate incomes and property.
Discretionary fiscal policy Change in the budget bal-
ance and in its components under the control of govern-
ment. It is usually measured as the residual of the change
in the balance after the exclusion of the budgetary impact
of automatic stabilisers. See also fiscal stance.
Early-warning mechanism Part of the preventive ele-
ments of the Stability and Growth Pact. It is activated
when there is significant divergence from the budgetary
targets set down in a stability or convergence programme.
Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) Formerly
the Monetary Committee, the EFC is a Committee of the
Council of the European Union set up by Article 114. Its
main task is to prepare and discuss (Ecofin) Council
decisions with regard to economic and financial matters.
Economic Policy Committee (EPC) Group of senior
government officials whose main task is to prepare dis-
cussions of the (Ecofin) Council on structural policies. It
plays an important role in the preparation of the broad
economic policy guidelines, and it is active on policies
related to labour markets, methods to calculate cyclically
adjusted budget balances and ageing populations.
Effective tax rate The ratio of broad categories of tax
revenue (labour income, capital income, consumption)
to their respective tax bases.
ESA 95/ESA 79 European accounting standards for the
reporting of economic data by the Member States to the
Excessive deficit procedure (EDP) A procedure
according to which the Commission and the Council
monitor the development of national budget balances
and public debt in order to assess and/or correct the risk
of an excessive deficit in each Member State. Its appli-
cation has been further clarified in the Stability and
Growth Pact. See also stability programmes and Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact.
Expenditure rules A subset of fiscal rules that target (a
subset of) public expenditure.
Fiscal consolidation An improvement in the budget bal-
ance through measures of discretionary fiscal policy,
either specified by the amount of the improvement or the
period over which the improvement continues.
Fiscal decentralisation The transfer of authority and
responsibility for public functions from the central gov-
ernment to intermediate and local governments or to the
market.
Fiscal federalism A subfield of public finance that inves-
tigates the fiscal relations across levels of government.
Fiscal impulse The estimated effect of fiscal policy on
GDP. It is not a model-free measure and it is usually cal-
culated by simulating an econometric model. The esti-
mates presented in the present report are obtained by
using the Commission services’ QUEST model.
Fiscal rule A permanent constraint on fiscal policy,
expressed in terms of a summary indicator of fiscal per-
formance, such as the government budget deficit, bor-
rowing, debt, or a major component thereof. See also
budgetary rule, expenditure rules.
Fiscal stance A measure of the effect of discretionary
fiscal policy. In this report, it is defined as the change in
the primary structural budget balance relative to the pre-
ceding period. When the change is positive (negative)
the fiscal stance is said to be expansionary (restrictive).
General government As used by the EU in its process
of budgetary surveillance under the Stability and Growth
Pact and the excessive deficit procedure, the general
government sector covers national government, regional351
EU. As of 2000, ESA 95 has replaced the earlier ESA 79
standard with regard to the comparison and analysis of
national public finance data.
and local government, as well as social security funds.
Public enterprises are excluded, as are transfers to and
from the EU budget.
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ing to the public finances, according to which total public
expenditure in any one year must be financed by taxation,
government borrowing, or changes in the monetary base.
In the context of EMU, the ability of governments to
finance spending through money issuance is prohibited.
See also stock-flow adjustment, sustainability.
Government contingent liabilities Obligations for the
government that are subject to the realisation of specific
uncertain and discrete future events. For instance, the
guarantees granted by governments to the debt of private
corporations bonds issued by enterprise are contingent
liabilities, since the government obligation to pay
depend on the non-ability of the original debtor to hon-
our its own obligations.
Government implicit liabilities Government obliga-
tions that are very likely to arise in the future in spite of
the absence of backing contracts or law. The government
may have a potential future obligation as a result of legit-
imate expectations generated by past practice or as a
result of the pressure by interest groups. Most implicit
liabilities are contingent, i.e., depend upon the occur-
rence of uncertain future events.
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter A statistical technique
used to calculate trend GDP and output gaps by filtering
actual GDP.
Indirect taxation Taxes that are levied during the pro-
duction stage, and not on the income and property aris-
ing from economic production processes. Prominent
examples of indirect taxation are the value added tax
(VAT), excise duties, import levies, energy and other
environmental taxes.
Interest burden General government interest payments
on public debt as a share of GDP.
Lisbon strategy Partnership between the EU and Mem-
ber States for growth and more and better jobs. Origi-
nally approved in 2000, the Lisbon strategy was
revamped in 2005. Based on the integrated guidelines
(merger of the broad economic policy guidelines and the
employment guidelines, dealing with macroeconomic,
microeconomic and employment issues) for the period
2005–08, Member States drew up three-year national
yses and summarises these reports in an EU Annual
Progress Report each year, in time for the spring Euro-
pean Council.
Maastricht reference values for public debt and defi-
cits Respectively, a 60 % general government debt-to-
GDP ratio and a 3 % general government deficit-to-GDP
ratio. These thresholds are defined in a protocol to the
Maastricht Treaty on European Union. See also exces-
sive deficit procedure.
Maturity structure of public debt The profile of total
debt in terms of when it is due to be paid back. Interest
rate changes affect the budget balance directly to the
extent that the general government sector has debt with
a relatively short maturity structure. Long maturities
reduce the sensitivity of the budget balance to changes
in the prevailing interest rate. See also public debt.
Medium-term objective (MTO) According to the
reformed Stability and Growth Pact, stability programmes
and convergence programmes present a medium-term
objective for the budgetary position. It is country-specific
to take into account the diversity of economic and budget-
ary positions and developments as well as of fiscal risks to
the sustainability of public finances, and is defined in
structural terms (see structural balance).
Minimum benchmarks The lowest value of the struc-
tural budget balance that provides a safety margin
against the risk of breaching the Maastricht reference
value for the deficit during normal cyclical fluctuations.
The minimum benchmarks are estimated by the Euro-
pean Commission. They do not cater for other risks such
as unexpected budgetary developments and interest rate
shocks. They are a lower bound for the ‘medium-term
budgetary objectives (MTO).
Monetary conditions index (MCI) An indicator com-
bining the change in real short-term interest rate and in
the real effective exchange rate to gauge the degree of
easing or tightening of monetary policy.
Mundell-Fleming model Macroeconomic model of an
open economy which embodies the main Keynesian
hypotheses (price rigidity, liquidity preference). In spite
of its shortcomings, it remains useful in short-term eco-
nomic policy analysis.352
reform programmes at the end of 2005. They reported on
the implementation of the national reform programmes
for the first time in autumn 2006. The Commission anal-
NAIRU Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemploy-
ment.
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effects which reverse the sign of traditional Keynesian
multipliers. Hence, if non-Keynesian effects dominate,
fiscal consolidation would be expansionary.
Old-age dependency ratio Population aged over 65 as a
percentage of working age population (usually defined
as persons aged between 15 and 64).
One-off and temporary measures Government trans-
actions having a transitory budgetary effect that does not
lead to a sustained change in the budgetary position. See
also structural balance.
Output gap The difference between actual output and
estimated potential output at any particular point in time.
See also cyclical component of budget balance.
Pay-as-you-go pension system (PAYG) Pension sys-
tem in which current pension expenditures are financed
by the contributions of current employees.
Pension fund A legal entity set up to accumulate, man-
age and administer pension assets. See also private pen-
sion scheme.
Pre-accession economic programmes (PEPs) Annual
programmes submitted by candidate countries which set
the framework for economic policies The PEPs consist of
a review of recent economic developments, a detailed mac-
roeconomic framework, a discussion of public finance
issues and an outline of the structural reform agenda.
Pre-accession fiscal surveillance framework (PFSF)
Framework for budgetary surveillance of candidate
countries in the run up to accession. It closely approxi-
mates the policy coordination and surveillance mecha-
nisms at EU level.
Policy mix The overall stance of fiscal and monetary
policy. The policy mix may consist of various combina-
tions of expansionary and restrictive policies, with a
given fiscal stance being either supported or offset by
monetary policy.
Potential GDP The level of real GDP in a given year
that is consistent with a stable rate of inflation. If actual
idle and inflationary pressures abate. See also produc-
tion function method and output gap.
Primary budget balance The budget balance net of
interest payments on general government debt.
Primary structural budget balance: The structural
budget balance net of interest payments.
Procyclical fiscal policy A fiscal stance which amplifies
the economic cycle by increasing the structural primary
deficit during an economic upturn, or by decreasing it in
a downturn. A neutral fiscal policy keeps the cyclically
adjusted budget balance unchanged over the economic
cycle but lets the automatic stabilisers work. See also
tax-smoothing.
Production function approach A method to estimate
the level of potential output of an economy based on
available labour inputs, the capital stock and their level
of efficiency. Potential output is used to estimate the out-
put gap, a key input in the estimation of cyclical compo-
nent of the budget.
Public debt Consolidated gross debt for the general
government sector. It includes the total nominal value of
all debt owed by public institutions in the Member State,
except that part of the debt which is owed to other public
institutions in the same Member State.
Public goods Goods and services that are consumed
jointly by several economic agents and for which there is
no effective pricing mechanism that would allow private
provision through the market.
Public investment The component of total public
expenditure through which governments increase and
improve the stock of capital employed in the production
of the goods and services they provide.
Public–private partnerships (PPP) Agreements that
transfer investment projects to the private sector that tra-
ditionally have been executed or financed by the public
sector. To qualify as a PPP, the project should concern a
public function, involve the general government as the
principal purchaser, be financed from non-public
sources and engage a corporation outside the general353
output rises above its potential level, then constraints on
capacity begin to bind and inflationary pressures build;
if output falls below potential, then resources are lying
government as the principal operator that provides sig-
nificant inputs in the design and conception of the
project and bears a relevant amount of the risk.
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framework that relates to the identification of strategic
priorities and the effective and efficient use of resources
in reaching them.
Quasi-fiscal activities Activities promoting public pol-
icy goals carried out by non-government units.
QUEST The macroeconomic model of the EU Member
States plus the USA and Japan developed by the Direc-
torate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the
European Commission.
Recently acceded Member States Countries that became
members of the EU in May 2004 and include the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. Two additional
countries, Bulgaria and Romania, joined in January 2007.
Ricardian equivalence Under fairly restrictive theoret-
ical assumptions on the consumer’s behaviour (inter alia
infinite horizon for decisionmaking), the impact of fiscal
policy does not depend on whether it is financed by tax
increases or by a widening deficit. The basic reasoning
behind this statement dates back to Ricardo and was
revisited by Robert Barro in the 1970s.
Securitisation Borrowing (issuing of bonds) with the
intention of paying interest and capital out of the pro-
ceeds derived from assets (use or sale of) or from future
revenue flows.
Sensitivity analysis An econometric or statistical simu-
lation designed to test the robustness of an estimated
economic relationship or projection, given various
changes in the underlying assumptions.
Significant divergence A sizeable excess of the budget
balance over the targets, laid out in the stability or con-
vergence programmes, which triggers the early warning
procedure of the Stability and Growth Pact.
‘Snow-ball’ effect The self-reinforcing effect of public
debt accumulation or decumulation arising from a posi-
tive or negative differential between the interest rate paid
on public debt and the growth rate of the national econ-
omy. See also government budget constraint.
insurance scheme to cover for pension, healthcare and
other welfare provisions.
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) Approved in 1997
and reformed in 2005, the SGP clarifies the provisions of
the Maastricht Treaty regarding the surveillance of
Member State budgetary policies and the monitoring of
budget deficits during the third phase of EMU. The SGP
consists of two Council regulations setting out legally
binding provisions to be followed by the European Insti-
tutions and the Member States and two resolutions of the
European Council in Amsterdam (June 1997). See also
excessive deficit procedure.
Stability programmes Medium-term budgetary strate-
gies presented by those Member States that have already
adopted the euro. They are updated annually, according
to the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. See
also convergence programmes.
Stock-flow adjustment The stock-flow adjustment (also
known as the debt-deficit adjustment) ensures consistency
between the net borrowing (flow) and the variation in the
stock of gross debt. It includes the accumulation of finan-
cial assets, changes in the value of debt denominated in
foreign currency, and remaining statistical adjustments.
Structural budget balance The actual budget balance
net of the cyclical component and one-off and other tem-
porary measures. The structural balance gives a measure
of the underlying trend in the budget balance. See also
primary structural budget balance.
Sustainability A combination of budget deficits and debt
that ensure that the latter does not grow without bound.
While conceptually intuitive, an agreed operational defi-
nition of sustainability has proven difficult to achieve.
Tax elasticity A parameter measuring the relative change
in tax revenues with respect to a relative change in GDP.
The tax elasticity is an input to the budgetary sensitivity.
Tax gaps Measure used in the assessment of the sustain-
ability of public finances. They measure the difference
between the current tax ratio and the constant tax ratio
over a given projection period to achieve a predetermined
level of debt at the end of that projection period.354
Social security contributions (SSCs) Mandatory con-
tributions paid by employers and employees to a social
Tax smoothing The idea that tax rates should be kept
stable in order to minimise the distortionary effects of
taxation, while leaving it for the automatic stabilisers to
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tral discretionary fiscal policy. See also cyclical compo-
nent of fiscal policy.
UMTS: Third generation of technical support for mobile
phone communications. Sale of UMTS licences gave
rise to sizeable one-off receipts in 2001.
Wagner’s law: Theory according to which public
spending — since it comprises ‘luxury goods’ with high
elasticity to income — would tend to rise as a share of
GDP as per-capita income increases.
Welfare state: Range of policies designed to provide
insurance against unemployment, sickness and risks
associated with old age.355
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EXTable A.1.1
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Belgium 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 11.9 12.9 12.7 13.0 13.2 13.3 13.2 13.2
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 16.3 17.1 16.7 16.7 17.1 16.7 16.4 16.3
3. Social contributions 16.4 16.0 16.5 16.2 16.1 15.9 15.8 15.8
4. of which actual social contributions 14.4 13.9 14.3 14.0 13.9 13.7 13.6 13.6
5. Other current resources 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
6. Total current resources 47.8 49.0 48.8 48.4 49.1 48.7 48.1 48.0
7. Government consumption expenditure 21.5 21.3 23.0 22.9 22.9 22.6 22.6 22.7
8. of which compensation of employees 11.9 11.5 12.3 12.0 12.1 12.0 11.8 11.6
9. Collective consumption 8.6 8.5 9.1 8.9 8.8 8.7 8.7 8.7
10. Social benefits in kind 13.0 12.8 13.9 14.0 14.1 13.9 13.9 14.0
11. Social transfers other than in kind 16.2 15.2 16.1 15.9 16.0 15.7 15.7 15.7
12. Interest payments 8.9 6.6 5.3 4.7 4.2 4.1 3.9 3.8
13. Subsidies 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9
14. Other current expenditure 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3
15. Total current expenditure 49.7 46.3 48.1 47.0 47.2 46.6 46.4 46.3
16. Gross savings – 1.9 2.6 0.7 1.3 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.6
17. Capital transfers received 0.4 0.5 2.4 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7
18. Total revenue 47.6 49.1 51.1 49.2 49.9 49.3 48.5 48.2
19. Gross fixed capital formation 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7
20. Other capital expenditure 0.9 1.1 1.5 0.7 3.3 0.8 0.9 0.9
21. Total expenditure 51.9 49.1 51.1 49.3 52.3 49.2 48.7 48.5
22. Current tax burden 45.5 46.9 46.6 46.4 47.1 46.6 46.0 45.9
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 4.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 – 2.3 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.2
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.368
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Table A.1.2
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Germany 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 11.1 11.9 11.8 11.8 11.8 12.1 12.9 12.8
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 10.8 12.3 10.5 10.0 10.2 10.8 10.9 10.8
3. Social contributions 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.0 17.7 17.4 16.5 16.4
4. of which actual social contributions 17.3 17.3 17.2 16.9 16.7 16.3 15.5 15.4
5. Other current resources 3.6 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.6
6. Total current resources 43.9 45.6 43.6 42.6 42.6 43.1 42.9 42.6
7. Government consumption expenditure 19.6 19.0 19.3 18.8 18.7 18.5 18.1 17.9
8. of which compensation of employees 8.7 8.1 7.8 7.7 7.5 7.3 6.9 6.8
9. Collective consumption 8.4 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.5 7.2 7.1
10. Social benefits in kind 11.1 10.9 11.3 10.9 11.0 11.0 10.9 10.8
11. Social transfers other than in kind 17.6 18.4 19.8 19.4 19.2 18.6 17.7 17.3
12. Interest payments 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
13. Subsidies 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1
14. Other current expenditure 1.2 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6
15. Total current expenditure 44.0 44.0 44.9 43.9 43.4 42.6 41.3 40.7
16. Gross savings – 0.1 1.6 – 1.3 – 1.3 – 0.9 0.6 1.6 2.0
17. Capital transfers received 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
18. Total revenue 45.1 46.4 44.5 43.4 43.5 44.0 43.7 43.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5
20. Other capital expenditure 1.4 – 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1
21. Total expenditure 48.3 45.1 48.5 47.1 46.8 45.7 44.3 43.7
22. Current tax burden 41.2 43.2 41.0 40.0 40.0 40.7 40.6 40.4
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 3.2 1.3 – 4.0 – 3.7 – 3.2 – 1.7 – 0.6 – 0.3
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.369
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Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Ireland 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.4 13.1 12.3 13.1 13.5 14.0 14.0 14.1
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 13.5 13.3 11.8 12.4 12.3 13.1 13.0 12.9
3. Social contributions 6.7 5.7 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2
4. of which actual social contributions 5.0 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8
5. Other current resources 2.8 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0
6. Total current resources 36.4 34.3 31.9 33.6 33.8 35.3 35.2 35.2
7. Government consumption expenditure 16.3 13.8 15.1 15.7 15.9 15.9 16.0 16.2
8. of which compensation of employees 10.1 8.0 9.0 9.4 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.4
9. Collective consumption 6.5 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6
10. Social benefits in kind 9.9 8.6 9.8 10.3 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.5
11. Social transfers other than in kind 11.6 8.1 9.0 9.1 8.7 8.2 8.9 8.9
12. Interest payments 5.3 2.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
13. Subsidies 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
14. Other current expenditure 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.4 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2
15. Total current expenditure 36.3 26.5 28.0 28.9 29.2 28.7 29.6 29.8
16. Gross savings 0.1 7.8 3.9 4.8 4.7 6.6 5.6 5.3
17. Capital transfers received 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9
18. Total revenue 39.1 36.2 33.9 35.5 35.5 36.9 36.6 36.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.3 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.3
20. Other capital expenditure 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1
21. Total expenditure 41.0 31.6 33.5 34.0 34.4 34.1 35.2 35.5
22. Current tax burden 34.7 32.7 30.3 31.8 32.0 33.4 33.3 33.3
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 2.0 4.6 0.4 1.4 1.0 2.9 1.5 1.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.370
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Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Greece 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.5 14.9 13.3 12.8 12.6 13.1 13.2 13.2
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 7.4 10.6 8.7 8.8 9.2 8.7 8.6 8.6
3. Social contributions 12.6 13.7 15.3 14.6 14.4 14.9 14.9 14.6
4. of which actual social contributions 10.5 11.5 13.0 12.3 12.1 12.6 12.5 12.2
5. Other current resources 4.5 3.6 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.2
6. Total current resources 38.1 42.7 39.8 38.5 38.3 38.8 39.1 38.6
7. Government consumption expenditure 15.3 17.3 16.8 16.7 16.1 15.5 15.1 15.1
8. of which compensation of employees 11.3 11.5 11.8 12.5 12.3 11.9 11.9 11.9
9. Collective consumption 9.4 11.5 10.0 9.9 9.6 9.3 10.4 10.4
10. Social benefits in kind 5.9 5.9 6.8 6.7 6.4 6.2 4.7 4.7
11. Social transfers other than in kind 15.1 16.2 17.6 17.1 17.6 17.7 18.1 18.1
12. Interest payments 12.7 8.0 5.5 5.5 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.2
13. Subsidies 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
14. Other current expenditure 1.3 1.1 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7
15. Total current expenditure 44.9 42.9 41.5 41.4 40.5 39.6 39.5 39.2
16. Gross savings – 6.8 – 0.2 – 1.8 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 1.1 – 0.4 – 0.7
17. Capital transfers received 1.6 3.2 1.9 1.8 1.7 2.7 2.2 2.2
18. Total revenue 40.9 47.1 43.2 41.9 41.6 43.2 43.0 42.5
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 4.0 4.2 4.2 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5
20. Other capital expenditure 1.7 3.1 2.2 2.6 1.5 0.8 0.8 0.8
21. Total expenditure 51.0 51.2 49.5 49.8 47.3 46.1 45.5 45.3
22. Current tax burden 34.4 39.7 37.9 36.6 36.6 36.7 36.8 36.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 10.2 – 4.0 – 6.2 – 7.9 – 5.5 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.7
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.371
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.5
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Spain 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 10.0 11.4 11.5 11.9 12.1 12.3 12.3 12.3
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 9.9 10.2 10.1 10.2 10.9 11.7 11.6 11.8
3. Social contributions 12.7 12.9 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 12.9 12.8
4. of which actual social contributions 11.8 12.0 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.2 12.1 12.0
5. Other current resources 4.2 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.2 2.9 2.9
6. Total current resources 36.8 37.8 37.9 38.1 39.1 40.2 39.7 39.7
7. Government consumption expenditure 18.1 17.2 17.4 17.8 18.0 17.9 18.1 18.3
8. of which compensation of employees 11.2 10.3 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.0 9.7 9.5
9. Collective consumption 7.9 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.7 7.7
10. Social benefits in kind 10.2 9.9 10.0 10.3 10.5 10.4 10.4 10.5
11. Social transfers other than in kind 13.6 12.0 11.7 11.7 11.6 11.6 11.8 11.8
12. Interest payments 5.1 3.2 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5
13. Subsidies 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
14. Other current expenditure 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7
15. Total current expenditure 38.7 34.8 33.9 34.1 33.9 33.8 34.0 34.2
16. Gross savings – 1.9 3.0 3.9 4.0 5.1 6.4 5.6 5.5
17. Capital transfers received 1.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5
18. Total revenue 38.0 38.1 38.2 38.6 39.3 40.3 39.7 39.7
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.7 3.2 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.9 3.6 3.7
20. Other capital expenditure 2.2 1.3 1.1 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2
21. Total expenditure 44.4 39.0 38.2 38.8 38.2 38.5 38.3 38.5
22. Current tax burden 33.3 35.0 34.9 35.4 36.4 37.3 37.2 37.4
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 6.5 – 0.9 0.0 – 0.2 1.1 1.8 1.4 1.2
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.372
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.6
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
France 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 15.2 15.2 15.0 15.3 15.5 15.4 15.4 15.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 8.1 12.0 10.9 11.1 11.3 11.9 11.7 11.8
3. Social contributions 20.3 17.9 18.2 18.0 18.2 18.4 18.3 18.3
4. of which actual social contributions 18.6 16.1 16.4 16.2 16.4 16.5 16.5 16.4
5. Other current resources 4.4 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1
6. Total current resources 48.0 48.9 47.7 48.2 48.8 49.6 49.5 49.6
7. Government consumption expenditure 23.6 22.9 23.7 23.7 23.8 23.7 23.5 23.2
8. of which compensation of employees 13.6 13.3 13.5 13.3 13.3 13.1 13.0 12.8
9. Collective consumption 9.2 8.6 8.4 8.4 8.3 8.3 8.2 8.1
10. Social benefits in kind 14.5 14.3 15.4 15.4 15.5 15.4 15.3 15.1
11. Social transfers other than in kind 17.9 17.1 17.5 17.6 17.8 17.8 17.8 17.8
12. Interest payments 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.5
13. Subsidies 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4
14. Other current expenditure 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7
15. Total current expenditure 48.9 46.7 48.4 48.3 48.5 48.4 47.9 47.6
16. Gross savings – 0.8 2.2 – 0.7 – 0.1 0.3 1.2 1.6 2.0
17. Capital transfers received 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5
18. Total revenue 49.0 50.2 49.2 49.6 50.7 51.0 50.7 50.8
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4
20. Other capital expenditure 1.7 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.1
21. Total expenditure 54.5 51.6 53.3 53.2 53.7 53.5 53.2 52.7
22. Current tax burden 44.4 45.7 44.4 44.6 45.2 45.9 45.7 45.7
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 5.5 – 1.5 – 4.1 – 3.6 – 3.0 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 1.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.373
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.7
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Italy 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 11.8 14.7 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.8 14.5 14.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 14.5 14.4 13.4 13.3 13.4 14.5 14.7 14.8
3. Social contributions 14.4 12.4 12.6 12.7 12.9 13.0 13.5 13.6
4. of which actual social contributions 12.7 12.1 12.4 12.4 12.6 12.8 13.3 13.4
5. Other current resources 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
6. Total current resources 44.5 44.9 43.4 43.6 44.0 45.8 46.2 46.3
7. Government consumption expenditure 18.0 18.4 19.7 19.9 20.4 20.3 19.9 20.0
8. of which compensation of employees 11.0 10.4 10.8 10.8 11.0 11.0 10.8 10.9
9. Collective consumption 7.6 7.6 8.2 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.3
10. Social benefits in kind 10.4 10.8 11.5 11.5 11.9 11.9 11.7 11.8
11. Social transfers other than in kind 16.3 16.4 16.8 16.9 17.0 17.1 17.3 17.3
12. Interest payments 11.6 6.3 5.1 4.7 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8
13. Subsidies 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
14. Other current expenditure 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7
15. Total current expenditure 48.3 43.6 44.2 44.1 44.5 44.5 44.5 44.7
16. Gross savings – 3.8 1.3 – 0.9 – 0.5 – 0.7 1.2 1.8 1.6
17. Capital transfers received 0.8 0.4 1.7 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
18. Total revenue 45.1 45.3 44.8 44.2 44.0 45.6 46.0 46.1
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4
20. Other capital expenditure 2.4 0.3 1.9 1.5 1.7 3.7 1.7 1.7
21. Total expenditure 52.5 46.2 48.3 47.7 48.3 50.1 48.1 48.3
22. Current tax burden 41.3 42.0 40.3 40.3 40.7 42.6 43.0 43.1
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 7.4 – 0.8 – 3.5 – 3.5 – 4.2 – 4.4 – 2.1 – 2.2
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.374
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.8
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Luxembourg 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 11.0 13.5 12.4 13.5 13.5 12.6 12.1 11.7
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 15.3 14.9 14.7 13.2 14.0 13.2 13.1 13.1
3. Social contributions 11.0 10.9 11.8 11.8 11.7 11.0 10.7 10.4
4. of which actual social contributions 9.9 10.1 10.9 11.0 10.8 10.2 9.9 9.6
5. Other current resources 4.8 4.3 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.2
6. Total current resources 42.0 43.6 42.4 41.9 42.4 40.3 39.2 38.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 15.9 15.1 16.4 17.1 17.0 15.9 15.3 15.0
8. of which compensation of employees 8.5 7.5 8.1 8.2 8.1 7.7 7.5 7.3
9. Collective consumption 6.8 6.3 6.6 6.8 6.7 6.1 5.9 5.7
10. Social benefits in kind 9.2 8.9 9.8 10.3 10.2 9.7 9.4 9.3
11. Social transfers other than in kind 14.3 13.1 15.2 15.0 14.9 14.0 13.4 13.0
12. Interest payments 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
13. Subsidies 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5
14. Other current expenditure 2.4 2.9 2.9 3.5 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.8
15. Total current expenditure 34.6 33.0 36.2 37.4 36.7 34.6 33.4 32.5
16. Gross savings 7.4 10.7 6.2 4.5 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.9
17. Capital transfers received 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
18. Total revenue 42.1 43.6 42.5 41.9 42.6 40.5 39.4 38.6
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.8 3.8 4.6 4.3 4.7 4.1 3.9 3.8
20. Other capital expenditure 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.8 1.7 1.7
21. Total expenditure 39.7 37.6 42.0 43.2 42.8 40.4 39.0 38.0
22. Current tax burden 38.1 39.9 39.2 38.7 39.3 37.0 36.1 35.4
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) 2.4 6.0 0.4 – 1.2 – 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.375
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.9
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1) 
(% of GDP)
The Netherlands 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 10.7 11.7 12.1 12.5 12.6 12.9 12.7 12.8
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 12.3 11.6 10.7 10.5 11.6 11.8 12.1 12.4
3. Social contributions 17.1 16.4 14.7 15.0 14.1 15.3 15.0 14.9
4. of which actual social contributions 15.9 15.4 13.8 14.0 13.1 14.4 14.1 13.9
5. Other current resources 5.9 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.7 5.1 5.1
6. Total current resources 45.9 44.6 42.4 42.9 43.6 45.7 44.9 45.0
7. Government consumption expenditure 23.8 22.0 24.5 24.3 24.1 25.3 25.4 25.4
8. of which compensation of employees 10.6 9.5 10.1 10.0 9.9 9.4 9.4 9.3
9. Collective consumption 11.3 10.0 10.9 10.7 10.6 10.3 10.4 10.5
10. Social benefits in kind 12.5 12.0 13.6 13.6 13.5 15.0 15.0 14.9
11. Social transfers other than in kind 15.2 11.3 11.5 11.5 11.1 11.2 10.9 10.6
12. Interest payments 5.6 3.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0
13. Subsidies 1.0 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1
14. Other current expenditure 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.1
15. Total current expenditure 46.8 40.1 41.7 41.6 40.7 42.0 41.7 41.3
16. Gross savings – 0.8 4.5 0.7 1.3 2.8 3.7 3.2 3.7
17. Capital transfers received 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
18. Total revenue 47.2 46.1 43.9 44.5 45.2 47.2 46.3 46.3
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 3.1 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.2
20. Other capital expenditure 0.7 – 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.0
21. Total expenditure 51.6 44.2 47.1 46.3 45.5 46.7 47.0 46.3
22. Current tax burden 41.1 40.6 38.1 38.4 38.8 40.3 40.1 40.2
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 4.3 2.0 – 3.1 – 1.8 – 0.3 0.6 – 0.7 0.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.376
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.10
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Austria 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.9 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.4 14.0 13.8 13.5
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 11.6 13.1 13.6 13.4 12.9 13.2 13.1 13.1
3. Social contributions 17.1 16.6 16.3 16.1 16.1 16.0 15.8 15.7
4. of which actual social contributions 14.9 14.7 14.6 14.6 14.6 14.5 14.3 14.2
5. Other current resources 4.9 3.2 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.3
6. Total current resources 47.5 47.2 48.2 47.8 47.1 46.8 46.1 45.7
7. Government consumption expenditure 20.1 18.4 18.3 18.2 18.2 18.1 17.7 17.7
8. of which compensation of employees 12.5 10.9 9.5 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.1
9. Collective consumption 8.1 7.3 7.1 6.9 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.9
10. Social benefits in kind 12.0 11.1 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.2 10.9 10.8
11. Social transfers other than in kind 19.5 18.5 19.2 18.8 18.6 18.3 18.0 17.8
12. Interest payments 3.8 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.6
13. Subsidies 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.1
14. Other current expenditure 2.2 2.2 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3
15. Total current expenditure 48.4 45.4 46.4 45.4 45.2 44.7 43.9 43.5
16. Gross savings – 1.0 1.6 1.6 2.2 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.1
17. Capital transfers received 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
18. Total revenue 50.3 49.8 49.3 49.0 48.2 48.0 47.4 47.1
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.0 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
20. Other capital expenditure 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2
21. Total expenditure 56.0 51.4 51.1 50.3 49.9 49.2 48.4 48.1
22. Current tax burden 43.5 44.7 44.8 44.4 43.7 43.5 43.0 42.6
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 5.6 – 1.5 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 1.6 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.8
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.377
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.11
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Portugal 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.9 13.5 14.8 14.1 14.9 15.4 15.3 15.3
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 8.4 9.8 8.6 8.5 8.6 8.9 9.2 9.3
3. Social contributions 10.4 11.2 12.2 12.2 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.4
4. of which actual social contributions 9.6 10.3 11.1 11.1 11.3 11.4 11.6 11.5
5. Other current resources 3.9 3.3 3.4 3.9 3.4 4.0 3.9 3.9
6. Total current resources 35.7 37.8 39.1 38.7 39.4 40.6 40.9 40.8
7. Government consumption expenditure 17.7 19.3 20.3 20.6 21.2 20.5 20.1 19.8
8. of which compensation of employees 12.9 14.2 14.1 14.1 14.4 13.5 13.0 12.6
9. Collective consumption 7.2 7.7 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.1 7.9 7.8
10. Social benefits in kind 10.4 11.6 12.3 12.5 12.8 12.4 12.2 12.0
11. Social transfers other than in kind 11.2 11.7 13.8 14.3 14.8 15.1 15.2 15.1
12. Interest payments 5.9 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0
13. Subsidies 1.3 1.2 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4
14. Other current expenditure 1.6 1.9 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
15. Total current expenditure 37.6 37.2 40.4 41.1 42.6 42.1 41.8 41.5
16. Gross savings – 2.0 0.6 – 1.4 – 2.4 – 3.2 – 1.5 – 1.0 – 0.7
17. Capital transfers received 1.8 1.4 2.7 3.6 1.3 1.0 0.9 0.9
18. Total revenue 37.6 40.2 42.5 43.1 41.4 42.2 42.3 42.3
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.5 3.8 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.2
20. Other capital expenditure 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.2 1.2
21. Total expenditure 42.8 43.1 45.5 46.4 47.5 46.1 45.8 45.5
22. Current tax burden 32.7 35.1 35.9 35.1 36.0 36.7 37.0 36.9
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 5.2 – 2.9 – 2.9 – 3.3 – 6.1 – 3.9 – 3.5 – 3.2
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.378
A
N
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EXTable A.1.12
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Slovenia 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports : 16.3 16.6 16.2 16.1 15.6 15.1 14.8
2. Current taxes on income and wealth : 7.5 8.2 8.5 9.0 9.4 9.1 8.8
3. Social contributions : 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.1 14.9 14.7 14.6
4. of which actual social contributions : 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.8 14.6 14.5 14.3
5. Other current resources : 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.4
6. Total current resources : 42.5 43.4 43.6 44.0 43.4 42.4 41.5
7. Government consumption expenditure : 19.3 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.3 19.1 19.0
8. of which compensation of employees : 11.6 12.1 12.0 12.0 11.7 11.5 11.3
9. Collective consumption : 7.9 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.7
10. Social benefits in kind : 11.4 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.4 11.3 11.3
11. Social transfers other than in kind : 17.0 17.0 16.4 16.3 16.0 15.6 15.4
12. Interest payments : 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4
13. Subsidies : 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6
14. Other current expenditure : 1.3 1.2 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2
15. Total current expenditure : 41.6 41.6 41.4 41.4 40.7 40.0 39.6
16. Gross savings : 0.9 1.8 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.0
17. Capital transfers received : 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1
18. Total revenue : 44.3 45.3 45.1 45.6 44.8 43.9 42.9
19. Gross fixed capital formation : 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.0
20. Other capital expenditure : 1.8 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.5
21. Total expenditure : 48.1 48.0 47.4 47.0 46.3 45.4 44.4
22. Current tax burden : 38.8 39.8 39.9 40.5 40.2 39.3 38.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) : – 3.9 – 2.8 – 2.3 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.5
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.379
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.13
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Finland 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.5 13.5 13.9 13.8 13.9 13.6 13.5 13.5
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 17.3 21.1 17.7 17.5 17.6 17.1 16.8 16.7
3. Social contributions 14.7 12.1 11.9 11.8 12.2 12.3 12.2 12.2
4. of which actual social contributions 14.5 12.1 11.9 11.8 12.2 12.3 12.2 12.2
5. Other current resources 7.2 6.0 5.8 6.0 5.9 6.0 5.8 5.7
6. Total current resources 52.7 52.6 49.4 49.0 49.5 49.0 48.3 48.0
7. Government consumption expenditure 22.8 20.3 21.7 21.9 22.1 21.4 21.1 21.1
8. of which compensation of employees 15.1 13.0 13.6 13.5 13.8 13.3 13.0 12.9
9. Collective consumption 8.5 7.4 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.2 7.1 7.0
10. Social benefits in kind 14.3 12.9 14.1 14.3 14.6 14.2 14.1 14.1
11. Social transfers other than in kind 21.9 16.2 16.7 16.6 16.5 15.9 15.7 15.6
12. Interest payments 3.9 2.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3
13. Subsidies 2.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2
14. Other current expenditure 2.0 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7
15. Total current expenditure 53.4 43.2 44.2 43.9 44.3 42.8 42.2 42.0
16. Gross savings – 0.7 9.4 5.0 4.9 5.0 6.2 6.0 6.0
17. Capital transfers received 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
18. Total revenue 55.4 55.2 52.4 52.3 53.0 52.3 51.3 50.9
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.7 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7
20. Other capital expenditure 2.9 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
21. Total expenditure 61.6 48.3 50.0 50.2 50.5 48.6 47.8 47.4
22. Current tax burden 46.2 47.1 43.9 43.3 43.8 43.3 42.7 42.6
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 6.2 6.9 2.5 2.3 2.7 3.9 3.7 3.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.380
A
N
N
EXTable A.1.14
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Bulgaria 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.8 13.8 16.0 17.7 18.6 19.3 19.0 19.2
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 11.8 9.4 6.8 6.3 6.0 5.6 5.2 5.2
3. Social contributions 12.0 12.2 10.6 10.5 10.3 8.8 8.7 8.7
4. of which actual social contributions 11.8 11.7 10.6 10.5 10.3 8.8 8.7 8.7
5. Other current resources 2.1 13.7 5.2 5.4 4.7 5.0 4.6 4.4
6. Total current resources 38.8 49.1 38.6 39.9 39.6 38.7 37.6 37.5
7. Government consumption expenditure 15.3 17.9 19.0 18.4 18.0 17.4 17.1 16.9
8. of which compensation of employees 9.3 10.0 9.4 9.2 8.7 8.2 8.1 8.0
9. Collective consumption 7.7 9.7 10.0 10.1 9.8 9.4 9.2 9.1
10. Social benefits in kind 7.5 8.2 8.9 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.9 7.8
11. Social transfers other than in kind 10.6 14.3 12.7 12.0 11.9 11.5 11.5 11.5
12. Interest payments 14.1 4.0 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.1
13. Subsidies 1.2 1.9 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1
14. Other current expenditure 0.3 6.1 0.6 0.9 1.4 0.8 1.6 1.6
15. Total current expenditure 41.5 44.2 35.5 34.3 33.7 31.9 32.3 32.2
16. Gross savings – 2.7 4.9 3.1 5.7 5.9 6.8 5.3 5.4
17. Capital transfers received 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.3
18. Total revenue : : 40.0 41.4 41.4 39.9 39.3 39.6
19. Gross fixed capital formation 0.8 3.7 2.5 2.7 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.5
20. Other capital expenditure 0.0 2.1 1.6 1.1 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.2
21. Total expenditure : : 40.9 39.3 39.5 36.6 37.3 37.6
22. Current tax burden : 36.6 33.4 34.6 34.9 33.7 33.0 33.2
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 3.4 – 0.5 – 0.9 2.2 1.9 3.3 2.0 2.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.381
A
N
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EXTable A.1.15
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Czech Republic 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.3 11.3 11.1 11.7 11.6 11.0 10.9 10.9
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 9.6 8.3 9.6 9.7 9.3 8.8 8.8 9.0
3. Social contributions 14.4 14.2 15.1 15.1 15.1 15.0 14.7 14.5
4. of which actual social contributions 14.4 14.2 15.1 15.1 15.1 15.0 14.7 14.4
5. Other current resources 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.3 5.8 5.8 5.2 4.8
6. Total current resources 42.3 40.0 42.1 42.8 41.8 40.6 39.6 39.2
7. Government consumption expenditure 20.9 21.1 23.4 22.4 22.3 21.5 21.6 21.2
8. of which compensation of employees 7.3 7.1 8.3 8.0 8.0 7.8 7.8 7.7
9. Collective consumption 10.0 10.6 11.9 10.8 11.2 10.8 10.9 10.7
10. Social benefits in kind 10.9 10.5 11.5 11.7 11.0 10.6 10.7 10.5
11. Social transfers other than in kind 10.7 12.1 12.2 11.8 11.5 11.4 11.1 10.7
12. Interest payments 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0
13. Subsidies 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7
14. Other current expenditure 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3
15. Total current expenditure 36.5 37.6 40.7 38.8 38.3 37.3 37.2 36.6
16. Gross savings 5.8 2.4 1.4 4.1 3.5 3.2 2.5 2.9
17. Capital transfers received 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.7
18. Total revenue 41.0 38.1 40.7 41.5 40.4 39.5 39.2 39.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation 5.3 3.6 4.5 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.3
20. Other capital expenditure 14.5 2.6 3.7 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.8 1.7
21. Total expenditure 54.5 41.8 47.3 44.4 44.0 42.5 43.0 42.7
22. Current tax burden 36.2 33.9 35.8 36.8 36.3 35.3 35.0 34.9
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 13.4 – 3.7 – 6.6 – 2.9 – 3.5 – 2.9 – 3.9 – 3.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.382
A
N
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EXTable A.1.16
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Denmark 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 16.8 17.0 17.2 17.5 17.7 17.8 17.5 17.4
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 30.7 30.3 29.3 30.3 31.2 29.5 28.7 28.4
3. Social contributions 2.1 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9
4. of which actual social contributions 1.1 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.9 1.9
5. Other current resources 5.2 4.2 4.2 4.5 4.2 4.1 3.7 3.6
6. Total current resources 54.8 54.1 52.9 54.4 55.1 53.4 51.9 51.3
7. Government consumption expenditure 25.2 25.1 26.5 26.6 25.9 25.6 25.3 25.2
8. of which compensation of employees 17.2 17.1 18.0 17.9 17.2 17.1 16.7 16.5
9. Collective consumption 8.2 8.0 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.7 7.5 7.4
10. Social benefits in kind 17.0 17.2 18.5 18.6 18.1 17.9 17.8 17.7
11. Social transfers other than in kind 19.5 16.2 17.1 16.9 16.2 15.3 15.4 15.2
12. Interest payments 5.9 3.6 2.6 2.3 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2
13. Subsidies 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.3
14. Other current expenditure 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5
15. Total current expenditure 55.7 50.1 51.5 51.1 49.0 47.5 46.9 46.4
16. Gross savings – 0.9 3.9 1.4 3.3 6.1 5.8 4.9 4.8
17. Capital transfers received 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
18. Total revenue 56.4 55.8 55.0 56.7 57.2 55.1 53.8 53.1
19. Gross fixed capital formation 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.5
20. Other capital expenditure 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
21. Total expenditure 59.2 53.6 55.1 54.8 52.6 50.9 50.3 49.7
22. Current tax burden 49.8 50.1 48.9 50.1 51.1 49.5 48.4 48.0
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 2.9 2.3 0.0 2.0 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.383
A
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EXTable A.1.17
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Estonia 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 13.5 12.4 12.4 12.2 13.2 13.4 13.7 14.0
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 10.6 7.8 8.3 8.2 7.1 7.2 7.1 6.8
3. Social contributions 12.7 11.1 11.0 10.8 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2
4. of which actual social contributions 12.7 11.0 10.9 10.7 10.4 10.3 10.2 10.1
5. Other current resources 8.6 3.6 4.3 4.0 3.2 4.2 4.9 4.3
6. Total current resources 45.5 34.9 35.9 35.2 34.0 35.3 36.0 35.3
7. Government consumption expenditure 26.6 19.9 18.7 18.5 17.4 16.7 16.4 16.0
8. of which compensation of employees 11.4 10.9 10.0 10.0 9.4 8.9 8.5 8.3
9. Collective consumption 11.6 9.2 8.8 8.5 7.9 7.7 7.7 7.6
10. Social benefits in kind 15.0 10.7 9.9 10.0 9.5 9.1 8.6 8.4
11. Social transfers other than in kind 9.8 9.6 9.1 9.6 9.2 9.0 9.1 9.1
12. Interest payments 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
13. Subsidies 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
14. Other current expenditure 1.3 0.5 0.8 1.3 1.8 1.6 3.2 3.0
15. Total current expenditure 38.6 31.3 29.6 30.4 29.4 28.4 29.8 29.3
16. Gross savings 6.9 3.6 6.2 4.8 4.5 6.9 6.2 6.0
17. Capital transfers received 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.3
18. Total revenue 42.8 36.2 37.4 36.6 35.5 37.0 36.2 35.9
19. Gross fixed capital formation 4.9 3.8 4.2 3.1 3.2 3.6 3.8 4.0
20. Other capital expenditure 1.7 0.4 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.3 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.1
21. Total expenditure 42.4 36.5 35.3 34.2 33.2 33.2 32.4 32.4
22. Current tax burden 36.7 31.3 31.6 31.5 31.0 31.4 31.3 31.2
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) 0.4 – 0.2 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.8 3.7 3.5
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.384
A
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EXTable A.1.18
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Cyprus 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports : 12.4 16.4 16.9 16.9 17.8 18.3 18.3
2. Current taxes on income and wealth : 10.9 9.6 8.0 9.3 10.9 10.9 10.9
3. Social contributions : 6.5 7.0 7.7 8.3 8.0 8.1 8.1
4. of which actual social contributions : 6.5 7.0 7.7 8.3 8.0 8.1 8.1
5. Other current resources : 3.1 4.0 3.7 4.0 3.4 3.0 3.0
6. Total current resources : 33.1 37.0 36.3 38.4 40.1 40.3 40.3
7. Government consumption expenditure : 16.1 19.8 17.9 18.1 18.0 18.0 18.0
8. of which compensation of employees : 13.5 15.6 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.7 14.7
9. Collective consumption : 8.2 10.9 9.8 10.0 9.9 9.9 9.9
10. Social benefits in kind : 7.8 8.9 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.1
11. Social transfers other than in kind : 9.0 11.3 12.0 12.7 12.3 12.8 12.8
12. Interest payments : 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1
13. Subsidies : 1.4 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5
14. Other current expenditure : 2.2 3.6 2.6 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7
15. Total current expenditure : 32.0 39.3 36.9 38.2 37.8 38.0 38.0
16. Gross savings : 1.1 – 2.3 – 0.6 0.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
17. Capital transfers received : 0.1 0.1 0.8 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
18. Total revenue : 34.7 38.8 38.8 41.2 42.4 42.6 42.6
19. Gross fixed capital formation : 2.9 3.4 4.0 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3
20. Other capital expenditure : 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4
21. Total expenditure : 37.0 45.1 42.9 43.6 43.9 44.0 43.9
22. Current tax burden : 29.9 33.0 32.8 34.7 37.0 37.5 37.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) : – 2.3 – 6.3 – 4.1 – 2.3 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.4
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.385
A
N
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EXTable A.1.19
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Latvia 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 14.1 12.3 12.1 11.7 12.4 12.7 12.6 12.3
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.9 7.9 8.4 8.5 8.3
3. Social contributions 12.0 10.1 9.1 8.9 8.6 8.9 8.6 8.2
4. of which actual social contributions 12.0 9.9 8.9 8.7 8.4 8.7 8.4 8.0
5. Other current resources 6.3 7.2 5.8 5.6 5.1 5.6 5.3 5.1
6. Total current resources 39.5 36.9 34.4 34.1 34.0 35.7 35.1 34.0
7. Government consumption expenditure 24.5 20.8 21.4 19.5 17.4 16.9 16.7 16.2
8. of which compensation of employees 11.2 10.8 10.7 10.5 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.0
9. Collective consumption 12.2 10.3 11.2 9.9 9.0 8.7 8.6 8.4
10. Social benefits in kind 12.3 10.5 10.3 9.7 8.5 8.2 8.1 7.8
11. Social transfers other than in kind 12.7 12.4 9.4 9.2 8.4 8.0 7.8 7.6
12. Interest payments 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3
13. Subsidies 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
14. Other current expenditure 0.1 1.5 0.9 1.4 3.2 4.8 4.9 4.2
15. Total current expenditure 39.3 36.7 33.3 31.4 30.1 30.8 30.4 29.0
16. Gross savings 0.2 0.2 1.1 2.7 3.9 4.9 4.7 5.0
17. Capital transfers received 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.5 1.1 1.1 1.8 2.0
18. Total revenue 36.8 34.6 33.2 34.7 35.2 37.4 37.5 36.5
19. Gross fixed capital formation 1.9 1.3 2.4 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.8 4.2
20. Other capital expenditure 0.8 2.4 0.4 1.1 1.9 2.2 2.6 2.7
21. Total expenditure 38.8 37.3 34.8 35.8 35.5 37.0 37.3 36.4
22. Current tax burden 33.2 29.7 28.7 28.7 29.2 30.4 30.3 29.3
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 2.0 – 2.8 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.386
A
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EXTable A.1.20
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Lithuania 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.4 12.6 11.7 11.1 11.2 11.2 11.6 11.8
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 8.7 8.5 8.0 8.7 9.1 9.7 9.9 10.0
3. Social contributions 7.5 9.4 8.6 8.7 8.6 8.8 9.2 9.1
4. of which actual social contributions 7.4 9.4 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.5 8.9 8.8
5. Other current resources 6.2 5.7 3.2 2.9 3.1 2.6 2.7 2.9
6. Total current resources 34.8 36.2 31.5 31.3 31.9 32.3 33.3 33.8
7. Government consumption expenditure 21.7 21.3 18.4 17.9 16.7 17.3 17.5 17.5
8. of which compensation of employees 10.0 12.2 10.9 10.9 10.4 10.5 11.0 11.1
9. Collective consumption 9.9 9.6 7.6 7.5 7.1 7.0 6.7 6.5
10. Social benefits in kind 11.8 11.7 10.7 10.4 9.6 10.3 10.8 11.1
11. Social transfers other than in kind 8.4 10.7 9.1 9.0 9.0 8.6 8.5 8.6
12. Interest payments 0.4 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.8
13. Subsidies 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
14. Other current expenditure 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8
15. Total current expenditure 31.6 34.7 29.7 29.4 29.4 29.1 29.3 29.6
16. Gross savings 3.2 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.2 4.0 4.2
17. Capital transfers received : 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2
18. Total revenue 34.1 35.9 32.0 31.8 33.1 33.3 34.4 34.9
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.3 2.4 3.0 3.4 3.5 4.2 5.1 6.0
20. Other capital expenditure : 2.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
21. Total expenditure 35.7 39.1 33.2 33.4 33.6 33.6 34.8 36.0
22. Current tax burden 28.6 30.5 28.3 28.7 29.2 29.7 30.6 30.8
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 1.6 – 3.2 – 1.3 – 1.5 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 1.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.387
A
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EXTable A.1.21
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Hungary 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 17.4 16.1 15.6 16.1 15.5 15.1 15.2 14.9
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 9.1 9.5 9.4 9.0 9.0 9.4 10.0 10.3
3. Social contributions 15.2 12.9 12.6 12.4 12.6 12.8 12.9 12.7
4. of which actual social contributions : 12.8 12.5 12.3 12.5 12.6 12.8 12.6
5. Other current resources : 5.9 4.6 5.0 4.7 5.6 5.1 4.9
6. Total current resources : 44.4 42.2 42.4 41.8 42.9 43.3 42.9
7. Government consumption expenditure 22.9 20.9 23.2 22.4 22.5 22.5 21.4 20.1
8. of which compensation of employees 11.9 10.5 13.1 12.6 12.6 12.1 11.3 10.4
9. Collective consumption 10.7 10.1 10.5 10.0 9.9 9.9 9.7 8.9
10. Social benefits in kind 12.2 10.8 12.7 12.4 12.6 12.6 11.7 11.1
11. Social transfers other than in kind 15.4 12.4 13.8 13.9 14.5 15.1 15.2 15.2
12. Interest payments : 5.3 4.1 4.4 4.1 3.9 4.1 3.9
13. Subsidies 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4
14. Other current expenditure : 1.6 1.8 2.2 2.4 3.8 3.1 3.0
15. Total current expenditure : 41.9 44.3 44.5 45.0 46.5 45.2 43.5
16. Gross savings : 2.5 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 3.2 – 3.7 – 2.0 – 0.7
17. Capital transfers received : 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.9
18. Total revenue : 43.6 41.9 42.5 42.2 43.7 44.0 44.1
19. Gross fixed capital formation : 3.2 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.5 3.6 3.3
20. Other capital expenditure : 2.7 2.1 1.2 1.4 2.1 2.7 2.9
21. Total expenditure : 46.5 49.1 48.9 50.0 53.0 50.9 49.0
22. Current tax burden 41.8 38.5 37.6 37.6 37.4 37.6 38.4 38.3
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) : – 2.9 – 7.2 – 6.5 – 7.8 – 9.2 – 6.8 – 4.9
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.388
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EXTable A.1.22
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Malta 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports : 12.6 13.1 14.8 15.0 15.5 15.9 15.9
2. Current taxes on income and wealth : 9.1 12.0 11.8 11.6 12.3 12.2 12.1
3. Social contributions : 7.5 8.1 8.2 8.6 8.0 8.0 7.8
4. of which actual social contributions : 6.4 6.6 6.7 7.0 6.5 6.4 6.3
5. Other current resources : 5.7 6.0 6.1 4.9 4.8 4.4 4.2
6. Total current resources : 34.9 39.2 40.9 40.1 40.5 40.4 40.0
7. Government consumption expenditure : 19.1 21.4 21.9 21.1 21.1 20.4 19.9
8. of which compensation of employees : 13.0 15.0 15.0 14.5 13.8 13.4 13.0
9. Collective consumption : 8.9 10.1 10.1 9.6 9.7 9.4 9.2
10. Social benefits in kind : 10.2 11.4 11.9 11.5 11.4 11.0 10.7
11. Social transfers other than in kind : 11.9 13.0 13.1 13.0 13.0 12.7 12.7
12. Interest payments : 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.3 3.3
13. Subsidies : 1.4 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7
14. Other current expenditure : 1.2 1.2 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6
15. Total current expenditure : 37.2 41.3 42.7 41.7 41.3 39.9 39.2
16. Gross savings : – 2.3 – 2.1 – 1.8 – 1.6 – 0.8 0.5 0.8
17. Capital transfers received : 1.1 0.5 1.9 3.8 3.1 2.6 2.8
18. Total revenue : 34.9 38.6 41.9 42.9 42.7 42.2 41.9
19. Gross fixed capital formation : 4.2 5.1 2.1 5.3 4.6 5.2 4.0
20. Other capital expenditure : 0.8 3.3 3.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 1.1
21. Total expenditure : 41.0 48.6 46.8 46.0 45.2 44.3 43.4
22. Current tax burden : 29.2 33.2 35.1 35.7 36.1 36.3 36.1
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) : – 6.2 – 10.0 – 4.9 – 3.1 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 1.6
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.389
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EXTable A.1.23
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Poland 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 14.2 12.6 13.2 12.9 13.6 13.9 13.9 14.0
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 11.7 7.2 6.6 6.4 7.0 7.5 7.8 8.1
3. Social contributions 11.3 12.9 12.8 12.3 12.3 12.2 11.6 10.4
4. of which actual social contributions 11.3 12.9 12.8 12.3 12.3 12.2 11.6 10.4
5. Other current resources 5.7 4.7 5.3 5.0 6.0 5.7 5.4 5.0
6. Total current resources 42.9 37.4 37.9 36.6 38.9 39.3 38.7 37.4
7. Government consumption expenditure 18.7 17.4 18.1 17.6 18.1 18.1 17.3 16.4
8. of which compensation of employees 10.7 10.1 10.7 10.1 10.1 9.7 9.5 9.1
9. Collective consumption 7.3 7.3 7.8 7.7 8.0 7.9 7.6 7.3
10. Social benefits in kind 11.3 10.2 10.3 9.9 10.1 10.1 9.6 9.2
11. Social transfers other than in kind 17.0 16.0 16.9 16.0 15.7 15.4 14.7 14.4
12. Interest payments 5.7 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.6
13. Subsidies 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9
14. Other current expenditure 1.1 0.6 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.8
15. Total current expenditure 43.4 37.5 39.5 38.3 39.2 38.8 37.4 36.1
16. Gross savings – 0.5 – 0.1 – 1.7 – 1.7 – 0.4 0.5 1.3 1.3
17. Capital transfers received 0.1 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.7
18. Total revenue 43.3 38.0 38.4 36.9 39.0 39.4 39.0 38.0
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.3 2.4 3.3 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.6 4.7
20. Other capital expenditure 0.7 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.6
21. Total expenditure 47.7 41.1 44.6 42.6 43.4 43.3 42.4 41.4
22. Current tax burden 37.2 32.7 32.5 31.8 33.1 33.9 33.6 32.7
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 4.4 – 3.0 – 6.3 – 5.7 – 4.3 – 3.9 – 3.4 – 3.3
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.390
A
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EXTable A.1.24
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Romania 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports : 16.4 12.5 11.8 12.9 12.2 11.6 11.6
2. Current taxes on income and wealth : 6.6 5.7 6.3 5.3 5.2 5.8 6.2
3. Social contributions : 12.3 9.9 9.6 10.5 10.2 10.0 9.8
4. of which actual social contributions : 12.0 9.4 9.2 9.6 9.5 9.2 8.9
5. Other current resources : 7.1 7.3 4.3 4.9 3.7 4.8 5.3
6. Total current resources : 42.4 35.4 32.0 33.6 31.3 32.2 32.8
7. Government consumption expenditure : 16.1 19.0 16.2 18.0 18.1 18.0 18.1
8. of which compensation of employees : 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.9 8.8 9.1 9.1
9. Collective consumption : 7.2 9.4 7.9 9.0 9.0 9.4 9.6
10. Social benefits in kind : 8.9 9.6 8.4 9.0 9.1 8.7 8.5
11. Social transfers other than in kind : 9.2 8.4 8.8 8.9 8.2 8.6 8.8
12. Interest payments : 4.4 1.6 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8
13. Subsidies : 1.9 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
14. Other current expenditure : 4.9 1.3 0.7 0.8 0.4 1.5 1.5
15. Total current expenditure : 44.4 31.8 28.7 30.3 28.8 30.1 30.4
16. Gross savings : 5.8 3.7 3.3 3.3 2.4 2.1 2.4
17. Capital transfers received : 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
18. Total revenue : 43.8 32.1 31.1 32.4 30.1 30.4 31.0
19. Gross fixed capital formation : 1.9 3.2 3.0 3.8 2.9 3.8 4.1
20. Other capital expenditure : 1.5 2.0 2.2 1.0 1.6 1.7 1.7
21. Total expenditure : 40.6 33.6 32.6 33.7 32.0 33.6 34.2
22. Current tax burden : 35.3 28.0 27.8 28.7 27.5 27.4 27.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) : – 4.6 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.9 – 3.2 – 3.2
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.391
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EXTable A.1.25
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Slovakia 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 15.1 12.8 12.2 12.3 12.7 11.5 11.2 11.1
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 11.5 7.6 7.0 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9
3. Social contributions 14.2 13.7 14.0 13.3 12.9 12.1 11.8 11.6
4. of which actual social contributions 14.1 13.6 13.9 13.2 12.8 12.0 11.7 11.6
5. Other current resources 7.8 7.7 6.0 5.9 5.4 6.0 5.8 5.6
6. Total current resources 48.5 41.8 39.1 37.5 37.0 35.5 34.6 34.3
7. Government consumption expenditure 21.3 19.9 20.4 19.2 18.6 19.2 18.4 18.1
8. of which compensation of employees 9.3 8.7 8.8 8.1 7.3 7.5 7.2 7.0
9. Collective consumption 17.0 11.1 12.2 11.7 10.9 11.5 11.0 10.8
10. Social benefits in kind 4.3 8.8 8.2 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.4 7.3
11. Social transfers other than in kind 12.1 12.2 11.9 12.3 12.5 12.0 11.5 11.2
12. Interest payments 2.4 4.1 2.5 2.2 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3
13. Subsidies 4.7 2.5 1.7 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4
14. Other current expenditure 1.1 1.8 2.3 1.6 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0
15. Total current expenditure 41.6 40.6 38.9 37.2 36.0 35.9 34.5 34.1
16. Gross savings 6.9 1.2 0.3 0.3 1.0 – 0.4 0.1 0.3
17. Capital transfers received 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
18. Total revenue 45.2 39.8 37.2 35.3 35.2 33.9 33.1 32.8
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.3 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2
20. Other capital expenditure 6.4 10.4 0.5 0.4 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.9
21. Total expenditure 47.0 51.7 40.0 37.7 38.1 37.3 36.0 35.6
22. Current tax burden 40.7 34.1 32.2 31.7 31.9 29.9 29.3 29.1
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 1.8 – 11.8 – 2.7 – 2.4 – 2.8 – 3.4 – 2.9 – 2.8
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.392
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EXTable A.1.26
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Sweden 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 15.4 16.3 17.0 16.9 17.0 17.1 17.1 17.0
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 19.9 22.2 18.6 19.4 20.2 20.0 18.0 18.1
3. Social contributions 13.0 14.2 14.2 14.0 13.9 13.2 13.1 13.0
4. of which actual social contributions 12.5 13.5 13.5 13.3 13.2 12.5 12.8 12.7
5. Other current resources 8.1 5.8 4.7 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.7
6. Total current resources 56.5 58.4 54.5 54.7 55.8 55.0 53.1 52.9
7. Government consumption expenditure 27.0 26.3 28.1 27.4 27.1 26.7 26.5 26.4
8. of which compensation of employees 16.6 15.6 16.5 16.3 16.1 15.6 15.4 15.4
9. Collective consumption 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.1 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.3
10. Social benefits in kind 18.7 18.0 19.8 19.3 19.4 19.2 19.1 19.0
11. Social transfers other than in kind 20.4 17.3 18.1 17.9 17.5 16.7 15.5 15.3
12. Interest payments 6.6 4.2 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.7
13. Subsidies 3.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.4
14. Other current expenditure 2.0 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.2 2.3
15. Total current expenditure 59.7 51.8 52.3 51.0 50.6 49.5 47.6 47.1
16. Gross savings – 3.1 6.6 1.9 3.5 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.8
17. Capital transfers received 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
18. Total revenue 59.7 60.9 57.1 57.4 58.4 57.5 55.2 54.9
19. Gross fixed capital formation 3.9 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.2
20. Other capital expenditure 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
21. Total expenditure 67.1 57.1 58.2 56.8 56.5 55.4 53.0 52.5
22. Current tax burden 49.0 53.1 50.2 50.6 51.4 50.5 48.5 48.5
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 7.5 3.8 – 0.9 0.8 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.4
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.393
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EXTable A.1.27
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
United Kingdom 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports 12.9 13.3 12.9 12.9 12.7 12.7 12.8 12.9
2. Current taxes on income and wealth 14.9 16.5 15.0 15.2 16.2 17.0 17.1 17.3
3. Social contributions 7.4 7.5 7.8 8.0 8.4 8.2 8.2 8.3
4. of which actual social contributions 6.6 6.8 7.2 7.6 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.7
5. Other current resources 2.8 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0
6. Total current resources 38.0 39.8 37.9 38.2 39.2 39.8 40.1 40.5
7. Government consumption expenditure 19.6 18.6 20.5 20.9 21.5 21.8 21.8 21.8
8. of which compensation of employees 10.7 9.8 10.7 10.9 11.2 11.3 11.0 11.0
9. Collective consumption 8.3 7.4 7.8 7.9 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.2
10. Social benefits in kind 11.3 11.2 12.7 13.0 13.3 13.6 13.7 13.7
11. Social transfers other than in kind 15.1 12.4 12.9 12.8 13.0 12.8 12.7 12.7
12. Interest payments 3.6 2.8 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.1
13. Subsidies 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
14. Other current expenditure 1.7 2.5 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.9 3.0 3.0
15. Total current expenditure 40.8 36.7 38.9 39.2 40.2 40.1 40.0 40.1
16. Gross savings – 2.8 3.1 – 1.0 – 0.9 – 1.0 – 0.3 0.1 0.4
17. Capital transfers received 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
18. Total revenue 38.6 40.7 39.2 39.5 40.6 41.3 41.6 41.9
19. Gross fixed capital formation 2.0 1.2 1.6 1.7 0.6 1.8 2.0 2.3
20. Other capital expenditure 1.2 – 1.8 0.9 0.8 1.9 1.0 1.0 0.8
21. Total expenditure 44.3 36.8 42.4 42.7 43.7 44.1 44.2 44.3
22. Current tax burden 36.2 38.0 36.2 36.5 37.5 38.3 38.4 38.8
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) – 5.7 4.0 – 3.2 – 3.1 – 3.1 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 2.4
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.394
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EXTable A.1.28
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
Euro area 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports : 13.3 13.1 13.3 13.4 13.6 13.7 13.7
2. Current taxes on income and wealth : 12.7 11.5 11.4 11.6 12.2 12.2 12.3
3. Social contributions : 15.9 15.8 15.6 15.5 15.6 15.3 15.3
4. of which actual social contributions : 14.7 14.7 14.5 14.4 14.5 14.3 14.2
5. Other current resources : 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.4
6. Total current resources : 45.3 43.8 43.7 44.0 44.9 44.7 44.6
7. Government consumption expenditure : 19.7 20.5 20.4 20.5 20.4 20.1 20.1
8. of which compensation of employees : 10.4 10.5 10.4 10.4 10.3 10.0 10.0
9. Collective consumption : 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.9
10. Social benefits in kind : 11.6 12.2 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.2 12.2
11. Social transfers other than in kind : 16.2 16.8 16.7 16.6 16.4 16.2 16.0
12. Interest payments : 3.9 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8
13. Subsidies : 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
14. Other current expenditure : 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
15. Total current expenditure : 43.0 43.8 43.4 43.3 42.9 42.4 42.1
16. Gross savings : 2.2 0.0 0.2 0.7 2.0 2.3 2.5
17. Capital transfers received : 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5
18. Total revenue : 46.3 45.1 44.8 45.1 45.8 45.5 45.4
19. Gross fixed capital formation : 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6
20. Other capital expenditure : 0.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.2
21. Total expenditure : 46.3 48.2 47.6 47.6 47.4 46.5 46.2
22. Current tax burden : 42.5 40.8 40.6 40.9 41.7 41.6 41.6
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) : 0.0 – 3.0 – 2.8 – 2.5 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 0.8
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.395
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EXTable A.1.29
Revenue and expenditure of general government (1)
(% of GDP)
EU–27 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Taxes on production and imports : 13.5 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 13.7
2. Current taxes on income and wealth : 13.7 12.4 12.4 12.7 13.3 13.2 13.3
3. Social contributions : 14.0 14.0 13.9 13.9 13.8 13.6 13.5
4. of which actual social contributions : 13.0 13.1 12.9 12.9 12.9 12.7 12.6
5. Other current resources : 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.3
6. Total current resources : 44.6 43.1 43.0 43.4 44.1 43.9 43.8
7. Government consumption expenditure : 19.8 20.8 20.7 20.9 20.8 20.6 20.5
8. of which compensation of employees : 10.5 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.7 10.4 10.3
9. Collective consumption : 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.0 8.0
10. Social benefits in kind : 11.7 12.6 12.5 12.7 12.7 12.6 12.5
11. Social transfers other than in kind : 15.5 16.0 15.9 15.8 15.6 15.3 15.1
12. Interest payments : 3.7 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6
13. Subsidies : 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
14. Other current expenditure : 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2
15. Total current expenditure : 42.1 43.1 42.7 42.7 42.3 41.8 41.5
16. Gross savings : 2.5 – 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.7 2.0 2.2
17. Capital transfers received : 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
18. Total revenue : : 44.3 44.1 44.5 45.1 44.8 44.7
19. Gross fixed capital formation : 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.7
20. Other capital expenditure : – 0.1 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1
21. Total expenditure : : 47.4 46.9 47.0 46.8 46.0 45.7
22. Current tax burden : 41.7 40.1 39.9 40.4 41.0 40.8 40.8
23. Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) : 0.7 – 3.1 – 2.7 – 2.4 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 1.0
(1) The table is based on ESA 95 definitions which do not necessarily correspond with former definitions. The totals are obtained in ESA 95 as follows:
Line 6 = line 1 + line 2 + line 3 + line 5
Line 7 = line 9 + line 10
Line 15 = total of lines 9 to 14
Line 16 = line 6 – line 15
Line 18 = line 6 + line 17
Line 21 = line 15 + line 19 + line 20
Line 23 = line 18 – line 21.
Source: Commission services.396
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EXTable A.2.1
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Belgium 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 4.4 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 2.4 – 0.1 0.2 0.3
2. Interest payments 8.9 6.6 5.4 4.8 4.4 4.2 4.0 3.8
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 7.0 6.1 5.3 5.0 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 3.6 5.7 2.6 5.4 3.1 4.9 4.6 4.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 4.4 – 0.1 0.0 0.1 2.4 – 0.1 0.2  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 4.6 – 6.1 – 2.6 – 5.1 – 2.9 – 4.4 – 3.9 – 3.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 1.5 0.3 – 1.9 0.7 – 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 4.5 – 6.7 – 5.4 – 4.7 – 2.0 – 4.3 – 3.8 – 3.5
9. Snow-ball effect 4.3 0.5 2.7 – 0.3 1.4 – 0.2 0.0 0.3
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 1.5 0.3 – 1.9 0.7 – 0.5 0.5 0.3  
11. Change in gross debt (5) – 1.8 – 5.9 – 4.6 – 4.4 – 1.1 – 4.1 – 3.5 – 3.0
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 129.7 107.7 98.6 94.3 93.2 89.1 85.6 82.6
Germany 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 3.2 – 1.3 4.0 3.7 3.2 1.7 0.6 0.3
2. Interest payments 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 7.6 5.3 5.0 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.4
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 3.8 2.5 0.9 2.1 1.5 3.0 4.3 3.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 3.2 – 1.3 4.0 3.7 3.2 1.7 0.6  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 1.8 – 1.5 – 0.5 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 1.9 – 2.8 – 2.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 6.2 1.6 0.0 – 0.6 – 0.1 0.3 – 0.3 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 0.3 – 4.5 1.1 0.9 0.5 – 1.1 – 2.2 – 2.5
9. Snow-ball effect 1.7 1.7 2.5 1.5 1.8 0.9 0.0 0.7
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 6.2 1.6 0.0 – 0.6 – 0.1 0.3 – 0.3  
11. Change in gross debt (5) 7.6 – 1.2 3.6 1.9 2.2 0.0 – 2.6 – 1.8
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 55.6 59.7 63.9 65.7 67.9 67.9 65.4 63.6
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.397
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EXTable A.2.2
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Ireland 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 2.0 – 4.6 – 0.4 – 1.4 – 1.0 – 2.9 – 1.5 – 0.9
2. Interest payments 5.3 1.9 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 6.7 4.7 4.0 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.4 4.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 13.0 16.3 6.9 6.2 9.2 9.1 8.2 6.7
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 2.0 – 4.6 – 0.4 – 1.4 – 1.0 – 2.9 – 1.5  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 10.2 – 6.8 – 2.1 – 1.8 – 2.5 – 2.3 – 1.9 – 1.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.6 0.7 1.4 1.8 1.2 2.6 1.5 1.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 3.3 – 6.6 – 1.6 – 2.6 – 2.0 – 3.9 – 2.5 – 1.9
9. Snow-ball effect – 4.9 – 4.8 – 0.9 – 0.7 – 1.5 – 1.3 – 0.9 – 0.4
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.6 0.7 1.4 1.8 1.2 2.6 1.5  
11. Change in gross debt (5) – 7.6 – 10.6 – 1.0 – 1.5 – 2.3 – 2.5 – 1.9 – 1.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 81.1 37.8 31.2 29.7 27.4 24.9 23.0 21.7
Greece 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 10.2 4.1 6.3 7.8 5.7 2.9 2.5 2.8
2. Interest payments 12.7 8.1 5.5 5.3 5.0 4.9 4.5 4.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 13.2 7.9 5.3 5.5 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.5
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 12.1 10.4 8.4 8.3 7.5 7.8 7.0 7.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 10.2 4.1 6.3 7.8 5.7 2.9 2.5  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 11.6 – 10.6 – 8.6 – 8.2 – 7.6 – 7.8 – 6.8 – 6.8
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 2.2 5.8 – 0.5 1.0 1.1 2.3 0.7 0.7
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 2.6 – 4.0 0.7 2.5 0.6 – 2.0 – 2.0 – 1.5
9. Snow-ball effect 1.1 – 2.5 – 3.1 – 2.8 – 2.7 – 3.2 – 2.4 – 2.6
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 2.2 5.8 – 0.5 1.0 1.1 2.3 0.7  
11. Change in gross debt (5) 0.8 – 0.8 – 2.9 0.7 – 1.0 – 2.9 – 3.7 – 3.4
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 108.7 111.6 107.8 108.5 107.5 104.6 100.9 97.6
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.398
A
N
N
EXTable A.2.3
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Spain 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 6.5 0.9 0.0 0.2 – 1.1 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.2
2. Interest payments 5.1 3.2 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 9.2 5.7 4.8 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.4
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 7.8 8.7 7.3 7.4 7.8 7.8 6.9 6.4
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 6.5 0.9 0.0 0.2 – 1.1 – 1.8 – 1.4  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 4.3 – 4.9 – 3.6 – 3.3 – 3.3 – 3.1 – 2.6 – 2.2
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.7 1.8 – 0.2 0.6 1.4 1.6 1.1 1.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 1.4 – 2.4 – 2.3 – 1.9 – 2.9 – 3.4 – 3.0 – 2.7
9. Snow-ball effect 0.8 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 1.3 – 1.6 – 1.5 – 1.0 – 0.7
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.7 1.8 – 0.2 0.6 1.4 1.6 1.1  
11. Change in gross debt (5) 2.9 – 2.3 – 3.8 – 2.5 – 3.1 – 3.3 – 2.9 – 2.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 62.7 59.2 48.8 46.2 43.2 39.9 37.0 34.6
France 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 5.5 1.5 4.1 3.6 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.0
2. Interest payments 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 7.4 5.2 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.1 4.1
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 3.4 5.5 3.0 4.0 3.1 4.0 4.4 4.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 5.5 1.5 4.1 3.6 3.0 2.6 2.4  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 1.6 – 3.0 – 1.7 – 2.5 – 2.2 – 2.5 – 2.7 – 2.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 2.3 0.0 1.7 0.8 1.0 – 2.2 – 0.8 – 0.4
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 2.0 – 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.3 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.5
9. Snow-ball effect 1.9 – 0.2 1.1 0.3 0.5 0.0 – 0.2 0.0
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 2.3 0.0 1.7 0.8 1.0 – 2.2 – 0.8  
11. Change in gross debt (5) 6.2 – 1.6 4.1 2.0 1.8 – 2.2 – 1.1 – 0.9
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 55.1 56.7 62.4 64.3 66.2 63.9 62.9 61.9
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.399
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Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Italy 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 7.4 0.9 3.5 3.5 4.4 4.5 2.1 2.2
2. Interest payments 11.6 6.4 5.2 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.8
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 10.3 5.9 5.0 4.7 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 7.9 5.7 3.1 4.1 2.3 3.7 4.0 4.0
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 7.4 0.9 3.5 3.5 4.4 4.5 2.1  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 8.9 – 6.1 – 3.2 – 4.1 – 2.4 – 3.8 – 4.1 – 4.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.2 0.7 – 1.6 0.2 0.6 – 0.1 0.2 – 0.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 4.2 – 5.5 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 0.3 – 0.1 – 2.7 – 2.5
9. Snow-ball effect 2.7 0.2 1.9 0.6 2.1 0.8 0.6 0.7
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.2 0.7 – 1.6 0.2 0.6 – 0.1 0.2  
11. Change in gross debt (5) – 0.3 – 4.6 – 1.3 – 0.5 2.4 0.6 – 1.8 – 1.9
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 121.2 109.1 104.3 103.8 106.2 106.8 105.0 103.1
Luxembourg 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) – 2.4 – 6.0 – 0.4 1.2 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.4 – 0.6
2. Interest payments 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 8.1 5.6 3.4 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.4
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 3.8 10.6 6.3 5.4 8.9 12.4 9.8 8.6
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) – 2.4 – 6.0 – 0.4 1.2 0.3 – 0.1 – 0.4  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 4.6 6.3 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.2 1.5 0.9 0.4
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 2.8 – 6.3 – 0.6 1.1 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.8
9. Snow-ball effect 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.4
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 4.6 6.3 0.6 – 0.6 – 0.2 1.5 0.9  
11. Change in gross debt (5) 1.9 – 0.3 – 0.2 0.3 – 0.4 0.7 – 0.1 – 0.7
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 7.4 6.4 6.3 6.6 6.1 6.8 6.7 6.0
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.400
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Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Netherlands 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 4.3 – 2.0 3.1 1.8 0.3 – 0.5 0.7 0.0
2. Interest payments 5.6 3.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 7.8 6.5 5.2 5.0 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.5
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 5.1 8.2 2.5 2.7 3.2 4.4 4.5 4.8
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 4.3 – 2.0 3.1 1.8 0.3 – 0.5 0.7  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 3.7 – 4.6 – 1.2 – 1.4 – 1.6 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 2.2
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.4 0.2 1.5 – 1.2 0.5 0.4
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 1.3 – 5.6 0.6 – 0.7 – 2.1 – 2.9 – 1.5 – 2.1
9. Snow-ball effect 2.0 – 1.0 1.3 1.1 0.7 0.1 0.0 – 0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.4 0.2 1.5 – 1.2 0.5  
11. Change in gross debt (5) 0.4 – 7.4 1.5 0.6 0.1 – 4.0 – 1.0 – 1.8
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 76.1 53.8 52.0 52.6 52.7 48.7 47.7 45.9
Austria 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 5.7 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.0 0.9
2. Interest payments 3.9 3.7 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.7
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 6.3 5.5 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.4
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 3.9 5.2 2.4 4.2 3.9 4.6 4.8 4.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 5.7 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.0  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 2.4 – 3.3 – 1.6 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.8 – 2.8 – 2.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.3 0.8 – 1.2 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 1.8 – 2.0 – 1.3 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 1.6 – 1.8 – 1.7
9/ Snow-ball effect 1.4 0.2 1.3 0.2 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.3 0.8 – 1.2 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.3
11. Change in gross debt (5) 4.6 – 1.0 – 1.2 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 1.3 – 1.6 – 1.4
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 67.9 65.5 64.6 63.9 63.5 62.2 60.6 59.2
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.401
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Table A.2.6
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Portugal 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 5.2 3.0 2.9 3.3 6.0 3.9 3.5 3.2
2. Interest payments 5.9 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 10.9 6.2 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.8 4.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 7.9 7.1 2.3 4.1 3.3 4.2 4.6 4.5
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 5.2 3.0 2.9 3.3 6.0 3.9 3.5  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 4.3 – 3.4 – 1.3 – 2.2 – 1.9 – 2.6 – 2.8 – 2.8
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.2 – 0.5 – 0.4 0.3 1.2 – 0.2 0.0 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 0.7 – 0.1 0.2 0.7 3.4 1.1 0.6 0.2
9. Snow-ball effect 1.6 – 0.4 1.5 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 1.2 – 0.5 – 0.4 0.3 1.2 – 0.2 0.0  
11. Change in gross debt (5) 2.1 – 1.0 1.3 1.3 5.4 1.2 0.7 0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 61.0 50.4 56.8 58.2 63.6 64.7 65.4 65.8
Slovenia 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) : 3.8 2.8 2.3 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5
2. Interest payments : 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 11.1 7.7 6.8 6.1 5.9 5.7 5.3
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 28.0 9.7 8.6 7.9 5.6 7.6 7.2 6.9
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) : 3.8 2.8 2.3 1.5 1.4 1.5  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 2.2 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 1.5 – 2.0 – 1.9 – 1.8
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : 1.3 – 0.9 0.1 – 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) : 1.4 0.7 0.5 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.1 0.1
9. Snow-ball effect : 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.3 0.1 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.4
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : 1.3 – 0.9 0.1 – 0.5 0.1 0.0  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : 3.0 – 0.4 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 27.6 28.6 28.9 28.4 27.8 27.5 27.2
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.402
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Table A.2.7
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Finland 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 6.2 – 6.9 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 2.5 – 3.8 – 3.6 – 3.5
2. Interest payments 3.9 2.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 7.4 6.6 4.3 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.8
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 8.9 7.8 1.4 4.4 3.2 6.8 4.9 4.3
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 6.2 – 6.9 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 2.5 – 3.8 – 3.6  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 4.7 – 3.3 – 0.6 – 1.9 – 1.4 – 2.6 – 1.8 – 1.5
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 2.6 8.5 6.1 4.0 1.3 4.2 3.4 3.3
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 2.2 – 9.7 – 4.2 – 3.8 – 4.2 – 5.3 – 5.1 – 4.9
9. Snow-ball effect – 0.8 – 0.5 1.2 – 0.3 0.1 – 1.2 – 0.4 – 0.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 2.6 8.5 6.1 4.0 1.3 4.2 3.4  
11. Change in gross debt (5) – 1.2 – 1.7 3.1 – 0.2 – 2.7 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 1.8
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 56.7 43.8 44.3 44.1 41.4 39.1 37.0 35.2
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.403
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Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Bulgaria 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 3.4 0.5 0.9 – 2.2 – 1.9 – 3.3 – 2.0 – 2.0
2. Interest payments 14.1 4.0 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.1
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 5.7 4.4 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.6 5.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 67.5 12.5 6.9 12.1 10.2 14.7 10.4 10.6
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 3.4 0.5 0.9 – 2.2 – 1.9 – 3.3 – 2.0  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 8.8 – 3.4 – 5.0 – 3.5 – 3.7 – 2.1 – 2.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : 2.6 – 5.2 – 0.9 – 3.3 0.6 2.3 2.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 10.7 – 3.6 – 1.3 – 4.0 – 3.4 – 4.6 – 3.1 – 3.0
9. Snow-ball effect : – 4.7 – 1.3 – 3.1 – 2.0 – 2.5 – 1.0 – 1.0
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : 2.6 – 5.2 – 0.9 – 3.3 0.6 2.3  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : – 5.7 – 7.8 – 8.0 – 8.7 – 6.4 – 1.8 – 2.0
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 73.6 45.9 37.9 29.2 22.8 20.9 19.0
Czech Republic 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 13.4 3.7 6.6 2.9 3.5 2.9 3.7 3.3
2. Interest payments 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 5.4 4.2 4.3 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.5
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 16.8 5.2 4.6 7.9 6.8 7.9 6.8 7.8
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 13.4 3.7 6.6 2.9 3.5 2.9 3.7  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 0.8 – 1.2 – 2.2 – 2.0 – 2.2 – 2.0 – 2.2
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 0.8 – 3.8 0.0 – 1.9 – 0.8 – 1.7 – 1.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 12.4 2.9 5.5 1.7 2.4 1.8 2.5 2.0
9. Snow-ball effect : 0.0 – 0.1 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 1.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 0.8 – 3.8 0.0 – 1.9 – 0.8 – 1.7  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : 2.2 1.6 0.7 – 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 14.6 18.5 30.1 30.7 30.4 30.4 30.6 30.9
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.404
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Table A.2.9
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Denmark 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 2.9 – 2.3 0.1 – 1.9 – 4.6 – 4.2 – 3.5 – 3.4
2. Interest payments 5.9 3.7 2.8 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 8.1 6.6 5.7 5.3 4.4 4.6 4.8 4.8
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 4.4 6.6 2.0 4.2 6.3 5.5 5.4 4.8
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 2.9 – 2.3 0.1 – 1.9 – 4.6 – 4.2 – 3.5  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 3.2 – 3.6 – 0.9 – 1.8 – 2.6 – 1.9 – 1.6 – 1.2
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 3.7 0.2 – 0.1 2.0 – 0.4 0.0 0.0 – 0.3
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 3.0 – 5.9 – 2.7 – 4.5 – 6.7 – 5.9 – 5.0 – 4.7
9. Snow-ball effect 2.7 0.0 1.7 0.5 – 0.8 – 0.3 – 0.2 0.0
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 3.7 0.2 – 0.1 2.0 – 0.4 0.0 0.0  
11. Change in gross debt (5) – 4.0 – 5.7 – 1.0 – 1.8 – 7.7 – 6.1 – 5.2 – 5.0
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 72.5 51.7 45.8 44.0 36.3 30.2 25.0 20.0
Estonia 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) – 0.4 0.2 – 2.0 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 3.8 – 3.7 – 3.5
2. Interest payments 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.6 3.9
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 37.4 13.6 9.5 10.4 18.0 18.2 17.7 15.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) – 0.4 0.2 – 2.0 – 2.3 – 2.3 – 3.8 – 3.7  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.8 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 0.3 2.6 2.4 2.4 4.1 2.9 3.5
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 0.5 0.0 – 2.3 – 2.5 – 2.5 – 3.9 – 3.8 – 3.6
9. Snow-ball effect : – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.3
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 0.3 2.6 2.4 2.4 4.1 2.9  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : – 0.8 0.0 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 1.4 – 0.4
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 8.8 5.2 5.7 5.2 4.4 4.1 2.7 2.3
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.405
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Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Cyprus 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) : 2.3 6.3 4.1 2.3 1.5 1.4 1.4
2. Interest payments : 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 6.2 5.6 5.1 5.2 5.0 5.1 5.4
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 9.4 9.1 7.0 7.6 6.4 6.4 6.1 6.3
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) : 2.3 6.3 4.1 2.3 1.5 1.4  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 4.9 – 4.2 – 4.9 – 4.2 – 4.1 – 3.8 – 3.6
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : 2.7 2.3 2.1 0.8 – 1.3 – 1.4 – 4.4
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) : – 1.0 2.9 0.8 – 1.1 – 1.7 – 1.7 – 1.7
9. Snow-ball effect : – 1.5 – 0.9 – 1.6 – 0.8 – 0.9 – 0.7 – 0.5
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : 2.7 2.3 2.1 0.8 – 1.3 – 1.4  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : 0.2 4.4 1.2 – 1.1 – 3.9 – 3.8 – 6.7
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 58.8 69.1 70.3 69.2 65.3 61.5 54.8
Latvia         
1. Net borrowing  (1) 2.0 2.8 1.6 1.0 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.1
2. Interest payments 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 8.7 5.7 5.8 4.7 4.8 5.0 5.0
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 14.0 10.9 11.0 16.3 21.9 24.3 21.9 17.9
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 2.0 2.8 1.6 1.0 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.2  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 1.3 – 1.3 – 2.0 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 1.2
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 1.7 0.7 1.1 – 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 1.1 1.8 0.9 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.4
9. Snow-ball effect : – 0.3 – 0.6 – 1.3 – 2.0 – 1.9 – 1.4 – 0.9
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 1.7 0.7 1.1 – 0.2 0.8 0.0  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : – 0.2 1.0 0.1 – 2.6 – 2.0 – 2.0 – 1.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 12.3 14.4 14.5 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.7
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.406
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Table A.2.11
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Lithuania 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 1.6 3.2 1.3 1.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 1.0
2. Interest payments 0.4 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.8
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 8.0 6.2 4.9 4.8 2.8 3.8 4.5
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 51.3 4.6 9.3 10.2 13.8 15.2 12.8 11.1
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 1.6 3.2 1.3 1.5 0.5 0.3 0.4  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 1.0 – 1.9 – 2.0 – 2.3 – 2.5 – 2.1 – 1.9
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 1.3 – 0.4 – 1.4 1.1 1.8 2.0 2.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 1.2 1.5 0.0 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.2 0.3
9. Snow-ball effect : 0.7 – 0.6 – 1.0 – 1.5 – 2.0 – 1.4 – 1.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 1.3 – 0.4 – 1.4 1.1 1.8 2.0  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : 0.9 – 1.0 – 1.8 – 0.8 – 0.4 0.4 1.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 11.9 23.7 21.2 19.4 18.6 18.2 18.6 19.9
Hungary 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) : 3.0 7.2 6.4 7.8 9.2 6.8 4.9
2. Interest payments : 5.4 4.0 4.4 4.1 3.9 4.1 3.9
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 10.3 8.0 8.3 7.4 6.8 6.8 6.2
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 28.6 15.6 10.1 9.4 6.3 7.0 8.7 6.1
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) : 3.0 7.2 6.4 7.8 9.2 6.8  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 8.0 – 5.1 – 5.0 – 3.5 – 4.0 – 5.3 – 3.9
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 0.1 0.2 – 0.1 – 1.9 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) : – 2.4 3.2 2.1 3.7 5.3 2.7 1.0
9. Snow-ball effect : – 2.7 – 1.0 – 0.6 0.6 – 0.1 – 1.2 0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 0.1 0.2 – 0.1 – 1.9 – 0.8 – 0.4  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : – 5.2 2.3 1.4 2.3 4.4 1.1 1.0
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 54.2 58.0 59.4 61.7 66.0 67.1 68.1
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.407
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EXTable A.2.12
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Malta 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) : 6.2 10.0 4.9 3.1 2.6 2.1 1.6
2. Interest payments : 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.3 3.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 7.0 5.8 5.4 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.3
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 11.4 8.3 2.2 1.9 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.0
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) : 6.2 10.0 4.9 3.1 2.6 2.1  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 4.3 – 1.3 – 1.3 – 3.8 – 3.8 – 3.4 – 3.2
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 2.3 0.9 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 4.7 0.7 0.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) : 2.5 6.5 1.2 – 0.7 – 1.1 – 1.2 – 1.8
9. Snow-ball effect : – 0.7 2.2 2.4 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 0.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 2.3 0.9 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 4.7 0.7  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : – 0.4 9.6 3.5 – 1.5 – 5.9 – 0.6 – 1.6
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 56.0 70.4 73.9 72.4 66.5 65.9 64.3
Poland 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 4.4 3.0 6.3 5.7 4.3 3.9 3.4 3.3
2. Interest payments 5.7 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.6
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 8.6 7.8 6.4 6.5 5.6 5.9 5.8
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 36.9 11.8 4.2 9.6 6.2 7.2 8.6 8.2
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 4.4 3.0 6.3 5.7 4.3 3.9 3.4  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 4.1 – 1.7 – 4.1 – 2.7 – 3.3 – 3.8 – 3.6
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 2.3 2.7 – 2.9 – 0.2 0.1 1.0 1.0
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 1.3 0.0 3.3 2.9 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.7
9. Snow-ball effect : – 1.1 1.3 – 1.4 0.1 – 0.9 – 1.2 – 1.0
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 2.3 2.7 – 2.9 – 0.2 0.1 1.0  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : – 3.5 7.3 – 1.4 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.7
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 35.9 47.1 45.7 47.1 47.8 48.4 49.1
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.408
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EXTable A.2.13
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Romania 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) : – 3.2 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.9 3.2 3.2
2. Interest payments : 4.4 1.6 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 26.7 8.4 8.3 6.8 5.7 6.8 7.0
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 44.9 47.3 30.4 24.8 16.9 18.9 17.2 15.0
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) : – 3.2 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.9 3.2  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 7.7 – 5.8 – 4.3 – 2.7 – 2.5 – 1.8 – 1.7
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : 3.0 0.9 0.1 – 1.6 – 2.8 – 1.0 – 1.3
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) : – 7.6 – 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.1 2.5 2.5
9. Snow-ball effect : – 3.4 – 4.2 – 2.8 – 1.6 – 1.7 – 1.1 – 0.9
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : 3.0 0.9 0.1 – 1.6 – 2.8 – 1.0  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : – 0.1 – 3.5 – 2.7 – 3.0 – 3.4 0.4 0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 23.9 21.5 18.8 15.8 12.4 12.8 13.1
Slovakia 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 1.8 11.8 2.7 2.4 2.8 3.4 2.9 2.8
2. Interest payments 2.4 4.1 2.5 2.2 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 9.4 6.4 5.7 4.0 4.4 4.9 4.7
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 16.3 10.5 9.1 11.8 8.5 11.2 12.1 8.9
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 1.8 11.8 2.7 2.4 2.8 3.4 2.9  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 4.5 – 3.9 – 4.3 – 3.2 – 3.5 – 3.3 – 2.4
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 4.7 0.3 1.0 – 6.7 – 3.6 – 0.7 – 0.6
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) – 0.6 7.8 0.2 0.2 1.3 2.0 1.5 1.5
9. Snow-ball effect : – 0.4 – 1.4 – 2.1 – 1.6 – 2.1 – 2.0 – 1.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : – 4.7 0.3 1.0 – 6.7 – 3.6 – 0.7  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : 2.7 – 0.9 – 0.9 – 7.0 – 3.8 – 1.1 – 0.3
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 22.0 50.2 42.4 41.5 34.5 30.7 29.7 29.4
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.409
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EXTable A.2.14
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio
(% of GDP)
Sweden 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 7.4 – 3.8 1.1 – 0.6 – 1.8 – 2.1 – 2.3 – 2.4
2. Interest payments 6.6 4.2 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 9.8 7.1 4.1 3.2 3.4 3.4 4.2 4.3
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 7.6 5.8 3.7 4.3 4.1 6.3 6.3 5.4
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 7.4 – 3.8 1.1 – 0.6 – 1.8 – 2.1 – 2.3  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 5.2 – 3.4 – 1.9 – 2.2 – 2.1 – 3.1 – 2.8 – 2.1
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 2.5 – 2.6 2.5 2.0 3.9 0.1 0.2 0.1
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 0.9 – 8.0 – 1.2 – 2.4 – 3.8 – 3.9 – 4.1 – 4.1
9. Snow-ball effect 1.5 0.8 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 1.4 – 0.9 – 0.4
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) – 2.5 – 2.6 2.5 2.0 3.9 0.1 0.2  
11. Change in gross debt (5) – 0.2 – 9.8 1.5 – 1.0 – 0.3 – 5.3 – 4.8 – 4.4
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 73.0 52.3 53.5 52.4 52.2 46.9 42.1 37.7
United Kingdom 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) 5.7 – 4.0 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.4
2. Interest payments 3.6 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2
3. Implicit interest rate (2) 8.0 6.6 5.6 5.3 5.5 5.1 5.0 5.1
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 5.7 5.1 5.9 6.0 4.2 5.2 5.5 4.8
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) 5.7 – 4.0 3.2 3.2 3.1 2.8 2.6  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth – 2.6 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 2.2 – 1.6 – 2.1 – 2.3 – 2.0
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.0 3.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.2
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) 2.1 – 6.7 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.2
9. Snow-ball effect 1.0 0.7 – 0.1 – 0.2 0.5 0.0 – 0.2 0.2
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) 0.0 3.3 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.1  
11. Change in gross debt (5) 3.1 – 2.8 1.3 1.5 1.9 1.3 0.5 0.6
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) 51.0 41.2 38.8 40.3 42.2 43.5 44.0 44.5
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.410
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EXTable A.2.15
Contributions to the change in the general government gross debt ratio 
(% of GDP)
Euro area 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) : 0.0 3.1 2.8 2.5 1.6 1.0 0.8
2. Interest payments : 3.9 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 5.7 5.0 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.4
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 4.7 5.3 2.9 4.0 3.3 4.4 4.8 4.4
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) : 0.0 3.1 2.8 2.5 1.6 1.0  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 3.6 – 1.9 – 2.6 – 2.3 – 3.0 – 3.2 – 2.8
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 – 0.1 0.1 0.2
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) : – 3.9 – 0.2 – 0.3 – 0.5 – 1.3 – 1.9 – 2.0
9. Snow-ball effect : 0.3 1.4 0.4 0.7 – 0.1 – 0.3 0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.6 – 0.1 0.1  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : – 2.6 1.2 0.5 0.8 – 1.5 – 2.1 – 1.8
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 69.2 69.2 69.7 70.5 69.0 66.9 65.0
EU-27 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Net borrowing  (1) : – 0.7 3.1 2.8 2.4 1.7 1.2 1.1
2. Interest payments : 3.7 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6
3. Implicit interest rate (2) : 6.0 5.0 4.8 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.6
4. Nominal GDP growth rate (%) 4.3 7.2 1.6 4.9 4.0 5.1 5.6 4.8
Budgetary constraint based on the deficit
5. Deficit (net borrowing) (1) : – 0.7 3.1 2.8 2.4 1.7 1.2  
6. Contribution of nominal GDP growth : – 4.4 – 1.0 – 2.9 – 2.4 – 3.1 – 3.3 – 2.7
7. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : 1.1 – 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2
Budgetary constraint based on the primary deficit
8. Primary deficit (4) : – 4.4 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 1.0 – 1.4 – 1.6
9. Snow-ball effect : – 0.8 2.0 – 0.1 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.7 – 0.1
10. Stock-flow adjustment (3) : 1.1 – 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.2  
11. Change in gross debt (5) : – 4.0 1.6 0.4 0.7 – 1.2 – 1.9 – 1.5
12. Level of gross debt (end of year) : 61.8 61.8 62.2 62.9 61.7 59.9 58.4
(1) Line 1 = line 5. A minus sign means a surplus.
(2) Actual interest payments as a percentage of gross debt at the end of t–1.
(3) Line 7 = line 10. 
(4) Net borrowing excluding interest payments; line 8 = (line 1 minus line 2). A minus sign means a primary surplus.
(5) Line 11 = total of lines 5, 6 and 7 or 8, 9 and 10.
Source: Commission services.411
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EXTable A.3.1
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Belgium 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)
1. Actual data 47.6 49.1 51.1 49.2 49.9 49.3 48.5 48.2
2. Cyclical component – 0.2 1.0 – 0.4 0.0 – 0.5 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data 47.8 48.1 51.5 49.2 50.4 49.4 48.6 48.4
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 51.9 49.1 51.1 49.3 52.3 49.2 48.7 48.5
5. Cyclical component 0.0 – 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 51.9 49.2 51.0 49.2 52.1 49.1 48.7 48.5
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 4.4 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 – 2.4 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.3
8 Cyclical component – 0.2 1.1 – 0.5 0.0 – 0.6 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 4.1 – 1.0 0.5 0.0 – 1.7 0.4 – 0.1 – 0.1
 (as % of potential GDP) – 3.9 – 1.0 0.5 – 0.1 – 1.7 0.5 0.1 0.1
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.4 3.7 1.0 3.0 1.1 3.1 2.3 2.2
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.3 2.3
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 0.8 2.0 – 0.8 0.1 – 1.0 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.6
         
Germany 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 45.1 46.4 44.5 43.4 43.5 44.0 43.7 43.4
2. Cyclical component 0.2 0.8 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.9 – 0.5 – 0.2 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data 44.9 45.7 45.0 44.0 44.4 44.4 43.9 43.4
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 48.3 45.1 48.5 47.1 46.8 45.7 44.3 43.7
5. Cyclical component 0.0 – 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 48.3 45.3 48.3 46.9 46.5 45.6 44.3 43.7
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 3.2 1.3 – 4.0 – 3.7 – 3.2 – 1.7 – 0.6 – 0.3
8 Cyclical component 0.2 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.8 – 1.1 – 0.6 – 0.2 0.1
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 3.4 0.4 – 3.3 – 2.9 – 2.1 – 1.1 – 0.4 – 0.4
 (as % of potential GDP) – 3.2 0.6 – 3.1 – 2.9 – 2.3 – 1.5 – 0.8 – 0.7
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 1.9 3.2 – 0.2 1.2 0.9 2.7 2.5 2.4
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.1 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.8
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP (% of 
potential GDP)
– 0.1 1.4 – 1.6 – 1.5 – 1.8 – 0.3 0.4 0.9
Source: Commission services.412
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EXTable A.3.2
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Ireland 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 39.1 36.2 33.9 35.5 35.5 36.9 36.6 36.4
2. Cyclical component – 1.8 2.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data 40.8 33.9 33.3 35.4 35.5 36.7 36.3 36.3
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 41.0 31.6 33.5 34.0 34.4 34.1 35.2 35.5
5. Cyclical component 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 40.8 31.9 33.6 34.1 34.4 34.1 35.2 35.5
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 2.0 4.6 0.4 1.4 1.0 2.9 1.5 0.9
8 Cyclical component – 2.0 2.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.1
9 Cyclically adjusted balance 0.0 2.1 – 0.3 1.4 1.0 2.6 1.2 0.9
 (as % of potential GDP) – 0.4 2.5 – 0.2 1.3 1.1 3.0 1.8 1.6
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 9.8 10.2 4.3 4.3 5.5 6.0 5.0 4.0
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 7.4 8.1 6.1 5.8 6.0 6.1 5.5 4.8
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 3.4 5.7 1.6 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.9 – 1.6
         
Greece 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)        
1. Actual data 40.9 47.1 43.2 41.9 41.6 43.2 43.0 42.5
2. Cyclical component – 0.7 – 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3
3. Cyclically adjusted data 41.6 47.3 42.8 41.4 41.2 42.7 42.7 42.2
Total expenditure (% of GDP)        
4. Actual data 51.0 51.2 49.5 49.8 47.3 46.1 45.5 45.3
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 51.0 51.1 49.4 49.9 47.1 45.8 45.5 45.2
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)        
Actual balance – 10.2 – 4.1 – 6.3 – 7.8 – 5.7 – 2.9 – 2.5 – 2.8
8. Cyclical component – 0.7 – 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3
9. Cyclically adjusted balance – 9.4 – 3.8 – 6.6 – 8.6 – 5.9 – 3.1 – 2.8 – 3.0
(as % of potential GDP) – 9.0 – 3.4 – 6.5 – 8.7 – 6.2 – 3.4 – 3.1 – 3.5
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.1 4.5 4.8 4.7 3.7 4.3 3.7 3.7
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.2 3.9 4.1 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.7
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 2.4 – 1.3 0.6 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.6
Source: Commission services.413
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EXTable A.3.3
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Spain 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 38.0 38.1 38.2 38.6 39.3 40.3 39.7 39.7
2. Cyclical component – 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data 38.7 37.5 38.1 38.6 39.4 40.3 39.7 39.9
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 44.4 39.0 38.2 38.8 38.2 38.5 38.3 38.5
5. Cyclical component 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 44.3 39.1 38.2 38.7 38.2 38.4 38.3 38.5
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 6.5 – 0.9 0.0 – 0.2 1.1 1.8 1.4 1.2
8 Cyclical component – 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.2
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 5.6 – 1.6 – 0.2 – 0.2 1.2 1.8 1.4 1.4
 (as % of potential GDP)  – 1.8       
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.8 5.0 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.9 3.7 3.4
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.7 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.6
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 3.2 2.2 0.1 – 0.6 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.0 – 1.3
France 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 49.0 50.2 49.2 49.6 50.7 51.0 50.7 50.8
2. Cyclical component – 0.5 1.0 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.3
3. Cyclically adjusted data 49.4 49.2 49.2 49.5 51.0 51.4 51.1 51.1
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 54.5 51.6 53.3 53.2 53.7 53.5 53.2 52.7
5. Cyclical component 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 54.4 51.7 53.3 53.2 53.6 53.4 53.1 52.7
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 5.5 – 1.5 – 4.1 – 3.6 – 3.0 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.0
8 Cyclical component – 0.5 1.1 – 0.1 0.0 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.4 – 0.4
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 4.9 – 2.5 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 2.0 – 1.6
 (as % of potential GDP) – 4.8 – 2.7 – 4.1 – 3.7 – 2.5 – 2.0 – 2.0 – 1.5
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.2 4.0 1.1 2.3 1.2 2.0 2.4 2.3
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 1.3 2.4 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 0.9 – 0.9
Source: Commission services.414
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EXTable A.3.4
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Italy 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 45.1 45.3 44.8 44.2 44.0 45.6 46.0 46.1
2. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.8 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.0
3. Cyclically adjusted data 45.2 44.5 44.9 44.3 44.7 46.1 46.2 46.1
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 52.5 46.2 48.3 47.7 48.3 50.1 48.1 48.3
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 52.5 46.2 48.3 47.7 48.1 50.0 48.1 48.3
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 7.4 – 0.9 – 3.5 – 3.5 – 4.4 – 4.5 – 2.1 – 2.2
8 Cyclical component – 0.1 0.8 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.2 0.0
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 7.3 – 1.7 – 3.4 – 3.3 – 3.4 – 4.0 – 1.9 – 2.2
 (as % of potential GDP) – 7.3 – 1.8 – 3.3 – 3.2 – 3.3 – 3.7 – 1.5 – 1.7
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.8 3.6 0.0 1.2 0.1 1.9 1.9 1.7
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.7
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 0.1 1.9 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 0.9
         
Luxembourg 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 42.1 43.6 42.5 41.9 42.6 40.5 39.4 38.6
2. Cyclical component – 0.9 2.0 – 0.6 – 0.9 – 1.0 – 0.1 0.2 0.5
3. Cyclically adjusted data 43.0 41.6 43.1 42.9 43.6 40.7 39.2 38.1
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 39.7 37.6 42.0 43.2 42.8 40.4 39.0 38.0
5. Cyclical component 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 39.7 37.6 42.0 43.1 42.8 40.4 39.0 38.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance 2.4 6.0 0.4 – 1.2 – 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6
8 Cyclical component – 0.9 2.0 – 0.6 – 0.9 – 1.1 – 0.1 0.3 0.6
9 Cyclically adjusted balance 3.3 4.0 1.0 – 0.3 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.1
 (as % of potential GDP)  4.1       
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 1.4 8.4 1.3 3.6 4.0 6.2 5.0 4.7
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 4.5 4.9 4.5 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.6 4.7
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 2.0 4.6 – 1.8 – 2.2 – 2.5 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.4
Source: Commission services.415
A
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EXTable A.3.5
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Netherlands 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 47.2 46.1 43.9 44.5 45.2 47.2 46.3 46.3
2. Cyclical component – 0.7 1.5 – 0.4 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data 48.0 44.7 44.3 45.0 45.9 47.7 46.6 46.4
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 51.6 44.2 47.1 46.3 45.5 46.7 47.0 46.3
5. Cyclical component 0.3 – 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 51.3 44.7 46.9 46.1 45.1 46.4 46.9 46.2
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 4.3 2.0 – 3.1 – 1.8 – 0.3 0.5 – 0.7 0.0
8 Cyclical component – 1.0 2.0 – 0.6 – 0.7 – 1.1 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 0.2
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 3.3 – 0.1 – 2.6 – 1.1 0.8 1.3 – 0.3 0.3
 (as % of potential GDP) – 3.4 0.2 – 2.1 – 1.0 0.7 1.1 – 0.4 0.1
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 3.0 3.9 0.3 2.0 1.5 2.9 2.8 2.6
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.8 3.0 2.0 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.3
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 1.4 3.2 – 1.7 – 1.5 – 1.8 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 0.1
  
Austria 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 50.3 49.8 49.3 49.0 48.2 48.0 47.4 47.1
2. Cyclical component – 0.2 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.2 0.1 0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data 50.5 48.8 49.9 49.5 48.8 48.1 47.3 46.9
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 56.0 51.4 51.1 50.3 49.9 49.2 48.4 48.1
5. Cyclical component 0.0 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 55.9 51.3 50.9 50.2 49.8 49.1 48.3 48.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 5.7 – 1.6 – 1.8 – 1.3 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 0.9
8 Cyclical component – 0.3 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.2 0.1 0.3
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 5.4 – 2.5 – 1.0 – 0.7 – 1.0 – 0.9 – 1.0 – 1.1
 (as % of potential GDP) – 5.2 – 2.5 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 1.1 – 1.0 – 1.1 – 1.2
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 1.9 3.4 1.1 2.4 2.0 3.1 2.9 2.5
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.2
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 0.9 2.2 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 0.2 0.5 0.8
Source: Commission services.416
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EXTable A.3.6
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Portugal 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 37.6 40.2 42.5 43.1 41.4 42.2 42.3 42.3
2. Cyclical component – 1.0 1.4 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.8 – 0.8 – 0.7
3. Cyclically adjusted data 38.6 38.8 42.6 43.3 42.1 43.1 43.1 43.0
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 42.8 43.1 45.5 46.4 47.5 46.1 45.8 45.5
5. Cyclical component 0.1 – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 42.7 43.2 45.4 46.4 47.5 46.1 45.8 45.4
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 5.2 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 3.3 – 6.0 – 3.9 – 3.5 – 3.2
8 Cyclical component – 1.1 1.5 – 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.7 – 0.9 – 0.9 – 0.8
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 4.1 – 4.4 – 2.8 – 3.1 – 5.3 – 3.0 – 2.6 – 2.4
 (as % of potential GDP) – 4.1 – 4.3 – 2.4 – 2.7 – 5.0 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.6
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 4.3 3.9 – 0.7 1.3 0.5 1.3 1.8 2.0
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.7 2.8 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 2.6 3.1 – 1.1 – 1.3 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 1.7 – 1.2
 
Slovenia 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data : 44.3 45.3 45.1 45.6 44.8 43.9 42.9
2. Cyclical component : 0.5 – 0.6 – 0.4 – 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data : 43.8 45.8 45.5 45.9 44.8 43.7 42.7
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data : 48.1 48.0 47.4 47.0 46.3 45.4 44.4
5. Cyclical component : – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data : 48.2 48.0 47.4 47.0 46.3 45.5 44.4
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance : – 3.8 – 2.8 – 2.3 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.5
8 Cyclical component : 0.6 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.3
9 Cyclically adjusted balance : – 4.5 – 2.1 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.8 – 1.7
 (as % of potential GDP) : – 4.4 – 2.0 – 1.7 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.8 – 1.7
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 4.1 4.1 2.7 4.4 4.0 5.2 4.3 4.0
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 4.4 3.8 3.8 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
: 1.1 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.4
Source: Commission services.417
A
N
N
EXTable A.3.7
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Finland 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 55.4 55.2 52.4 52.3 53.0 52.3 51.3 50.9
2. Cyclical component – 2.0 1.4 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4
3. Cyclically adjusted data 57.3 53.9 52.7 52.5 53.4 51.8 50.8 50.5
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 61.6 48.3 50.0 50.2 50.5 48.6 47.8 47.4
5. Cyclical component 0.5 – 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 61.1 48.6 49.8 49.9 50.2 48.6 47.8 47.4
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 6.2 6.9 2.3 2.1 2.5 3.8 3.6 3.5
8 Cyclical component – 2.4 1.7 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 3.7 5.3 2.9 2.6 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.1
 (as % of potential GDP) – 4.3 5.6 3.3 2.9 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.6
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 3.9 5.0 1.8 3.7 2.9 5.5 3.1 2.7
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 1.9 3.9 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 3.2 3.1 – 1.7 – 1.3 – 1.6 0.4 0.3 – 0.1
Source: Commission services.418
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Table A.3.8
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Bulgaria 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data : : 40.0 41.4 41.4 39.9 39.3 39.6
2. Cyclical component : – 1.7 – 0.8 – 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.4
3. Cyclically adjusted data : : 40.8 41.5 41.0 39.2 38.3 38.2
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data : : 40.9 39.3 39.5 36.6 37.3 37.6
5. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data : : 40.9 39.3 39.5 36.6 37.4 37.6
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 3.4 – 0.5 – 0.9 2.2 1.9 3.3 2.0 2.0
8 Cyclical component : – 1.7 – 0.8 – 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.4
9 Cyclically adjusted balance : 1.3 – 0.1 2.2 1.5 2.6 0.9 0.6
 (as % of potential GDP) : – 1.4 – 0.9 1.7 1.3 2.9 1.6 1.9
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.9 5.4 5.0 6.6 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.2
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 1.1 5.0 5.5 6.2 6.2 6.4 6.6
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
10.6 1.8 0.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.3
 
Czech Republic 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 41.0 38.1 40.7 41.5 40.4 39.5 39.2 39.4
2. Cyclical component 0.8 – 0.4 – 1.0 – 0.9 – 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
3. Cyclically adjusted data 40.2 38.5 41.7 42.4 40.7 39.2 38.8 38.9
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 54.5 41.8 47.3 44.4 44.0 42.5 43.0 42.7
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 54.5 41.8 47.3 44.4 44.0 42.5 43.1 43.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 13.4 – 3.7 – 6.6 – 2.9 – 3.5 – 2.9 – 3.7 – 3.3
8 Cyclical component 0.9 – 0.4 – 1.0 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 14.3 – 3.3 – 5.6 – 2.0 – 3.3 – 3.3 – 4.3 – 4.2
 (as % of potential GDP) : – 3.0 – 5.4 – 1.8 – 3.1 – 3.1 – 4.1 – 3.9
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 5.9 3.6 3.6 4.2 6.1 6.1 4.9 4.9
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 1.8 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.6 4.8 4.9
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
: – 1.8 – 2.9 – 2.8 – 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.5
Source: Commission services.419
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EXTable A.3.9
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Denmark 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 56.4 55.8 55.0 56.7 57.2 55.1 53.8 53.1
2. Cyclical component 0.0 1.3 – 1.0 – 0.9 – 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.0
3. Cyclically adjusted data 56.4 54.5 55.9 57.6 57.7 55.1 53.6 53.1
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 59.2 53.6 55.1 54.8 52.6 50.9 50.3 49.7
5. Cyclical component 0.0 – 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 59.2 53.9 54.7 54.5 52.5 51.0 50.2 49.6
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 2.9 2.3 – 0.1 1.9 4.6 4.2 3.5 3.4
8 Cyclical component 0.0 1.7 – 1.2 – 1.2 – 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 2.8 0.7 1.2 3.2 5.2 4.1 3.5 3.5
 (as % of potential GDP) – 2.8 0.8 1.0 2.8 4.9 4.0 3.6 3.8
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 3.1 3.5 0.4 2.1 3.1 3.2 2.3 2.0
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.3 2.3 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.5
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 0.1 2.6 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 0.5 0.3 0.1 – 0.4
 
Estonia 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 42.8 36.2 37.4 36.6 35.5 37.0 36.2 35.9
2. Cyclical component 0.7 – 0.9 – 0.8 – 0.8 – 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.8
3. Cyclically adjusted data 42.1 37.1 38.2 37.4 35.7 36.3 35.3 35.1
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 42.4 36.5 35.3 34.2 33.2 33.2 32.4 32.4
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 42.5 36.4 35.3 34.2 33.1 33.2 32.5 32.4
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance 0.4 – 0.2 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.8 3.7 3.5
8 Cyclical component 0.7 – 0.9 – 0.9 – 0.8 – 0.2 0.7 0.9 0.9
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 0.4 0.7 2.9 3.2 2.5 3.1 2.9 2.6
 (as % of potential GDP) 2.4 0.4 2.3 2.8 2.4 3.3 3.5 3.8
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 4.5 7.9 7.1 8.1 10.5 11.4 8.7 8.2
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 5.7 7.9 8.6 8.9 9.5 9.8 9.9
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 6.0 – 2.1 – 1.0 – 1.5 – 0.1 1.7 0.7 – 0.9
Source: Commission services.420
A
N
N
EXTable A.3.10
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Cyprus 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)
1. Actual data : 34.7 38.8 38.8 41.2 42.4 42.6 42.6
2. Cyclical component : 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data : 34.1 39.3 39.1 41.4 42.5 42.6 42.5
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data : 37.0 45.1 42.9 43.6 43.9 44.0 43.9
5. Cyclical component : 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data : 37.0 45.1 42.9 43.6 43.9 44.0 43.9
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance : – 2.3 – 6.3 – 4.1 – 2.3 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.4
8 Cyclical component : 0.6 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.1 0.0 0.1
9 Cyclically adjusted balance : – 2.9 – 5.8 – 3.8 – 2.2 – 1.4 – 1.4 – 1.5
 (as % of potential GDP) : – 3.1 – 6.1 – 3.8 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.1
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 9.9 5.0 1.8 4.2 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.9
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 3.3 3.8 4.4 4.4 3.5 3.6 3.7
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
0.9 2.1 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.6
  
Latvia 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 36.8 34.6 33.2 34.7 35.2 37.4 37.5 36.5
2. Cyclical component 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.9 – 0.8 – 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.9
3. Cyclically adjusted data 35.9 35.3 34.1 35.5 35.5 36.8 36.6 35.6
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 38.8 37.3 34.8 35.8 35.5 37.0 37.3 36.4
5. Cyclical component – 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 38.9 37.3 34.7 35.7 35.4 37.0 37.4 36.5
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 2.0 – 2.8 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1
8 Cyclical component 1.0 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.2 0.7 1.0 0.9
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 3.0 – 2.0 – 0.6 – 0.2 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.8 – 0.9
 (as % of potential GDP – 0.1 – 2.4 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.4
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) – 0.9 6.9 7.2 8.7 10.6 11.9 9.6 7.9
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 6.1 7.7 8.7 9.7 10.2 10.2 10.0
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 5.6 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 0.2 1.4 0.8 – 1.2
Source: Commission services.421
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EXTable A.3.11
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Lithuania 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 34.1 35.9 32.0 31.8 33.1 33.3 34.4 34.9
2. Cyclical component 0.2 – 1.3 – 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.8
3. Cyclically adjusted data 33.9 37.2 32.0 31.7 32.8 32.8 33.7 34.2
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 35.7 39.1 33.2 33.4 33.6 33.6 34.8 36.0
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 35.7 39.1 33.2 33.4 33.6 33.6 34.9 36.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 1.6 – 3.2 – 1.3 – 1.5 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 1.0
8 Cyclical component 0.2 – 1.4 – 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 1.8 – 1.9 – 1.2 – 1.6 – 0.8 – 0.8 – 1.2 – 1.8
 (as % of potential GDP) 0.1 – 2.2 – 1.9 – 2.0 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 1.0
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 3.3 4.1 10.3 7.3 7.6 7.5 7.3 6.3
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 4.0 7.0 7.7 7.9 7.6 8.1 7.0
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 6.1 – 3.2 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.3 0.6 – 0.1
Hungary 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data : 43.6 41.9 42.5 42.2 43.7 44.0 44.1
2. Cyclical component 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.3 – 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data : 43.5 41.9 42.0 41.5 43.0 43.8 44.2
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data : 46.5 49.1 48.9 50.0 53.0 50.9 49.0
5. Cyclical component : 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data : 46.5 49.2 48.9 50.0 52.9 50.9 49.0
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance : – 3.0 – 7.2 – 6.4 – 7.8 – 9.2 – 6.8 – 4.9
8 Cyclical component : 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.3 – 0.1
9 Cyclically adjusted balance : – 2.9 – 7.3 – 6.9 – 8.5 – 10.0 – 7.1 – 4.8
 (as % of potential GDP) : – 2.8 – 6.8 – 6.5 – 8.0 – 9.7 – 6.9 – 4.7
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 1.5 5.2 4.1 4.9 4.2 3.9 2.4 2.6
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 4.4 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.4 3.2 3.1
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
1.6 – 0.3 – 0.7 0.1 0.5 1.0 0.2 – 0.4
Source: Commission services.422
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Table A.3.12
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Malta 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data : 34.9 38.6 41.9 42.9 42.7 42.2 41.9
2. Cyclical component : 1.7 – 0.7 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.4 0.0 0.3
3. Cyclically adjusted data : 33.2 39.3 43.1 43.7 43.1 42.2 41.6
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data : 41.0 48.6 46.8 46.0 45.2 44.3 43.4
5. Cyclical component : 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data : 41.1 48.6 46.8 46.0 45.2 44.3 43.5
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance : – 6.2 – 10.0 – 4.9 – 3.1 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 1.6
8 Cyclical component : 1.7 – 0.7 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.4 0.0 0.3
9 Cyclically adjusted balance : – 7.9 – 9.3 – 3.7 – 2.3 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 1.9
 (as % of potential GDP) : – 8.2 – 9.0 – 3.5 – 2.1 – 2.0 – 1.9 – 1.6
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 6.2 6.4 – 2.3 0.4 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.8
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 3.7 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.1
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 1.4 5.5 – 2.1 – 3.4 – 2.5 – 1.5 – 0.6 0.1
 
Poland 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 43.3 38.0 38.4 36.9 39.0 39.4 39.0 38.0
2. Cyclical component – 1.0 0.8 – 1.0 – 0.6 – 0.7 – 0.2 0.4 0.9
3. Cyclically adjusted data 44.3 37.3 39.4 37.5 39.8 39.6 38.5 37.1
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 47.7 41.1 44.6 42.6 43.4 43.3 42.4 41.4
5. Cyclical component 0.2 – 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.2
6. Cyclically adjusted data 47.5 41.2 44.5 42.5 43.2 43.3 42.5 41.5
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 4.4 – 3.0 – 6.3 – 5.7 – 4.3 – 3.9 – 3.4 – 3.3
8 Cyclical component – 1.2 0.9 – 1.2 – 0.7 – 0.9 – 0.2 0.5 1.1
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 3.3 – 3.9 – 5.1 – 5.0 – 3.4 – 3.7 – 4.0 – 4.4
 (as % of potential GDP) – 3.4 – 3.3 – 5.7 – 5.8 – 4.1 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 3.3
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 7.0 4.2 3.8 5.3 3.5 5.8 6.1 5.5
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 3.3 3.0 3.6 4.3 5.2 5.9 6.1
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 2.2 0.7 – 1.3 0.3 – 0.4 0.1 0.4 – 0.2
Source: Commission services.423
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EXTable A.3.13
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Romania 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data : 43.8 32.1 31.1 32.4 30.1 30.4 31.0
2. Cyclical component : – 3.0 – 0.8 0.2 – 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.8
3. Cyclically adjusted data : 46.8 32.9 30.9 32.5 29.7 29.7 30.2
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data : 40.6 33.6 32.6 33.7 32.0 33.6 34.2
5. Cyclical component : 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data : 48.3 33.5 32.6 33.7 32.0 33.6 34.2
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance : 3.2 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.9 – 3.2 – 3.2
8 Cyclical component : – 3.1 – 0.9 0.2 – 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.8
9 Cyclically adjusted balance : – 1.5 – 0.6 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 2.3 – 3.9 – 4.0
 (as % of potential GDP) : – 1.2 – 0.6 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 2.2 – 3.5 – 3.3
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 7.1 2.1 5.2 8.5 4.1 7.7 6.7 6.3
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 2.1 4.1 4.8 5.4 6.1 6.7 7.1
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
4.7 – 7.6 – 2.7 0.7 – 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.2
 
Slovakia 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 45.2 39.8 37.2 35.3 35.2 33.9 33.1 32.8
2. Cyclical component – 0.4 – 0.7 – 1.0 – 0.9 – 0.8 0.0 0.7 0.8
3. Cyclically adjusted data 45.7 40.5 38.3 36.2 36.0 34.0 32.4 32.0
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 47.0 51.7 40.0 37.7 38.1 37.3 36.0 35.6
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 – 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 47.0 51.6 39.9 37.6 38.0 37.3 36.0 35.6
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 1.8 – 11.8 – 2.7 – 2.4 – 2.8 – 3.4 – 2.9 – 2.8
8 Cyclical component – 0.5 – 0.7 – 1.1 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.1 0.7 0.9
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 1.3 – 11.1 – 1.6 – 1.4 – 2.0 – 3.3 – 3.6 – 3.7
 (as % of potential GDP) : – 10.8 – 1.9 – 1.6 – 2.0 – 3.3 – 3.4 – 3.4
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 5.8 0.7 4.2 5.4 6.0 8.3 8.5 6.5
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 2.4 4.5 5.1 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.4
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
: – 2.4 – 2.8 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 0.4 1.7 1.8
Source: Commission services.424
A
N
N
EXTable A.3.14
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Sweden 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 59.7 60.9 57.1 57.4 58.4 57.5 55.2 54.9
2. Cyclical component – 0.4 1.3 – 0.7 – 0.2 – 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5
3. Cyclically adjusted data 60.1 59.6 57.8 57.6 58.7 57.3 54.8 54.4
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 67.1 57.1 58.2 56.8 56.5 55.4 53.0 52.5
5. Cyclical component 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 – 0.1
6. Cyclically adjusted data 67.1 57.3 57.8 56.5 56.2 55.3 53.1 52.6
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 7.4 3.8 – 1.1 0.6 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.4
8 Cyclical component – 0.5 1.5 – 0.9 – 0.3 – 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.5
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 7.0 2.3 0.0 1.1 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.8
 (as % of potential GDP) – 6.4 2.8 0.2 1.2 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.9
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 3.9 4.3 1.7 4.1 2.9 4.4 3.8 3.3
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.2 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.0
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 1.8 1.9 – 1.8 – 0.7 – 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.8
 
United Kingdom 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data 38.6 40.7 39.2 39.5 40.6 41.3 41.6 41.9
2. Cyclical component – 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
3. Cyclically adjusted data 38.9 40.2 39.2 39.3 40.7 41.3 41.4 41.7
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data 44.3 36.8 42.4 42.7 43.7 44.1 44.2 44.3
5. Cyclical component 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data 44.3 36.8 42.4 42.7 43.7 44.1 44.2 44.3
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance – 5.7 4.0 – 3.2 – 3.2 – 3.1 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 2.4
8 Cyclical component – 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
9 Cyclically adjusted balance – 5.4 3.4 – 3.2 – 3.4 – 3.0 – 2.8 – 2.8 – 2.6
 (as % of potential GDP) – 5.6 3.5 – 3.3 – 3.5 – 3.0 – 2.7 – 2.5 – 2.2
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.9 3.8 2.7 3.3 1.9 2.8 2.8 2.5
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.5 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
– 0.5 1.3 0.0 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.5
Source: Commission services.425
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EXTable A.3.15
Cyclical adjustment of general government revenue, expenditure and budget balances
Euro area 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data : 46.3 45.1 44.8 45.1 45.8 45.5 45.4
2. Cyclical component : 0.9 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.1
3. Cyclically adjusted data : 45.4 45.3 45.0 45.7 46.1 45.7 45.5
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data : 46.3 48.2 47.6 47.6 47.4 46.5 46.2
5. Cyclical component : – 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data : 46.5 48.1 47.5 47.4 47.3 46.5 46.2
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance : 0.0 – 3.1 – 2.8 – 2.5 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 0.8
8 Cyclical component : 1.0 – 0.3 – 0.3 – 0.7 – 0.4 – 0.2 – 0.1
9 Cyclically adjusted balance : – 1.0 – 2.8 – 2.5 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.7
 (as % of potential GDP) : – 1.0 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.7
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.5 3.9 0.8 2.0 1.4 2.7 2.6 2.4
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
: 2.0 – 0.7 – 0.7 – 1.3 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.2
EU-27 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total revenue (% of GDP)         
1. Actual data : : 44.3 44.1 44.5 45.1 44.8 44.7
2. Cyclical component : 0.8 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.2 0.0 0.0
3. Cyclically adjusted data : : 44.6 44.3 45.0 45.3 44.8 44.6
Total expenditure (% of GDP)         
4. Actual data : : 47.4 46.9 47.0 46.8 46.0 45.7
5. Cyclical component : – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
6. Cyclically adjusted data : : 47.3 46.8 46.8 46.7 46.0 45.7
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) (% of GDP)         
7 Actual balance : 0.7 – 3.1 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 1.1
8 Cyclical component : 0.9 – 0.3 – 0.2 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.1 0.0
9 Cyclically adjusted balance : – 0.2 – 2.8 – 2.5 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.2 – 1.1
 (as % of potential GDP) : – 0.2 – 2.7 – 2.5 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 0.9
10. GDP at constant prices (annual % change) 2.7 3.9 1.3 2.5 1.7 2.9 2.8 2.6
11. Potential GDP at constant prices (annual % change) : 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.6
12. Gap between actual and potential GDP 
(% of potential GDP)
: 1.7 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 1.1 – 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.3
Source: Commission services.426
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EXTable A.4.1
Current tax burden; total economy — ESA 1995
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 45.5 46.9 46.6 46.4 47.1 46.6 46.0 45.9
DE 41.2 43.2 41.0 40.0 40.0 40.7 40.6 40.4
IE 34.7 32.7 30.3 31.8 32.0 33.4 33.3 33.3
EL 34.4 39.7 37.9 36.6 36.6 36.7 36.8 36.5
ES 33.3 35.0 34.9 35.4 36.4 37.3 37.2 37.4
FR 44.4 45.7 44.4 44.6 45.2 45.9 45.7 45.7
IT 41.3 42.0 40.3 40.3 40.7 42.6 43.0 43.1
LU 38.1 39.9 39.2 38.7 39.3 37.0 36.1 35.4
NL 41.1 40.6 38.1 38.4 38.8 40.3 40.1 40.2
AT 43.5 44.7 44.8 44.4 43.7 43.5 43.0 42.6
PT 32.7 35.1 35.9 35.1 36.0 36.7 37.0 36.9
FI 46.2 47.1 43.9 43.3 43.8 43.3 42.7 42.6
SI : 38.8 39.8 39.9 40.5 40.2 39.3 38.5
EU-13 : 42.5 40.8 40.6 40.9 41.7 41.6 41.6
BG : 36.6 33.4 34.6 34.9 33.7 33.0 33.2
CZ 36.2 33.9 35.8 36.8 36.3 35.3 35.0 34.9
DK 49.8 50.1 48.9 50.1 51.1 49.5 48.4 48.0
EE 36.7 31.3 31.6 31.5 31.0 31.4 31.3 31.2
CY : 29.9 33.0 32.8 34.7 37.0 37.5 37.5
LV 33.2 29.7 28.7 28.7 29.2 30.4 30.3 29.3
LT 28.6 30.5 28.3 28.7 29.2 29.7 30.6 30.8
HU 41.8 38.5 37.6 37.6 37.4 37.6 38.4 38.3
MT : 29.2 33.2 35.1 35.7 36.1 36.3 36.1
PL 37.2 32.7 32.5 31.8 33.1 33.9 33.6 32.7
RO : 35.3 28.0 27.8 28.7 27.5 27.4 27.5
SK 40.7 34.1 32.2 31.7 31.9 29.9 29.3 29.1
SE 49.0 53.1 50.2 50.6 51.4 50.5 48.5 48.5
UK 36.2 38.0 36.2 36.5 37.5 38.3 38.4 38.8
EU-27 : 41.7 40.1 39.9 40.4 41.0 40.8 40.8
Source: Commission services.427
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.2
Social contributions received; general government — ESA 1995
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 16.4 16.0 16.5 16.2 16.1 15.9 15.8 15.8
DE 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.0 17.7 17.4 16.5 16.4
IE 6.7 5.7 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2
EL 12.6 13.7 15.3 14.6 14.4 14.9 14.9 14.6
ES 12.7 12.9 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 12.9 12.8
FR 20.3 17.9 18.2 18.0 18.2 18.4 18.3 18.3
IT 14.4 12.4 12.6 12.7 12.9 13.0 13.5 13.6
LU 11.0 10.9 11.8 11.8 11.7 11.0 10.7 10.4
NL 17.1 16.4 14.7 15.0 14.1 15.3 15.0 14.9
AT 17.1 16.6 16.3 16.1 16.1 16.0 15.8 15.7
PT 10.4 11.2 12.2 12.2 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.4
FI 14.7 12.1 11.9 11.8 12.2 12.3 12.2 12.2
SI : 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.1 14.9 14.7 14.6
EU-13 : 15.9 15.8 15.6 15.5 15.6 15.3 15.3
BG 12.0 12.2 10.6 10.5 10.3 8.8 8.7 8.7
CZ 14.4 14.2 15.1 15.1 15.1 15.0 14.7 14.5
DK 2.1 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9
EE 12.7 11.1 11.0 10.8 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.2
CY : 6.5 7.0 7.7 8.3 8.0 8.1 8.1
LV 12.0 10.1 9.1 8.9 8.6 8.9 8.6 8.2
LT 7.5 9.4 8.6 8.7 8.6 8.8 9.2 9.1
HU 15.2 12.9 12.6 12.4 12.6 12.8 12.9 12.7
MT : 7.5 8.1 8.2 8.6 8.0 8.0 7.8
PL 11.3 12.9 12.8 12.3 12.3 12.2 11.6 10.4
RO : 12.3 9.9 9.6 10.5 10.2 10.0 9.8
SK 14.2 13.7 14.0 13.3 12.9 12.1 11.8 11.6
SE 13.0 14.2 14.2 14.0 13.9 13.2 13.1 13.0
UK 7.4 7.5 7.8 8.0 8.4 8.2 8.2 8.3
EU-27 : 14.0 14.0 13.9 13.9 13.8 13.6 13.5
Source: Commission services.428
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EXTable A.4.3
Current taxes on income and wealth (direct taxes); general government — ESA 1995
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 16.3 17.1 16.7 16.7 17.1 16.7 16.4 16.3
DE 10.8 12.3 10.5 10.0 10.2 10.8 10.9 10.8
IE 13.5 13.3 11.8 12.4 12.3 13.1 13.0 12.9
EL 7.4 10.6 8.7 8.8 9.2 8.7 8.6 8.6
ES 9.9 10.2 10.1 10.2 10.9 11.7 11.6 11.8
FR 8.1 12.0 10.9 11.1 11.3 11.9 11.7 11.8
IT 14.5 14.4 13.4 13.3 13.4 14.5 14.7 14.8
LU 15.3 14.9 14.7 13.2 14.0 13.2 13.1 13.1
NL 12.3 11.6 10.7 10.5 11.6 11.8 12.1 12.4
AT 11.6 13.1 13.6 13.4 12.9 13.2 13.1 13.1
PT 8.4 9.8 8.6 8.5 8.6 8.9 9.2 9.3
FI 17.3 21.1 17.7 17.5 17.6 17.1 16.8 16.7
SI : 7.5 8.2 8.5 9.0 9.4 9.1 8.8
EU-13 : 12.7 11.5 11.4 11.6 12.2 12.2 12.3
BG 11.8 9.4 6.8 6.3 6.0 5.6 5.2 5.2
CZ 9.6 8.3 9.6 9.7 9.3 8.8 8.8 9.0
DK 30.7 30.3 29.3 30.3 31.2 29.5 28.7 28.4
EE 10.6 7.8 8.3 8.2 7.1 7.2 7.1 6.8
CY : 10.9 9.6 8.0 9.3 10.9 10.9 10.9
LV 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.9 7.9 8.4 8.5 8.3
LT 8.7 8.5 8.0 8.7 9.1 9.7 9.9 10.0
HU 9.1 9.5 9.4 9.0 9.0 9.4 10.0 10.3
MT : 9.1 12.0 11.8 11.6 12.3 12.2 12.1
PL 11.7 7.2 6.6 6.4 7.0 7.5 7.8 8.1
RO : 6.6 5.7 6.3 5.3 5.2 5.8 6.2
SK 11.5 7.6 7.0 6.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9
SE 19.9 22.2 18.6 19.4 20.2 20.0 18.0 18.1
UK 14.9 16.5 15.0 15.2 16.2 17.0 17.1 17.3
EU-27 : 13.7 12.4 12.4 12.7 13.3 13.2 13.3
Source: Commission services.429
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EXTable A.4.4
Taxes linked to imports and production (indirect taxes); general government — ESA 1995 
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 11.9 12.9 12.7 13.0 13.2 13.3 13.2 13.2
DE 11.1 11.9 11.8 11.8 11.8 12.1 12.9 12.8
IE 13.4 13.1 12.3 13.1 13.5 14.0 14.0 14.1
EL 13.5 14.9 13.3 12.8 12.6 13.1 13.2 13.2
ES 10.0 11.4 11.5 11.9 12.1 12.3 12.3 12.3
FR 15.2 15.2 15.0 15.3 15.5 15.4 15.4 15.4
IT 11.8 14.7 14.0 14.1 14.2 14.8 14.5 14.4
LU 11.0 13.5 12.4 13.5 13.5 12.6 12.1 11.7
NL 10.7 11.7 12.1 12.5 12.6 12.9 12.7 12.8
AT 13.9 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.4 14.0 13.8 13.5
PT 12.9 13.5 14.8 14.1 14.9 15.4 15.3 15.3
FI 13.5 13.5 13.9 13.8 13.9 13.6 13.5 13.5
SI : 16.3 16.6 16.2 16.1 15.6 15.1 14.8
EU-13 : 13.3 13.1 13.3 13.4 13.6 13.7 13.7
BG 12.8 13.8 16.0 17.7 18.6 19.3 19.0 19.2
CZ 12.3 11.3 11.1 11.7 11.6 11.0 10.9 10.9
DK 16.8 17.0 17.2 17.5 17.7 17.8 17.5 17.4
EE 13.5 12.4 12.4 12.2 13.2 13.4 13.7 14.0
CY : 12.4 16.4 16.9 16.9 17.8 18.3 18.3
LV 14.1 12.3 12.1 11.7 12.4 12.7 12.6 12.3
LT 12.4 12.6 11.7 11.1 11.2 11.2 11.6 11.8
HU 17.4 16.1 15.6 16.1 15.5 15.1 15.2 14.9
MT : 12.6 13.1 14.8 15.0 15.5 15.9 15.9
PL 14.2 12.6 13.2 12.9 13.6 13.9 13.9 14.0
RO : 16.4 12.5 11.8 12.9 12.2 11.6 11.6
SK 15.1 12.8 12.2 12.3 12.7 11.5 11.2 11.1
SE 15.4 16.3 17.0 16.9 17.0 17.1 17.1 17.0
UK 12.9 13.3 12.9 12.9 12.7 12.7 12.8 12.9
EU-27 : 13.5 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 13.7
Source: Commission services.430
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EXTable A.4.5
Other current revenue; general government — ESA 1995
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 3.3 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
DE 3.6 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.6
IE 2.8 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0
EL 4.5 3.6 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.2
ES 4.2 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.2 2.9 2.9
FR 4.4 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.1
IT 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
LU 4.8 4.3 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.2
NL 5.9 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.3 5.7 5.1 5.1
AT 4.9 3.2 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.3
PT 3.9 3.3 3.4 3.9 3.4 4.0 3.9 3.9
FI 7.2 6.0 5.8 6.0 5.9 6.0 5.8 5.7
SI : 3.7 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.5 3.4 3.4
EU-13 : 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.4 3.4
BG 2.1 13.7 5.2 5.4 4.7 5.0 4.6 4.4
CZ 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.3 5.8 5.8 5.2 4.8
DK 5.2 4.2 4.2 4.5 4.2 4.1 3.7 3.6
EE 8.6 3.6 4.3 4.0 3.2 4.2 4.9 4.3
CY : 3.1 4.0 3.7 4.0 3.4 3.0 3.0
LV 6.3 7.2 5.8 5.6 5.1 5.6 5.3 5.1
LT 6.2 5.7 3.2 2.9 3.1 2.6 2.7 2.9
HU : 5.9 4.6 5.0 4.7 5.6 5.1 4.9
MT : 5.7 6.0 6.1 4.9 4.8 4.4 4.2
PL 5.7 4.7 5.3 5.0 6.0 5.7 5.4 5.0
RO : 7.1 7.3 4.3 4.9 3.7 4.8 5.3
SK 7.8 7.7 6.0 5.9 5.4 6.0 5.8 5.6
SE 8.1 5.8 4.7 4.5 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.7
UK 2.8 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0
EU-27 : 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.3
Source: Commission services.431
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EXTable A.4.6
Total current revenue; general government — ESA 1995 
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 47.8 49.0 48.8 48.4 49.1 48.7 48.1 48.0
DE 43.9 45.6 43.6 42.6 42.6 43.1 42.9 42.6
IE 36.4 34.3 31.9 33.6 33.8 35.3 35.2 35.2
EL 38.1 42.7 39.8 38.5 38.3 38.8 39.1 38.6
ES 36.8 37.8 37.9 38.1 39.1 40.2 39.7 39.7
FR 48.0 48.9 47.7 48.2 48.8 49.6 49.5 49.6
IT 44.5 44.9 43.4 43.6 44.0 45.8 46.2 46.3
LU 42.0 43.6 42.4 41.9 42.4 40.3 39.2 38.4
NL 45.9 44.6 42.4 42.9 43.6 45.7 44.9 45.0
AT 47.5 47.2 48.2 47.8 47.1 46.8 46.1 45.7
PT 35.7 37.8 39.1 38.7 39.4 40.6 40.9 40.8
FI 52.7 52.6 49.4 49.0 49.5 49.0 48.3 48.0
SI : 42.5 43.4 43.6 44.0 43.4 42.4 41.5
EU-13 : 45.3 43.8 43.7 44.0 44.9 44.7 44.6
BG 38.8 49.1 38.6 39.9 39.6 38.7 37.6 37.5
CZ 42.3 40.0 42.1 42.8 41.8 40.6 39.6 39.2
DK 54.8 54.1 52.9 54.4 55.1 53.4 51.9 51.3
EE 45.5 34.9 35.9 35.2 34.0 35.3 36.0 35.3
CY : 33.1 37.0 36.3 38.4 40.1 40.3 40.3
LV 39.5 36.9 34.4 34.1 34.0 35.7 35.1 34.0
LT 34.8 36.2 31.5 31.3 31.9 32.3 33.3 33.8
HU : 44.4 42.2 42.4 41.8 42.9 43.3 42.9
MT : 34.9 39.2 40.9 40.1 40.5 40.4 40.0
PL 42.9 37.4 37.9 36.6 38.9 39.3 38.7 37.4
RO : 42.4 35.4 32.0 33.6 31.3 32.2 32.8
SK 48.5 41.8 39.1 37.5 37.0 35.5 34.6 34.3
SE 56.5 58.4 54.5 54.7 55.8 55.0 53.1 52.9
UK 38.0 39.8 37.9 38.2 39.2 39.8 40.1 40.5
EU-27 : 44.6 43.1 43.0 43.4 44.1 43.9 43.8
Source: Commission services.432
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.7
Interest general government — ESA 1995
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 8.9 6.6 5.4 4.8 4.4 4.2 4.0 3.8
DE 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
IE 5.3 1.9 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
EL 12.7 8.1 5.5 5.3 5.0 4.9 4.5 4.3
ES 5.1 3.2 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5
FR 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5
IT 11.6 6.4 5.2 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.8
LU 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
NL 5.6 3.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1
AT 3.9 3.7 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.7
PT 5.9 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0
FI 3.9 2.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.5
SI : 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4
EU-13 : 3.9 3.3 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9
BG 14.1 4.0 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.1
CZ 1.0 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3
DK 5.9 3.7 2.8 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.3
EE 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
CY : 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1
LV 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3
LT 0.4 1.8 1.3 0.9 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.8
HU : 5.4 4.0 4.4 4.1 3.9 4.1 3.9
MT : 3.6 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.3 3.3
PL 5.7 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.6
RO : 4.4 1.6 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8
SK 2.4 4.1 2.5 2.2 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3
SE 6.6 4.2 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7
UK 3.6 2.7 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2
EU-27 : 3.7 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.6
Source: Commission services.433
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.8
Final consumption expenditure; general government — ESA 1995
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 21.5 21.3 23.0 22.9 22.9 22.6 22.6 22.7
DE 19.6 19.0 19.3 18.8 18.7 18.5 18.1 17.9
IE 16.3 13.8 15.1 15.7 15.9 15.9 16.0 16.2
EL 15.3 17.3 16.8 16.7 16.1 15.5 15.1 15.1
ES 18.1 17.2 17.4 17.8 18.0 17.9 18.1 18.3
FR 23.6 22.9 23.7 23.7 23.8 23.7 23.5 23.2
IT 18.0 18.4 19.7 19.9 20.4 20.3 19.9 20.0
LU 15.9 15.1 16.4 17.1 17.0 15.9 15.3 15.0
NL 23.8 22.0 24.5 24.3 24.1 25.3 25.4 25.4
AT 20.1 18.4 18.3 18.2 18.2 18.1 17.7 17.7
PT 17.7 19.3 20.3 20.6 21.2 20.5 20.1 19.8
FI 22.8 20.3 21.7 21.9 22.1 21.4 21.1 21.1
SI : 19.3 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.3 19.1 19.0
EU-13 : 19.7 20.5 20.4 20.5 20.4 20.1 20.1
BG 15.3 17.9 19.0 18.4 18.0 17.4 17.1 16.9
CZ 20.9 21.1 23.4 22.4 22.3 21.5 21.6 21.2
DK 25.2 25.1 26.5 26.6 25.9 25.6 25.3 25.2
EE 26.6 19.9 18.7 18.5 17.4 16.7 16.4 16.0
CY : 16.1 19.8 17.9 18.1 18.0 18.0 18.0
LV 24.5 20.8 21.4 19.5 17.4 16.9 16.7 16.2
LT 21.7 21.3 18.4 17.9 16.7 17.3 17.5 17.5
HU 22.9 20.9 23.2 22.4 22.5 22.5 21.4 20.1
MT : 19.1 21.4 21.9 21.1 21.1 20.4 19.9
PL 18.7 17.4 18.1 17.6 18.1 18.1 17.3 16.4
RO : 16.1 19.0 16.2 18.0 18.1 18.0 18.1
SK 21.3 19.9 20.4 19.2 18.6 19.2 18.4 18.1
SE 27.0 26.3 28.1 27.4 27.1 26.7 26.5 26.4
UK 19.6 18.6 20.5 20.9 21.5 21.8 21.8 21.8
EU-27 : 19.8 20.8 20.7 20.9 20.8 20.6 20.5
Source: Commission services.434
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.9
Compensation of employees; general government — ESA 1995 
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 11.9 11.5 12.3 12.0 12.1 12.0 11.8 11.6
DE 8.7 8.1 7.8 7.7 7.5 7.3 6.9 6.8
IE 10.1 8.0 9.0 9.4 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.4
EL 11.3 11.5 11.8 12.5 12.3 11.9 11.9 11.9
ES 11.2 10.3 10.1 10.1 10.0 10.0 9.7 9.5
FR 13.6 13.3 13.5 13.3 13.3 13.1 13.0 12.8
IT 11.0 10.4 10.8 10.8 11.0 11.0 10.8 10.9
LU 8.5 7.5 8.1 8.2 8.1 7.7 7.5 7.3
NL 10.6 9.5 10.1 10.0 9.9 9.4 9.4 9.3
AT 12.5 10.9 9.5 9.3 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.1
PT 12.9 14.2 14.1 14.1 14.4 13.5 13.0 12.6
FI 15.1 13.0 13.6 13.5 13.8 13.3 13.0 12.9
SI : 11.6 12.1 12.0 12.0 11.7 11.5 11.3
EU-13 : 10.4 10.5 10.4 10.4 10.3 10.0 10.0
BG 9.3 10.0 9.4 9.2 8.7 8.2 8.1 8.0
CZ 7.3 7.1 8.3 8.0 8.0 7.8 7.8 7.7
DK 17.2 17.1 18.0 17.9 17.2 17.1 16.7 16.5
EE 11.4 10.9 10.0 10.0 9.4 8.9 8.5 8.3
CY : 13.5 15.6 14.8 14.8 14.8 14.7 14.7
LV 11.2 10.8 10.7 10.5 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.0
LT 10.0 12.2 10.9 10.9 10.4 10.5 11.0 11.1
HU 11.9 10.5 13.1 12.6 12.6 12.1 11.3 10.4
MT : 13.0 15.0 15.0 14.5 13.8 13.4 13.0
PL 10.7 10.1 10.7 10.1 10.1 9.7 9.5 9.1
RO : 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.9 8.8 9.1 9.1
SK 9.3 8.7 8.8 8.1 7.3 7.5 7.2 7.0
SE 16.6 15.6 16.5 16.3 16.1 15.6 15.4 15.4
UK 10.7 9.8 10.7 10.9 11.2 11.3 11.0 11.0
EU-27 : 10.5 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.7 10.4 10.3
Source: Commission services.435
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.10
Total current expenditure; general government — ESA 1995
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 49.8 46.3 48.1 47.1 47.3 46.7 46.5 46.4
DE 44.0 44.0 44.9 43.9 43.5 42.6 41.3 40.7
IE 36.3 26.4 28.0 28.9 29.1 28.7 29.6 29.8
EL 44.9 42.9 41.6 41.3 40.7 39.9 39.5 39.3
ES 38.7 34.8 33.9 34.1 33.9 33.8 34.0 34.2
FR 48.9 46.7 48.4 48.4 48.5 48.4 47.9 47.6
IT 48.3 43.6 44.3 44.2 44.7 44.5 44.5 44.7
LU 34.6 33.0 36.2 37.4 36.7 34.6 33.4 32.5
NL 46.8 40.1 41.7 41.6 40.7 42.0 41.7 41.3
AT 48.5 45.6 46.6 45.6 45.4 44.8 44.0 43.6
PT 37.6 37.2 40.5 41.2 42.5 42.1 41.8 41.5
FI 53.4 43.2 44.3 44.2 44.5 42.9 42.3 42.1
SI : 41.6 41.6 41.4 41.4 40.7 40.0 39.6
EU-13 : 43.1 43.8 43.4 43.3 42.9 42.4 42.1
BG 41.5 44.2 35.5 34.3 33.7 31.9 32.3 32.2
CZ 36.5 37.6 40.7 38.8 38.3 37.3 37.1 36.2
DK 55.7 50.2 51.6 51.1 49.0 47.5 47.0 46.5
EE 38.6 31.3 29.6 30.4 29.4 28.4 29.8 29.3
CY : 32.0 39.3 36.9 38.2 37.8 38.0 38.0
LV 39.3 36.7 33.3 31.4 30.1 30.8 30.4 29.0
LT 31.6 34.7 29.7 29.4 29.4 29.1 29.3 29.6
HU : 41.9 44.3 44.5 45.0 46.6 45.2 43.5
MT : 37.2 41.3 42.7 41.7 41.3 39.9 39.2
PL 43.4 37.5 39.5 38.3 39.2 38.8 37.4 36.1
RO : 36.6 31.8 28.7 30.3 28.8 30.1 30.4
SK 41.6 40.6 38.9 37.2 36.0 35.9 34.5 34.1
SE 59.6 51.8 52.6 51.2 50.8 49.6 47.5 47.0
UK 40.8 36.7 38.9 39.2 40.2 40.1 40.1 40.1
EU-27 : 42.1 43.2 42.8 42.8 42.4 41.8 41.5
Source: Commission services.436
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.11
Gross saving; general government — ESA 1995
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE – 1.9 2.6 0.7 1.3 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.6
DE – 0.1 1.6 – 1.3 – 1.3 – 0.9 0.6 1.6 2.0
IE 0.1 7.8 3.9 4.8 4.7 6.6 5.6 5.3
EL – 6.8 – 0.2 – 1.8 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 1.1 – 0.4 – 0.7
ES – 1.9 3.0 3.9 4.0 5.1 6.4 5.6 5.5
FR – 0.8 2.2 – 0.7 – 0.1 0.3 1.2 1.6 2.0
IT – 3.8 1.3 – 0.9 – 0.5 – 0.7 1.2 1.8 1.6
LU 7.4 10.7 6.2 4.5 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.9
NL – 0.8 4.5 0.7 1.3 2.8 3.7 3.2 3.7
AT – 1.0 1.6 1.6 2.2 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.1
PT – 2.0 0.6 – 1.4 – 2.4 – 3.2 – 1.5 – 1.0 – 0.7
FI – 0.7 9.4 5.0 4.9 5.0 6.2 6.0 6.0
SI : 0.9 1.8 2.2 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.0
EU-13 : 2.2 0.0 0.2 0.7 2.0 2.3 2.5
BG – 2.7 4.9 3.1 5.7 5.9 6.8 5.3 5.4
CZ 5.8 2.4 1.4 4.1 3.5 3.2 2.5 2.9
DK – 0.9 3.9 1.4 3.3 6.1 5.8 4.9 4.8
EE 6.9 3.6 6.2 4.8 4.5 6.9 6.2 6.0
CY : 1.1 – 2.3 – 0.6 0.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
LV 0.2 0.2 1.1 2.7 3.9 4.9 4.7 5.0
LT 3.2 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.2 4.0 4.2
HU : 2.5 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 3.2 – 3.7 – 2.0 – 0.7
MT : – 2.3 – 2.1 – 1.8 – 1.6 – 0.8 0.5 0.8
PL – 0.5 – 0.1 – 1.7 – 1.7 – 0.4 0.5 1.3 1.3
RO : 5.8 3.7 3.3 3.3 2.4 2.1 2.4
SK 6.9 1.2 0.3 0.3 1.0 – 0.4 0.1 0.3
SE – 3.1 6.6 1.9 3.5 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.8
UK – 2.8 3.1 – 1.0 – 0.9 – 1.0 – 0.3 0.1 0.4
EU-27 : 2.5 – 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.7 2.0 2.2
Source: Commission services.437
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.12
Gross fixed capital formation; general government — ESA 1995
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
        1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.7
DE 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5
IE 2.3 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.3
EL 3.2 4.0 4.2 4.2 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.5
ES 3.7 3.2 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.9 3.6 3.7
FR 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4
IT 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4
LU 3.8 3.8 4.6 4.3 4.7 4.1 3.9 3.8
NL 3.2 3.1 3.6 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.2
AT 3.0 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
PT 3.5 3.8 3.1 3.1 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.2
FI 2.7 2.5 2.9 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7
SI : 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.0
EU-13 : 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6
BG 0.8 3.7 2.5 2.7 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.5
CZ 5.3 3.6 4.5 4.9 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.3
DK 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.5
EE 4.9 3.8 4.2 3.1 3.2 3.6 3.8 4.0
CY : 2.9 3.4 4.0 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.3
LV 1.9 1.3 2.4 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.8 4.2
LT 3.3 2.4 3.0 3.4 3.5 4.2 5.1 6.0
HU : 3.2 3.5 3.5 4.0 4.5 3.6 3.3
MT : 4.2 5.1 2.1 5.3 4.6 5.2 4.0
PL 3.3 2.4 3.3 3.4 3.4 4.1 4.6 4.7
RO : 1.9 3.2 3.0 3.8 2.9 3.8 4.1
SK 2.3 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2
SE 3.9 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.2
UK 2.0 1.2 1.6 1.7 0.6 1.8 2.0 2.3
EU-27 : 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.7
Source: Commission services.438
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.13
Total expenditure; general government — ESA 1995 
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 51.9 49.1 51.1 49.3 52.3 49.2 48.7 48.5
DE 48.3 45.1 48.5 47.1 46.8 45.7 44.3 43.7
IE 41.0 31.6 33.5 34.0 34.4 34.1 35.2 35.5
EL 51.0 51.2 49.5 49.8 47.3 46.1 45.5 45.3
ES 44.4 39.0 38.2 38.8 38.2 38.5 38.3 38.5
FR 54.5 51.6 53.3 53.2 53.7 53.5 53.2 52.7
IT 52.5 46.2 48.3 47.7 48.3 50.1 48.1 48.3
LU 39.7 37.6 42.0 43.2 42.8 40.4 39.0 38.0
NL 51.6 44.2 47.1 46.3 45.5 46.7 47.0 46.3
AT 56.0 51.4 51.1 50.3 49.9 49.2 48.4 48.1
PT 42.8 43.1 45.5 46.4 47.5 46.1 45.8 45.5
FI 61.6 48.3 50.0 50.2 50.5 48.6 47.8 47.4
SI : 48.1 48.0 47.4 47.0 46.3 45.4 44.4
EU-13 : 46.3 48.2 47.6 47.6 47.4 46.5 46.2
BG : : 40.9 39.3 39.5 36.6 37.3 37.6
CZ 54.5 41.8 47.3 44.4 44.0 42.5 43.0 42.7
DK 59.2 53.6 55.1 54.8 52.6 50.9 50.3 49.7
EE 42.4 36.5 35.3 34.2 33.2 33.2 32.4 32.4
CY : 37.0 45.1 42.9 43.6 43.9 44.0 43.9
LV 38.8 37.3 34.8 35.8 35.5 37.0 37.3 36.4
LT 35.7 39.1 33.2 33.4 33.6 33.6 34.8 36.0
HU : 46.5 49.1 48.9 50.0 53.0 50.9 49.0
MT : 41.0 48.6 46.8 46.0 45.2 44.3 43.4
PL 47.7 41.1 44.6 42.6 43.4 43.3 42.4 41.4
RO : 40.6 33.6 32.6 33.7 32.0 33.6 34.2
SK 47.0 51.7 40.0 37.7 38.1 37.3 36.0 35.6
SE 67.1 57.1 58.2 56.8 56.5 55.4 53.0 52.5
UK 44.3 36.8 42.4 42.7 43.7 44.1 44.2 44.3
EU-27 : : 47.4 46.9 47.0 46.8 46.0 45.7
Source: Commission services.439
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.14
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–); general government — ESA 1995 
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE – 4.4 0.1 0.0 – 0.1 – 2.4 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.3
DE – 3.2 1.3 – 4.0 – 3.7 – 3.2 – 1.7 – 0.6 – 0.3
IE – 2.0 4.6 0.4 1.4 1.0 2.9 1.5 0.9
EL – 10.2 – 4.1 – 6.3 – 7.8 – 5.7 – 2.9 – 2.5 – 2.8
ES – 6.5 – 0.9 0.0 – 0.2 1.1 1.8 1.4 1.2
FR – 5.5 – 1.5 – 4.1 – 3.6 – 3.0 – 2.6 – 2.4 – 2.0
IT – 7.4 – 0.9 – 3.5 – 3.5 – 4.4 – 4.5 – 2.1 – 2.2
LU 2.4 6.0 0.4 – 1.2 – 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6
NL – 4.3 2.0 – 3.1 – 1.8 – 0.3 0.5 – 0.7 0.0
AT – 5.7 – 1.6 – 1.8 – 1.3 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 0.9
PT – 5.2 – 3.0 – 2.9 – 3.3 – 6.0 – 3.9 – 3.5 – 3.2
FI – 6.2 6.9 2.3 2.1 2.5 3.8 3.6 3.5
SI : – 3.8 – 2.8 – 2.3 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.5 – 1.5
EU-13 : 0.0 – 3.1 – 2.8 – 2.5 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 0.8
BG – 3.4 – 0.5 – 0.9 2.2 1.9 3.3 2.0 2.0
CZ – 13.4 – 3.7 – 6.6 – 2.9 – 3.5 – 2.9 – 3.7 – 3.3
DK – 2.9 2.3 – 0.1 1.9 4.6 4.2 3.5 3.4
EE 0.4 – 0.2 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.8 3.7 3.5
CY : – 2.3 – 6.3 – 4.1 – 2.3 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.4
LV – 2.0 – 2.8 – 1.6 – 1.0 – 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1
LT – 1.6 – 3.2 – 1.3 – 1.5 – 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 1.0
HU : – 3.0 – 7.2 – 6.4 – 7.8 – 9.2 – 6.8 – 4.9
MT : – 6.2 – 10.0 – 4.9 – 3.1 – 2.6 – 2.1 – 1.6
PL – 4.4 – 3.0 – 6.3 – 5.7 – 4.3 – 3.9 – 3.4 – 3.3
RO : 3.2 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 1.4 – 1.9 – 3.2 – 3.2
SK – 1.8 – 11.8 – 2.7 – 2.4 – 2.8 – 3.4 – 2.9 – 2.8
SE – 7.4 3.8 – 1.1 0.6 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.4
UK – 5.7 4.0 – 3.2 – 3.2 – 3.1 – 2.8 – 2.6 – 2.4
EU-27 : 0.7 – 3.1 – 2.8 – 2.4 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 1.1
Source: Commission services.440
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N
N
EXTable A.4.15
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) excluding interest; general government — ESA 1995 
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 4.5 6.7 5.4 4.7 2.0 4.3 3.8 3.5
DE 0.3 4.5 – 1.1 – 0.9 – 0.5 1.1 2.2 2.5
IE 3.3 6.6 1.6 2.6 2.0 3.9 2.5 1.9
EL 2.6 4.0 – 0.7 – 2.5 – 0.6 2.0 2.0 1.5
ES – 1.4 2.4 2.3 1.9 2.9 3.4 3.0 2.7
FR – 2.0 1.4 – 1.3 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.5
IT 4.2 5.5 1.6 1.3 0.3 0.1 2.7 2.5
LU 2.8 6.3 0.6 – 1.1 – 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8
NL 1.3 5.6 – 0.6 0.7 2.1 2.9 1.5 2.1
AT – 1.8 2.0 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.7
PT 0.7 0.1 – 0.2 – 0.7 – 3.4 – 1.1 – 0.6 – 0.2
FI – 2.2 9.7 4.2 3.8 4.2 5.3 5.1 4.9
SI : – 1.4 – 0.7 – 0.5 0.2 0.2 – 0.1 – 0.1
EU-13 : 3.9 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.3 1.9 2.0
BG 10.7 3.6 1.3 4.0 3.4 4.6 3.1 3.0
CZ – 12.4 – 2.9 – 5.5 – 1.7 – 2.4 – 1.8 – 2.5 – 2.0
DK 3.0 5.9 2.7 4.5 6.7 5.9 5.0 4.7
EE 0.5 0.0 2.3 2.5 2.5 3.9 3.8 3.6
CY : 1.0 – 2.9 – 0.8 1.1 1.7 1.7 1.7
LV – 1.1 – 1.8 – 0.9 – 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.4
LT – 1.2 – 1.5 0.0 – 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 – 0.3
HU : 2.4 – 3.2 – 2.1 – 3.7 – 5.3 – 2.7 – 1.0
MT : – 2.5 – 6.5 – 1.2 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.8
PL 1.3 0.0 – 3.3 – 2.9 – 1.5 – 1.5 – 0.9 – 0.7
RO : 7.6 0.1 – 0.1 – 0.3 – 1.1 – 2.5 – 2.5
SK 0.6 – 7.8 – 0.2 – 0.2 – 1.3 – 2.0 – 1.5 – 1.5
SE – 0.9 8.0 1.2 2.4 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.1
UK – 2.1 6.7 – 1.2 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 0.7 – 0.6 – 0.2
EU-27 : 4.4 – 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.4 1.6
Source: Commission services.441
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EXTable A.4.16
General government consolidated gross debt — Excessive deficit procedure (based on ESA 1995) 
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 129.7 107.7 98.6 94.3 93.2 89.1 85.6 82.6
DE 55.6 59.7 63.9 65.7 67.9 67.9 65.4 63.6
IE 81.1 37.8 31.2 29.7 27.4 24.9 23.0 21.7
EL 108.7 111.6 107.8 108.5 107.5 104.6 100.9 97.6
ES 62.7 59.2 48.8 46.2 43.2 39.9 37.0 34.6
FR 55.1 56.7 62.4 64.3 66.2 63.9 62.9 61.9
IT 121.2 109.1 104.3 103.8 106.2 106.8 105.0 103.1
LU 7.4 6.4 6.3 6.6 6.1 6.8 6.7 6.0
NL 76.1 53.8 52.0 52.6 52.7 48.7 47.7 45.9
AT 67.9 65.5 64.6 63.9 63.5 62.2 60.6 59.2
PT 61.0 50.4 56.8 58.2 63.6 64.7 65.4 65.8
FI 56.7 43.8 44.3 44.1 41.4 39.1 37.0 35.2
SI : 27.6 28.6 28.9 28.4 27.8 27.5 27.2
EU-13 : 69.2 69.2 69.7 70.5 69.0 66.9 65.0
BG : 73.6 45.9 37.9 29.2 22.8 20.9 19.0
CZ 14.6 18.5 30.1 30.7 30.4 30.4 30.6 30.9
DK 72.5 51.7 45.8 44.0 36.3 30.2 25.0 20.0
EE 8.8 5.2 5.7 5.2 4.4 4.1 2.7 2.3
CY : 58.8 69.1 70.3 69.2 65.3 61.5 54.8
LV : 12.3 14.4 14.5 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.7
LT 11.9 23.7 21.2 19.4 18.6 18.2 18.6 19.9
HU : 54.2 58.0 59.4 61.7 66.0 67.1 68.1
MT : 56.0 70.4 73.9 72.4 66.5 65.9 64.3
PL : 35.9 47.1 45.7 47.1 47.8 48.4 49.1
RO : 23.9 21.5 18.8 15.8 12.4 12.8 13.1
SK 22.0 50.2 42.4 41.5 34.5 30.7 29.7 29.4
SE 73.0 52.3 53.5 52.4 52.2 46.9 42.1 37.7
UK 51.0 41.2 38.8 40.3 42.2 43.5 44.0 44.5
EU-27 : 61.8 61.8 62.2 62.9 61.7 59.9 58.4
Source: Commission services.442
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EXTable A.4.17
Cyclically adjusted total revenue of general government — Adjustment based on potential GDP — ESA 1995
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 48.0 48.2 51.5 49.1 50.4 49.5 48.8 48.5
DE 45.1 45.9 45.1 44.0 44.3 44.1 43.6 43.1
IE 40.5 34.2 33.3 35.4 35.6 37.1 36.9 37.0
EL 41.8 47.6 43.0 41.3 41.0 42.5 42.4 41.8
ES 39.1 37.3 38.1 38.8 39.8 40.7 40.1 40.2
FR 49.6 49.1 49.2 49.5 51.0 51.4 51.1 51.2
IT 45.2 44.4 44.9 44.4 44.8 46.3 46.5 46.6
LU 43.0 41.6 43.3 43.0 43.8 40.9 39.6 38.8
NL 47.8 44.9 44.6 45.1 45.9 47.6 46.5 46.3
AT 50.7 48.9 50.0 49.5 48.7 48.0 47.2 46.8
PT 38.5 39.0 43.0 43.6 42.3 43.1 43.0 42.8
FI 56.8 54.0 53.1 52.8 53.7 52.2 51.2 50.9
SI : 43.9 46.0 45.6 45.9 44.8 43.7 42.7
EU-13 : 45.5 45.4 45.1 45.7 46.1 45.7 45.5
BG : : 40.0 40.9 40.8 39.4 39.0 39.4
CZ : 38.7 41.8 42.5 40.8 39.4 39.0 39.2
DK 56.4 54.6 55.8 57.4 57.5 55.0 53.7 53.3
EE 44.9 36.8 37.6 37.0 35.5 36.5 36.0 36.2
CY : 34.0 39.0 39.1 41.7 42.8 42.9 42.8
LV 38.6 34.9 33.4 35.0 35.3 37.0 37.3 36.8
LT 35.8 36.8 31.4 31.4 32.7 33.0 34.3 35.0
HU : 43.7 42.3 42.4 42.0 43.3 44.0 44.3
MT : 33.3 39.4 43.2 43.9 43.2 42.4 41.9
PL 44.1 37.8 38.8 36.8 39.2 39.3 38.8 38.1
RO : 47.0 33.0 30.9 32.5 29.9 30.1 30.9
SK : 40.6 38.0 36.0 35.9 34.0 32.6 32.3
SE 60.5 60.0 58.0 57.7 58.7 57.4 54.9 54.5
UK 38.8 40.2 39.2 39.3 40.7 41.5 41.7 42.1
EU-27 : : 44.6 44.3 45.0 45.3 44.9 44.8
Source: Commission services.443
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EXTable A.4.18
Cyclically adjusted total expenditure of general government — Adjustment based on potential GDP — 
Excessive deficit procedure 
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 51.9 49.2 51.0 49.2 52.1 49.1 48.6 48.4
DE 48.3 45.3 48.3 46.9 46.6 45.7 44.4 43.8
IE 40.9 31.8 33.6 34.1 34.4 34.0 35.1 35.4
EL 51.0 51.1 49.4 49.9 47.1 45.8 45.5 45.3
ES 44.3 39.1 38.2 38.7 38.2 38.4 38.2 38.5
FR 54.4 51.7 53.3 53.2 53.6 53.4 53.1 52.7
IT 52.5 46.2 48.3 47.7 48.1 50.0 48.1 48.3
LU 39.7 37.6 42.0 43.1 42.8 40.4 39.0 38.0
NL 51.3 44.6 46.8 46.0 45.1 46.5 46.9 46.2
AT 55.9 51.3 50.9 50.2 49.8 49.1 48.3 48.0
PT 42.7 43.2 45.4 46.3 47.4 46.1 45.8 45.4
FI 61.2 48.6 49.7 49.9 50.1 48.5 47.7 47.3
SI : 48.2 47.9 47.4 47.0 46.3 45.5 44.4
EU-13 : 46.4 48.1 47.5 47.5 47.3 46.5 46.2
BG : : 40.9 39.3 39.5 36.6 37.3 37.6
CZ : 41.8 47.3 44.4 44.0 42.5 43.1 43.0
DK 59.2 53.8 54.8 54.5 52.5 51.0 50.1 49.5
EE 42.3 36.4 35.3 34.2 33.2 33.2 32.5 32.4
CY : 37.0 45.1 42.9 43.6 43.9 44.0 43.9
LV 38.7 37.3 34.8 35.7 35.4 37.0 37.3 36.4
LT 35.7 39.1 33.2 33.4 33.6 33.6 34.8 36.0
HU : 46.5 49.1 48.9 50.0 52.9 50.9 49.0
MT : 41.1 48.6 46.8 46.0 45.2 44.3 43.4
PL 47.6 41.1 44.6 42.6 43.3 43.3 42.4 41.4
RO : 48.3 33.5 32.6 33.7 32.0 33.6 34.2
SK : 51.6 39.9 37.6 38.0 37.3 36.0 35.6
SE 67.0 57.2 57.8 56.5 56.2 55.3 53.1 52.6
UK 44.3 36.8 42.4 42.7 43.7 44.1 44.2 44.3
EU-27 : : 47.3 46.8 46.8 46.7 46.0 45.7
Source: Commission services.444
A
N
N
EXTable A.4.19
Cyclically adjusted net lending (+) or net borrowing (–) of general government — Adjustment based on 
potential GDP — Excessive deficit procedure 
(% of GDP at market prices (excessive deficit procedure))
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE – 3.9 – 0.9 0.5 – 0.1 – 1.7 0.5 0.1 0.1
DE – 3.2 0.6 – 3.2 – 2.9 – 2.3 – 1.5 – 0.8 – 0.7
IE – 0.4 2.4 – 0.2 1.3 1.1 3.0 1.8 1.6
EL – 9.2 – 3.5 – 6.4 – 8.6 – 6.1 – 3.3 – 3.1 – 3.4
ES – 5.1 – 1.8 – 0.1 0.1 1.6 2.3 1.8 1.7
FR – 4.8 – 2.6 – 4.1 – 3.7 – 2.6 – 2.0 – 2.0 – 1.5
IT – 7.4 – 1.8 – 3.4 – 3.2 – 3.4 – 3.8 – 1.6 – 1.8
LU 3.3 3.9 1.3 – 0.1 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.8
NL – 3.5 0.2 – 2.2 – 1.0 0.7 1.1 – 0.4 0.1
AT – 5.3 – 2.5 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 1.1 – 1.0 – 1.1 – 1.2
PT – 4.2 – 4.2 – 2.4 – 2.7 – 5.1 – 2.9 – 2.7 – 2.6
FI – 4.4 5.4 3.4 3.0 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.6
SI : – 4.3 – 2.0 – 1.8 – 1.1 – 1.5 – 1.7 – 1.7
EU-13 : – 1.0 – 2.7 – 2.4 – 1.8 – 1.2 – 0.8 – 0.7
BG : – 1.4 – 0.9 1.6 1.3 2.8 1.6 1.8
CZ : – 3.1 – 5.5 – 1.9 – 3.1 – 3.1 – 4.1 – 3.8
DK – 2.8 0.7 1.0 2.9 5.0 4.0 3.6 3.8
EE 2.5 0.4 2.4 2.8 2.4 3.3 3.5 3.8
CY : – 3.0 – 6.1 – 3.8 – 1.9 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.1
LV – 0.1 – 2.4 – 1.3 – 0.7 – 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4
LT 0.1 – 2.3 – 1.8 – 2.0 – 0.9 – 0.6 – 0.6 – 1.0
HU : – 2.8 – 6.9 – 6.5 – 8.0 – 9.6 – 6.9 – 4.7
MT : – 7.8 – 9.2 – 3.6 – 2.2 – 2.0 – 1.9 – 1.6
PL – 3.5 – 3.3 – 5.7 – 5.8 – 4.2 – 4.0 – 3.6 – 3.3
RO : – 1.3 – 0.6 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 2.2 – 3.5 – 3.3
SK : – 11.1 – 1.9 – 1.7 – 2.1 – 3.3 – 3.4 – 3.3
SE – 6.5 2.7 0.2 1.2 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.9
UK – 5.5 3.4 – 3.2 – 3.4 – 2.9 – 2.6 – 2.5 – 2.1
EU-27 : – 0.2 – 2.7 – 2.5 – 1.8 – 1.4 – 1.1 – 0.9
Source: Commission services.445
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EXTable A.5.1
Gross domestic product at current prices
(Billion EUR)
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 217.4 251.7 274.7 289.5 298.5 313.2 327.6 341.3
DE 1 929.4 2 062.5 2 161.5 2 207.2 2 241.0 2 307.2 2 407.0 2 484.6
IE 51.3 104.6 138.9 147.6 161.2 175.8 190.1 202.9
EL 89.9 125.9 155.5 168.4 181.1 195.3 208.8 223.9
ES 456.5 630.3 782.5 840.1 905.5 976.2 1 044.0 1 111.3
FR 1 201.1 1 441.4 1 594.8 1 659.0 1 710.0 1 778.1 1 856.7 1 933.9
IT 861.1 1 191.1 1 335.4 1 390.5 1 423.0 1 475.4 1 534.2 1 595.7
LU 15.8 22.0 25.6 27.0 29.4 33.1 36.3 39.4
NL 320.5 418.0 476.9 489.9 505.6 527.9 551.9 578.2
AT 183.2 210.4 226.2 235.8 245.1 256.4 268.7 280.1
PT 87.0 122.3 138.6 144.3 149.0 155.3 162.4 169.7
FI 99.9 132.3 145.9 152.3 157.2 167.9 176.1 183.8
SI 15.5 20.8 24.9 26.2 27.6 29.7 31.9 34.1
EU-13 5 528.7 6 733.1 7 481.5 7 777.9 8 034.3 8 391.4 8 795.7 9 179.0
BG 10.0 13.7 17.8 19.9 21.9 25.1 27.7 30.6
CZ 42.3 61.5 80.9 87.2 99.7 113.1 122.3 132.0
DK 139.1 173.6 188.5 196.2 208.3 219.5 231.5 242.7
EE 3.0 6.1 8.5 9.4 11.1 13.1 15.4 17.7
CY 7.1 10.1 11.8 12.7 13.6 14.5 15.3 16.2
LV 3.8 8.5 10.0 11.2 13.0 16.2 19.5 22.9
LT 5.0 12.4 16.5 18.1 20.6 23.7 26.8 29.8
HU 35.1 52.0 74.7 82.3 88.8 89.2 103.5 110.5
MT 2.8 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.9 5.2 5.4
PL 106.4 185.8 191.4 204.0 243.8 269.7 296.3 321.5
RO 27.1 40.3 52.6 60.8 79.6 97.1 119.8 138.2
SK 15.1 22.1 29.2 33.9 38.1 43.9 54.5 59.8
SE 191.6 262.6 269.5 281.1 287.7 306.7 325.8 342.5
UK 868.4 1 564.0 1 604.5 1 733.6 1 792.9 1 892.2 2 011.0 2 101.5
EU-27 6 985.4 9 150.0 10 041.7 10 532.6 10 957.9 11 520.5 12 170.2 12 750.4
Source: Commission services.446
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EXTable A.5.2
Gross domestic product at constant prices
(Annual % change)
           1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 2.4 3.7 1.0 3.0 1.1 3.1 2.3 2.2
DE 1.9 3.2 – 0.2 1.2 0.9 2.7 2.5 2.4
IE 9.8 10.2 4.3 4.3 5.5 6.0 5.0 4.0
EL 2.1 4.5 4.8 4.7 3.7 4.3 3.7 3.7
ES 2.8 5.0 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.9 3.7 3.4
FR 2.2 4.0 1.1 2.3 1.2 2.0 2.4 2.3
IT 2.8 3.6 0.0 1.2 0.1 1.9 1.9 1.7
LU 1.4 8.4 1.3 3.6 4.0 6.2 5.0 4.7
NL 3.0 3.9 0.3 2.0 1.5 2.9 2.8 2.6
AT 1.9 3.4 1.1 2.4 2.0 3.1 2.9 2.5
PT 4.3 3.9 – 0.7 1.3 0.5 1.3 1.8 2.0
FI 3.9 5.0 1.8 3.7 2.9 5.5 3.1 2.7
SI 4.1 4.1 2.7 4.4 4.0 5.2 4.3 4.0
EU-13 2.4 3.9 0.8 2.0 1.4 2.7 2.6 2.5
BG 2.9 5.4 5.0 6.6 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.2
CZ 5.9 3.6 3.6 4.2 6.1 6.1 4.9 4.9
DK 3.1 3.5 0.4 2.1 3.1 3.2 2.3 2.0
EE 4.5 7.9 7.1 8.1 10.5 11.4 8.7 8.2
CY 9.9 5.0 1.8 4.2 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.9
LV – 0.9 6.9 7.2 8.7 10.6 11.9 9.6 7.9
LT 3.3 4.1 10.3 7.3 7.6 7.5 7.3 6.3
HU 1.5 5.2 4.1 4.9 4.2 3.9 2.4 2.6
MT 6.2 6.4 – 2.3 0.4 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.8
PL 7.0 4.2 3.8 5.3 3.5 5.8 6.1 5.5
RO 7.1 2.1 5.2 8.5 4.1 7.7 6.7 6.3
SK 5.8 0.7 4.2 5.4 6.0 8.3 8.5 6.5
SE 3.9 4.3 1.7 4.1 2.9 4.4 3.8 3.3
UK 2.9 3.8 2.7 3.3 1.9 2.8 2.8 2.5
EU-27 2.6 3.9 1.3 2.5 1.7 3.0 2.9 2.7
Source: Commission services.447
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EXTable A.5.3
Potential gross domestic product at constant prices
(Annual % change)
   1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.3 2.3
DE 2.1 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.8
IE 7.4 8.1 6.1 5.8 6.0 6.1 5.5 4.8
EL 2.2 3.9 4.1 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.7
ES 2.7 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.6
FR 1.9 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3
IT 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.7
LU 4.5 4.9 4.5 4.1 4.3 4.3 4.6 4.7
NL 2.8 3.0 2.0 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.3
AT 2.2 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.2 2.2
PT 2.7 2.8 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5
FI 1.9 3.9 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1
SI : 4.4 3.8 3.8 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0
EU-13 : 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3
BG : 1.1 5.0 5.5 6.2 6.2 6.4 6.6
CZ : 1.8 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.6 4.8 4.9
DK 2.3 2.3 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.5
EE : 5.7 7.9 8.6 8.9 9.5 9.8 9.9
CY : 3.3 3.8 4.4 4.4 3.5 3.6 3.7
LV : 6.1 7.7 8.7 9.7 10.2 10.2 10.0
LT : 4.0 7.0 7.7 7.9 7.6 8.1 7.0
HU : 4.4 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.4 3.2 3.1
MT : 3.7 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.1
PL : 3.3 3.0 3.6 4.3 5.2 5.9 6.1
RO : 2.1 4.1 4.8 5.4 6.1 6.7 7.1
SK : 2.4 4.5 5.1 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.4
SE 2.2 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.0
UK 2.5 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.6
EU-27 : 2.5 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.6
Source: Commission services.448
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EXTable A.5.4
Gap between actual and potential gross domestic product at constant prices
(% of potential GDP)
        1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
BE – 0.8 2.0 – 0.8 0.1 – 1.0 – 0.5 – 0.5 – 0.6
DE – 0.1 1.4 – 1.6 – 1.5 – 1.8 – 0.3 0.4 0.9
IE – 3.4 5.7 1.6 0.1 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.9 – 1.6
EL – 2.4 – 1.3 0.6 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.6
ES – 3.2 2.2 0.1 – 0.6 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 1.0 – 1.3
FR – 1.3 2.4 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.8 – 1.0 – 0.9 – 0.9
IT – 0.1 1.9 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 0.9
LU – 2.0 4.6 – 1.8 – 2.2 – 2.5 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.4
NL – 1.4 3.2 – 1.7 – 1.5 – 1.8 – 1.0 – 0.4 – 0.1
AT – 0.9 2.2 – 1.6 – 1.2 – 1.1 – 0.2 0.5 0.8
PT – 2.6 3.1 – 1.1 – 1.3 – 2.1 – 2.1 – 1.7 – 1.2
FI – 3.2 3.1 – 1.7 – 1.3 – 1.6 0.4 0.3 – 0.1
SI : 1.1 – 1.7 – 1.2 – 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.4
EU-13 : 2.0 – 0.7 – 0.7 – 1.3 – 0.8 – 0.4 – 0.2
BG 10.6 1.8 0.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.3
CZ : – 1.8 – 2.9 – 2.8 – 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.5
DK – 0.1 2.6 – 1.6 – 1.3 – 0.5 0.3 0.1 – 0.4
EE – 6.0 – 2.1 – 1.0 – 1.5 – 0.1 1.7 0.7 – 0.9
CY 0.9 2.1 – 0.5 – 0.7 – 1.2 – 1.0 – 0.8 – 0.6
LV – 5.6 – 1.3 – 1.0 – 1.0 – 0.2 1.4 0.8 – 1.2
LT – 6.1 – 3.2 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.3 0.6 – 0.1
HU 1.6 – 0.3 – 0.7 0.1 0.5 1.0 0.2 – 0.4
MT – 1.4 5.5 – 2.1 – 3.4 – 2.5 – 1.5 – 0.6 0.1
PL – 2.2 0.7 – 1.3 0.3 – 0.4 0.1 0.4 – 0.2
RO 4.7 – 7.6 – 2.7 0.7 – 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.2
SK : – 2.4 – 2.8 – 2.5 – 2.4 – 0.4 1.7 1.8
SE – 1.8 1.9 – 1.8 – 0.7 – 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.8
UK – 0.5 1.3 0.0 0.5 – 0.3 – 0.4 – 0.4 – 0.5
EU-27 : 1.7 – 0.7 – 0.5 – 1.1 – 0.6 – 0.3 – 0.3
Source: Commission services.449
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